Abstract
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Sepāh-e Pāsdarān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi) was established under a decree issued by Khomeini as the Revolution’s leader on May 5, 1979, less than three months after the victory of the Iranian Revolution. The Revolutionary Guards were intended to guard the victorious revolution, consolidate the clerical regime and assist the ruling clergy in the day-to-day enforcement of the government’s Islamic codes and moral strictures. It was also impossible to dissolve a well-equipped and well-trained army, although the new regime could not trust it. The Islamization of an Americanized army that was emasculated in the first two years after the victory of the Revolution was not something accomplished quickly. In this situation, a dual military system was unavoidable. The eighth chapter of the book discusses the reasons and causes behind this duality in Iranian polity and governmental structure.
Post-revolutionary Iran is the only nation-state that has two formal military systems under one commander-in-chief—the guardian jurist—beside its militia (Basij) and the disciplinary forces. Each of these two military systems has an army, navy and air force. This chapter examines the sociological causes (from the revolutionary leaders’ and analysts’ point of view) of this dual system, the interaction between society and the military, how this dual system can survive, the relationship between the dualism in the military system and the dualism in the political system, and the consequences of this duality for social and political structures and changes. The duality is the context in which the military forces interfere in the day-to-day politics and, at the same time, restrict the legitimacy and popularity of the country’s armed forces.
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Notes
- 1.
In this period, the officers of military held the governorship of most of the provinces. They, beside the interior ministry, constituted an important element of the political elite. The Law of Conscription, passed in May 1925, facilitated the army’s access to human resources and stabilized its power in the provinces.
- 2.
In the Pahlavi era, the king was the commander-in-chief, not as a civilian, but as a member of the military personnel. In that era, “no military chief’s prestige in the army was equal to that of the Shah who was cherished by the rank and file” (Arfa 1964: 436).
- 3.
The main idea was a mass army with 20 million volunteers (almost everyone over 16 in a country that had a population of 35 million in 1979) and the name of this force was “the Army of 20 Millions”, then changed to “the Force of Resistance” or Basij .
- 4.
The same phenomenon happened when the Nazi regime came to power in Germany. In 1933, the Schutzstaffel organized a full-time armed branch called the SS-Verfügungstruppen (SS-VT). These units were placed at Hitler’s disposal, and were intended to be special purpose troops for such duties as putting down counter-revolutions and strikes, conducting purges and quelling riots. By 1939, the size of the SS-VT had been expanded to four regiments (Standarten), due to the usefulness of having combat units outside the control of the German military. These soldiers were carefully selected, and the requirements for joining were very strict. Himmler desired to have a military force that rivaled that of the German army and equipped these troops with the most modern weapons and vehicles. The Waffen-SS continued to expand their numbers, but competed for recruits with all the other military services. The strict requirements for membership decreased the pool of potential recruits even further. In an attempt to bolster their numbers, the Waffen-SS began recruiting from non-German, “nordic” peoples who lived outside the German border. This gave the Waffen-SS an advantage over the army, who were prevented by law from recruiting from conquered territories (waffen-ss.com/history).
- 5.
These are some of the main Shi’i tenets: tavallā and tabarrā as the ninth and tenth secondary tenets of Twelver Shi’ism.
- 6.
Khomeini repeatedly spoke about a possible 20 years of the Iran–Iran war (this could definitely have been phrased better) (Script of Light (Sahife ye Noor), 1999) and the necessity of the expansion of the military through mobilization.
- 7.
A militant group that is supported by the religious authoritarian leaders, especially by the leader of the Islamic Republic, and its duty has been suppressing intellectuals and dissident political activists and oppressing other ways of life that are not compatible with the clerics’ way of life. A long list of this group’s operations over a period of five years is presented in Iran, July 29, 2002.
- 8.
For the difference between national and military strategies, see Clayton 1986: 703.
- 9.
New York Times, December 31, 2001.
- 10.
- 11.
Reformists have been jailed in the Revolutionary Guards’ illegal detention centers (such as Prison No. 59 and Prison 66). Some of the political activists, students and journalists were in solitary confinement for three to nine months in this prison.
- 12.
The last happened between these forces in Shiraz, where they were fighting to take possession of disputed land between the barracks of the regular army and the Revolutionary Guards.
- 13.
This is my observation when I was a volunteer during the Iran–Iraq war . As I know, no survey has been carried out about the social stratification of the Revolutionary Guards’ members and its social structure.
- 14.
For example, the reader can look at the letter of 24 high-ranking commanders of the Revolutionary Guards to President Khatami: Kayhān , July 19, 1999.
- 15.
Iran’s population is not divided by any racial configuration.
- 16.
These are the latest official numbers of Iran’s casualties of the Iran–Iraq war :
-
Killed in battle: 172,056
-
Killed in cities by bombardments, missiles and canon shells: 15,959
-
Died later because of injuries: 30,852
-
The whole number of killed because of war: 218,867
-
Injured: 386,653 (including 48,420 that still are suffering from exposure to chemical weapons).
From the injured, the number of people who
-
are blind: 6310
-
are amputated: 30,804
-
have brain injuries: 15,800
-
have spinal cord injuries: 1919
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and are mentally ill: 22,229.
For more details, see: sharghnewspaper.com/830630/societ.htm#s112668 (accessed on September 21, 2004).
-
- 17.
Bāztāb news website, July 27, 2005.
- 18.
See the letter of the Revolutionary Guards’ 24 high-ranking officials to President Khatami , Iran, July 19, 1999.
- 19.
See the IRGC’s statement against the reformers, Iran, July 21, 2002.
- 20.
Basij of Isfahan as the mobilization force of the Revolutionary Guards wrote a letter to Isfahan’s supervisor and condemned university students’ demonstration in November 2002, asking city officials to prevent such events: Qods, January 14, 2003.
- 21.
Emrooz.com, January 23, 2003.
- 22.
Emrooz.com, January 17 & 19, 2003.
- 23.
The statement of Militants of Islamic Republic Organization condemns the Revolutionary Guards’ statement against reformers, Hayāt-e Nou, July 29, 2002.
- 24.
Ninety members of parliament questioned the defense minister, Shamkhāni, about the Revolutionary Guards’ statement of July 21, 2002, Iran, July 22, 2002. Some 151 members of parliament in a letter on August 5, 2002 warned against a series of attempts that they said would lead the country to the “downhill road to disappointment, pessimism and discontent.” It expressed disgust at the closure of 85 publications in a period of three years, a political statement issued by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, the court ruling against Mohsen Mirdāmādi, the chairman of the Majles National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, and the sentences issued on 41 members of the Freedom Movement of Iran; 84 members of parliament questioned the defense minister about the Revolutionary Guards’ statement of December 2002 against the reformers.
- 25.
Two Revolutionary Guard generals have been accused by Mazandaran province judiciary of electoral fraud. Their files were sent to Tehran for further investigation and action. Provinces do not have ability to prosecute Revolutionary Guard commanders (Baztab news site, July 27, 2005). As usual, no further action was taken.
- 26.
The Guardian Council put almost 300,000 loyal monitors, all from the authoritarian camp, in polling stations in the seventh parliamentary and ninth presidential elections, most of them members of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij .
- 27.
- 28.
IRGC has illegally possessed much preserved land for building houses for its members (Hayāt-e Nou Daily, December 1, and December 12, 2002).
- 29.
Fox News, April 19, 2000.
- 30.
Some groups do not reject the possibility of a coup by the Revolutionary Guards. The Mujāhedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (not to be confused with the Iraqi-based military group known as the Mujāhedin Khalq Organization) has been predicting a hardline coup, state-of-emergency or martial law since at least the spring of 2000. At that time, the Mujāhedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization said that the closure of the newspapers and the attempt to kill Sa’id Hajjāriān (a key member in the President’s advisory team and one of the high-ranking members of Participation Front Party) by authoritarians was a move in a hardline coup. It referred to the April 2000 IRGC warning, “if necessary, our enemies, be they small or large, will feel the reverberating impact of the hammer of the Islamic Revolution on their skulls and the impact will be so strong that they will never be able to engage in hatching plots or committing crimes” as Statement Number Zero. In their view, Statement Number One would be the announcement of a coup. The Revolutionary Guards have worried observers on other occasions. One memorable occurrence took place in 1998 when Revolutionary Guards’ chief commander Yahyā Rahim-Safavi threatened to “cut the necks and tongues” of political opponents. In July 1999, Revolutionary Guard commanders sent a letter to President Khatami in which they warned him that he was responsible for the atmosphere that had led to the riots and demonstrations, and if he did not act to contain them then the Revolutionary Guards would do so. In early 2002, the legislature expressed its anger when Revolutionary Guards’ deputy commander Mohammad Bāqer Zolqadr threatened to set the Persian Gulf ablaze, and the deputies summoned the defense minister. They also expressed their unhappiness that military officials were making political statements. After President George W. Bush’s State of the Union Address, putting Iran in the “axis of evil,” Iranian reformers were worried about the state-of-emergency and cracking down the reform movement by Khamenei and his cronies in the Revolutionary Guards. One cannot dismiss out of hand statements about cultural erosion and the need for military preparedness from the minister of defense and armed forces logistics, Ali Shamkhāni, from Safavi or from Zolqadr. The occasional threats from reformist lawmakers and from President Khatami to quit the government indicate heightened sensitivities, too. Iran is not on the brink of a civil war, even if all bills proposed by the president and passed by parliament are not ratified. The probability of the president and members of parliament resigning then calling in the Revolutionary Guards to stop the ensuing civil strife is negligible. Iranian reformers did not exit the system when Khatami’s interior and culture ministers were interpellated, about 90 newspapers and magazines were closed between 2000 and 2002, when police and paramilitary forces raided Tehran University dorms, and when more than 100 political activists, journalists and intellectuals were tried for their ideas and speeches. The “American threat,” on the other hand, may become a pretext for the Revolutionary Guards to step in and create a military junta similar to the Pakistani regime. The state of emergency in Iran has little to do with internal political jockeying; rather, it is due to the fear from American plans for invading Middle East countries and its likely impact on Iran.
- 31.
There is a difference between the Revolutionary Guards’ rank and its file with respect to political affiliation. Based on figures from the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and Culture, “a poll conducted by moderate parliament members indicated that 80% of IRGC [Revolutionary Guards] members favored Khatami […]. Reportedly, 73% of the IRGC and 70% of the Basij’s members voted for Khatami [in 1997]” (Byman et al. 2001: 49). The undying loyalty toward Khamenei may be true for the top brass of the Revolutionary Guards, but the younger generation is far more cynical when it comes to revolutionary and religious indoctrination.
- 32.
This is totally different from the political situation in a society such as Japan before World War II (Snyder 1993: 150; Spector 1985: 33). When deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Brigadier Mohammad Bāqer Zolqadr, was questioned by some Iranian members of parliament about his threatening to attack Persian Gulf oil infrastructure in the event of a US attack on Iran, he denied (IRNA, March 1, 2002).
- 33.
Cf. note 4.
- 34.
The Revolutionary Guards were an armed force of about 10,000 members equipped mostly with AK-47s and Kalashnikovs in the period 1979–1981.
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Mohammadi, M. (2019). The Dual Military System and the Framework for the Counter-Movement. In: The Iranian Reform Movement. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90969-1_8
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