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A Complete Tolerant Algebraic Side-Channel Attack for AES with CP

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Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 11008))

Abstract

Tolerant Algebraic Side-Channel Attack (TASCA) is a combination of algebraic and side-channel analysis with error tolerance. Oren et al., used mathematical programming to implement TASCA over a round-limited version of AES. In [7], Liu et al. revisited their results and introduced a TASCA-CP model that delivers solutions to this 1-round relaxation with orders of magnitude improvement in both solving time and memory consumption.

This paper extends the result and considers TASCA for the full 10-rounds AES algorithm. Two approaches are introduced: staged and integrated. The staged approach uses TASCA-CP as a spring board to enumerate and check its candidate solutions against the requirements of subsequent rounds. The integrated model formulates all the rounds of AES together with side-channel constraints on all rounds within a single unified optimization model. Empirical results shows both approaches are suitable to find the correct key of AES while the integrated model dominates the staged both in simplicity and solving time.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Recall that E is the set of all error variables.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science and Engineering Department, School of Engineering, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, 06269-4155, USA

    Fanghui Liu, Waldemar Cruz & Laurent Michel

Authors
  1. Fanghui Liu
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  2. Waldemar Cruz
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  3. Laurent Michel
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Laurent Michel .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

    John Hooker

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Liu, F., Cruz, W., Michel, L. (2018). A Complete Tolerant Algebraic Side-Channel Attack for AES with CP. In: Hooker, J. (eds) Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming. CP 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11008. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98334-9_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98334-9_18

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-98333-2

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