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The DPP Ascendancy and Cross-Strait Relations

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Taiwan’s Political Re-Alignment and Diplomatic Challenges

Part of the book series: Politics and Development of Contemporary China ((PDCC))

Abstract

This chapter analyzes the possibility of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Tsai Ing-wen taking a galvanizing strategy when the next presidential election nears. It adopts an electoral cycle theory and posits that during the electoral periods, political parties in Taiwan adopt either a median (M) or galvanizing (G) approach on cross-Strait issues. The theory also posits that during the inter-electoral period, the equilibrium for Taiwan is either a semi-partner of the US or a hedger between Washington and Beijing. Both are realistic (R) positions. Chen Shui-bian, a former DPP president, initially took an M approach, then alternated between G and R. Whether Tsai will follow the Chen scenario is determined by the president’s approval rating, timing, and the strength and coherence of her opponents.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Three edited volumes specifically address the theoretical development in cross-Strait studies: Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu, eds., Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Contending Theories in the Study of Cross-Strait Relations) (Taipei: Wu-nan, 1999); Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu, eds., Chongxin Jianshi Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Revisiting Theories on Cross-Strait Relations) (Taipei: Wu-nan, 2009); Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang, and Samuel S.G. Wu, eds., Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). For a summary of the different approaches, see Yu-Shan Wu, “Theorizing on Relations across the Taiwan Strait: Nine Contending Approaches,” Journal of Contemporary China 9 (2000): 407–428; Yu-Shan Wu, “Cross-Strait Dialogue and Policies,” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan, ed. Gunter Schubert (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016). Also see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed., Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) for a compendium of different approaches to cross-Strait relations without an emphasis on theoretical models.

  2. 2.

    Such as integration theory in Lang Kao, “Cong Zhenghe Lilun Tansuo Liangan Zhenghe De Tiaojian Yu Kunjing” (“Exploring the Conditions and Dilemma of Cross-Strait Integration in the Perspective of Integration Theory”), in Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Contending Theories in the Study of Cross-Strait Relations), eds. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wu-nan, 2004); power asymmetry theory in Yu-Shan Wu, Kangheng Huo Hucong: Liang’an Guanxi Xinquan (Balancing or Bandwagoning: Cross-Strait Relations Revisited) (Taipei: Cheng-chung, 1997); and Yu-Shan Wu, “Quanli Bu Duicheng Yu Liang’an Guanxi” (“Power Asymmetry and Cross-Strait Relations”), in Chongxin Jianshi Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Revisiting Theories on Cross-Strait Relations), eds. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wu-nan, 2009); game theory in Samuel S. G. Wu and Chi-hsin Shih, “Liang’an Tanpan De Shuangceng Saiju Fenxi” (“A Two-Level Game Theoretical Analysis of Cross-Strait Negotiations”), in Chongxin Jianshi Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Revisiting Theories on Cross-Strait Relations), eds. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wu-nan, 2009); and Jih-wen Lin and Chih-cheng Lo, “Between Sovereignty and Security: A Mixed Strategy Analysis of Current Cross-Strait Interactions,” Issues & Studies 31, no. 3 (1995): 64–91; and divided nation theory in Ya-chung Chang, “Liang’an Guanxi De Guifanxing Yanjiu: Dingwei Yu Zouxiang” (“Normative Analysis of Cross-Strait Relations: Orientation and Trend”), in Chongxin Jianshi Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Revisiting Theories on Cross-Strait Relations), eds. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wu-nan, 2009).

  3. 3.

    Such as the political competition model in John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Chiefs, Staffs, Indians, and Others: How was Taiwan’s Mainland China Policy Made?” in Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits, eds. Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang, Samuel S.G. Wu (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and Yu-Shan Wu, “Does Chen’s Election Make Any Difference? Domestic and International Constraints on Taipei, Washington, and Beijing,” in Taiwan’s Democratic Politics: Democratization and Cross-strait Relations in the twenty-first Century, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001); the state-society approach in Tse-Kang Leng, The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Tse-Kang Leng, “Dalu Jingmao Zhengce De Genyuan: Guojia Yu Shehui De Hudong” (“The Source of Taiwan’s Economic Policy toward Mainland China: The Interaction Between the State and Society”), in Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Contending Theories in the Study of Cross-Strait Relations), eds. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wu-nan, 1999); and Tse-Kang Leng, “Guojia, Quanqiuhua Yu Liang’an Guanxi” (“State, Globalization and Cross-Strait Relations”), in Chongxin Jianshi Zhengbian Zhong De Lliang’an Guanxi Lilun (Revisiting Theories on Cross-Strait Relations), eds. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wu-nan, 2009); and political psychology theory in Chih-yu Shih, “Zhima! Kaimen Xinli Fenxi Yinling Liangan Zhengce Yanjiu Jinru Xinjingjie” (“Sesame! Open the Door: Psychoanalysis Leads the Study on Cross-Strait Policy to a New Frontier”), in Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Contending Theories in the Study of Cross-Strait Relations), eds. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wu-nan, 1999); T.Y. Wang and I-Chou Liu, “Contending Identities in Taiwan: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations,” Asian Survey 44 (2004): 568–590; and Yu-Shan Wu, “Taiwanese Nationalism and Its Implications: Testing the Worst-Case Scenario,” Asian Survey 44 (2004): 614–625.

  4. 4.

    Such as systems theory in Chu-cheng Ming, “Guoji Tixi Lilun Yu Liangan Guanxi” (“International Systems Theory and Cross-Strait Relations”), in Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Contending Theories in the Study of Cross-Strait Relations), eds. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wu-nan, 1999); and Chu-cheng Ming, “Guoji Tixi Cengci Lilun Yu Liang’an Guanxi: Jianshi Yu Huigu” (“International System-level Theory and Cross-Strait Relations: A Review in Retrospect”), in Chongxin Jianshi Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Revisiting Theories on Cross-Strait Relations), eds. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wu-nan, 2009); the strategic triangle model in Tzong-Ho Bau, “Zhanlue Sanjiao Getilun Jianshi Yu Zongtilun Jiangou Ji Qi Dui Xianshi Zhuyi De Chongji” (“Review of the Micro Theory of Strategic Triangles and Construction of the Macro Theory: Impact on Realism”), in Chongxin Jianshi Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Revisiting Theories on Cross-Strait Relations), eds. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wu-nan, 2009); and Yu-Shan Wu, “From Romantic Triangle to Marriage? Washington-Beijing-Taipei Relations in Historical Comparison,” Issues & Studies 4, no. 1 (2005): 113–159; and constructivist exposition in Yi Yuan, “Anquan Dianzhi Yu Mei ‘Zhong’ Guanxi: Yige Renzhishequnlun De Fenxi Jiagou” (“The Security Regime and U.S.-PRC Relations: An Analytical Framework of Perception Community”) in Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Contending Theories in the Study of Cross-Strait Relations), eds. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wu-nan, 1999); and Yi Yuan, “Guifan Jiangou Zhuyi Yu Liang’an Guanxi: Lilun Yu Shijian” (“Normative Constructivism and Cross-Strait Relations: Theory and Practice”), in Chongxin Jianshi Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Revisiting Theories on Cross-Strait Relations), eds. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wu-nan, 2009).

  5. 5.

    Such as the one that combines power asymmetry theory and the political competition model in Yu-Shan Wu, “Taiwan De Dalu Zhengce: Jiegou Yu Lixing” (“Taiwan’s Mainland Policy: Structure and Reason”), in Zhengbian Zhong De Liang’an Guanxi Lilun (Contending Theories in the Study of Cross-Strait Relations), eds. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wu-nan, 1999); and the one that put together integration theory and divided nation theory in Yung Wei, “From ‘Multi-System Nations’ to ‘Linkage Communities’: A New Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations,” Issues & Studies 33, no. 10 (1997): 1–19; and Yung Wei, “Recognition of Divided States: Implication and Application of Concepts of ‘Multi-System Nations,’ ‘Political Entities,’ and ‘Intra-National Commonwealth,” The International Lawyer 34 (2000): 997–1011.

  6. 6.

    There has been a long tradition in international relations and foreign policy theories that address the integration of international and domestic factors. The most famous model is two-level game. See, for example, Christopher H. Achen, “Two-Level Games and Unitary Rational Actors,” in Zhengzhi Fenxi De Cengci (Level-of-Analysis Effects in Political Research), eds. Yung-ming Hsu and Huang Chi (Taipei: Weber, 2000); Peter Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert Putman, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); Keisuke Iida, “When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (1993): 403–426; Jongryn Mo, “The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38 (1994): 402–422; Jongryn Mo, “Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Agent Veto in Two-Level Games,” American Political Science Review 89 (1995): 914–924; Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomatic and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (1998): 427–460. For an application of the two-level game perspective to cross-Strait relations, see Jih-wen Lin, “Two-Level Games Between Rival Regimes: Domestic Politics and the Remaking of Cross-Strait Relations,” Issues & Studies 36, no. 6 (2000): 1–26.

  7. 7.

    For elections and Taiwan’s mainland policy, see Yu-Shan Wu, “Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations,” The China Journal 53 (2005): 35–60; and Richard Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 142–198.

  8. 8.

    See Yu-Shan Wu, “The Evolution of the KMT’s Stance on the One China Principle,” in Taiwanese Identity in the Twenty-first Century, eds. Gunter Schubert and Jens Damm (New York: Routledge, 2011).

  9. 9.

    See Cheng, Huang and Wu, eds., Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995 CITY: PUBLISHER, YEAR).

  10. 10.

    For a discussion of Taiwan’s strategic choice as a lesser power caught in the rivalry between the US and the PRC, see Yu-Shan Wu, “Pivot, Hedger, or Partner: Strategies of Lesser Powers Caught between Hegemons,” in Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace, ed. Lowell Dittmer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017).

  11. 11.

    Yu-Shan Wu, “Under the Shadow of a Rising China: Convergence towards Hedging and The Peculiar Case of Taiwan,” in Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of Power, eds. Ming-chin Monique Chu and Scott L. Kastner (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2014).

  12. 12.

    The following analysis draws on Yu-Shan Wu, “Heading towards Troubled Waters? The Impact of Taiwan’s 2016 Elections on Cross-Strait Relations,” American Journal of Chinese Studies 23, no. 1 (2016): 59–75.

  13. 13.

    Chi Su and An-kuo Cheng, eds., “Yige Zhongguo, Gezi Biaoshu” Gongshi de Shishi (“One China, with Respective Interpretations”—A Historical Account of the Consensus of 1992) (Taipei: National Policy Foundation, 2002), p. i.

  14. 14.

    It is stated in the document that “The two sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the meaning of ‘one China.’ It should mean the Republic of China (ROC), founded in 1912 and with de jure sovereignty over all of China. The ROC, however, currently has jurisdiction only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu…Since 1949, China has been temporarily divided, and each side of the Taiwan Strait is administered by a separate political entity. This is an objective reality.” See National Unification Council, “‘Yige Zhongguo’ de Hanyi” (“On the Meaning of ‘One China’”), http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=68275&CtNode=5836&mp=4, accessed January 1, 2016.

  15. 15.

    In August 1998, the advisory group on strengthening the ROC’s sovereignty (qianghua Zhonghuaminguo zhuquan diwei xiaozu) was formed, and their report was finished in May 1999. In July Lee announced the group’s “two-state theory” in the famous interview with Deutsche Welle. He was trying to torpedo the visit to Taiwan by Wang Daohan, the mainland’s chief negotiator. It is worth noting that Tsai Ing-wen, who later joined the DPP government under Chen Shui-bian and won the 2016 presidential election, was a member of the advisory group that proposed the “two-state theory.” This foretells her later position.

  16. 16.

    Mainland Affairs Council, Lee zongtong teshu guoyuguo guanxi—Zhonghua minguo zhengce shuoming wenjian (Special State to State Relationship by President Lee Teng-hui: An Explanatory Note on the ROC’s Policy), (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 1999).

  17. 17.

    Yu-Shan Wu, “The Evolution of the KMT’s Stance on the One-China Principle: National Identity in Flux,” in Taiwanese Identity in the twenty-first Century: Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives, eds. Gunter Schubert, Jens Damm (London: Routledge, 2011).

  18. 18.

    During Lien’s trip to China, he made a fervent speech at Peking University that appealed to the audience with liberalism and Chinese nationalism. Lien also openly denounced Taiwan independence in his speech. He was given a standing ovation. Lien’s trip was the first time that a KMT chairman had visited the mainland since the end of the Chinese civil war. Common commitment to Chinese nationalism and opposition to Taiwan independence bridged the gap between the KMT and the CCP, an unthinkable pair of strange bedfellows.

  19. 19.

    The four conditions are: if the KMT enters into negotiation with the CCP, if the KMT betrays the interest of the Taiwanese people, if the CCP rules Taiwan, and if the KMT does not practice bonne fide constitutional democracy.

  20. 20.

    The Resolution states, “Taiwan, although bearing the name of the Republic of China according to the current constitution, is not subject to the PRC’s sovereignty, and vice versa.” This was the first time when the DPP granted legitimacy to the ROC, under the condition that the ROC was simply the current name of Taiwan.

  21. 21.

    Chen even mentioned his willingness to accept the consensus reached by the SEF and the ARATS, namely “one China with respective interpretations,” as long as the other side was willing to do the same. That position was denied by his own minister of mainland affairs, Tsai Ing-wen, one day later. For Chen’s remarks, see “Zongtong jiejian meiguo yazhou jijinhui huizhang Fuller boshi” (The President received Dr. William Fuller, President of The Asia Foundation), News Release, June 27, 2000, Office of the President, http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=7712, accessed February 10, 2016.

  22. 22.

    The same wording can be found in “On the Meaning of ‘One China’” passed by the ROC’s National Unification Council in 1992. For the concessions by Beijing and the adoption of Taiwan’s wording in redefining “one China,” see Chi-hung Wei, “China-Taiwan Relations and the 1992 Consensus, 2000–2008,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 16, no. 1 (January 2006): 67–95.

  23. 23.

    Hsi-tang Pan, “‘Yizhong’ xin sanduanlun shifou neng fuzhu xingdong ‘neiwai wubie’?” (“Can the new ‘one-China’ syllogism be put into practice ‘without differentiating between cross-Strait and international relations?”), NPF Backgrounder, March 7, 2002, http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION /NS/091/NS-C-091-087.htm, accessed January 10, 2016.

  24. 24.

    President Ma Delivers Address at Symposium on “1992 Consensus” (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 2013).

  25. 25.

    “Ma-Xi hui dengchang: Ma Ying-jeou Xi Jinping kaishang fayan quanwen” (Ma-Xi meeting on stage: full text of the opening remarks by Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping), chinatimes.com, November 7, 2015YEAR?, http://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20151107003702-260401.

  26. 26.

    Tsai mentioned, “The KMT leans towards greater China and performs poorly, but the DPP can tolerate the KMT, and tolerate the ROC, because they are both included in Taiwan” (“baorong zai Taiwan limian”), Apple Daily, October 9, 2011, http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article /headline/20111009/33725978/, accessed February 10, 2016.

  27. 27.

    “Tsai Ing-wen 2016: Taiwan Faces the Future,” June 3, 2015, CSIS, http://csis.org/event/tsai-ing-wen-2016, accessed February 20.

  28. 28.

    “Tsai bashes Ma’s advocacy of ‘1992 Consensus’,” November 10, 2015, The China Post, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/11/10/450530/Tsai-bashes.htm, accessed February 10.

  29. 29.

    The US reception of Tsai in 2015 was qualitatively different from four years before. When she came to the US as the DPP’s presidential candidate in 2011, her stance on cross-Strait relations was considered ambiguous. Four years later, Tsai became more moderate and reassuring in her approach to cross-Strait affairs. See Douglas H. Paal, “Maintaining Peace Across Taiwan Strait Can Benefit All,” China Daily, January 21, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/22/maintaining-peace-across-taiwan-straits-can-benefit-all/it2u, accessed February 20, 2016.

  30. 30.

    Xi made this stern warning when he attended a meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on March 4, 2015. See “Xi chongshen jiuer gongshi: jichu bulao, didong shanyao” (Xi reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus: if the foundation is undermined, then the ground will move and mountain will be shaken), worldjournal.com, March 5, 2015, http://www.worldjournal.com/2610831/article-習近平重申九二共識:基礎不牢地動山搖/.

  31. 31.

    Concerning Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy, see the official website at http://www.moea.gov.tw/MNS/otn/news/News.aspx?kind=1&menu_id=2629&news_id=71631.

  32. 32.

    See, for example, Tsai’s Double Tenth (national day) address on October 10, 2016. “Taiwan ‘will not bow’ to Beijing on sovereignty issue, says President,” DW, http://www.dw.com/en/taiwan-will-not-bow-to-beijing-on-sovereignty-issue-says-president/a-36003201.

  33. 33.

    See the KMT’s platform adopted after Wu’s inauguration in August 2017 at: http://www.kmt.org.tw/p/blog-page_3.html.

  34. 34.

    Sean Lin, Article author? “KMT assets to be seized for unpaid fine,” Taipei Times, August 27, 2017YEAR?, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/08/27/2003677254.

  35. 35.

    Stacy Hsu,Author? “KMT seeks Grand Justices ruling on ill-gotten assets,” Taipei Times, July 27, 2016YEAR?, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/07/27/2003651870.

  36. 36.

    Ben Bland Author?, “Maverick mayor shakes up Taiwan politics,” Financial Times, September 29, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/031106c0-a4f1-11e7-9e4f-7f5e6a7c98a2.

  37. 37.

    Tsai Ya-hua, Su Fang-he Author?, “Ko’s ‘Two Sides are the Same Family’ shook collaboration with DPP” (Ko ‘liang’an yijiaqin chongji yu luying hezuo), Liberty Times, July 5, 2017, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/1116243.

  38. 38.

    Lee I-chia Author?, “MAC defends itself over Ko’s complaint,” Taipei Times, September 14, 2017, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2017/09/14/2003678404; Lee I-chia Author?, “City government did its job: Ko,” Taipei Times, September 27, 2017 Year?, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2017/09/27/2003679233.

  39. 39.

    In the Lin cabinet, all the ministers in charge of national security, such as defense, foreign affairs, and mainland affairs, including Lin himself, are “mainlander” professional bureaucrats, a sign of Tsai’s pro-stability cross-Strait policy.

  40. 40.

    Factions in the DPP were officially dissolved in 2006, but many of them continue to operate, particularly the New Tide Faction.

  41. 41.

    According to a poll commissioned by Taiwan Trust Brain, Lai is more popular than Tsai among DPP supporters if he were to run for president in 2020, and he has a better chance than Tsai to defeat the KMT rival. See Author? NO AUTHOR, “Press conference for the release of a survey on ‘Government Crisis in Poll Numbers: An Analysis on the 2020 Presidential Election’” (Cong zuixin mindiao kan zhizheng weiji: 2020 zongtong xuanqing guancha pingxi), Taiwan Brain Trust, http://www.braintrust.tw/article_detail/2150.

  42. 42.

    Sean Lin Author?, “Lai reaffirms support for independence,” Liberty Times, September 27, 2017, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/09/27/2003679217.

  43. 43.

    Lin Ching-yin, Chiu Tsai-wei, Hsu Chia-yu Author?, “Lai: Tsai government would not announce Taiwan independence, nor would it hold an independence referendum” (Laikui: Tsai zhengfu buhui xuanbu taidu buhui taidu gongtou), UDN News Network, October 4, 2017, https://udn.com/news/story/11515/2738316.

  44. 44.

    Lin Ching-yin Author?, “Did the president know beforehand? Lai: She knows my personal beliefs” (Zongtong shiqian zhiqing? Lai: Ta zhidao wo geren zhuzhang), UDN News Network, September 29, 2017, https://udn.com/news/story/11515/2729216.

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  1. Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan

    Yu-Shan Wu

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  1. Department of Politics and International Affairs, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA

    Wei-chin Lee

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Wu, YS. (2019). The DPP Ascendancy and Cross-Strait Relations. In: Lee, Wc. (eds) Taiwan’s Political Re-Alignment and Diplomatic Challenges. Politics and Development of Contemporary China. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77125-0_8

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