Skip to main content

Civic Dignity in the Age of Donald Trump: A Kantian Perspective

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Trump and Political Philosophy
  • 864 Accesses

Abstract

If there is one generally acknowledged “take away” from the election of Trump, it may well be that the old divisions between right and left no longer hold. Trump supporters were seemingly moved less by traditional conservative appeals to free markets and small government than by anger against perceived condescension and indifference on the part of the cultural elite to their own deeply held moral beliefs and sense of personal dignity. Kant offers both insight into and potential remedies for the dilemmas growing out of our present situation. This is particularly true in matters of economic policy and civic engagement, where “top down” solutions have often left their would-be beneficiaries feeling ever more powerless and disrespected. By addressing these concerns in the name of common citizenship, Kant’s thought helps restore the meaning of the core constitutional principles of freedom, equality, and civic dignity that Trump’s presidency increasingly puts in question.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 24.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 32.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For a discussion of some of these links, see also the chapter in this volume by John Burt; see also his Lincoln’s Tragic Pragmatism (2013).

  2. 2.

    See, for example, Beiner (2011).

  3. 3.

    On Kant’s relation to Siéyès and the constitutional moderates, see also Maliks (2014).

  4. 4.

    When Kant’s speaks of the innate right to “independence” from the elective wills of others, he uses “Unabhängigkeit,” rather than “Selbständigkeit,” a term he here exclusively reserves for citizenship in the “active” sense. (Cf., however, Vorarbeiten [19: 351]; and Theory and Practice [8: 295], where Kant equates Selbstandigkeit with being sui iuris.).

  5. 5.

    Kant’s understanding of self-sufficiency thus not only falls outside Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction between positive and negative freedom , but also is not to be identified with the “third concept of freedom” more recently championed by Quentin Skinner. On Berlin’s two concepts of freedom in relation to Kant see also Williams (2013).

  6. 6.

    Siéyès, Arch Parl., 27 August 1789, tome VIII, p. 503.

  7. 7.

    A “person” is a subject “whose actions may be imputed to him.” “Moral personality” is the freedom of a rational being under moral laws,” from which it follows, Kant says, that “a person is subject to no laws other than those he gives himself (either alone or at least along with others).” [6: 223]

  8. 8.

    I.e., who have not willfully made poverty a “means of acquisition.” Kant’s own striking example of such no-fault neediness is that of abandoned children, whom the state is to charge the people “with not allowing to perish knowingly.” [6: 326–27]

  9. 9.

    See, for example, Pettit (2001), Skinner (1998).

  10. 10.

    See note 10 above.

  11. 11.

    In the Anthropology and Lectures on Pedagogy, Kant suggests that the “idea of education” has not yet been fully worked out and, indeed, may never be.

  12. 12.

    See Abraham Lincoln , “Address to the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society: September 30, 1859.

  13. 13.

    That wealth and active citizenship are not identical categories can be illustrated by the example of wealthy minors, whose funds are administered by others.

  14. 14.

    See Critique of Judgment [5: 375n.].

  15. 15.

    See Kant , ‘What is Enlightenment?’: an ‘enlightened’ prince , who considers it his duty, in religious matters, not to prescribe anything to his people, ‘will reject the arrogant name of tolerance.’ [8: 40] From a Kantian point of view, mere toleration (implying as it does an evil one chooses to put up with) would not be enough, while ‘celebration’ of difference for its own sake (as some contemporary ethicists urge) would be equally misguided.

  16. 16.

    “Nachschrift eines Freundes,” [8: 445].

Bibliography

  • Beiner, Ronald. 2011. Paradoxes in Kant’s Account of Citizenship. In Kant and the Concept of Community, ed. Chalton Payne and Lucas Thorp. Rochester: University of Rochester Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immanuel. All references are to volume and page number in the Academy Edition of Kant’s Work [Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften] (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1968–). (These references also appear in the standard Cambridge University Press edition of Kant’s work in translation).

    Google Scholar 

  • Maliks, Reidar. 2014. Kant’s Politics in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pettit, Philip. 2001. A Theory of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Skinner, Quentin. 1998. Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, Howard. 2013. Kant and Libertarianism. In Kant on Practical Justification, ed. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu. Oxford: Oxford Unviersity Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Shell, S.M. (2018). Civic Dignity in the Age of Donald Trump: A Kantian Perspective. In: Sable, M., Torres, A. (eds) Trump and Political Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74427-8_10

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics