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Cultural Underpinnings of Current Russian Nuclear and Security Strategy

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Crossing Nuclear Thresholds

Abstract

Dima Adamsky tracks Russian strategic culture from the Soviet period through the current day, arguing that more continuity than change is featured in Russian security thinking. Adamsky interweaves an analysis of Russian strategic culture with descriptions of the current Russian geopolitical threat perception, the architecture of its nuclear community, and the evolution of Russian nuclear and cross-domain coercion strategies over the last two decades. Cautioning that Russia’s siege mentality will continue to color its perceptual lens, Adamsky argues that imagined threat perceptions may encourage Moscow to draw flawed conclusions and attribute non-existent aggressive intentions to its adversaries, resulting in overreaction. Adamsky ends with a powerful contribution to deterrence thinking: Inspired by Clausewitz’s “culminating point of victory,” Adamsky argues that US practitioners may benefit from considering the “culminating point of deterrence”—a term he employs to refer to the moment after which additional threats may become counterproductive, provoking escalation instead of restraint.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy,” IFRI Proliferation Papers, no.54, November 2015; Bobo Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press with Chatham House, 2015); Anthony Cordesman, Russia and the Color Revolution: Russian View of a World Destabilized by the US and the West (Washington, DC, CSIS, 2014).

  2. 2.

    Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence Theory and Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 37, no.1, 2014.

  3. 3.

    David Hoffman, The Dead Hand (New York: Doubleday, 2010).

  4. 4.

    Adamsky, 2014.

  5. 5.

    Ibid.

  6. 6.

    “Hybrid” categorization is inaccurate. The current Russian thinking and waging of war is different from HW, even if similar in some regards. Ironically, the Russian strategic community envisions its NGW , which it wages across several domains, as a response to what it sees as a Western “hybrid campaign” directed against Russia.

  7. 7.

    Adamksy, 2014; V.Poletaev and V. Alferov, “O neiadernom sderzhivanii,” Voennaia Mysl’, July, no.7, 2015, pp. 3–10.

  8. 8.

    In Russian military terminology, reconnaissance-strike complex stands for the system that integrates long-range precision-guided munitions (strike) with the host of intelligence , surveillance and reconnaissance sensors, and command and control capabilities into one operational architecture.

  9. 9.

    See Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: the Impact of Cultural Factors on Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US and Israel (Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 2010), pp. 42–45.

  10. 10.

    See Adamsky, 2015, pp. 25–27.

  11. 11.

    Adamsky, 2010, pp. 40–42.

  12. 12.

    For examples, see the complex view of threats and countermeasures in Russian National Security Strategy, 31 December 2015.

  13. 13.

    Adamsky, 2015, p. 29.

  14. 14.

    Ibid., p. 29.

  15. 15.

    Ibid., p. 25.

  16. 16.

    Ibid., p. 23.

  17. 17.

    Adamsky, 2010, pp. 44–47.

  18. 18.

    Adamsky, 2014.

  19. 19.

    Ibid.

  20. 20.

    Adamsky, 2010, pp. 48–50.

  21. 21.

    See Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky and Kjell Inge Bjerga, Contemporary Military Innovation (New York: Routledge, 2012).

  22. 22.

    Adamsky, 2010, p. 40.

  23. 23.

    Adamsky, 2014.

  24. 24.

    The problem partially rests in the inability of the Russian early warning systems to provide the leadership with the reliable notice on the incoming massive precision-guided strikes by groups of conventional low-altitude cruise missiles on military and civilian infrastructure targets. The problem is also due to the absence of criteria for defining or calculating unacceptable damage, prospective and actual, to critical social-military-economic infrastructure or to political-military command-and-control systems, by means of conventional aggression. O. Aksenov, Iu. Tret’jakov, E. Filin, “Osnovnye principi sozdaniia sistemy ocenki tekucshego I prognoziruemoga uscherba,” VM, no. 6, 2015, pp. 68–74.

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(Dima) Adamsky, D. (2018). Cultural Underpinnings of Current Russian Nuclear and Security Strategy. In: Johnson, J., Kartchner, K., Maines, M. (eds) Crossing Nuclear Thresholds. Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72670-0_6

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