Abstract
In many respects, the historical trajectory of the Russian economy during the twentieth century has been a terra incognita until now. As for the official statistics, there are at least three important reasons for this. First, many relevant indicators were either not measured or were kept secret and never published. Second, Russia (as the RSFSR) was a part of the USSR, and statistics for the RSFSR was much less prevalent than for the USSR as a whole (historical changes of the Russian borders also require special consideration). Third, an ideological dogma existed about the absence of inflation in the planned Soviet economy; therefore, all deflators (if any) were underestimated, and all aggregates in constant and/or comparable prices were overestimated (as were the corresponding growth rates). As for the unofficial historical estimates, most of them were focused on the USSR, not on the RSFSR. It’s very risky to use them as a proxy for historical indicators of the Russian Federation.
Hence, our first aim was to construct a statistical time-series that might be useful to describe the long-run trajectory of the Russian (the RSFSR and/or the RF) economy. Using previously unpublished data stored in Russian archives, we tried to extend them back as far as possible; in fact, most of them began in the late 1920s.
Our second aim was to denote periods of growth and contraction in the Russian economy and to reveal the economic factors that caused changes in trajectory. Periods of contractions during the era of the planned economy were of special interest for us. We found that recessions had occurred, not only in the market but also in the planned Russian economy (of course, with a significant remark that contractions in the planned economy were much rarer but evidently more destructive).
This chapter is an updated version of the earlier article: Smirnov S. V. Economic Fluctuations in Russia (from the late 1920s to 2015). Russian Journal of Economics. 2015. Vol. 1. No. 2. P. 130-153. The author is grateful for nonprofit partnership “Redaktsiya zhurnala ‘Voprosy Ekonomiki’” for permission to republish it. Support from the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics is also gratefully acknowledged.
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Notes
- 1.
See Smirnov (2012) for a survey.
- 2.
In the West, the word “Russia” is often applied to the USSR. Strictly speaking, it’s no more justified than it is to use the word “England” for “Great Britain” or to use “Great Britain” and “the United Kingdom” as full synonyms.
- 3.
Hereinafter, we shall use “Russia” as a synonym for the Russian Federation (the RF) and/or the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (the RSFSR).
- 4.
It’s especially true for the defense and military statistics. One has no real foundation for splitting this kind of data into time-series for the RSFSR and for “all other” regions of the USSR.
- 5.
See Harrison (1998) for interesting analyses.
- 6.
There were also several minor changes of the borders between the RSFSR and other Union Republics. Their macroeconomic outcomes are close to zero.
- 7.
In 1940 as a result of the 1939–1940 Winter War, the area of the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic slightly expanded as some territories (Vyborg and several others) were ceded from Finland to the USSR. There is no necessary statistical information to make this amendment, but it is definitely negligible for macroeconomic indicators.
- 8.
Scanned copies of most of them can be found on the private website http://istmat.info/statistics
- 9.
Needless to say, this is a very intriguing issue, but it’s also very special and highly complex. We do doubt that enough information has ever existed to split—in a meaningful manner—the historical data on military expenses and military production in the USSR between the RSFSR and all other regions of the Soviet Union. On the role of the defense or military sector in the USSR, see Simonov (1996) and Gregory (2003b). The current situation in the RF is described in Balashov and Martianova (2015).
- 10.
We also tried a semilog scale and charts for Y-o-Y % changes, but charts for absolute levels are more distinct. Other types of diagrams are available from the author upon request.
- 11.
If one views the Soviet statistics as an “instrument of propaganda,” one would agree that its effectiveness was quite high: for each “unit” of output produced by industrial establishments during 1961–1990, the statistical system created just another “unit.” As a result, in 1990 the total “official” index was twice the (more realistic) “unofficial.”
- 12.
As supplementary indicators for agriculture, we also used time-series on grain production and on grain area planted. It is worth noting that the average harvest after 2000 (slightly more than 80 million tons) is roughly equal to the average harvests of the 1960s, while the area planted is 1.7 times less. One could argue that an increase in agricultural productivity occurred across the world and was related to the use of fertilizers, better seeds, and new harvesting machines. But the following facts are very revealing: from 1970 to 1991 (the last year of the USSR), the global average cereal yield grew 57%, while in Russia it declined 3%; on the contrary, from 1991 to 2014 (more recent global data are unavailable), the global average cereal yield grew 37% which is much less than in Russia (58%). Does anyone need any other proof as to the ineffectiveness of the Soviet planned economic system?
- 13.
See Davies and Wheatcroft (2009) for excellent research of this period.
- 14.
See, for example, Lopatin and Lopatina (2009, pp. 22, 30, 84), and others.
- 15.
According to www.merriam-webster.com, a collective farm (or “kolkhoz” in Russian) is “a farm… formed from many small holdings collected into a single unit for joint operation under governmental (and the Communist Party’s—S.S.) supervision.” The collectivization in the USSR was a highly forced process.
- 16.
The 1963 crop failure was the first time grain was imported to the USSR for many decades.
- 17.
It may even be a leading one because the transportation of raw materials—not other goods—has been the main specialization of Russian railroads. Surely, the leading effect may not be observable with annual data but can be seen by examining more frequent data (e.g., monthly). See Smirnov (2013b) and Macheret (2015).
- 18.
See Kuboniwa (2014) and the references herein for the most important details.
- 19.
The famine was not less serious in the current territories of Kazakhstan and especially Ukraine, but here we focus on Russia only.
- 20.
Some other researchers emphasize great losses while gathering the harvest due to the low level of agricultural technologies and the high level of irresponsibility on the part of newly established collective farmers. See Zhuravlev (2012).
- 21.
Detailed analyses in Davies (1996) don’t contradict this thesis.
- 22.
These low prices were the main channel of influence of the Great Depression in the USA and some other industrialized countries on the Soviet economy. By that time, the USSR had departed from the world economy to a great extent. All other economic interconnections were weak, except “imports of brains” [see Korneychuk (2015) for interesting details].
- 23.
And by an additional 18% in 1943. Total grain production in 1943 was only 36% of 1940 production.
- 24.
The growth of 1941 may be overestimated because of incorrect deflators. On the other hand, this disturbance is probably less than usual because price control was evidently stricter during the war years. In any case, the industrial production of the RSFSR was much more dynamic than in the USSR as a whole (a drop by 2% in 1941, and by 21% in 1942). There are two reasons for this: (a) the loss of territories (in percent) for the USSR was much greater than for the RSFSR, as all the Soviet republics in the west of the USSR (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Baltic States) were totally occupied, and their contribution to the total output of the USSR was equal to zero (a decline of 100%); (b) a number of large industrial plants were moved from the Western regions of the USSR to the Eastern regions of the RSFSR during the first months of the war. Their output in the new locations expanded the industrial production of the RSFSR.
- 25.
It’s impossible to split the official index of industrial production into military and civilian parts. Hence, from the point of view of common sense, one may be sure that a significant decrease of military production took place, but several hypotheses about civil production are possible.
- 26.
- 27.
Measured by the average alternative index. The official data gives +3% (the minimum for all years since 1947).
- 28.
Of course, one must keep in mind that there is some specificity in the concept of “demand” under the planned economy. For example, in 1971 the first conveyor line at the largest Soviet automobile plant was implemented; at the end of 1973, the whole plant was completed. Total production of autos in 1974 (1 million autos) turned to be roughly four times larger than in 1970 (0.26 million). Does it mean that the demand for autos was fulfilled? Of course not. The number of autos per capita in Russia was many times lower than in the US or European countries; those who wanted to buy an auto had to wait for permission for 2 or 3 years or to buy one immediately at the black market. But there was no “demand” for production of more autos from those in the USSR who were responsible for investment decisions; they thought they had done “enough” for the population. The output of autos in the planned Russian economy never exceeded 1 million by more than 16%, while there were zero auto imports.
- 29.
With only one exception: in 1986 it was equal to 2.8%.
- 30.
If measured by the alternative index. The official industrial index began to decrease in 1990; it fell by 8.1% during 1990–1991.
- 31.
Official statistics became much more reliable after the USSR; there is no need for alternative estimates after 1991.
- 32.
The political risk of restoring communism and returning to a planned economy existed until the presidential election in the middle of 1996. Then Boris Yeltsin won a new 4-year term.
- 33.
To the “crawling peg” regime, according to the IMF’s classification, to be precise.
- 34.
As the deep crisis in Russia began only in the end of the third quarter of 2008 and there had been previous overheating, there was not enough time to make the 2008 annual growth rates negative for most other indicators.
- 35.
See Akindinova et al. (2017) for a deeper analysis of the economic and institutional reasons for this.
- 36.
Here we count two waves of the Great Russian Depression as separate ones.
- 37.
There is a huge amount of economic literature dedicated to the transition period of Russian economy [e.g., see Åslund (2013) for its description].
- 38.
See Ickes (1986) for a survey.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Main Russian Macroeconomic Indicators (1928–2017a)
Years | Index of industrial output | Agriculture | Residential construction, new completions | Railroad | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Official | Alternative | Livestock inventory | Grain production, at granary | Grain production, in the field | Grain area planted | State organizations and establishments | Total population | Workers and employees | Freight transportation | |
Y-o-Y % change | Millions of heads | Millions of tons | Millions of hectares | Millions of m2 | Millions of tons | |||||
1928 | Na | Na | 108.0 | 50.0 | 50.0 | 61.4 | Na | Na | Na | 88.6 |
1929 | 20.0 | Na | 87.0 | Na | 45.5 | 64.0 | Na | Na | Na | 107.1 |
1930 | 22.0 | Na | 68.0 | Na | 52.5 | 67.2 | Na | Na | Na | 133.7 |
1931 | 18.0 | Na | 57.0 | Na | 43.4 | 70.2 | Na | Na | Na | 144.9 |
1932 | 15.0 | Na | 50.7 | 47.5 | 47.5 | 69.0 | Na | Na | Na | 151.2 |
1933 | 5.2 | Na | 52.5 | Na | 58.8 | 69.5 | Na | Na | Na | 150.2 |
1934 | 19.2 | Na | 62.1 | Na | 65.1 | 71.9 | Na | Na | Na | Na |
1935 | 22.7 | Na | 77.2 | Na | 62.5 | 71.2 | Na | Na | Na | 219.9 |
1936 | 28.7 | Na | 72.2 | Na | 48.9 | 70.8 | Na | Na | Na | Na |
1937 | 11.2 | Na | 86.6 | 70.4 | 86.4 | 73.1 | Na | Na | Na | 299.3 |
1938 | 12.1 | Na | 86.6 | Na | 63.0 | 71.4 | Na | Na | Na | 295.3 |
1939 | 17.2 | Na | 86.5 | Na | 64.9 | 69.2 | Na | Na | Na | 317.5 |
1940 | 10.5 | Na | 91.1 | 55.6 | 73.0 | 70.1 | Na | Na | Na | 333.9 |
1941 | 3.8 | Na | 68.5 | 45.5 | 75.9 | 68.5 | Na | Na | Na | 322.7 |
1942 | −8.9 | Na | 55.7 | 24.0 | 44.0 | 54.6 | Na | Na | Na | 236.8 |
1943 | 17.5 | Na | 59.5 | 19.8 | 36.3 | 51.4 | Na | Na | Na | 265.7 |
1944 | 13.2 | Na | 63.4 | 26.9 | 39.8 | 48.9 | Na | Na | Na | 271.0 |
1945 | −15.6 | Na | 65.8 | 25.4 | Na | 50.9 | Na | Na | Na | 268.3 |
1946 | −21.7 | Na | 62.0 | 21.2 | Na | 50.0 | 7.0 | Na | 2.5 | 282.9 |
1947 | 19.3 | Na | 67.6 | 35.7 | Na | 53.3 | 7.3 | Na | 3.3 | 302.1 |
1948 | 24.2 | Na | 77.9 | 34.2 | Na | 61.0 | 9.0 | Na | 3.3 | 370.9 |
1949 | 18.7 | Na | 87.9 | 38.9 | Na | 63.2 | 9.8 | Na | 3.3 | 439.3 |
1950 | 19.9 | Na | 88.3 | 46.8 | Na | 64.9 | 11.9 | Na | 3.6 | 498.2 |
1951 | 15.4 | Na | 98.3 | 47.5 | Na | 68.2 | 14.1 | Na | 4.3 | 547.9 |
1952 | 10.9 | Na | 97.9 | 51.9 | Na | 68.6 | 14.1 | Na | 4.3 | 597.6 |
1953 | 11.2 | Na | 101.5 | 48.2 | Na | 68.2 | 16.5 | Na | 4.3 | 638.7 |
1954 | 12.9 | Na | 102.1 | 56.3 | Na | 72.5 | 17.5 | Na | 4.5 | 677.7 |
1955 | 11.7 | Na | 105.1 | 54.7 | Na | 76.2 | 17.1 | Na | 4.7 | 761.7 |
1956 | 9.6 | Na | 110.6 | 66.5 | Na | 74.4 | 20.9 | Na | 6.6 | 819.9 |
1957 | 9.0 | Na | 117.9 | 54.9 | Na | 72.7 | 26.6 | Na | 7.7 | 891.5 |
1958 | 9.1 | Na | 125.6 | 72.9 | Na | 72.5 | 31.6 | Na | 14.2 | 970.3 |
1959 | 11.0 | Na | 132.2 | 64.9 | Na | 69.1 | 36.3 | Na | 14.5 | 1061.3 |
1960 | 8.8 | Na | 133.1 | 72.6 | Na | 71.4 | 36.7 | Na | 14.6 | 1140.7 |
1961 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 143.3 | 70.3 | Na | 74.5 | 36.9 | Na | 12.4 | 1193.8 |
1962 | 9.0 | 6.3 | 150.6 | 83.1 | Na | 79.2 | 38.4 | Na | 10.6 | 1236.7 |
1963 | 8.1 | 5.3 | 124.9 | 62.8 | Na | 79.4 | 39.4 | Na | 8.4 | 1285.0 |
1964 | 6.0 | 5.6 | 130.8 | 83.2 | Na | 81.6 | 37.7 | Na | 7.7 | 1350.0 |
1965 | 7.2 | 5.2 | 139.1 | 66.3 | Na | 77.6 | 40.2 | Na | 7.3 | 1415.8 |
1966 | 8.4 | 6.7 | 141.5 | 95.6 | Na | 76.1 | 41.3 | Na | 7.1 | 1441.3 |
1967 | 9.9 | 6.2 | 139.6 | 84.8 | Na | 74.9 | 42.6 | Na | 6.8 | 1514.9 |
1968 | 8.1 | 5.1 | 138.7 | 103.8 | Na | 74.3 | 43.6 | Na | 5.9 | 1558.9 |
1969 | 6.9 | 4.2 | 140.2 | 83.9 | Na | 73.5 | 45.9 | Na | 5.4 | 1585.3 |
1970 | 8.0 | 4.4 | 151.8 | 107.4 | Na | 72.7 | 48.1 | Na | 5.0 | 1648.2 |
1971 | 7.6 | 4.2 | 156.5 | 98.8 | Na | 71.8 | 49.5 | Na | 4.6 | 1736.6 |
1972 | 6.4 | 4.3 | 152.7 | 86.0 | Na | 73.1 | 50.3 | Na | 4.4 | 1782.6 |
1973 | 7.3 | 4.9 | 157.0 | 121.5 | Na | 76.6 | 51.9 | Na | 4.6 | 1879.0 |
1974 | 7.8 | 5.7 | 161.7 | 105.1 | Na | 76.5 | 52.5 | Na | 4.3 | 1979.8 |
1975 | 7.2 | 4.5 | 151.5 | 72.4 | Na | 77.0 | 52.9 | Na | 4.0 | 2039.8 |
1976 | 4.9 | 3.2 | 152.9 | 119.0 | Na | 77.2 | 52.0 | Na | 3.3 | 2041.5 |
1977 | 5.4 | 1.8 | 159.5 | 101.6 | Na | 78.4 | 52.7 | Na | 3.3 | 2072.2 |
1978 | 4.5 | 1.4 | 162.2 | 127.4 | Na | 77.0 | 52.4 | Na | 3.1 | 2090.6 |
1979 | 3.0 | −0.4 | 161.9 | 84.8 | Na | 75.9 | 48.4 | Na | 2.9 | 2010.2 |
1980 | 3.0 | 1.7 | 159.1 | 97.2 | Na | 75.5 | 52.1 | 4.0 | 2.9 | 2047.9 |
1981 | 2.9 | 0.8 | 158.6 | 73.8 | Na | 74.1 | 51.5 | 3.9 | Na | 2065.3 |
1982 | 2.7 | 0.7 | 161.4 | 98.0 | Na | 72.0 | 52.7 | 3.9 | Na | 2032.9 |
1983 | 3.8 | 1.6 | 165.0 | 104.3 | Na | 70.7 | 54.3 | 3.8 | Na | 2110.5 |
1984 | 3.8 | 1.6 | 163.2 | 85.1 | Na | 69.7 | 53.2 | 3.9 | Na | 2134.8 |
1985 | 3.7 | 1.5 | 162.0 | 98.6 | Na | 68.1 | 53.6 | 3.7 | Na | 2165.0 |
1986 | 4.8 | 2.8 | 164.8 | 107.5 | Na | 67.5 | 57.4 | 3.9 | Na | 2236.0 |
1987 | 3.6 | 0.8 | 161.9 | 98.6 | Na | 66.7 | 63.8 | 4.2 | Na | 2228.0 |
1988 | 3.8 | 0.6 | 161.8 | 93.7 | Na | 66.0 | 62.6 | 5.2 | Na | 2261.0 |
1989 | 1.4 | −1.4 | 160.1 | 104.8 | Na | 64.9 | 60.3 | 5.9 | Na | 2205.0 |
1990 | −0.1 | −2.2 | 153.6 | 116.7 | Na | 63.1 | 51.6 | 5.5 | Na | 2140.0 |
1991 | −8.0 | −8.9 | 145.3 | 89.1 | Na | 61.8 | 44.0 | 5.4 | Na | 1957.3 |
1992 | −16.0 | −14.9 | 135.1 | 106.9 | Na | 61.9 | 36.6 | 4.9 | Na | 1640.1 |
1993 | −13.7 | −14.4 | 121.2 | 99.1 | Na | 60.9 | 36.2 | 5.6 | Na | 1347.8 |
1994 | −21.6 | −26.1 | 102.7 | 81.3 | Na | 56.3 | 32.1 | 7.1 | Na | 1058.2 |
1995 | −4.6 | −5.2 | 90.4 | 63.4 | Na | 54.7 | 32.0 | 9.0 | Na | 1028.0 |
1996 | −7.6 | −8.6 | 77.0 | 69.2 | Na | 53.4 | 24.3 | 10.0 | Na | 911.5 |
1997 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 67.6 | 88.5 | Na | 53.6 | 21.2 | 11.5 | Na | 887.2 |
1998 | −4.8 | −4.2 | 61.3 | 47.8 | Na | 50.7 | 18.6 | 12.1 | Na | 834.8 |
1999 | 8.9 | 9.2 | 61.2 | 54.6 | Na | 46.5 | 18.3 | 13.7 | Na | 947.4 |
2000 | 8.7 | 8.1 | 58.3 | 65.4 | Na | 45.6 | 17.7 | 12.6 | Na | 1046.8 |
2001 | 2.9 | 4.5 | 59.2 | 85.1 | Na | 47.2 | 18.6 | 13.1 | Na | 1057.5 |
2002 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 60.8 | 86.5 | Na | 47.4 | 19.7 | 14.2 | Na | 1083.7 |
2003 | 8.9 | 6.2 | 58.6 | 67.0 | Na | 42.1 | 21.3 | 15.2 | Na | 1160.9 |
2004 | 8.0 | 5.5 | 54.9 | 77.8 | Na | 43.6 | 24.9 | 16.1 | Na | 1221.2 |
2005 | 5.1 | 3.2 | 54.0 | 77.8 | Na | 43.6 | 26.0 | 17.5 | Na | 1273.3 |
2006 | 6.3 | 5.0 | 57.9 | 78.2 | Na | 43.2 | 30.6 | 20.0 | Na | 1311.6 |
2007 | 6.8 | 5.4 | 59.4 | 81.5 | Na | 44.3 | 34.9 | 26.3 | Na | 1344.6 |
2008 | 0.6 | −0.8 | 59.0 | 108.2 | Na | 46.7 | 36.7 | 27.4 | Na | 1304.4 |
2009 | −10.7 | −9.9 | 59.9 | 97.1 | Na | 47.6 | 31.3 | 28.5 | Na | 1108.8 |
2010 | 7.3 | 9.5 | 59.0 | 61.0 | Na | 43.2 | 32.9 | 25.5 | Na | 1312.0 |
2011 | 5.0 | Na | 60.3 | 94.2 | Na | 43.6 | 35.5 | 26.8 | Na | 1381.7 |
2012 | 3.4 | Na | 62.9 | 70.9 | Na | 44.4 | 37.3 | 28.4 | Na | 1421.1 |
2013 | 0.4 | Na | 63.0 | 92.4 | Na | 45.8 | 39.8 | 30.7 | Na | 1381.2 |
2014 | 1.7 | Na | 63.5 | 105.3 | Na | 46.2 | 48.0 | 36.2 | Na | 1375.4 |
2015 | −3.4 | Na | 65.4 | 104.8 | Na | 46.6 | 50.1 | 35.2 | Na | 1329.0 |
2016 | 1.3 | Na | 65.6 | 120.7 | Na | 47.1 | 48.4 | 31.8 | Na | 1325.2 |
2017a | 1.0 | Na | 66.4 | 134.1 | Na | 47.9 | 45.9 | 32.7 | Na | 1362.3 |
Appendix 2: Statistical Sources for the Main Russian Macroeconomic Indicators
Below we use the following translations from Russian to English:
-
Динамика и география грузового движения на путях сообщения СССР—Dynamics and Geographical Distribution of Freight Transportation in the USSR
-
Народное хозяйство РСФСР (или СССР)—National Economy of the RSFSR (or the USSR);
-
Посевные площади СССР (Статистический сборник)—USSR: Areas Planted. Statistical Digest
-
Российский статистический ежегодник—Russian Statistical Yearbook
-
Сельское хозяйство, охота и охотничье хозяйство, лесоводство в России—Agriculture, Hunting, and Forestry in Russia
-
Сельское хозяйство СССР. Ежегодник—Agriculture in the USSR. Yearbook
-
Социалистическое строительство СССР. Статистический ежегодник—Socialist Construction of the USSR. Statistical yearbook
-
Социально-экономические показатели Российской Федерации в 1991–2016 гг. Приложение к «Российскому статистическому ежегоднику (РСЕ)»—Socioeconomic indicators of the Russian Federation: 1991–2016. Supplement to “Russian Statistical Yearbook (RSY)”
-
СССР—страна социализма. Статистический сборник—The USSR is a Country of Socialism. Statistical Digest
-
Транспорт и связь СССР (Статистический сборник)—Transportation and Communication in the USSR. Statistical Digest
-
Центральная база статистических данных (ЦБСД)—Centralized Base of Statistical Data (CBSD)
-
Российский государственный архив экономики (РГАЭ)—The Russian State Economical Archive (RSEA)
The sources for each indicator are placed in a table—one table per indicator; there are also some methodological comments, if necessary. The information stored in the RSEA was initially “secret” or “top-secret,” but since 1956, the same indicators have been published in official statistical yearbooks.
1.1 Index of Industrial Production, Official
The official index of industrial production (1960 = 100) is in fact not fully official. We calculated it using official Y-o-Y percent changes (if available) or Y-o-Y percent changes that, in turn, were calculated using official base indices (with various bases) or values of industrial production in list prices (also with various bases). We took 1960 as a base to have a time-series comparable with the alternative index of industrial production.
Years | Source: title/archive and code | Page(s) |
|---|---|---|
1929–1932, 1946–1965 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1965. Moscow: Statistika, 1966 | 46–47 |
1933–1936a | National Economy of the USSR in 1963. Moscow: Statistika, 1965 | 110 |
1938–1945, ex. 1941 | RSEA 1562-33-2903 | 59–60, 64 |
1941 | RSEA 1562-329-1488 | 18–19 |
1966–1975 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1975. Moscow: Statistika,1976 | 45 |
1976–1980 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1980. Moscow: Finansy i Statistika,1981 | 50 |
1981 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1985. Moscow: Finansy i Statistika,1986 | 55 |
1982–1985 | Rosstat, CBSD | – |
1986–1991 | Russian statistical yearbook. 1994. Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1994 | 296 |
1992–2016 | Rosstat, supplement to RSY | – |
1.2 Livestock Inventory
We added together the total number of cattle, sheep, goats, and pigs. Almost continuous time-series, beginning with 1927, are published in only one source; more recent and fully comparable data may be taken from the CBSD held by Rosstat. The “holes” for almost 90 years are 1928 and 1938. We succeeded in patching the hole in 1928 and substituted the average of 1937 and 1939 for 1938.
Years | Source: title/archive and code | Page(s) |
|---|---|---|
1927–1989, e.g., 1928 and 1938 | Agriculture, hunting and forestry in Russia. 2013. Moscow: Rosstat, 2013 | 90–91 |
1928a | RSEA 1562-41-66 | 297 |
1938b | Not available | – |
1990 | Rosstat, CBSD | – |
1991–2016 | Rosstat, supplement to RSY | – |
1.2.1 Grain Production
According to the present methodology (in use since 1953), the garnered grain is counted (at the granary at net weight). According to the “old” methodology, the harvest is estimated in the field (standing grain). It’s not a surprise that the “old” methodology gave higher numbers than the “present”; it’s a surprise that, according to Rosstat, for 1928 and 1932, both methodologies gave equal volumes. Therefore, one may doubt if Rosstat’s re-estimations for the 1920s and the 1930s were made in a proper way; in practice, it also means that one can’t use “old” data to interpolate the “new.” For this reason, we preferred to use both time-series in parallel (one for the “present” methodology, another for the “old” one).
Years | Source: title/archive and code | Page(s) |
|---|---|---|
In the field (old methodology) | ||
1928, 1932–1944 | RSEA 1562-329-1409 | 1–2, 8 |
1929–1931 | Agriculture in the USSR. Yearbook. 1935. Moscow: Selhozgiz, 1936 | 270–271 |
At granary (new methodology) | ||
1928, 1932, 1937, 1940–1990 | Agriculture, hunting, and forestry in Russia. 2013. Moscow: Rosstat, 2013 | 74 |
1991–2016 | Rosstat, supplement to RSY | – |
1.2.2 Grain Area Planted
The grain area planted was counted by the Soviet statistical system beginning in 1925. This indicator is more or less comparable through time. Some minor problems were connected with two factors: (a) the changes of the RSFSR’s borders (as a rule, these problems were easily solved, as the relevant regional information was usually available); and (b) with corn grain of milky-wax ripeness, which was included in total grain for several years in the second part of 1950s, and excluded for all other years. To handle with this bug we had to make our own estimates of this factor for 1956–1957 using information for the USSR as a whole; the correction was around 1.5% of the total area planted in the RSFSR.
Years | Source: title/archive and code | Page(s) |
|---|---|---|
1925–1926a | Agriculture in the USSR. 1925–1928. Moscow: Stat. Izd-vo TsSU SSSR, 1929 | 220 |
1927 | Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical yearbook. 1934. Moscow, Soyuzorguchet, 1934 | 178, 190 |
1928, 1932, 1945, 1950–1956b | USSR: Areas planted. Statistical digest. 1957. Vol. 1. Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1957 | 20–21 |
1929–1931 | Agriculture in the USSR. Yearbook. 1935. Moscow: Selhozgiz, 1936 | 245–247 |
1933–1940 | RSEA 1562-329-1409 | 1–2, 8 |
1941–1944 | RSEA 1562-329-1490 | 157–158 |
1946–1949c | RSEA 1562-329-3871 | 90, 316 |
1957b | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1958. Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1959 | 223 |
1958–1965 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1965. Moscow: Statistika, 1966 | 190–191 |
1966–1969 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1969. Moscow: Statistika, 1970 | 152–153 |
1970–1974 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1975. Moscow: Statistika, 1976 | 164–165 |
1975–1980 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1980. Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1981 | 134–135 |
1981–1984 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1985. Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1986 | 116 |
1985–1989 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1990. Moscow: Resp. inf.-izd. Centr., 1991 | 418 |
1990 | Rosstat, CBSD | – |
1991–2016 | Rosstat, supplement to RSY | – |
1.3 New Residential Completions
Historical information on residential construction is less available than on other sectors of the Russian economy, at least those considered here. Publication of the RSFSR’s data on new residential completions began in 1946; we couldn’t find any older information, even in unpublished documents stored in archives. Our hypothesis relates this to the fact that the main goal of economic policy during the Soviet period was the creation of large-scale industrial establishments, especially those which were specialized in producing machines and equipment (capital goods). The Communist and Soviet authorities paid far less attention to the production of consumer goods and to residential construction (it even seems that for years, the Soviet statistics simply didn’t count the new houses built by collective farmers, which were the majority of the houses in rural areas). As the official figures for total new residential construction consist of different components for different years, we decided not to use them at all. Instead, we chose three time-series: one for state organizations and establishments (it’s roughly comparable for all years) and two for the population, for workers and employees up to 1980, and for the total population beginning in 1980 (we hope that the trajectories of the latter two are similar).
Years | Source: title/archive and code | Page(s) |
|---|---|---|
State organizations and establishmentsa and/or populationb | ||
1946–1956 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1958. Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1959 | 344 |
1957–1960 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1965. Moscow: Statistika, 1966 | 381 |
1961–1967 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1967. Moscow: Statistika, 1968 | 366 |
1968–1969 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1970. Moscow: Statistika, 1971 | 327 |
1970–1974 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1975. Moscow: Statistika, 1976 | 339 |
1975–1979 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1980. Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1981 | 230 |
1980–1984 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1985. Moscow: Finansy i Statistika,1986 | 246 |
1985–1990 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1990. Moscow: Resp. inf.-izd. Centr., 1991 | 203 |
1991–2016 | Rosstat, supplement to RSY | – |
1.4 Railroad Freight Transportation
Railroad statistics for the RSFSR was openly published up to the mid-1930s and after 1958 with the more than a 20-year gap in between. We found almost all of the necessary information in unpublished documents stored in archives. Unfortunately, at the moment we still have three holes: 1934 and 1936–1937. It makes it impossible to say anything reasonable about the dynamics of railroad freight transportation during the second 5-year plan (1933–1937), but it’s enough to detect the contraction in 1933.
Years | Source: title/archive and code | Page(s) |
|---|---|---|
1928–1931 | Dynamic and geographical distribution of freight transportation in the USSR. 1928–1931. Moscow, TsUNHU SSSR, 1932 | 12–13 |
1932 | Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical yearbook. 1934. Moscow, Soyuzorguchet, 1934 | 263–264 |
1933 | Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical yearbook. 1935. Moscow, Soyuzorguchet, 1935 | 400–401 |
1934 | Not available | |
1935 | The USSR is a country of socialism. Statistical digest. 1936. Moscow, v/o Soyuzorguchet, 1936 | 188–189 |
1936–1937 | Not available | |
1938–1939 | RSEA 1884-61-82 | 37, 124 |
1940, 1945–1955 | RSEA 1562-33-2515 | 31 |
1941–1944 | RSEA 1562-33-3445 | 380 |
1956–1957 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1958. Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1959 | 355 |
1958–1962 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1962. Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1963 | 369 |
1963–1964 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1964. Moscow: Statistika, 1965 | 321 |
1965–1970 | Transportation and communication in the USSR. Statistical digest. 1972 | 113 |
1971–1975 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1975. Moscow: Statistika, 1976 | 309 |
1976–1980 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1980. Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1981 | 193 |
1981–1985 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1985. Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1986 | 202 |
1986–1989 | National Economy of the RSFSR in 1989. Moscow: Resp. inf.-izd. Centr., 1990 | 618 |
1990 | Rosstat, CBSD | – |
1991–2016 | Rosstat, supplement to RSY | – |
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Smirnov, S.V. (2019). Economic Fluctuations and Their Drivers in Russia. In: Smirnov, S., Ozyildirim, A., Picchetti, P. (eds) Business Cycles in BRICS. Societies and Political Orders in Transition. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90017-9_6
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