Abstract
For the best part of the 2000s and 2010s, Iran’s nuclear programme was a major source of international concern. In spite of Iran’s insistence that it sought the capability to use atomic energy for electricity production, policy-makers and experts in America, Europe and elsewhere feared that the Islamic Republic could in fact be after the technological and industrial capacity to build nuclear weapons. A coalition of six world powers—China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, along with the EU—determined to bring Iran to agree to verifiable guarantees of the solely peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Thanks to a combination of diplomacy and sanctions, their efforts were eventually successful. On 14 July 2015, after marathon talks in Vienna, the group and Iran struck a landmark deal that removed the prospect of an Iranian nuclear breakout for an extended period of time.
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Notes
- 1.
More alarming still was the finding of traces of enriched uranium at the Natanz facility as well as the Kalaye Electrical Company in Tehran, as it indirectly implied that Iran could have already started to secretly enrich uranium at some undeclared facilities (Gaietta 2015: 92). At the time, Iran was not known to have enriched uranium – in fact, it was not even assumed to possess the necessary technology or to have mastered the know-how. Sometime later, Western experts concluded that the traces of enriched uranium found in Iran derived from contaminated machinery that Iran had imported from Pakistan (Linzer 2005). This finding removed the concern that Iran could have enriched uranium in undisclosed facilities, but not the one over Iran’s enrichment programme.
- 2.
In the early 1990s, Iran tried to persuade the Germans to reactivate work at Bushehr, but their efforts hit against a wall. According to Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s ambassador to Germany from 1990 to 1997 (and nuclear negotiator in 2003–5), the Germans declined Iran’s requests under pressure from the United States and Israel (Mousavian 2008: 65).
- 3.
The United States commonly refers to Iran as a state ‘sponsor of terrorism’. Iran was allegedly involved in attacks against Iranian exiles as well as US, Israeli and Saudi targets in countries such as Argentina, France, Germany, Kenya, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia itself. While several cases of ‘terrorism’ involved political assassinations of Iranian dissidents and enemies to the regime (Mousavian 2008: 135–136), others made casualties among foreign civilians, such as the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires. The US Department of State believed Iran to have provided a limited number of al-Qaeda operatives with safe haven in exchange for a pledge to abstain from any activity inside Iran. In addition, Iran actively and openly supported armed groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which the US Department of State officially designated terrorist organisations (Department of State 2012).
- 4.
Phone interview with a high-level E3 official, 21 April 2009.
- 5.
Production of uranium hexafluoride is alternatively called ‘gas conversion’ because it consists of the transformation of uranium oxide (the so-called yellow cake, as it appears in the form of yellow concentrate powder) into gaseous form. Uranium hexafluoride is the feedstock used in enrichment activities.
- 6.
- 7.
The centrifuges are rotating cylinders fed with uranium hexafluoride (which is in gaseous form) that separate the more fissionable U235 isotope from the less fissionable U238 by spinning at supersonic speed. Uranium is then turned again into solid form, ready to be crafted into a fuel rod (necessary for a nuclear reactor) or, after further enrichment, into the core material of a bomb.
- 8.
The full text of the Paris Agreement was included in a communication by IAEA Director General El Baradei to the Board of Governors, based on a letter sent to him by the E3 and Iran on 26 November 2004.
- 9.
According to Iran’s constitution, the two-term limit only applies to consecutive terms. Having been president from 1989 to 1997, Rafsanjani was entitled to run again in 2005.
- 10.
The full text of the E3/EU August 2005 offer to Iran is included in a communication by the IAEA director general to the agency’s executive board dated 5 August. The Iranian government’s response was delivered some time at the end of August 2005.
- 11.
The E3/EU statement was included in a communication by the IAEA.
- 12.
A brief History of official proposals on the Iranian nuclear issue is posted on the website of the Arms Control Association, the US-based non-governmental organisation (https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals). The page was last updated in January 2014.
- 13.
Obama delivered his TV address on Nowruz, the Persian New Year’s Day (19 March 2009). The video is available on the White House’s website at www.whitehouse.gov/video/The-Presidents-Message-to-the-Iranian-People. In a less publicised way, the message was conveyed again in 2010.
- 14.
Interview with an official from the HR office, 22 June 2010. Iran’s May 2010 deal with Brazil and Turkey superficially resembled the US-French-Russian-Iranian nuclear fuel swap of October 2009. On substance, however, it was flawed in many respects. The agreement committed Iran to shipping abroad the same amount of LEU foreseen by the October 2009 deal, but neglected three critical factors: first, in the interval between the two deals Iran had increased its LEU stock, whereby it would have remained in possession of enough LEU for fabricating the necessary HEU for a bomb anyway; second, the original deal was supposed to deprive Iran of any reason to enrich uranium to the 20 per cent threshold, which Iran had started doing after the deal’s collapse; third, the Brazilian-Turkish version of the deal failed to address Iran’s autonomous enrichment capacity, which was the main bone of contention for the E3/EU+3. Brazil and Turkey seemed to view the nuclear fuel swap as an end in itself, while the E3/EU+3 had seen it as a confidence-building measure whose purpose was to create enough room for a negotiation over a comprehensive agreement (Alcaro 2011: 127–8).
- 15.
The US intelligence community asserted in 2007 that it had high confidence that Iran had frozen all military or military-related nuclear work in 2003 and moderate confidence that by 2007 it had not yet restarted it.
- 16.
Other measures included a prohibition to develop ballistic capabilities (which Iran seemed to be acquiring at good pace), an embargo on certain heavy weapons, as well as a framework for intercepting and inspecting cargoes suspected of transporting forbidden goods to Iran.
- 17.
The legal basis for actions against companies with links to the IRGC are Presidential Executive Orders 13,224 (23 September 2001) and 13,382 (28 June 2005). The Treasury Department maintains and periodically updates black lists of persons and companies.
- 18.
An up-to-date and detailed account of UN, EU and US sanctions against Iran is available on the website of Iran Watch, an observatory set up by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control (www.iranwatch.org/).
- 19.
The cyberattacks were reportedly the result of coordinated US-Israeli action. The targeted assassinations have been attributed to Israel’s intelligence (Pollack 2013: 147–150).
- 20.
Iran Watch compiled a list of nuclear milestones that Iran crossed over the last 50 years. The timeline is available here: http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/iran-nuclear-milestones-1967-2016
- 21.
The US delegations included high-level or top officials from the State Department: Jake Sullivan, Secretary Clinton’s deputy chief of staff in July 2012, and Deputy Secretary of State William Burns in March 2013 (Rozen 2015).
- 22.
Iran committed to doing so by converting part of the stock to oxidised form, which is less prone to proliferation risks, as well as by blending it down to 3–5 per cent levels of enrichment.
- 23.
As the E3/EU+3 and Iran had not really agreed to a text in Lausanne, but only to some general parameters, the ‘fact sheet’ that the State Department published on its website reflected the US view of the set of arrangements on which the parties had reached an understanding of the sort (Fabius 2016: 32).
- 24.
To approximately 5000, down from around 19,000, 9000 of which operational.
- 25.
From 10 tons to 300 kg.
- 26.
Experts estimated that Iran would need about one year to produce enough HEU for a bomb. It is worth underlining that Iran would still need to ‘weaponise’ the HEU, that is, shape it to fit atop a ballistic missile (the only credible delivery system Iran would use). In short, the time for Iran to have a single weapon ready to use would be longer than one year (probably significantly longer).
- 27.
Iran was allowed to trade in nuclear technologies under a special arrangement. The embargo on weapons sales and technologies and materials for ballistic missiles were to remain in place for five and eight years, respectively.
- 28.
Six of the twelve members of the Guardian Council are appointed directly by the supreme leader, while the other six are picked by the parliament from a list of jurists provided by the head of the judiciary (who is himself appointed by the supreme leader). The Guardian Council has the power to disqualify would-be candidates for the presidency or parliamentary seats and veto any law passed by parliament.
- 29.
For a list of all actions that the European Union was committed to taking in accordance with the JCPOA on Implementation Day, see EEAS (2016).
- 30.
The Brookings Institution and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), two leading Washington-based think tanks, have posted on their website a useful summary of the JCPOA ’s implementation timetable. The Brookings’ timetable is available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/07/21/a-comprehensive-timeline-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/. The CSIS’ one is available here: http://jcpoatimeline.csis.org/
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Alcaro, R. (2018). The History: The 2003–16 Iran Nuclear Crisis. In: Europe and Iran’s Nuclear Crisis. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74298-4_3
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