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Introduction to Formal Philosophy pp 705–720Cite as

Judgment Aggregation

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Abstract

Judgment aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of barely judgments of preference. The theory derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, which List and Pettit turned into an impossibility theorem – the first of a long list to come. After mentioning this formative stage, the paper restates what is now regarded as the “canonical theorem” of judgment aggregation theory (in three versions due to Nehring and Puppe, Dokow and Holzman, and Dietrich and Mongin, respectively). The last part of paper discusses how judgment aggregation theory connects with social choice theory and can contribute to it; it singles out two representative applications, one to Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the other to the group identification problem.

The author gratefully acknowledges Franz Dietrich’s and Ashley Piggins’s comments.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    (* means ``recommended as introductory material'', and ** ``recommended as advanced material'')

References and Recommended Readings

(* means ``recommended as introductory material'', and ** ``recommended as advanced material'')

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. CNRS & HEC Paris, Paris, France

    Philippe Mongin

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  1. Philippe Mongin
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Correspondence to Philippe Mongin .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Division of Philosophy, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Stockholm, Sweden

    Sven Ove Hansson

  2. Center for Information and Bubble Studies, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Vincent F. Hendricks

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Mongin, P. (2018). Judgment Aggregation. In: Hansson, S., Hendricks, V. (eds) Introduction to Formal Philosophy. Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77434-3_38

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