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International Conference on Formal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components, and Systems

FORTE 2018: Formal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components, and Systems pp 79–100Cite as

Relating Process Languages for Security and Communication Correctness (Extended Abstract)

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 10854))

Abstract

Process calculi are expressive specification languages for concurrency. They have been very successful in two research strands: (a) the analysis of security protocols and (b) the enforcement of correct message-passing programs. Despite their shared foundations, languages and reasoning techniques for (a) and (b) have been separately developed. Here we connect two representative calculi from (a) and (b): we encode a (high-level) \(\pi \)-calculus for multiparty sessions into a (low-level) applied \(\pi \)-calculus for security protocols. We establish the correctness of our encoding, and we show how it enables the integrated analysis of security properties and communication correctness by re-using existing tools.

Work partially funded by FAP-DF 0193.001381/2017.

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their useful remarks and suggestions. Pérez is also affiliated to the NOVA Laboratory for Computer Science and Informatics (supported by FCT grant NOVA LINCS PEst/UID/CEC/04516/2013), Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, Brazil

    Daniele Nantes

  2. University of Groningen and CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Jorge A. Pérez

Authors
  1. Daniele Nantes
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  2. Jorge A. Pérez
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Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Daniele Nantes or Jorge A. Pérez .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden, Germany

    Christel Baier

  2. Departamento de Informática, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Caparica, Portugal

    Luís Caires

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Nantes, D., Pérez, J.A. (2018). Relating Process Languages for Security and Communication Correctness (Extended Abstract). In: Baier, C., Caires, L. (eds) Formal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components, and Systems. FORTE 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10854. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92612-4_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92612-4_5

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-92611-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-92612-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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