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Analytic Narratives

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An Economist’s Guide to Economic History

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Economic History ((PEHS))

Abstract

Analytic narratives are used to understand historical phenomena where the data required to employ econometrics is lacking. This methodological approach allows for the analysis of a historical setting using economic theory or arguments combined with historical evidence that can be diverse in nature. Analytic narratives offer interesting alternatives to general formal models which may not be suited to understanding a particular case study or historical institution. A series of examples illustrate potential areas of application in economic history.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    There are of course many other examples of analytical narratives that cannot be surveyed here due to space constraints. Examples include Johnson and Koyama’s (2014) analysis of the evolution of tax farming in early modern England and France and Hoffman (2012) on the military rise of Europe. In addition to his work on pirates, Leeson has written on the conditions under which trade and cooperation can only in the absence of a formal legal system (Leeson 2014) and on the role of superstitious beliefs in supporting social order and market exchange (Leeson 2017). In medieval economic history, analytical narratives have been used to study craft guilds (Richardson 2005; Richardson and McBride 2009) and the evolution of usury laws (Rubin 2010; Koyama 2010).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

    Mark Koyama

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  1. Mark Koyama
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK

    Matthias Blum

  2. Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK

    Christopher L. Colvin

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Koyama, M. (2018). Analytic Narratives. In: Blum, M., Colvin, C. (eds) An Economist’s Guide to Economic History. Palgrave Studies in Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96568-0_43

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96568-0_43

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-96567-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-96568-0

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