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Examining Schellenberg's Hiddenness Argument

Part of the book series: Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion ((PFPR))

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Abstract

In this chapter, three general characteristics of Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument arediscussed, namely that it is anti-theistic, deductive, and evidentialistic. Moreover, Weidner introduces and discusses the relevance of the terms propositional hiddenness, experiential hiddenness, experiential evidence, and propositional evidence. The bulk of the chapter consists of a much-needed exposition of the details of the hiddenness argument and its premises. That is, Weidner explicates Schellenberg’s concepts of divine relational-personal love and God’s openness for relationship (premises 1 and 2), belief and non-belief that God exists as well as the role of experiential evidence, i.e., religious experience (premise 4), and four different types of nonresistant nonbelievers (premise 6).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Schellenberg, “Replies to my colleagues,” 264.

  2. 2.

    See his Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), The Wisdom to Doubt, as well as The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). In 2013 and 2015, two further books by Schellenberg mentioned above were published which are addressed at a relatively wide audience (i.e., its readers need not to be philosophically educated in order to easily understand the main lines of thoughts which are introduced), namely his Evolutionary Religion and The Hiddenness Argument.

  3. 3.

    See, as already mentioned, Daniel Howard-Snyder, ed. “Critical Essays on J. L. Schellenberg’s Philosophy of Religion,” Special Issue, Religious Studies 49, no. 2 (2013).

  4. 4.

    See Schellenberg, “The hiddenness argument revisited (I),” 201–215, and “The hiddenness argument revisited (II),” 287–303.

  5. 5.

    See Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 34. At least, these are the words Schellenberg puts into the mouth of ‘S,’ ‘C’s’ dialogue partner. The latter (‘C’) represents some putative Christian theist, whereas the former (‘S’) is obviously defending Schellenberg’s own views. As Luke Teeninga rightly indicated to me, my calling the hiddenness argument ‘anti-theistic’ might be misleading. Hence, I wish to clarify that with this term I am not referring to the contemporary discussion in analytic philosophy of religion on protheism and antitheism, i.e., about whether or not God’s existence would be a good thing.

  6. 6.

    Actually, his way of defining the God of theism is quite common among some analytics, whether in this way or in a similar way. I am well aware that the concept’s simplicity or its straightforwardness might irritate some continental philosophers or theologians.

  7. 7.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 10. The divine attribute ‘all-powerful’ and the expression ‘omnipotent’ are used synonymously in this survey as it is common in the debate. Likewise, God’s property to be ‘all-knowing’ is tantamount to God’s being ‘omniscient.’

  8. 8.

    I owe thanks to Thomas Schärtl-Trendel for stressing this point toward me. To be sure, a so-called classical theist highlighting, for example, God’s simplicity, God’s immutability, or also the utter unrecognisability of God’s nature will not be unduly irritated by Schellenberg’s argument against the existence of such a personally conceived God of theism . However, the underlying task to be done here may consist in identifying as many ways as possible in which classical theism contrasts with personal theism, and in which respects the former can be said to be more traditional than the latter. From Schellenberg’s point of view, of course, any transcendent reality which could rightly be called ‘God’ by theists would have the features Schellenberg himself specifies, as Luke Teeninga correctly remarked in his comments. Hence, Schellenberg claims, in effect, that the view of God endorsed by classical theism is not typically theistic.

  9. 9.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 17. More specifically, Schellenberg suggests here that “researchers in philosophy should accept that ultimism filled out personalistically (that is to say, theistically) is false because of the case that can be made for the soundness of a hiddenness argument, and move on to consider other ways in which ultimism may be true” (p. 31). For a brief definition of the term ultimism, see the end of this Subsection 3.1.1 Anti-Theistic .

  10. 10.

    I am alluding here to the so-called Four Horsemen of the Non-Apocalypse, i.e., Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens. To be fair, concerning my judgement about the intellectual depth of their claims, or rather the carefulness by which they utter their remarks, it may be noted that only Dennett is an educated philosopher. This is not to say that, in my view, the intellectual level of a comment is guaranteed by the fact that the person giving that comment is a philosopher. Yet, I assume that, regarding a philosopher’s view, it is generally more likely to expect not only that she has presumably thought about the matter quite thoroughly for a little while, but also that words expressing her thoughts are chosen rather carefully. The latter is not always guaranteed to be found in the utterings of some of the New Atheists.

  11. 11.

    Schellenberg, Evolutionary Religion, 3. See also his earlier book The Will to Imagine, which, in contrast to the former, is addressed to a more philosophically educated audience.

  12. 12.

    See, e.g., Schellenberg, Evolutionary Religion, 56. “Reason requires us to be religious skeptics,” as Schellenberg programmatically states on the introduction’s very first page in his The Wisdom to Doubt (p. 1). For a detailed account and defense of his religious skepticism, see his earlier Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion (esp. pp. 95–105). According to Schellenberg, there are four types of religious skepticism. Or rather, a religious skeptic is defined this way. “S is in doubt and⁄or withholds judgement with respect to (i) this or that particular religious proposition or limited set of religious propositions (common skepticism), or (ii) the proposition that there is an ultimate and salvific reality (categorical skepticism), or (iii) the proposition … that human beings are capable of discovering at least some basic truths concerning such a reality (capacity skepticism), or (iv) both (ii) and (iii) together (complete skepticism)” (Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 105).

  13. 13.

    According to Schellenberg, religious “skeptics are uncertain or in doubt ” (Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 95) in relation to religious claims. In other words, a ‘religious skeptic’ lacks any religious belief and lacks any ‘religious disbelief,’ i.e., she lacks belief that any religious claim is true, and she also lacks belief that any religious claim is false. A ‘religious disbeliever,’ in turn, who is also labelled by Schellenberg as a ‘irreligious believer’ (see Schellenberg, Evolutionary Religion, 58), is defined as someone who not only lacks belief that any religious claim is true, but who actually has belief that a certain religious claim is false (see Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 88–91). Both religious disbelief and ‘religious skepticism’ are, in Schellenberg’s view, two particular types of the more general phenomenon of ‘religious nonbelief’ which is broadly defined as the lack of belief that any religious claim is true.

  14. 14.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 5.

  15. 15.

    As mentioned above, Schellenberg states that there are at least two particular types of religious nonbelief, i.e., religious skepticism and religious disbelief. Accordingly, there is also a more specific variety of religious nonbelief, namely what might be called ‘theistic nonbelief’ in relation to the religious claim that theism is true. More exactly, there is theistic nonbelief in relation to the religious claim that the God of theism exists. That is, theistic nonbelief is defined as the lack of belief that the religious claim that the God of theism exists is true or as the lack of belief that the God of theism exists. Likewise, there are at least two particular types of theistic nonbelief, i.e., what may be labelled as ‘theistic skepticism’ and as ‘theistic disbelief.’ A ‘theistic skeptic’ lacks belief that the God of theism exists, and she also lacks belief that the God of theism does not exist. A ‘theistic disbeliever,’ on the other hand, not only lacks belief that the God of theism exists, but also actually believes that the God of theism does not exist (see Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 58–59, or also The Hiddenness Argument, 75). In the following, the notion of nonbelief, or rather, more exactly, the notion of nonresistant nonbelief refers, unless stated otherwise, only to theistic nonbelief thus understood, i.e., the involuntary lack of belief that the God of theism exists.

  16. 16.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 218.

  17. 17.

    See Schellenberg’s The Will to Imagine. For what follows, see Evolutionary Religion, esp. 94–99 (and for a brief summary of the latter, see Veronika Weidner, “Evolutionary Religion, by J. L. Schellenberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013),” Faith and Philosophy 32, no. 3 (2015): 350–354).

  18. 18.

    In the following, I use the terms ‘epistemic justification,’ ‘rationality,’ and ‘warrant,’ as Swinburne suggests (see his Faith and Reason, 43), as well as ‘reasonableness ’ synonymously. Given the epistemic context of this discussion, I, furthermore, abbreviate ‘epistemic justification’ and being ‘epistemically justified’ with ‘justification’ and being ‘justified.’ For the opposite view that the terms rationality and justification differ regarding their meaning, and thus need to be distinguished, see Robert Audi, “Faith , Belief, and Rationality,” Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 220–221.

  19. 19.

    In fact, his The Will to Imagine constitutes a detailed account of the reasons why someone who has a beliefless sort of faith that such a transcendent reality exists may be justified in having that faith.

  20. 20.

    Schellenberg explicitly contrasts his concept of ultimate reality with John Hick’s earlier mentioned apophaticism concerning ‘the Real’ or, more rarely, what Hick also calls ‘the Ultimate’ which is in principal not knowable. Compared with this, Schellenberg states that “the concept of ultimacy I am working with … is not to be taken as the concept of something forever beyond our grasp” (Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 29).

  21. 21.

    For Schellenberg’s first mention of the term ultimism and its two specifications, i.e., ‘general’ and ‘elaborated’ ultimism, see Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 37–38.

  22. 22.

    Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 95. See also his paper “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 17.

  23. 23.

    Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 123.

  24. 24.

    Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 21.

  25. 25.

    Without entering the debate about what the term naturalism means precisely, I here understand it as broadly signifying ontological naturalism, i.e., the view that there is no supernatural reality or deity.

  26. 26.

    Schellenberg, The Will to Imagine, 15.

  27. 27.

    See, exemplarily, Schellenberg, “The hiddenness argument revisited (I),” 212, his “Divine Hiddenness,” 510, or The Hiddenness Argument, 3, 104, 113.

  28. 28.

    The German equivalent adjective is ‘gültig.’ I wish to note that I am ignoring the aspect of non-circularity in order to avoid needless complication here.

  29. 29.

    Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 4.

  30. 30.

    In the German-speaking world, such an argument is often referred to as being ‘schlüssig’ or ‘stichhaltig.’

  31. 31.

    For an explicit statement from Schellenberg regarding the alleged soundness of his argument, see his Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 84, “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals, or How Weak Theistic Evidence is Strong Atheistic Proof,” or “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 31.

  32. 32.

    For Schellenberg’s own comment on this, see “The hiddenness argument revisited (I),” 204. See also his “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 23.

  33. 33.

    More accurately, one premise, i.e., premise (6), constitutes not a necessary truth but an “evident empirical fact” (Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 25; see also p. 23).

  34. 34.

    By the notion possible world I do not refer to any cosmological claim about another so-called parallel universe in a given multiverse. Rather, I allude to the semantics common in analytic philosophy regarding the modal status of a given proposition p. Claiming that p is (a) necessarily true, (b) contingently true, or (c) impossibly true, is to say that p is, ad (a), true in every possible world, i.e., not logically possible to be false, ad (b), false in at least one possible world, i.e., logically possible to be either true or false, or, ad (c), false in every possible world, i.e., not logically possible to be true.

  35. 35.

    In fact, as I show later on, the empirical claim and the second epistemic claim are in the background of premise (6) in Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument, whereas all three epistemic claims play a significant role in establishing premise (4).

  36. 36.

    For the following, see Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 2, 39–40, 48. First of all, Schellenberg establishes the term weak evidence simply as the negation of ‘strong evidence,’ i.e., not strong evidence. Thus, strong evidence, in turn, is the negation of weak evidence, i.e., not weak evidence. Accordingly, Schellenberg states that a weak epistemic situation is the negation of a ‘strong epistemic situation .’ Furthermore, a strong epistemic situation in relation to God’s existence obtains if strong evidence for God’s existence is “generally and at all times available” to those who do not resist God (p. 48). That is, if a weak epistemic situation in relation to God’s existence obtains, then it is not the case that strong evidence for God’s existence is always available to everyone who is not resisting God. Thus, if a weak epistemic situation in relation to God’s existence obtains, then only weak evidence for God’s existence is available to at least one individual, even though this individual is not resisting God.

  37. 37.

    I will again omit the temporal tag ‘at t,’ but once again it will be implicit, and may refer to a time in the past or the present time (see Chapter 1 Introduction, fn. 4).

  38. 38.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 4. I suppose that in Schellenberg’s writings the term obvious in relation to talk about God’s existence is tantamount to the word ‘evident.’

  39. 39.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 36.

  40. 40.

    Schellenberg, “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals, or How Weak Theistic Evidence is Strong Atheistic Proof.” (This title of his first contribution in the aforementioned Internet debate with Jeff Jordan also speaks for itself.) See, similarly, Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 218.

  41. 41.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 1.

  42. 42.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 33. In later days, Schellenberg states this. “I construe evidence fairly broadly – as anything supporting the truth or falsity of a proposition or blocking such support” (see his Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 218, fn. 10). This definition is almost word by word repeated in his The Wisdom to Doubt, 15. There, Schellenberg clarifies that the notion of evidence which is ‘blocking such support’ means that such evidence prevents some other evidence to effectively support the truth or falsity of p, i.e., it serves as an undercutting defeater. For a further qualification regarding two different kinds of evidence distinguished by Schellenberg, see the beginning of Subsection 3.1.5.1 Experiential Evidence (ee).

  43. 43.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 33, fn. 29.

  44. 44.

    See Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 51.

  45. 45.

    That is, one might specify that the evidence in question is subjectively probabilifying evidence and hence subjectively sufficient evidence. I owe thanks to Christoph Jäger for his comments on this point. In the following, this subjective perspective is implicitly included in the talk about someone’s evidence.

  46. 46.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 35–38. To be exact, he illustrates his evidence -based stance toward the process of S’s forming, sustaining, or losing belief that the particular proposition ‘The theistic God exists’ is true here. However, as the next quote shows, he holds this view in general in relation to S’s forming, sustaining, or losing belief that any p is true.

  47. 47.

    Schellenberg, “The Sounds of Silence Stilled.” (In the original, no letters are set in italics, and I have quoted this definition exactly as it is put there.)

  48. 48.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 34.

  49. 49.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 35–38.

  50. 50.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 71.

  51. 51.

    See Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 16–17.

  52. 52.

    I am well aware that the epistemic notion of ‘self-deception’ is highly controversial and rather ambiguous. Here, when I use this notion I intend to underline that S is not reasonable in having bG, because (i) S has no sufficient evidence supporting G, or S has sufficient evidence supporting ¬G, and (ii) S is consciously aware of (i) and its inevitable effect on her bG which she is in danger to lose, but S also has a desire not to lose bG, and thus S deludes herself that she may have sufficient evidence for G, or S suppresses that she has sufficient evidence for ¬G, instead of facing the fact that she actually lacks sufficient evidence for G or possesses sufficient evidence for ¬G.

  53. 53.

    Interestingly, Jeff Jordan differentiates between six kinds of evidentialism attributing ‘epistemic evidentialism’ and, more specifically, ‘absolute evidentialism’ to Schellenberg. According to epistemic evidentialism, it is reasonable to believe that p is true “only if it is supported by adequate evidence ” (Jeff Jordan, Pascal’s Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 42). An ‘absolute evidentialist’ additionally claims that “S ought to believe that p at t if the evidence supports S’s believing p at t; and S ought not to believe that p if the evidence does not support S’s believing p at t” (p. 45). Furthermore, according to Jordan’s definition of ‘absolute evidentialism,’ if S lacks sufficient evidence supporting her belief that p is true, then S should cease to believe that p is true. That is, in terms of justification, if S lacks sufficient evidence supporting her belief that p is true, then it is reasonable for S to cease to believe that p is true, or rather it is unreasonable for S to continue to believe that p is true. Furthermore, if S has equally balanced evidence which supports not only her belief that p but also someone else’s belief that ¬p, then S should neither believe nor disbelieve that p (this is the ‘agnostic imperative’). That is, in this case it is reasonable for S to be agnostic in relation to p, or rather it is unreasonable for S not to be agnostic in relation to p (see pp. 42–45, 201–202). Also, I agree with Jordan in not attributing to Schellenberg a view in the vicinity of William Clifford which might be called, as Jordan proposes, ‘ethical evidentialism’ (pp. 42–43). According to Clifford, a society building its beliefs on insufficient evidences would be in danger of falling back into barbarity, and thus beliefs which are only insufficiently supported by the evidences are to be avoided for ethical reasons. As Clifford famously stated, “if the belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence, the pleasure is a stolen one. Not only does it deceive ourselves by giving us a sense of power which we do not really possess, but it is sinful, because it is stolen in defiance of our duty to mankind. That duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from a pestilence, which may shortly master our own body and then spread to the rest of the town. … To sum up; it is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon insufficent evidence” (William K. Clifford, The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays, intro. Timothy J. Madigan (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1999), 75–76, 77). As I see it, Schellenberg neither explicitly nor implicitly endorses this evidentialistic view which is based on ethical considerations.

  54. 54.

    For more explanatory details and textual references to Schellenberg’s writings on this point, see in this survey Subsections 3.1.5.1 Experiential Evidence (ee) and 3.2.3.3 Subpremise (**4).

  55. 55.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 33.

  56. 56.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 53.

  57. 57.

    See, e.g., Schellenberg, “Preface to the Paperback Edition,” vii–ix.

  58. 58.

    See the already mentioned e-book God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence, ed. Paul Draper (2007–2008), http://infidels.org/library/modern/debates/great-debate.html.

  59. 59.

    See Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 23, 36–38.

  60. 60.

    Additionally, as indicated above, in relation to experiential evidence Schellenberg states that S is justified to sustain bG only if S’s experiential evidence is universal and uniformly described.

  61. 61.

    See Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 37.

  62. 62.

    See Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 38.

  63. 63.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 34.

  64. 64.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 35.

  65. 65.

    One might, in attempting to develop such a second strand of hiddenness-argument, also refer to the occurrence of irreconcilably diverse religious experiences around the world. However, such hiddenness-arguments based on the occurrence of eh non-literally understood would need to be sharply distinguished from the literally-taken experiential hiddenness of God a theistic believer might complain about, when she is pointing to the apparent lack of no longer feeling God’s presence in her life. For as a theist she affirms that there is a God, and she may have even experienced the presence of God before (see in this survey Subsection 2.1.1 Missing His Presence—Hiddenness I). In the next sentence and hereafter, when using the term phenomenological I do not make a reference to the philosophy of phenomenology by Edmund Husserl or, for example, Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

  66. 66.

    See Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 34. In another paper, which was published eight years later, Schellenberg confirms his claim that dhn “is equivalent to a fairly large disjunction of claims, each of whose disjuncts is available to hiddenness arguers” (see J. L. Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil,” Faith and Philosophy 27, no. 1 (2010): 47, fn. 1).

  67. 67.

    See Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 34. Furthermore, in conversation John Schellenberg confirmed that both types of dhn (i.e., eh and ph) are instances of ‘subjective hiddenness.’ In one publication for the Blackwell Companion on the Philosophy of Religion, Schellenberg introduces the topic of divine hiddenness by asserting that there are two different ways in which the non-literal use of the term hiddenness of God apparently is used in the contemporary analytic debate. Namely, dhn either refers to what he calls subjective hiddenness or ‘objective hiddenness.’ The former refers to the claim “that many individuals or groups of people feel uncertain about the existence of God, or else never mentally engage the idea of God at all,” whereas the latter designates “that the available relevant evidence makes the existence of God uncertain.” His own argument, which, as indicated above, mainly concentrates on ph, is classified as focusing on subjective hiddenness. Except from noting that “there are various possible connections between these two, and both may consistently be affirmed,” no further account of these terms is given there (all these direct quotations are to be found in Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness,” 509). However, in commenting on a draft of this book, Schellenberg clarified to me that subjective hiddenness alludes to the fact that the evidence for G available to some S is, in S’s own subjective point of view, not sufficient to form or hold bG. That is, for some S there is no subjectively sufficient evidence supporting G (see in this chapter also fn. 45). Hence, a response to the hiddenness argument in the wake of natural theology alluding to the objectively sufficient evidence for G, i.e., evidence for G which is principally available to every S and which in every S’s point of view (i.e., in a what might be called objective point of view) should be sufficient to form or sustain bG, will constitute no thread to the argument. For there is, as Schellenberg might assert, at least one S for whom, without fault on her own, this objectively sufficient evidence for G does not constitute subjectively sufficient evidence for G. This may be, for example, due to S’s lack of intellectual capacities or time to reflect on, for example, objectively sufficient pe for G in form of a sound argument for God’s existence. In what follows, the occurrence of dhn is thus understood as the occurrence of subjective hiddenness. Yet, I would like to add that in Schellenberg’s later publications on the topic this terminological distinction between subjective and objective hiddenness does not appear. Neither is it adopted by his colleagues in their introductory portrayals of the argument in any study text books or encyclopedia entries, nor is it received by those scholars who are actually engaged in the debate arguing for a certain position in respect to the hiddenness argument. Formulations such as “I defend subjective hiddenness” or “X objects objective hiddenness” may be searched but hardly found. For example, Schellenberg labels the approach of Paul Draper as dealing with objective hiddenness (see Paul Draper, “Seeking but Not Believing: Confessions of a Practicing Agnostic,” in Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, eds. Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 197–214, esp. 198) and as reading something into Schellenberg’s writings which he did not intend to express. In turn, Schellenberg ascribes this interpretation to Draper as if it originated in him, but not in himself (see Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness,” 511), but the latter does not take it up.

  68. 68.

    In the following, I make use of this abbreviation. Likewise, I occasionally refer to the theologumenon of divine hiddenness literally understood with the acronym ‘dh.’

  69. 69.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 33.

  70. 70.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 33.

  71. 71.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 34.

  72. 72.

    In writing that ee ‘may’ constitute such a basis for S’s having bG, I take into consideration Schellenberg’s idea of ‘resistance ’ which I discuss later. In short, if S is resistant toward personally relating to God, then S does not have bG, even though sufficient ee is available to S.

  73. 73.

    That is, ee must be adequate and probabilifying as well as universal and uniformly described.

  74. 74.

    The notion of S’s having bG includes S’s forming or sustaining bG. According to Thomas Schärtl-Trendel’s comments on an earlier draft, my wording of ‘direct ground’ is highly ambivalent and does not fit in well with the framework of evidentialism. Unfortunately, since I am currently lacking an alternative notion, I have to stick with this one for the moment.

  75. 75.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 35.

  76. 76.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 71.

  77. 77.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 71.

  78. 78.

    In my formulation that pe ‘might’ constitute a ground for S’s having bG Schellenberg’s idea of resistance mentioned later is again taken into consideration. In short, if S is resistant toward personally relating to God, then S does not have bG, even though S has sufficient pe.

  79. 79.

    That is, sufficient pe is adequate and probabilifying propositional evidence . Since Schellenberg’s focus in discussing ph is not on the ability of pe to prevent ph from obtaining and the lack of pe, he gives no comment on what further features pe must exhibit in order for S to be able to and justified in forming or sustaining bG.

  80. 80.

    Likewise, as in relation to the definition of the role of ee regarding bG, the notion of S’s having bG due to sufficient pe, which I am using here, concerns S’s forming or sustaining bG.

  81. 81.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 71.

  82. 82.

    Both direct quotations are to be found in Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 71.

  83. 83.

    The notion that S ‘possibly’ lacks bG if S has no sufficient ee takes into consideration that if, however, sufficient pe is available to S, then pe may serve as a ground for S’s having bG, given that S is not resisting to personally relate to God (see ‘The role of sufficient pe regarding bG’).

  84. 84.

    In terms of predicate logic, this would be [(Ǝs) ((¬EEs) → (¬BGs)) → ((¬EEs) → (PHs))].

  85. 85.

    I say that S ‘possibly’ lacks bG due to the unavailability of sufficient pe to S, since it might be the case that S, nevertheless, has sufficient ee which, in the absence of resistance , may serve as a ground for S to have bG (see ‘The role of sufficient ee regarding bG’).

  86. 86.

    Put in the formula of predicate logic, it is [(Ǝs) ((¬PEs) → (¬BGs)) → ((¬PEs) → (PHs))].

  87. 87.

    I have left out the possible notion of resistance which Schellenberg may want to introduce here.

  88. 88.

    Likewise, in predicate logic this amounts to: (Ǝs) ((¬EEs) → (EHs)), and (Ǝs) ((¬EEs) ˄ (EHs)).

  89. 89.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 34–35, 38.

  90. 90.

    Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism,” 31.

  91. 91.

    See Schellenberg’s defense of premise (4) in his hiddenness argument (or rather, see in this survey Subsection 3.2.3 No Nonresistant Nonbelief to Be Expected—Premise (4)).

  92. 92.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 48.

  93. 93.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 48, fn. 3.

  94. 94.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 48.

  95. 95.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 48.

  96. 96.

    This might, for example, be the case when S learns about and is convinced by the premises and reasoning of an argument for God’s existence.

  97. 97.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 48.

  98. 98.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 48. The ‘it’ in this quote refers to the relationship between S and God.

  99. 99.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 73.

  100. 100.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 57, fn. 19. It might be observed that Schellenberg is referring to human persons as the recipients of ee, although nowadays Schellenberg prefers, instead, to express these thoughts regarding any ‘finite persons as there may be,’ as I soon discuss.

  101. 101.

    Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness,” 514. See also John L. Schellenberg, “Evil, Hiddenness, and Atheism,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Problem of Evil, eds. Paul K. Moser and Chad Meister (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 108–123.

  102. 102.

    In earlier days, Schellenberg stated that the problem of divine hiddenness is a special instance of a certain evidential or what he calls an ‘empirical’ version of the problem of evil (see Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 6–9).

  103. 103.

    Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil,” 47.

  104. 104.

    One may also put it this way. The premises of an inductive argument are, in contrast to those of a deductive argument, held not to preserve or to necessitate but to at least support the truth of its conclusion. Regarding evidential versions of an argument from evil , they usually emphasise certain features of the evil state of affairs in question. For example, the high amount of evil in the actual world, or the horrific degree of suffering that is involved in the occurrence of that evil state of affairs, is claimed to be very unlikely to obtain if God exists.

  105. 105.

    See Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil,” 47–48. For more details on these four types of nonresistant nonbelief, see in this survey Subsections 3.2.5.1 Four Types of Nonresistant Nonbelievers and 3.2.5.2 Four Types of Hiddenness Arguments.

  106. 106.

    Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil,” 50. See also Schellenberg, “The hiddenness argument revisited (I),” 210.

  107. 107.

    One might, e.g., think of a former believer who suffered from anguished doubt , then lost his treasured bG, and has, since then, been desperately but unsuccessfully trying to regain bG. The occurrence of this type of nonresistant nonbelief presumably implies some sort of pain or suffering. Also, any kind of weaker form of suffering such as distress which might accompany doubt about whether or not G is true does not necessarily accompany all occurrences of nonresistant nonbelief but rather one particular type of nonbelief, namely doubt or skepticism (see Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness,” 512).

  108. 108.

    Schellenberg, “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals, or How Weak Theistic Evidence is Strong Atheistic Proof.”

  109. 109.

    See also Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness,” 513.

  110. 110.

    Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil,” 52.

  111. 111.

    Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil,” 52.

  112. 112.

    See Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil,” 54–55.

  113. 113.

    See Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil,” 56–57.

  114. 114.

    Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil,” 56. See also Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness,” 513–514.

  115. 115.

    Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil,” 57. See also very similarly Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness,” 514.

  116. 116.

    See Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 291–296. To be precise, the cumulative case against theism includes not only the various forms of hiddenness arguments, which are based either (a) on the general occurrence of nonresistant theistic nonbelief in general or (b) on the occurrence of one of its more specific types, such as, e.g., former believers or isolated nontheists, but also the different versions of the ‘argument from horrors’ (see pp. 243–269). Moreover, Schellenberg adds to the cumulative anti-theistic case what he calls his ‘free-will offense.’ This latter strand of argument views the assumption that humans have libertarian free will as evidence against God’s existence (see pp. 270–290).

  117. 117.

    Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil,” 60.

  118. 118.

    According to this rule of inference, which I refer to in an abbreviated way as ‘HS’ henceforth, the following holds: (1) p → q, (2) q → r, and (3) ∴ p → r.

  119. 119.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 24–25.

  120. 120.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 24.

  121. 121.

    For Schellenberg’s own emphasis on this point, see “Preface to the Paperback Edition,” viii.

  122. 122.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 23.

  123. 123.

    See, e.g., Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 10.

  124. 124.

    See, e.g., Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 10–11, his “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 41, or “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 17.

  125. 125.

    See Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 17.

  126. 126.

    Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 90 (for his defense of this claim, see pp. 89–95).

  127. 127.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 17, fn. 7.

  128. 128.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 10.

  129. 129.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 18.

  130. 130.

    For a defense of this claim, see, e.g., Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 95–102.

  131. 131.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 41.

  132. 132.

    See Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 41.

  133. 133.

    Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 95, 96.

  134. 134.

    See Schellenberg, “The hiddenness argument revisited (I),” 201. Here, Schellenberg states “that there is little evidence of any inclination among philosophers to question the argument’s claim that perfect love is an essential property of God.” However, according to Schellenberg many of his colleagues have not spelled out the notion of perfect love the way he understands it, as I indicate soon.

  135. 135.

    See Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 20.

  136. 136.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 28.

  137. 137.

    As Schellenberg remarks, “a philosopher must remain open to the possibility that if God would create persons at all, these would be persons very different from those that actually exist” (Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 20, fn. 12).

  138. 138.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 26.

  139. 139.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 26. I may add that Schellenberg presents a philosophical argument of a certain kind, namely not a theistic but an anti-theistic one. But he presumably thinks that only a theological argument presupposes that there is a God who created human persons, whereas a philosophical argument is characterised by not smuggling in any metaphysical assumptions of this kind. I doubt that the latter is the case.

  140. 140.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 23.

  141. 141.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 24–25.

  142. 142.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 199.

  143. 143.

    See Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 18.

  144. 144.

    See Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 20. Also, God’s seeking to be personally related to a finite person would involve this: “Seeking presumably would here include both desiring and valuing but could operate subtly and without strong promotion” (p. 20).

  145. 145.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 18.

  146. 146.

    See on this point also Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 23.

  147. 147.

    See Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 41, or, similarly, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 18, 22. See also his “The hiddenness argument revisited (I),” 202–203.

  148. 148.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 45.

  149. 149.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 18.

  150. 150.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 202, or, similarly, see “Preface to the Paperback Edition,” viii.

  151. 151.

    In fact, Schellenberg points out that this oversight might also be quite common in academic philosophy. According to Schellenberg, “when philosophers speak of love , they usually mean just what falls under the narrower virtue notion of ‘benevolence.’ Few of them seem to know what to do with the idea that love might involve more than benevolence, which can operate safely from a distance. And yet it is precisely this ‘more’—those softer, relationship-centered properties which hardnosed analytical philosophers can find uncomfortable …—that I have … used to frame the hiddenness argument” (Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil,” 55).

  152. 152.

    See Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 18.

  153. 153.

    See, e.g., Schellenberg, “Divine Hiddenness,” 509, “Preface to the Paperback Edition,” x, or “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 18.

  154. 154.

    Schellenberg, “Preface to the Paperback Edition,” x.

  155. 155.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 196.

  156. 156.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 196.

  157. 157.

    See Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 196.

  158. 158.

    In his first publication on the subject, Schellenberg states that “we may suppose that God seeks to be personally related to all …, for all may, at some time or other, be given some degree of capacity for such relationship. But to avoid the possibility of objection, let us say that God, if perfectly loving, seeks to be personally related to those … who at some time evince some capacity for such relationship” (Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 25). As Schellenberg clarified to me, the objection he has in mind here is that a theist may response to his argument by claiming that God may create finite persons who are never capable of personal relationship with God, because they are not able to form the belief that an transcendent personal being exists. But Schellenberg mentions that if there should be a person who “for whatever reason, environmental or genetic, seems at some time utterly incapable of personal relationship with God, we cannot rule out the possibility that God … will at some future point … provide him with the capacities” (pp. 24–25) which are needed to be able to personally relate to God. This implies, on Schellenberg’s own account, that God is always open for a personal relationship with all finite persons, may they be capable of a personal relationship with God or not. For if they are not capable to be personally related to God, then the reason why they become capable to be personally related to God is precisely because of God’s continuous openness to be in a personal relationship with all finite persons which results in God’s providing them with the capacities needed, as Schellenberg claims.

  159. 159.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 24.

  160. 160.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 21, fn. 15.

  161. 161.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 49, or “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 50.

  162. 162.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 24.

  163. 163.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 24, fn. 16.

  164. 164.

    As may be noted, in Schellenberg’s presentation of the argument of 2015, any capable finite person ‘S’ is not in italics. But I italicise it for the sake of uniformity in my survey. Moreover, in the beginning of Chapter 2 I introduced the notion of S as a finite human person living in the actual world (at some time). Schellenberg’s notion of S as any finite person as there may be is broader but at least includes human persons. Hereafter, I broaden my former notion of S in accordance with Schellenberg as standing for any finite person, whether she is living in the actual world or not. Moreover, my description of S did not explicitly include the notion of S’s capability for personal relationship with God. In the following, I thus narrow my former description of S in this regard and adopt Schellenberg’s wording, so that henceforth S only designates such finite persons who are capable to personally relate to God.

  165. 165.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 18.

  166. 166.

    Schellenberg, “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals, or How Weak Theistic Evidence is Strong Atheistic Proof.”

  167. 167.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 30.

  168. 168.

    Schellenberg, “The Sounds of Silence Stilled.”

  169. 169.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 18.

  170. 170.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 30.

  171. 171.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 23.

  172. 172.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 28.

  173. 173.

    Again, as in the case of his concept of God’s perfect love which Schellenberg derives from what he regards as the best love among human persons, apparently the implicit idea in the background of conceptualising a personal relationship between God and S is what Schellenberg conceives of as a personal relationship between two human persons.

  174. 174.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 42.

  175. 175.

    For the following, see, e.g., Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 18, 21–22, or “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 41.

  176. 176.

    See, e.g., Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 17.

  177. 177.

    See Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 18, 26. However, as Schellenberg repeatedly highlights, exhibiting perfect benevolence is necessary yet not sufficient for God to be perfectly loving.

  178. 178.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 18.

  179. 179.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 25–26.

  180. 180.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 19.

  181. 181.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 18.

  182. 182.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 19.

  183. 183.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 20.

  184. 184.

    Obviously, this is a claim which would need substantial clarification and argumentative support. Yet, at present it is not my task to develop such an argument on my own, but rather to reconstruct a charitable account of Schellenberg’s argument. I do so by way of supplementing it with further thoughts which he may be implicitly entertaining without explicitly expressing them.

  185. 185.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 20. For the textual basis of the following, see ibid., pp. 20–21.

  186. 186.

    My notion that S ‘finds herself experiencing’ to be always loved by God tries to accommodate Schellenberg’s assertion that the experience of being always loved by God is not something which can be so-to-speak made in terms of being intentionally willed and caused by S, but is rather something which S recognises as somehow happening to her (see Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 20).

  187. 187.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 44.

  188. 188.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 20.

  189. 189.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 21.

  190. 190.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 21.

  191. 191.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 21.

  192. 192.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 21.

  193. 193.

    The notion of the ‘profoundness’ of the desire to be related to God is an addition made by me. Otherwise, speaking just about one desire amongst others would not emphasise the overall importance of the relationship between S and God which Schellenberg presumably wants to point out here.

  194. 194.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 21.

  195. 195.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 21.

  196. 196.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 21.

  197. 197.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 19.

  198. 198.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 19.

  199. 199.

    See Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 19.

  200. 200.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 19. Unfortunately, Schellenberg does not explicate the terms ‘express’ as well as ‘in a positively meaningful way’ any further.

  201. 201.

    I cannot hold back here my slight critique that it seems odd to me that S’s behavioral dispositions to personally relate to God are intrinsically valuable to God if S acts on them, i.e., freely chooses to personally relate to God. Rather, it seems to be the case that, according to Schellenberg, these behavioral dispositions of S are instrumentally valuable to God insofar as they are a means by which a good can be attained, namely S’s personally relating to God. But claiming that S’s main dispositions (which are characteristic to S) are intrinsically valuable to God, while also claiming that S’s behavioral dispositions (which are correlated to S’s main dispositions) are only instrumentally valuable to God, seems to me to be clearly incoherent. I have the same objection regarding, ad (iii), the instrumental rather than intrinsic value of God’s dispositions to personally relate to S.

  202. 202.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 19.

  203. 203.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 25.

  204. 204.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 25.

  205. 205.

    Schellenberg, “Preface to the Paperback Edition,” viii.

  206. 206.

    For Schellenberg’s own formulation of such a subargument, see Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 28, 38, or The Wisdom to Doubt, 204–206. For an articulation of Schellenberg’s subargument by other authors, see, e.g., Howard-Snyder, “Hiddenness of God,” 353, Howard-Snyder, and Green, “Hiddenness of God,” or also Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Divine openness and creaturely nonresistant nonbelief,” in Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives, eds. Adam Green and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 127–128.

  207. 207.

    Both direct quotations are to be found in Schellenberg, “Preface to the Paperback Edition,” ix.

  208. 208.

    Schellenberg, “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals, or How Weak Theistic Evidence is Strong Atheistic Proof.”

  209. 209.

    Schellenberg, “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals, or How Weak Theistic Evidence is Strong Atheistic Proof.”

  210. 210.

    Schellenberg, “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals, or How Weak Theistic Evidence is Strong Atheistic Proof.”

  211. 211.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 28.

  212. 212.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 204.

  213. 213.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 209.

  214. 214.

    Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 54.

  215. 215.

    See Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 200, fn. 8. There, Schellenberg briefly defines libertarian (or incompatabilist) freedom of will this way. “An action’s being a result of the exercise of free will in this sense is incompatible with its being determined by prior conditions outside the agent’s control.” As a matter of fact, Schellenberg assumes that human persons actually have libertarian free will (see Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 10, or also The Wisdom to Doubt, 270, fn. 1). Upon closer inspection, however, things get slightly complicated, since, as already mentioned, according to Schellenberg’s more recent free-will-offense the apparent fact that human persons have libertarian free will is itself evidence against God’s existence (see The Wisdom to Doubt, 270–290).

  216. 216.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 27.

  217. 217.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 44.

  218. 218.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 201.

  219. 219.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 27.

  220. 220.

    See also Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 204.

  221. 221.

    Schellenberg, “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals, or How Weak Theistic Evidence is Strong Atheistic Proof.”

  222. 222.

    See Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 55–56.

  223. 223.

    Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 54.

  224. 224.

    Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 55. For mentioning the light-metaphor in an earlier text, see Schellenberg, “The hiddenness argument revisited (I),” 203.

  225. 225.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 27–28.

  226. 226.

    See Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 202. Also, in his “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals, or How Weak Theistic Evidence is Strong Atheistic Proof,” Schellenberg defines resistance as opposition to “relationship with God or any of the apparent implications of such a relationship.” Yet, given the overall importance of the notion of resistance in the defense of his hiddenness argument, one might wonder why Schellenberg’s account of resistance itself seems to be rather underdetermined, and the question of what the object of resistance might be is also not clearly formulated. That is, Schellenberg uses different formulations regarding what a finite person might be resistant toward without unambiguously differentiating between them. For example, a resistant finite person might likewise be someone who is “opposing belief in God” (The Wisdom to Doubt, 201), or “opposing the evidence that God provides” (Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 38).

  227. 227.

    See Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 55.

  228. 228.

    I assume that Schellenberg uses the rather artificial term of S’s ‘nonresistance’ deliberately insofar as it points to the required negation, or rather absence, of any resistance . But Schellenberg is not saying that S needs, on the other hand, to be ‘open’ for a personal relationship with God in order to be able to personally relate to God. In other words, S’s nonresistance is not necessarily tantamount with an alleged openness of S for a personal relationship with God. That is, Schellenberg is not claiming that S’s nonresistance must amount to (1)* a desire of S to personally relate to God and (2)* actions and omissions supporting this desire of S to personally relate to God. Rather, one might say that Schellenberg actually presents a fairly weak necessary condition which needs to be met in order for S to be in a position to personally relate to God.

  229. 229.

    See, e.g., Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 2, 30–31, or “The hiddenness argument revisited (I),” 207.

  230. 230.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 30. To be precise, Schellenberg states in the cited passage that this premise amounts to the claim that “a personal relationship with God entails belief in Divine existence.” Yet, what he means and explicates later, as I demonstrate soon, is that having bG is necessary for S to be able to personally relate to God, and thus to allow someone to be in a personal relationship with God. In my later discussion of his argument, I challenge Schellenberg’s claim that this premise is as uncontroversial as he takes it to be.

  231. 231.

    What Schellenberg does not allude to is if S’s having bG is also a sufficient condition for the obtaining of a personal relationship between S and God. Or rather, it remains unclear if it is additionally necessary that God believes that S exists in order to allow for a personal relationship between S and God to obtain. More generally, whether or not the omniscient God of theism has, according to Schellenberg, propositional knowledge in form of propositional beliefs which are justified and true is not explicitly mentioned by Schellenberg.

  232. 232.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 229. Schellenberg makes this comment in the context of describing a certain type of nonresistant nonbeliever, namely ‘former believers.’ Yet, this notion about S’s loosing bG resulting, inter alia, in the end of S’s being in a personal relationship with God illustrates well the consequence, or rather the other side, of Schellenberg’s general claim regarding the necessary connection of S’s having bG and S’s being in a position to personally relate to God.

  233. 233.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 41.

  234. 234.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 2.

  235. 235.

    See Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 59–60, or “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 24.

  236. 236.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 23.

  237. 237.

    This might be even worse than in the case of (for example) some S1 who is an obsessed Jon Bon Jovi fan living in Norway and has never met the rockstar, but who considers herself, for whatever reason, to be in a personal relationship with Bon Jovi. Even though S1 believes that Bon Jovi exists, S1 is nevertheless deceiving herself about being in a personal relationship with this other finite person .

  238. 238.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 30.

  239. 239.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 25.

  240. 240.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 43.

  241. 241.

    See Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 40–50, 65–67.

  242. 242.

    Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 41.

  243. 243.

    Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 41, 43.

  244. 244.

    See Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 44.

  245. 245.

    Obviously, Schellenberg’s considerations on propositional belief are based on human experiences. However, these ideas are also the basis of his more specific notion of the propositional belief that God exists, which is at the center of the hiddenness argument, and the latter is more recently formulated as applying to any finite person as there may be. Thus, I take it that his ideas about propositional belief also apply to any finite person as there may be, and present his concept of belief-that this way.

  246. 246.

    Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 40.

  247. 247.

    See Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 41–42.

  248. 248.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 30. There, Schellenberg states that belief is “a disposition to ‘feel it true’” that something is the case. But since he uses the expression of thinking of or of ‘having the thought that’ in relation to a certain state of affairs or proposition in his later Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, I only employ the latter terms here.

  249. 249.

    Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 50.

  250. 250.

    Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 44.

  251. 251.

    Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 50.

  252. 252.

    It may be noted that I have substituted Schellenberg’s original wording of having the thought that or also of thinking of in relation to a state of affairs with ‘to think that’ regarding p. I do not think that Schellenberg will object to my wording in this respect.

  253. 253.

    Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 65.

  254. 254.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 9–10. For a prominent proponent of this view, see, e.g., Schellenberg’s doctoral advisor Richard Swinburne ( Faith and Reason, 24–26).

  255. 255.

    Schellenberg, Evolutionary Religion, 40.

  256. 256.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 205, fn. 12.

  257. 257.

    To be exact, in Schellenbergian terms this means that—given that S’s consciously experiencing having a propositional belief is tantamount to, (a), S’s having a certain world-thought or to, (b), S’s being disposed to having the thought that a certain state of affairs in the world obtains—it is logically impossible for S to voluntarily change, ad (a), S’s world-thought or, ad (b), S’s disposition to having the thought that a certain state of affairs obtains in the world.

  258. 258.

    Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 67.

  259. 259.

    See above Subsection 3.1.3.3 Belief That God Exists Needs Strong Theistic Evidence ….

  260. 260.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 205, fn. 12.

  261. 261.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 31. For the following, see pp. 31–32.

  262. 262.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 32.

  263. 263.

    See above Subsection 3.1.3.4 … And Is Reasonable If There Is Strong Theistic Evidence.

  264. 264.

    See Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 52.

  265. 265.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 33.

  266. 266.

    See in this survey Subsection 3.1.3.3 Belief That God Exists Needs Strong Theistic Evidence ….

  267. 267.

    For a more detailed explication of these features of the evidence which S needs in order to have bG, see the next but one paragraphs entitled (me) What Sort of Evidence Is Necessary.

  268. 268.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 34, fn. 31.

  269. 269.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 32.

  270. 270.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 45.

  271. 271.

    For this formulation, see Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 32.

  272. 272.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 32. Again, as already noted, in his earlier writings Schellenberg uses the expression of a disposition to ‘feel’ that G is true in contrast to his later wording in this context which speaks of a disposition to ‘think’ that G is true.

  273. 273.

    Schellenberg, “The Sounds of Silence Stilled.”

  274. 274.

    For the following, see Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 34–35.

  275. 275.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 35–38.

  276. 276.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 38.

  277. 277.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 51.

  278. 278.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 23.

  279. 279.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 33.

  280. 280.

    Schellenberg, “Preface to the Paperback Edition,” ix.

  281. 281.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 33.

  282. 282.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 212–213.

  283. 283.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 49.

  284. 284.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 194.

  285. 285.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 38. Maybe, this is a project which he now considers to be more worthwile pursuing regarding religious experiences with, e.g., the Ultimate.

  286. 286.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 51, fn. 7.

  287. 287.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 47. Nevertheless, it seems undeniable that his account of te is clearly inspired by (i) actual religious experiences of what is claimed to be the God of theism that human persons have reported to have had as well as (ii) the debate in the philosophy of religion about whether or not human persons are justified in having bG due to their religious experiences.

  288. 288.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 48.

  289. 289.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 49.

  290. 290.

    See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 48, 50.

  291. 291.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 49–50.

  292. 292.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 48.

  293. 293.

    For this formulation, see Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 48–49.

  294. 294.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 51, fn. 8.

  295. 295.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 51, fn. 8.

  296. 296.

    Schellenberg, “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals,” 50.

  297. 297.

    But that is not to say that an interventionistic account of the occurrence of te which involves God’s directly causing that te is available to S is in theory not sensible from Schellenberg’s point of view. That is, according to Schellenberg one might likewise claim that te occurs to S because God, who wishes that S becomes aware of his presence, intentionally acts in the course of the world. But since it is not necessary to enhance divine interventionism, as Schellenberg sees it, he sticks to a non-interventionist account of God’s rather indirectly causing that S has te (see Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 50).

  298. 298.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 50.

  299. 299.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 50. It may be noticed that Schellenberg is talking about human persons, even though, as indicated, he intends to present a possible state of affairs which is not bound to actual religious experiences by human persons in this world. Yet, these days it is likely that he would reformulate this passage regarding finite persons as there may be.

  300. 300.

    For the next paragraph, see Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 49.

  301. 301.

    See again Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 49.

  302. 302.

    Schellenberg, “The hiddenness argument revisited (I),” 205.

  303. 303.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 47. That is, according to Schellenberg events which are traditionally called miracles must not necessarily constitute or accompany te.

  304. 304.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 49.

  305. 305.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 56.

  306. 306.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 56.

  307. 307.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 52.

  308. 308.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 51.

  309. 309.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 49.

  310. 310.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 52. As one may notice, Schellenberg re-introduces through the back door an interventionist account of God’s directly causing that S has bG due to God’s providing sufficient ee to S which S actually needs to sustain bG.

  311. 311.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 56–57.

  312. 312.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 53.

  313. 313.

    Here, Schellenberg quotes from Alvin Plantinga’s influential essay “Reason and Belief in God,” in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, eds. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1983), 16–93.

  314. 314.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 53.

  315. 315.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 54.

  316. 316.

    For the first mention of both of these terms, see Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 2.

  317. 317.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 3, fn. 2.

  318. 318.

    Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 54–55.

  319. 319.

    See Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 205, fn. 11.

  320. 320.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 25.

  321. 321.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 25.

  322. 322.

    Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 58.

  323. 323.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 27.

  324. 324.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 229, 233, 236, 238. For a treatise on these four types, see ibid., 227–242. Previously, in his Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, however, Schellenberg concentrated on the occurrence of inculpable doubt as an actualised type of nonresistant nonbelief (see pp. 59–69). There, Schellenberg further differentiates between unreflective and reflective nonbelievers (see pp. 58–59). To the former group belong (a) those who are now called isolated nontheists, and, additionally, (b) those “from both Western and non-Western backgrounds … who are to some extent familiar with the idea of God, but who have never considered with any degree of seriousness whether it is instantiated” (p. 58). The latter group consists of (c) atheistic disbelievers as well as (d) agnostic doubters. “It seems clear enough that each type is inculpably exemplified, especially the first” (p. 59). Ad (d), regarding the nonbelief of those who are in doubt whether or not God exists, Schellenberg was “attempting to show that it is sometimes inculpable” (p. 59), i.e., he attempted to show that there are at least some inculpable instances of doubt.

  325. 325.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 227–228.

  326. 326.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 230.

  327. 327.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 233.

  328. 328.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 233. Apparently, Schellenberg is alluding to Mt 7:7 or Lk 11:19 (“Ask, and it will be given you; search, and you will find; knock, and the door will be opened for you.”). In the Old Testament, similar references may be found in Deut 4:29 and Jer 29:13.

  329. 329.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 237.

  330. 330.

    Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 238.

  331. 331.

    See Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 242.

  332. 332.

    Schellenberg, “Divine hiddenness and human philosophy,” 25.

  333. 333.

    Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument, 88.

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  1. Catholic Theological Faculty, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Munich, Germany

    Veronika Weidner

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Weidner, V. (2018). Its Most Recent Statement. In: Examining Schellenberg's Hiddenness Argument. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97517-7_3

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