Abstract
What appears to be the accepted view by most philosophers on Plato and punishment is that Plato was a moral education theorist about punishment. This chapter examines and exposes this view to be incorrect and poorly established by way of the informational contents of the Platonic corpus. Given the plausibility of the Socratic (Anti-Mouthpiece ) Interpretation, what the Platonic corpus tells us is nothing at all about Plato’s theory of punishment. Nor does it reveals Plato’s views on punishment. Nor does it reveal a theory of punishment at all. Indeed, it at best reveals what is expressed by Plato’s Socrates about punishment. But what it reveals through the words of Plato’s Socrates is hardly a moral education theory of punishment. Instead, what it reveals is mostly a retributivist view (not a theory), coupled with some words consistent with a utilitarian view of punishment , and comparatively very little about moral education and punishment.
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Notes
- 1.
For a bibliography which contains such works, see Corlett (2014).
- 2.
The distinction between the justification of the institution of punishment versus the justification of particular forms of punishment is found in Stanley I. Benn, Anthony Quinton, and John Rawls , later “borrowed” by H. L. A. Hart. (Corlett 2014: Introduction and Chapter 2)
- 3.
- 4.
See Corlett (2014: Chapter 5), where Kant is quoted as stating that considerations of social utility count as secondary justifications for punishment .
- 5.
Contrast Mackenzie (1981).
- 6.
The only philosophical work which has even hinted at this view of Socrates on punishment is Brickhouse and Smith (2007).
- 7.
I write “theory” here in that it is hardly obvious that what Socrates says in Plato’s dialogues concerning punishment amounts to a theory in light of the criteria for a theory of punishment found in Murphy (1987). Using Murphy’s criteria as a propaedeutic, one might argue plausibly that a theory of punishment requires at least the following: (a) a definition of “punishment;” (b) a statement of the moral and legal justifications of punishment; (c) a distinction between the justification of punishment as an institution and particular forms of punishment; and (d) an account of proportionate punishment. While Socrates’ words on punishment seem to satisfy (a) and perhaps to a lesser extent (d), it seems implausible to think that they satisfy (b)–(c). However, this is not to say that a Socratic basis for a theory of punishment so construed cannot be constructed from what Socrates says of punishment and other Socratic statements made that might relate indirectly to punishment. Hence, it might be possible to piece together a Socratic theory of punishment, one that, it is cautioned, ought not to be confused with that (allegedly) of Socrates’ given what he says in Plato’s dialogues. Thus while the texts of Plato on punishment do not amount to a theory of punishment, especially regarding the words placed therein in Socrates’ mouth, rational reconstruction might possibly provide something of a Socratically-based theory of punishment .
- 8.
Hampton (1984); Brickhouse and Smith (2002). I write “punishment,” because it is unclear that such a view amounts to a belief about punishment if by “punishment” is meant “hard treatment” (Joel Feinberg ) and treatment normally considered to be unpleasant (Rawls ). (Corlett 2014: 26) For if Laws 728c is correct, then punishment is “suffering that follows a wrongdoing,” just as capital punishment ensures the safety of others in society. It is unclear how moral education amounts to punishment in any significant sense of the term: “punishment .” This confusion of moral education or curing wrongdoers with punishment as hard and unpleasant treatment is widespread among philosophers.
- 9.
“Secondary,” because it is unclear on precisely what legitimate (non-ideologically driven) grounds such writings are to be denied canonical or primary textual status.
- 10.
- 11.
As opposed to Hammurabi’s code, which includes the dictum: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”
- 12.
Including for the fourth crime of perjury (Laws 937c) and frivolous law suits! (Laws 938c)
- 13.
This also applies to Hampton (1984) which attributes, however tentatively, a moral education theory of “punishment ” to Plato as she supportively cites Mackenzie’s work.
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Corlett, J.A. (2018). The Socratic Roots of Retributivism. In: Interpreting Plato Socratically. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77320-9_7
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