Abstract
Beliefs have genealogies. Can tracing a belief’s genealogy illuminate the epistemic quality of the belief? This paper sets out a general epistemology of genealogies. As it turns out, genealogies for beliefs come in two sorts: those that trace a belief to some mental event that doubles as evidence for the belief and those that do not. The former have the potential to undercut the belief, rebut the belief, or—importantly—both. The latter have the potential to reinforce the belief or rebut the belief but—importantly—not undercut it. The ultimate conclusion is that there is a role for genealogies in the epistemic appraisal of our beliefs, but this role will be circumscribed by the availability of clear and compelling genealogies.
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Notes
- 1.
Even Wikipedia knows what the genetic fallacy is: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetic_fallacy
- 2.
You might think this is a debate about what contemporary epistemologist’s call the “basing relation” which is the relation between a belief with a particular propositional content and the thing on which the belief is “based.” Whether this is so depends on what one takes the basing relation to be. If the relation is understood in a causal way, then the question of a belief’s genealogy and the nature of a belief’s basing amount to the same thing: what causes or explains why the person in question has a belief. If the basing relation is understood in a more epistemic way, then these are different questions. For a taxonomy of various basing relation cases, see Korcz 1997 and Jäger 2016.
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Acknowledgements
This paper has two presentations in its genealogy: one at the Explaining Religion workshop hosted by VU in Amsterdam and one at Berry College in Rome, Georgia. Audience members at both presentations—especially Matthew Lee, Robert McCauley, Rik Peels, and Jeroen de Ridder—provided helpful feedback. Drafts of the paper were critiqued by Weston Ellis, Christoph Jäger, Dugald Owen, Gijsbert van den Brink, and Aku Visala. Thanks to each of them for their time and expertise. Part of this publication was completed while on a Fulbright appointment to the University of Innsbruck, Austria. Thanks to the Austrian-American Fulbright Commission and their staff in Vienna. Another part of this publication was completed while on a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.
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McBrayer, J.P. (2018). The Epistemology of Genealogies. In: van Eyghen, H., Peels, R., van den Brink, G. (eds) New Developments in the Cognitive Science of Religion. New Approaches to the Scientific Study of Religion , vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90239-5_9
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