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The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law pp 907–926Cite as

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The Intersection of AML/SFT and Security Council Sanctions

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Abstract

This chapter considers the relationship which has developed between AML/SFT and UN Security Council Sanctions. The chapter describes the development of the use of sanctions within the context of counter terrorism and terrorist financing and highlights the key resolutions which led to the development of the Al-Qaida Sanctions regime. Particular consideration is given to the fair process challenges surrounding the use of targeted sanctions in this context and the introduction and development of the Office of the Ombudsperson for this particular sanctions regime. The chapter also considers some of the other challenges which arise from the intersection of AML/SFT measures with UN Security Council sanctions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See UNGA International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted 9 December 1999, opened for signature 10 January 2000) (2000) 39 ILM 270.

  2. 2.

    See UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (adopted 19 December 1988, opened for signature 20 December 1988) (1989) 28 ILM 493.

  3. 3.

    See UNGA Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, opened for signature 12 December 2000) (2001) 40 ILM 335; UNGA Convention Against Corruption (adopted 31 October 2003, opened for signature 9 December 2003) (2004) 43 ILM 37.

  4. 4.

    See, for instance, Todd Doyle, ‘Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current FATF Tactics Needlessly Violate International Law’ (2002) 24(2) Houston Journal of International Law 279; Ben Hayes, ‘Counter-Terrorism, “Policy Laundering”, and the FATF: Legalizing Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society’ (2012) 14(1–2) International Journal of Not-For-Profit Law 5; Jason Sharman and Eleni Tsingou, ‘Enduring Challenges in the Governance of Money Laundering’ (2013) 10 NUPI Policy Brief 1.

  5. 5.

    Financial Action Task Force ‘Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing’ (2001) <www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Standards%20%20IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf> accessed 8 March 2017.

  6. 6.

    For further discussion, see Colin King and Clive Walker, ‘Counter Terrorism Financing: A Redundant Fragmentation?’ (2015) 6(3) New Journal of European Criminal Law 372.

  7. 7.

    For instance, economic and trade sanctions, travel bans, arms embargoes, financial limits. For a list of cases, see UN, Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List <https://scsanctions.un.org/f op/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resources/xsl/en/consolidated.xsl> accessed15 December 2016.

  8. 8.

    See UN Charter, arts 24, 25 and 26.

  9. 9.

    See, among others, UNSC Res 1368 (12 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1368; UNSC Res 1440 (24 October 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1440; UNSC Res 1530 (11 March 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1530; UNSC Res 1611 (7 July 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1611.

  10. 10.

    See Michael Plachta, ‘The Lockerbie Case: The Role of the Security Council in Enforcing the Principle Aut Dedere Aut Judicare’ (2001) 12(1) European Journal of International Law 125.

  11. 11.

    See UN, Letter dated 20 December 1991 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, A/46/825 - S23306, 31 December 1991.

  12. 12.

    See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom) (Application Instituting Proceedings) General List No 88 [1992] ICJ 1; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States of America) (Application Instituting Proceedings) General List No 89 [1992] ICJ 1.

  13. 13.

    On 31 January 2001, the Scottish Court in The Netherlands rendered its judgment. One of the two accused, Al Amin Fhima, was found not guilty and he then returned to Libya. The other accused, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, was found guilty of murder and he was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment to be served in Scotland. For later events (including release), see Clive Walker, Terrorism and the Law (OUP 2011), para 11(121)ff.

  14. 14.

    See UNSC Res 661 (6 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/661.

  15. 15.

    See, for example, UNSC Res 733 (23 January 1992) UN Doc S/RES/733; UNSC Res 788 (19 November 1992) UN Doc S/RES/788; UNSC Res 864 (15 September 1993) UN Doc S/RES/864; UNSC Res 918 (17 May 1994) UN Doc S/RES/918.

  16. 16.

    See UNSC Res 820 (17 April 1993) UN Doc S/RES/820, targeting the assets of government authorities within the former Yugoslavia; UNSC Res 917 (6 May 1994) UN Doc S/RES/914 para 2, in support of Security Council efforts to reinstall Jean-Bertrand Aristide following the October 1991 coup in Haiti—all States were required to impose a travel ban on all officers of the Haitian military, including the police (major participants in the coup and subsequent illegal government) and those employed or acting on behalf of them and their immediate families; UNSC Res 942 (23 September 1994) UN Doc S/RES/942 para 42, concerning an arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia and imposing a travel ban against a range of authorities and those providing support in violation of the resolution, and establishing a Committee to develop and maintain a list based on information from States and organizations of the persons falling within the paragraph.

  17. 17.

    See UNSC Res 1127 (28 August 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1127. An existing Committee was used to prepare guidelines for implementation and to identify the individuals to be targeted.

  18. 18.

    The original sanctions in Resolution 1267 imposed a flight ban on all Taliban owned, leased or operated flights, and required the freezing of Taliban funds and other financial resources. UNSC Res 1333 (19 December 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1333 amended the regime by adding an arms embargo and extending the asset freeze to include individuals associated with Osama bin Laden, and individuals and entities associated with him. UNSC Res 1526 (30 January 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1526 further expanded the sanctions to include a travel ban on listed individuals.

  19. 19.

    Gavin Sullivan and Ben Hayes, Blacklisted, Targeted Sanctions, Preemptive Security and Fundamental Rights (European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights 2010) 12.

  20. 20.

    According to the Carnegie Council, in the weeks following 9/11 the United States added some 200 names to the Consolidated List: see Yvonne Terlingen, ‘The US and the UN’s Targeted Sanctions of Suspected Terrorists: What Role for Human Rights?’ (2010) 24(2) Ethics and International Affairs 131.

  21. 21.

    UNSC Res 1989 (17 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1989.

  22. 22.

    See UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373. In particular, see paras 1 and 2.

  23. 23.

    See Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (n 1) arts 4 and 8.

  24. 24.

    See, for example, Elin Miller, ‘The Use of Targeted Sanctions in the Fight Against International Terrorism—What About Human Rights?’ (2003)97 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)46; Peter Gutherie, ‘Security Council Sanctions and the Protection of Individual Rights’ (2005) 60(3) New York University Annual Survey of American Law 491, 503–6; Identical letters dated 19 May 2006 from the Permanent Representatives of Germany, Sweden and Switzerland to the UN addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc A/60/887 - S/2006/331 annexing ‘Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and Clear Procedures: White Paper prepared by the Watson Institute Targeted Sanctions Project Brown University 30 June 2006’; Larissa van den Herik, ‘The Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In Need of Better Protection of the Individual’ (2007) 20(4) Leiden Journal of International Law 797; Ian Johnstone, ‘The UN Security Council, Counterterrorism and Human Rights’ in Andrea Bianchi and Alexis Keller (eds), Studies in International Law: Counterterrorism: Democracy’s Challenge (Hart Publishing 2008) 341; Michael Bothe, ‘Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions Against Presumed Terrorists: The Need to Comply with Human Rights Standards’ (2008) 6(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 541; Clemens Feinaugle, ‘The UN Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee: Emerging Principles of International Law for the Protection of Individuals’ (2008) 9(11) German Law Journal 1513; Carmen Cheung, The UN Security Council’s 1267 Regime and the Rule of Law in Canada (British Columbia Civil Liberties Association 2010).

  25. 25.

    For example, in response to the inclusion of three Swedish nationals (Abdirisak Aden, Abdi Abdulaziz Ali and Yusuf Ahmed Ali) in the list as of November 2001, Sweden became a vocal critique of the regime. Their campaign to obtain the delisting of the individuals included public protests and denouncement of the sufficiency of the case, a national investigation and lengthy bilateral negotiations with the United States which resulted in delisting but only in 2006.

  26. 26.

    See Christina Eckes, EU Counter Terrorism Policies and Fundamental Rights: The Case of Individual Sanctions (OUP 2009) 31.

  27. 27.

    See UNSC Res 1735 (22 December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1735 paras 10 and 11; Nada v Switzerland (2012) ECHR 1691.

  28. 28.

    See UNSC Res 1822 (30 June 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1822, para 12.

  29. 29.

    See UNSC Res 1730 (19 December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/730.

  30. 30.

    See UNSC Res 1822 (n28) paras 25 and 26.

  31. 31.

    See Her Majesty’s Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC) [2010] UKSC 2 and [2010] 2 AC 534; Abdelrazik v Canada [2010] 2 FCR 467; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-06351.

  32. 32.

    The Al Barakaat International Foundation was removed from the later cases in this series of litigation as it was delisted by both the 1267 Committee and the European Union during the Resolution 1822 review in October 2009: see UN ‘Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee Removes Names of Four Entities from Consolidated List’ (Press Release SC/9773, 22 October 2009) <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9773.doc.htm>accessed15 December 2016.

  33. 33.

    Case T-306/01 Yusuf v Council [2005] ECR II-3533; Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2009] AC 1225. For a detailed discussion of this case and related issues, see Allan Rosas, ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Rule of Law: Issues of Judicial Control’ in Ana Maria Salinas de Frías, Katia Samuel, and Nigel White (eds), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (OUP 2012); Katalin Tunder Huber and Alejandro Rodiles, ‘An Ombudsperson in the United Nations Security Council: A Paradigm Shift?’ (2012) Décimo Aniversario Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 107, 118–21. See also Thomas Biersteker and Sue Eckert, ‘Addressing Challenges to Targeted Sanctions: An Update of the Watson Report’ (The Graduate Institute Geneva and Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, October 2009), Appendix A <www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/2009_10_targeted_sanctions.pdf> accessed 8 March 2017.

  34. 34.

    See Kadi (n 31) [318]-[326].

  35. 35.

    This was the number of members at the time of the decision in 2008.

  36. 36.

    See Nada v Switzerland (n27); Al-Dulimi and Montana Management v Switzerland (2016) ECHR 206.

  37. 37.

    See UNSC Res 1904 (17 December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1904.

  38. 38.

    The Group currently comprises Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Liechenstein, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. At the time Austria was not in the group as it held the Chair of the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions committee.

  39. 39.

    For a detailed discussion of the events leading up to the adoption of Resolution 1904, see Rosas (n33); Tunde Huber and Rodiles (n33) 121–27.

  40. 40.

    State of nationality, residence and the Designating State as well as any State that might hold relevant information.

  41. 41.

    See UNSC Res 2161 (17 June 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2161, Annex II para 7(c).

  42. 42.

    Ibid. Annex II para 8(c).

  43. 43.

    Ibid. Annex II paras 9 and 11.

  44. 44.

    Ibid. para 43 and Annex II para 15.

  45. 45.

    Ibid. para 42 and Annex II para 14.

  46. 46.

    This includes one entity which was not delisted per se but the name of which was removed as an alias of another listed entity.

  47. 47.

    See UNSC, Twelfth Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) (1 August 2016) UN Doc S/2016/671.

  48. 48.

    See Kadi (n33); Nada (n27); Al-Dulimi (n36).

  49. 49.

    See Joined Cases C-584/10P, C-593/10P and C-595/10P European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi [2013] ECR I - 518[111]-[131]; Al-Dulimi (n36) [69]-[70] and [149]. For a review of these final cases, see Karen Cooper and Clive Walker, ‘Heroic or Hapless? The Legal Reforms of Counter-Terrorism Financial Sanctions Regimes in the European Union’ in Federico Fabbrini and Vicki Jackson, Constitutionalism Across Borders in the Struggle Against Terrorism (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016).

  50. 50.

    See Twelfth Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson (n 47) Annex (Case 19).

  51. 51.

    See UNSC, Press release ‘Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee Approves Deletion of One Entry from Consolidated List’ (23 September 2009) UN Doc SC/9744.

  52. 52.

    See UN, ‘Sanctions’ <www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/information> accessed 15 December 2016.

  53. 53.

    See Al-Dulimi (n 36).

  54. 54.

    Ibid.

  55. 55.

    On the purpose of UNSC sanctions, see Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, ‘Evaluating UN Sanctions: New Ground, New Dilemmas, and Unintended Consequences’ (2009–2010) 65 International Journal 1; Enrico Carish and Loraine Rickard-Martin, ‘Global Threats and the Role of United Nations Sanctions’ (2011) International Policy Analysis FES New York 1;Thomas J Biersteker, Sue E Eckert and Marcos Tourinho (eds), Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Actions (CUP 2016).

  56. 56.

    See, for instance, Doyle (n 4); Hayes (n 4).

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  1. International Criminal Court, The Hague, Netherlands

    Kimberly Prost

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  1. University of Sussex, Falmer, United Kingdom

    Colin King

  2. University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom

    Clive Walker

  3. Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, IN, USA

    Jimmy Gurulé

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Prost, K. (2018). The Intersection of AML/SFT and Security Council Sanctions. In: King, C., Walker, C., Gurulé, J. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64498-1_37

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