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International Symposium on Intelligent and Distributed Computing

IDC 2017: Intelligent Distributed Computing XI pp 61–72Cite as

A Modified Vickrey Auction with Regret Minimization for Uniform Alliance Decisions

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Part of the book series: Studies in Computational Intelligence ((SCI,volume 737))

Abstract

We consider a supply chain management problem where a business alliance of small capacity retailers needs to collectively select a unique supplier considering the assignment’s efficiency at both the alliance and retailers’ level. We model the alliance as a multi-agent system. For this model, we present a modified Vickrey auction algorithm with regret minimization and compare it experimentally with aggregation of preferences by voting and standard Vickrey auction. Through simulation, we show that the proposed method on average reaches globally efficient and individually acceptable solutions. The solutions are evaluated in terms of different social welfare values.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. IMT Lille Douai, Douai, France

    Marin Lujak

  2. University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway

    Marija Slavkovik

Authors
  1. Marin Lujak
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  2. Marija Slavkovik
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Marin Lujak .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Informatics, Faculty of Sciences, University of Novi Sad, Novi Sad, Serbia

    Mirjana Ivanović

  2. Faculty of Automatics, Computer Science and Electronics, University of Craiova, Craiova, Romania

    Costin Bădică

  3. Institut für Informatik, Technische Universität Clausthal, Clausthal-Zellerfeld, Germany

    Jürgen Dix

  4. School of Electrical Engineering, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia

    Zoran Jovanović

  5. Dipartimento di Ingegneria Elettrica, Elettronica e Informatica, Universita degli Studi di Catania, Catania, Italy

    Michele Malgeri

  6. Department of Mathematics and Informatics, Faculty of Sciences, University of Novi Sad, Novi Sad, Serbia

    Miloš Savić

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Lujak, M., Slavkovik, M. (2018). A Modified Vickrey Auction with Regret Minimization for Uniform Alliance Decisions. In: Ivanović, M., Bădică, C., Dix, J., Jovanović, Z., Malgeri, M., Savić, M. (eds) Intelligent Distributed Computing XI. IDC 2017. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 737. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66379-1_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66379-1_6

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-66378-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-66379-1

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