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International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design

COSADE 2018: Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design pp 135–152Cite as

SCATTER: A New Dimension in Side-Channel

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10815))

Abstract

Side-channel techniques have been progressing over the last few years, leading to the creation of a variety of statistical tools, aiming at extracting secrets handled in cryptographic algorithms. Noticeably, the vast majority of side-channel techniques requires to get the traces aligned together prior to applying statistics. This prerequisite turns out to be challenging in the practical realization of attacks as implementations tend to include hardware or software countermeasures to increase this difficulty. This is typically achieved by adding random jitters or random executions with fake operations. In this paper, we introduce the new side-channel technique scatter, whose potential is to tackle alignment issues. By construction, scatter brings an additional dimension and opens the door to a large set of potential new attack techniques. The effectiveness of scatter has been proven on both simulated traces and real world secure products. In summary scatter is a new side-channel technique offering a valuable alternative when the trace alignment represents an issue. Furthermore, scatter represents a suitable option for low-cost attacks, as the requirements in terms of equipment and expertise are significantly reduced.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Here, one byte of the output of AES SubBytes operation was chosen as an example without loss of generality.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. eshard, Martillac, France

    Hugues Thiebeauld, Georges Gagnerot & Antoine Wurcker

  2. Université de Limoges, XLIM-CNRS, Limoges, France

    Christophe Clavier

Authors
  1. Hugues Thiebeauld
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  2. Georges Gagnerot
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  3. Antoine Wurcker
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  4. Christophe Clavier
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Antoine Wurcker .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Open Security Research, Shenzhen, China

    Junfeng Fan

  2. KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Benedikt Gierlichs

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Thiebeauld, H., Gagnerot, G., Wurcker, A., Clavier, C. (2018). SCATTER: A New Dimension in Side-Channel. In: Fan, J., Gierlichs, B. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10815. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89641-0_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89641-0_8

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