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Conclusions: A Critical Analysis of the PPM Measures’ Legal Regime De Lege Lata and De Lege Ferenda

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Environmental Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 3))

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Abstract

The product-process distinction, in the form it was expressed mainly in the US – Tuna GATT Panel reports, has been largely undermined by different evolutions of case law. It might thus be asked what is left of this doctrine in the current Appellate Body’s practice. The product-process distinction was mainly based on the following assumptions:

  1. (i)

    PPM measures are not covered by Article III but are subject to Articles II (tariffs) and XI (prohibition of quantitative restrictions) ;

  2. (ii)

    In any event, differences in PPMs cannot render two products unlike and thus cannot be justified under Article III ;

  3. (iii)

    Unincorporated PPM measures are extraterritorial in nature and thus cannot in principle be justified by Article XX ;

  4. (iv)

    PPM measures that unilaterally prescribe the adoption of a particular conduct abroad threaten the multilateral trading system and are thus unjustifiable ;

  5. (v)

    When it comes to technical barriers to trade, the TBT Agreement only applies to incorporated PPMs and does not cover unincorporated PPMs.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See supra, Chaps. 6 and 7.

  2. 2.

    Concerning regulatory measures, see US – Tuna I, Panel Report, para. 5.11–5.18; US – Tuna II, Panel Report, para. 5.9 and 5.10. See also supra, 6.1.

  3. 3.

    See US – Tuna I, Panel Report, para. 5.9 ff. US – Tuna II, Panel Report, para. 5.9. See also supra, 6.3.1.2.2.

  4. 4.

    See US – Tuna I, Panel Report, para. 5.28; US – Tuna II, Panel Report, para. 5.17 ff. See also supra, 7.1.2.1.1.

  5. 5.

    See US – Tuna II, Panel Report, para. 5.26; US – Shrimp, Panel Report, para. 7.45. See also supra, 7.1.2.1.1.

  6. 6.

    See supra, 8.1.

  7. 7.

    See supra, 6.1.

  8. 8.

    See supra, 6.1.

  9. 9.

    See supra, 6.3.1.4.4.

  10. 10.

    See supra, 6.4.

  11. 11.

    See supra, 7.1.2.1.2.

  12. 12.

    See supra, 8.3.

  13. 13.

    See US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report, para. 7.401 and 7.425; US – Tuna II (Mexico), Appellate Body Report, para. 337. See supra, 8.3.

  14. 14.

    See US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5, Panel Report, para. 7.522 ff. See also supra, 7.1.2.1.1.

  15. 15.

    See supra, 7.1.2.1.1.

  16. 16.

    See US – Clove Cigarettes, Appellate Body Report, para. 91 (stating that the GATT and the TBT ‘should be interpreted in a coherent and consistent manner’).

  17. 17.

    See supra, 7.1.2.1.2.

  18. 18.

    See supra, 7.1.2.2.

  19. 19.

    See US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, para. 121. See also supra, 7.1.2.1.1 and 7.1.2.1.2.

  20. 20.

    See supra, 7.3.2.2.3.

  21. 21.

    See US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report, para. 7.78. See supra, 8.1.

  22. 22.

    See supra, 8.1.

  23. 23.

    See supra, 6.1.1.

  24. 24.

    See supra, 7.1.2.1.1.

  25. 25.

    See supra, 8.1.

  26. 26.

    See supra, 6.4 and 8.2.

  27. 27.

    See supra, 7.1.2.

  28. 28.

    See also Matsushita et al. (2015), p. 724, stating that ‘[m]uch of the reasoning in the Tuna Dolphin cases has been effectively overruled’.

  29. 29.

    See supra, 8.1.

  30. 30.

    See supra, 6.3.1.4.4.

  31. 31.

    See supra, 7.3.2.2.

  32. 32.

    See supra, 6.1 and 6.3.1.2.2. See also 7.1.2.1.1.

  33. 33.

    See Hudec (2000), pp. 187 ff.; Howse and Regan (2000), pp. 249 ff.; Vranes (2009), p. 322. See also supra, 6.3.1.2.2.

  34. 34.

    See supra, 7.1.2.2.

  35. 35.

    Idem.

  36. 36.

    See supra, 4.1.

  37. 37.

    See supra, 3.4.

  38. 38.

    See also Matsushita et al. (2015), p. 747, stating that the fact that under the WTO, the hard line against all PPM restrictions that are not based on product characteristics has been modified is ‘one of the most important aspect of WTO jurisprudence’. See also Cosbey and Mavroidis (2014), p. 300, stating that the dominant trend in the treatment of environmental trade measures by WTO adjudicating bodies has been towards deference to the regulating WTO Member. It has allowed in their view to correct the ‘clear mistake’ committed in the two original Tuna-Dolphin GATT reports.

  39. 39.

    See Jackson (2000), p. 303.

  40. 40.

    See e.g. supra, Chaps. 2–4.

  41. 41.

    See e.g. Jackson (2000), p. 306.

  42. 42.

    See supra, 2.1.

  43. 43.

    See the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, which refers to the objective of ‘entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers to trade’.

  44. 44.

    See supra, 3.1.

  45. 45.

    See Horn and Mavroidis (2008), p. 1132.

  46. 46.

    See supra, 4.1.1.

  47. 47.

    See Conrad (2011), p. 473.

  48. 48.

    See supra, 7.1.2.2.2.

  49. 49.

    See in particular supra, 6.5.1 and 7.1.2.

  50. 50.

    See e.g. theories and fluctuations in case law relating to the conditions of Article III in Chap. 6 (see in particular supra, 6.5.1).

  51. 51.

    See Bierman (2001), pp. 434 ff.; Conrad (2011), pp. 438 ff., with further references.

  52. 52.

    See e.g. supra, Chaps. 2–4.

  53. 53.

    See e.g. Sinclair (1984), p. 114; Shaw (2014), pp. 675 f.

  54. 54.

    US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, para. 114.

  55. 55.

    The most obvious example is the notion of like products in the GATT and the TBT Agreement, which is examined in details in this book.

  56. 56.

    See Article II(2) of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO.

  57. 57.

    See US – Clove Cigarettes, Appellate Body Report, para. 91.

  58. 58.

    See e.g. Mavroidis (2008a), p. 446 ff.; Distefano and Mavroidis (2011), p. 755. See also e.g. US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, para. 115; Weiler (2001), p. 206; Chang (2005), pp. 28 f.

  59. 59.

    See e.g. Distefano and Mavroidis (2011), p. 757 with further references. See also Mavroidis (2008a), p. 446 ff.

  60. 60.

    See Distefano and Mavroidis (2011), p. 759.

  61. 61.

    See supra, 8.2.

  62. 62.

    See supra, 7.3.1.

  63. 63.

    Of the same view, see Distefano and Mavroidis (2011), p. 758.

  64. 64.

    On the notions of ‘internal legitimacy’ (legitimacy vis-à-vis trade officials, Secretariat employees, etc.) and ‘external legitimacy’ (legitimacy vis-à-vis constituencies outside the WTO, such as national parliaments, governments, multinational corporations, NGO, citizens, etc.), see Weiler (2001), pp. 191 ff.

  65. 65.

    See in particular supra, 6.5.1 and 7.1.2.

  66. 66.

    See in particular the arguments made by the US – Tuna reports’ opponents (supra 2.3).

  67. 67.

    See in particular supra, 6.2, 6.3.1.3, 6.4.3.3 and 7.1.

  68. 68.

    See in particular supra, 6.4.3.3.

  69. 69.

    See supra, 6.3.1.4.

  70. 70.

    See supra, 6.5.2.2.

  71. 71.

    See supra, 6.3.1.4.

  72. 72.

    See supra, 7.1.1.2.

  73. 73.

    See supra, 7.3.4.3.

  74. 74.

    See supra, 7.3.1.

  75. 75.

    See supra, 9.3.

  76. 76.

    See supra, 6.2, 6.3.1.3, 6.4.3.3 and 7.1.

  77. 77.

    See e.g. Horn and Mavroidis (2004), pp. 60 ff.; Pauwelyn (2008), pp. 358 f. and supra, 6.4.3.3 (concerning the examination of the regulatory purpose in Article III discriminatory treatment conditions). See also supra, 6.3.2.1 (concerning the examination of the regulatory purpose in the likeness analysis).

  78. 78.

    See Mavroidis (2008b), pp. 249 ff.

  79. 79.

    See supra, 8.1.

  80. 80.

    See e.g. US – Clove Cigarettes, Appellate Body Report, para. 91, in which the Appellate Body stated that the GATT and the TBT Agreement ‘should be interpreted in a coherent and consistent manner’.

  81. 81.

    Since the reduction of barriers to trade is an objective of the WTO (See the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement).

  82. 82.

    Cf. e.g. Marceau and Trachtman (2002), p. 861.

  83. 83.

    See supra, 6.4.4.

  84. 84.

    See supra, 6.5.2.1.

  85. 85.

    See Japan – Alcohol II, Appellate Body Report, p. 21.

  86. 86.

    See supra, 6.5.2.2.

  87. 87.

    See supra, 6.4.

  88. 88.

    See supra, 7.1.2.2.2.

  89. 89.

    See Korea – Beef, Appellate Body Report, para. 162 f. See also supra, 7.2.1.1.1.

  90. 90.

    See supra, 7.2.1.2.1.

  91. 91.

    See supra, 7.3.1.

  92. 92.

    Idem.

  93. 93.

    See US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, para. 159. See also supra, 7.3.1.

  94. 94.

    US – Shrimp 21.5, Panel Report, para. 5.51.

  95. 95.

    See supra, 7.3.1.

  96. 96.

    See supra, 7.3.4.1.2.

  97. 97.

    See supra, 6.5.2.

  98. 98.

    See supra, 9.3.

  99. 99.

    See Jackson (2000), p. 303.

  100. 100.

    See e.g. supra, 9.1.

  101. 101.

    See supra, 7.2.1.

  102. 102.

    See the arguments made by the opponents to the subjective definition of likeness, supra, 6.3.2.1.2.

  103. 103.

    See supra, 9.2.

  104. 104.

    See e.g. supra, 6.3.1.4.4.

  105. 105.

    See supra, 6.4.4.

  106. 106.

    See US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, para. 161 ff. See also supra, 7.3.2.2.

  107. 107.

    See Brazil – Tyres, Appellate Body Report, para. 217 ff.

  108. 108.

    See EC – Seal Products, Appellate Body Report, para. 5.316 ff.

  109. 109.

    See e.g. US – Tuna II (Mexico), Appellate Body Report, para. 297. See also US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5, Panel Report, para. 7.591 f. and US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5, Appellate Body Report, para. 7.359 (in which the Appellate Body indicated that the crucial aspect of the assessment of the contested measure was to determine if the regulatory distinctions applicable to the different fisheries could be explained by the differences in the relative risks associated with different methods of fishing for tuna in different areas of the ocean).

  110. 110.

    See supra, 7.3.1.

  111. 111.

    In the Appellate Body’s view, the sub-paragraphs are concerned with the design of the measure, whereas the chapeau concerns the way the measure is applied. See US – Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p. 22; US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, para. 118. See also supra, 7.3.1.

  112. 112.

    Jackson (2000), p. 304.

  113. 113.

    See supra, 7.1.2.

  114. 114.

    See e.g. supra, 7.3.4.3. See also 7.3.1.

  115. 115.

    See supra, 9.3.

  116. 116.

    See also supra, 7.3.1.

  117. 117.

    In this case, the Panel considered in its US – Tuna 21.5 report that the less stringent certification requirements for tuna caught outside the ETP (certification could be made by the captain of the ship, while within the ETP, an independent observer had to be present on the ship) could not guarantee that no dolphin had been harmed or killed (see Panel Report, para. 7.586 ff).

  118. 118.

    See supra, 7.1.2.1.

  119. 119.

    See US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, para. 133 and supra, 7.1.2.1.2.

  120. 120.

    See US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report, para. 7.401 and 7.425 and supra, 8.2.

  121. 121.

    See supra, 7.1.2.1.

  122. 122.

    See supra, 7.1.2.2.

  123. 123.

    Idem.

  124. 124.

    See supra, 9.4.1. See also supra, 7.1.2.2.

  125. 125.

    See supra, 7.1.2.2.

  126. 126.

    See supra, 5.2 and 7.1.2.2.

  127. 127.

    See EC – Seal Products, Panel Report, para. 7.459; Appellate Body Report, para. 5.225. See also supra, 7.2.1.1.3.

  128. 128.

    See Charnovitz (2002), p. 67.

  129. 129.

    Ibid.

  130. 130.

    See supra, 7.3.2.2.2.

  131. 131.

    See Korea – Beef, Appellate Body Report, para. 162 f. See also supra, 7.2.1.1.1.

  132. 132.

    See supra, 7.3.2.2.2.

  133. 133.

    See US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, para. 121. See supra, 7.1.2.1.2.

  134. 134.

    See supra, 7.3.2.2.3.

  135. 135.

    See supra, 7.3.4.1.1.

  136. 136.

    See supra, 7.3.4.1.2.

  137. 137.

    See supra, 7.2.1.1.2.

  138. 138.

    Idem.

  139. 139.

    See supra, 7.3.2.2.2.

  140. 140.

    See in particular supra, 2.1.

  141. 141.

    See supra, 7.1.2.1.2.

  142. 142.

    See supra, 8.5.

  143. 143.

    See supra, 7.3.4.2.

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    David Sifonios

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Sifonios, D. (2018). Conclusions: A Critical Analysis of the PPM Measures’ Legal Regime De Lege Lata and De Lege Ferenda. In: Environmental Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65726-4_9

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