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China's Rise in the Age of Globalization pp 1–49Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Introduction

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Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Economic History ((PEHS))

Abstract

Has China risen? And if so, has the West created a Frankenstein? Why has the widely perceived economic success of China been followed not by a democratic transition but by a totalitarian turn? The author challenges the conventional wisdom that takes the “rise of China” as a given. Refuting both market liberals and market skeptics, the author argues that China’s deep integration into the global economy has led to dependent development. Such an end result was not preordained. The alternative pathway of autonomous development not only exists but also is available for China, even in the age of liberal globalization. This book sheds intense critical light on China’s “reform and opening” process from a multidisciplinary perspective.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Francis Fukuyama (1989), “The End of History?” The National Interest, Summer.

  2. 2.

    Re-Stalinization, special issue of Communist and Post-Communist Studies, March 2016, 49:1, pp. 1–112.

  3. 3.

    Robert Kagan (2008), The Return of History and the End of Dreams, London: Atlantic Books.

  4. 4.

    Eliane Glaser (2014), “Bring Back Ideology: Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ 25 Years On,” The Guardian, 21/03/2014. http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/21/bring-back-ideology-fukuyama-end-history-25-years-on

  5. 5.

    “Wang Qishan Sent out Blurred Signal,” Radio France Internationale (RFI), 12/05/2015. http://cn.rfi.fr/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/20150512-%E4%B8%AD%E7%BA%AA%E5%A7%94%E4%B9%A6%E8%AE%B0%E7%8E%8B%E5%B2%90%E5%B1%B1%E4%BC%9A%E8%A7%81%E6%97%A5%E8%A3%94%E5%AD%A6%E8%80%85%E9%87%8A%E6%94%BE%E6%A8%A1%E7%B3%8A%E2%80%9C%E4%BF%A1%E5%8F%B7%E2%80%9D

  6. 6.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yWJWCoVYF_Q, posted on 24/02/2016.

  7. 7.

    Timothy Stanley and Alexander Lee (2014), “It’s Still Not the End of History,” The Atlantic Monthly, September 1. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/its-still-not-the-end-of-history-francis-fukuyama/379394/

  8. 8.

    Wu Guoguang interviewed by NTDTV, 2/05/2011. http://www.ntdtv.com/xtr/gb/2011/05/30/a65981.html.-%E3%80%90%E9%80%8F%E8%A7%86%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E3%80%91%E5%90%B4%E5%9B%BD%E5%85%89%3A-%E6%97%A0%E6%B3%95%E9%80%9A%E8%BF%87%E7%9A%84%E3%80%9D%E7%AA%84%E9%97%A8%E3%80%9E.html

  9. 9.

    Lieven (2003), Empire, p. 45. An example of this was the exportation of German welfare state spreading “across Atlantic to America” from the late nineteenth century onward. See Richard M. Ebeling, “Marching to Bismarck’s Drummer: The Origins of the Modern Welfare State,” FEE (Foundation for Economic Education), 1/12/2007. https://fee.org/articles/marching-to-bismarcks-drummer-the-origins-of-the-modern-welfare-state/

  10. 10.

    Ibid. with Lieven, p. 45.

  11. 11.

    Lieven (2003), Empire, pp. 44–45.

  12. 12.

    Richard Franklin Bensel (2008), The Political Economy of Industrialization, 1877–1900, NY: Cambridge University Press, Preface: xvii.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., pp. 1–2.

  14. 14.

    Bruce Cumings (1984), “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy,” International Organization, 38:1, pp. 1–40.

  15. 15.

    Ibid.

  16. 16.

    Dylan Finlay (2012), “Gorbachev’s Miscalculation and the Collapse of the Soviet Union,” Foreign Policy, November 22. https://thestateofthecentury.wordpress.com/2012/11/22/gorbachevs-miscalculation-and-the-collapse-of-the-soviet-union/

  17. 17.

    Joseph Stiglitz (2002), Globalization and Its Discontents, London: Penguin Books, p. 14.

  18. 18.

    Ha-Joon Chang (2003), Kicking away the Ladder—Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, London: Anthem Press, pp. 17–18.

  19. 19.

    Robert Wade (2003), Governing the Market—Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (2nd ed.), NJ: Princeton University Press, introduction, p. xv.

  20. 20.

    Joseph Stiglitz (2007), Making Globalization Work: The Next Steps to Global Justice, London: Penguin Books, p. 19.

  21. 21.

    Ha-Joon Chang (2009), “Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: How Development Has Disappeared from the ‘Development’ Discourse?” 15/02/2009. http://hajoonchang.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/HamletwithoutthePrinceofDenmark-revised.pdf

  22. 22.

    “Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China: Experience with Special Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2501

  23. 23.

    Thomas G. Rawski, “What’s Happening to China’s GDP Statistics?” 12/09/2001. http://www.pitt.edu/~tgrawski/papers2001/gdp912f.pdf (hyperlink no longer available); Lester Thurow, “A Chinese Century? Maybe It’s the Next One,” New York Times, 19/08/2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/business/yourmoney/19view.html

  24. 24.

    The Wall Street Journal, 18/06/2014.

  25. 25.

    Nick Crafts (1994), “The Golden Age of Economic Growth in Western Europe, 1950–1973,” Warwick Economic Research Paper, No. 427. https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/1989-1994/twerp_427.pdf

  26. 26.

    http://news.ifeng.com/history/phtv/tfzg/detail_2010_03/24/403443_0.shtml

  27. 27.

    Paul Krugman (1994), “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle,” Foreign Affairs, 73:6, November/December, pp. 62–78.

  28. 28.

    Lieven (2003), Empire, p. 44.

  29. 29.

    Janos Kornai (1992), The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 197–198.

  30. 30.

    The bulk of private enterprises were technologically backward, managerially inadequate, thus were of limited significance in national economy, according to Cheng Xiaonong (2003) in “Reinterpreting China’s Economy,” Modern China Studies, No. 1.

  31. 31.

    Shaun Breslin (2005), “Power and Production: Rethinking China’s Global Economic Role,” Review of International Studies, 31:4, pp. 735–753.

  32. 32.

    Cristóbal Kay (2002), “Why East Asia Overtook Latin America,” Third World Quarterly, 23:6, pp. 1073–1102.

  33. 33.

    Stiglitz, J (2002), Globalization and Its Discontent, p. 14.

  34. 34.

    Charles Gore (2000), “The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries,” World Development, 28:5, pp. 789–804.

  35. 35.

    Kay (2002), pp. 1073–1102; Henry J. Bruton (1998), “A Reconsideration of Import Substitution,” Journal of Economic Literature, 36:2, June, pp. 903–936.

  36. 36.

    Charmers Johnson (1982), MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975, Redwood: Stanford University Press.

  37. 37.

    Robert Wade, professor of development studies, recalled his past personal experience in his lectures at the London School of Economics (LSE) in the 2008–2009 session.

  38. 38.

    Interviews and discussions with Chinese counterparts from 2005 until recently.

  39. 39.

    Jianyong Yue (2016), “China, Global Capitalism, and the Quest for Political Legitimacy,” International Politics, 53:6, November, pp. 752–774.

  40. 40.

    Michael Lind (2016), “Taking Modernization Seriously—How to Think About Global Industrialization,” Breakthrough Journal, Issue 6, Summer. https://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/issue-6/taking-modernization-seriously

  41. 41.

    Mancur Olson (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New Haven: Yale University Press; Wade (2003), introduction: xlviii.

  42. 42.

    Meredith Woo-Cuming (1999), “Introduction: Charmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development,” in The Developmental State, ed. Woo-Cumings, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p. 10.

  43. 43.

    Peter Preston (2011), Theories of Development, London: Routledge, p. 41.

  44. 44.

    UNCTAD (2013), “The Asian Developmental State and the Flying Geese Paradigm,” November, p. 13. http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/osgdp20133_en.pdf

  45. 45.

    Bruce Cumings (1984), “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy,” International Organization, 38:1, pp. 1–40.

  46. 46.

    Ibid.

  47. 47.

    Michael Mastanduno (1997), “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” International Security, 21:4, pp. 49–88.

  48. 48.

    Yue Jianyong (2011), “The Myth of the Chinese Model,” Leaders (Hong Kong), 40, June, pp. 11–27.

  49. 49.

    Ha-Joon Chang (2009), “Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: How Development Has Disappeared from the ‘Development’ Discourse?” 15/02/2009. http://hajoonchang.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/HamletwithoutthePrinceofDenmark-revised.pdf

  50. 50.

    Michael Pillsbury (2014), The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, New York: Henry Holt and Co.

  51. 51.

    Interview with an informed source 20/06/2004.

  52. 52.

    Jung Chang and Jon Haliday (2006), Mao, The Unknown Story, Hong Kong: Open Press, p. 373.

  53. 53.

    Interviews and discussions with insiders from 2005 until 2015.

  54. 54.

    John Ikenberry (2011), Liberal Levithan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 9.

  55. 55.

    Ha-Joon Chang (2009), “Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark,” http://hajoonchang.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/HamletwithoutthePrinceofDenmark-revised.pdf

  56. 56.

    Edward Steinfeld (2010), Playing Our Game—Why China’s Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 18.

  57. 57.

    Thomson Reuters: Top 100 Global Innovators 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/tr-pr-innovations-idUSKCN0T72RA20151119

  58. 58.

    Dani Rodrik (2011), The Globalization Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 273.

  59. 59.

    Joseph Stiglitz (2002), Globalization and Its Discontent, p. 20.

  60. 60.

    Martin Wolf (2004), Why Globalization Works—The Case for the Global Market Economy, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 144–146.

  61. 61.

    “China had Lifted 680 Million People out of Poverty between 1981 and 2010,” The Economist, 1/06/2013. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21578643-world-has-astonishing-chance-take-billion-people-out-extreme-poverty-2030-not

  62. 62.

    World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4253, June 2007. http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6615660.pdf

  63. 63.

    Danny Quah (2011), “The Global Economy’s Shifting Centre of Gravity,” Global Policy, 2:1, pp. 3–9.

  64. 64.

    “China Noses ahead as Top Goods Producer,” The Financial Times, 13/03/2011.

  65. 65.

    Various predictions in recent years made by The Economist, Standard Chartered Bank, Deutsche Bank, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and so on claimed that China will overtake the USA by 2020. The international Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted most recently that China will become the largest economy in 2016. See report “The Age of America Ends in 2016: IMF Predicts the Year China will Surpass U.S.,” Daily Mail, 26/04/2011. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1380486/The-Age-America-ends-2016-IMF-predicts-year-Chinas-economy-surpass-US.html. “The Dating Game,” The Economist, 27/12/2011 (2018). http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2010/12/save_date

  66. 66.

    Joseph Stiglitz (2002), Globalization and Its Discontents, p. 221.

  67. 67.

    The term “Washington Consensus” is often used interchangeably with “neoliberalism” and “globalization”. http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html

  68. 68.

    Joseph Stiglitz (2007), Making Globalization Work: The Next Steps to Global Justice, London: Penguin Books, p. 31.

  69. 69.

    Dani Rodrik (2011), The Globalization Paradox, pp. 149–153.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., pp. 155–156.

  71. 71.

    Joseph Stiglitz (2007), Making Globalization Work, p. 10; Sanjaya Lall (2004), “Reinventing Industrial Strategy: The Role of Government Policy in Building Industrial Competitiveness,” UNCTAD G-24 Discussion Paper Series No. 28, April, pp. 1–46.

  72. 72.

    Philip Golub (2013), “From the New International Economic Order to the G20,” Third World Quarterly, 34:6, pp. 1000–1015.

  73. 73.

    Helen Clark addressed the LSE audience in the capacity of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on March 12, 2010, “if we took China’s figures out of the equation, the number of people living in extreme poverty is actually estimated to have increased between 1990 and 2005 by about 36 million.” Helen Clark: Meeting Development Challenges in the 21st Century,” http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2010/03/12/helen-clark-meeting-development-challenges-in-the-21stcentury.html

  74. 74.

    “China’s Success on Millennium Development Goals Provides an Example for Others to Follow for the Post-2015 Development Agenda, Says New UNDP Report,” http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/articles/2015/02/17/china-s-success-on-millennium-development-goals-provides-an-example-for-others-to-follow-for-the-post-2015-development-agenda-says-new-undp-report0.html; The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf

  75. 75.

    China’s latest poverty line was raised upward from 1196 yuan set in 2008 to 2300 yuan in 2011, equivalent to US 1$ per day, which was lower than the World Bank criterion. The number of people living in extreme poverty would increase from 26.88 million in 2010 to 128 million by the end of 2011. (http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2011_11/30/10997300_0.shtml); In November 2015, the Chinese government vowed to eradicate poverty by 2020 which implies that still 74 million people would have to be lifted out of poverty within five years’ time. http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_china/2015-12/8082333.html. Premier Li Keqiang admitted on 15/03/2015 during the annual National People’s Congress that China still had 200 million people living in poverty as per relevant World Bank criterion (People’s Daily online, 15/03/2015). http://lianghui.people.com.cn/2015npc/n/2015/0315/c394537-26695251.html

  76. 76.

    UN (2009), Rethinking Poverty—Report on the World Social Situation 2010, Chap. 2: Poverty: The Official Figures, p. 15: “Without the rapidly growing developing economies of Brazil, the Russian Federation, India and China, the absolute number of people living in extreme poverty actually went up, from 619 million in 1981 to about 699 million in 2005.” http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/docs/2010/chapter2.pdf; http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/docs/2010/fullreport.pdf (full report)

  77. 77.

    The ten policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus were normally simplified as “deregulation, privatization, and liberalization.”

  78. 78.

    Alice Amsden (2007), Escape from Empire—The Developing World’s Journey through Heaven and Hell, Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 131.

  79. 79.

    Gunnar Myrdal (1968), Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, p. 208.

  80. 80.

    Chalmers Johnson (1999), “The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept,” in The Developmental State, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p. 48.

  81. 81.

    Transparency International Annual Report. https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publications/doc/ar/

  82. 82.

    Peter Nolan (2001), “China, the US and the WTO: Battle of the Giants or Defeat of the Pygmies?” (manuscript).

  83. 83.

    Stiglitz contended most convincingly that “privatization without the necessary institutional infrastructure in the transition countries led to asset stripping rather than wealth creation … By contrast, privatization accompanied by regulation, corporate restructuring, and strong corporate governance has led to higher growth.” Stiglitz (2002), p. 220; Also see Yusuf (2007), Under New Ownership: Privatizing China’s State-Owned Enterprises; He Qinglian (2003), The Pitfall of Modernization (new edition), Sunnydale: Broad Press, pp. 53–89.

  84. 84.

    Andre Gunder Frank (1966), The Development of Underdevelopment, Boston: New England Free Press.

  85. 85.

    The Princeton Encyclopedia of the World Economy (Two volume set) (2009), NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 271.

  86. 86.

    Immanuel Wallerstein (1979), The Capitalist World-Economy, Cambridge University Press, p. 21.

  87. 87.

    Peter Evans (1979), Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil, NJ: Princeton University Press.

  88. 88.

    Michael Latham (2011), The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and US Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 50.

  89. 89.

    Vincent Ferraro (2008), “Dependency Theory: An Introduction,” in The Development Economics Reader, ed. Giorgio Secondi, London: Routledge, pp. 58–64.

  90. 90.

    Ibid.

  91. 91.

    Economides, S and Wilson, P (2003), The Economic Factor in International Relations: A Brief Introduction, London: I.B. Tauris, p. 60.

  92. 92.

    CASS Blue Paper 2014, Xinhuawang, Beijing, 10/12/2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-12/11/c_125838153.htm; Wang Bao’an (Deputy Minister of Finance): “How to Forge an Upgrading of the Chinese Economy?” Qiushi (Seeking Truth, one of the most authoritative mouthpieces of the CCP), 1/01/2014. http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2014/201401/201312/t20131230_307459.htm; Yao Jingyuan: Chinese Manufacturing “Big but not Strong,” See report “‘Made in China’ in Unprecedented Crisis,” 9/02/2015. http://finance.qq.com/a/20150209/057597.htm; Yao Jingyuan argued that China’s extensive mode of growth in the past decades driven by three “massive inputs,” namely, capital, resource, and labor force, has become unsustainable. Although it can outproduce the rest of the world combined in more than half of the 440 kinds of UN-identified major industrial products, China is still running short of “Core Technologies,” Jiemian, 20/08/2016. http:www.jiemian.com/article/809384.html; “Miao Wei (Minister of Industry and Information Technology): ‘Chinese Manufacturing still in the Third-tier in the World’,” China News Agency, 18/11/2015. http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2015/11-18/7630207.shtml; Chen Ming, “Chinese Manufacturing “Big but not Strong” not Changed,” 11/01/2017. http://www.jfdaily.com/news/detail?id=41829

  93. 93.

    Yue, J (2016), “China, Global Capitalism, and the Quest for Political Legitimacy,” International Politics, pp. 752–774.

  94. 94.

    Peter Evans (1979), Dependent Development, Princeton University Press.

  95. 95.

    (Finance Minister) Lou Jiwei’s speech at the School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, 24/04/2015. http://www.sem.tsinghua.edu.cn/portalweb/sem?__c=fa1&u=xyywcn/69292.htm

  96. 96.

    Chinese media reports.

  97. 97.

    The newly upward adjusted poverty line set by the World Bank would increase China’s poverty-stricken population from 70.71 million (China’s own criterion of measuring extreme poverty was set at just 2300 yuan, even lower than the US 1.25$ standard) to 200 million. “Ending Poverty—An Empty Victory?” China Economic Review (online), 16/10/2015. http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/spicy-hotpot/ending-poverty%E2%80%94-empty-victoryhttp://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/spicy-hotpot/ending-poverty%E2%80%94-empty-victory

  98. 98.

    The Chinese Livelihood Development Report 2015, issued by the Peking University, was released on January 13, 2016. The report shows that China’s income gap has been expanding rapidly in the past three decades which rose from 0.3 in the early 1980s to over 0.45 in recent years. In 2012, China’s income Gini coefficient reached 0.49, far above the widely recognized alert level of 0.4. China’s family wealth inequality was even more acute. The top 1% families possessed one third of the country’s total wealth, while the bottom 25% families owned just 1%. China’s family wealth Gini coefficient had risen from 0.45 in 1995 to 0.73 in 2012. Yicaiwang (yicai.com), 13/01/2016. http://www.yicai.com/news/2016/01/4738424.html

  99. 99.

    http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html

  100. 100.

    Omar Sanchez (2003), “The Rise and Fall of the Dependency Movement: Does it inform Underdevelopment Today?” EIAL (Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe), 14:2, July to December.

  101. 101.

    Richard Evans, “Autarky: Fantasy or Reality?” http://www.richardjevans.com/lectures/autarky-fantasy-reality/; Hitler’s Confidential Memo on Autarky (August 1936), German History in Documents and Images, vol. 7. Nazi Germany, 1933–1945. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/English61.pdf

  102. 102.

    John Ikenberry (2011), Liberal Levithan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 169–174.

  103. 103.

    Jeffrey A. Frieden (2006), Global Capitalism—Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century, NY: Norton, p. 63.

  104. 104.

    Ronaldo Munck (2012), Contemporary Latin America (3rd ed.), NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 77.

  105. 105.

    Joseph Stiglitz (2003), Globalization and Its Discontents, pp. 4, 20–21, 214.

  106. 106.

    Alice Amsden (2001), The Rise of “The Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 16.

  107. 107.

    Joseph Stiglitz (2007), Making Globalization Work, p. 72.

  108. 108.

    Ibid.

  109. 109.

    Dani Rodrik (2011), The Globalization Paradox, pp. 169–170.

  110. 110.

    Sanchez (2003), “The Rise and Fall of the Dependency Movement: Does It Inform Underdevelopment Today?” EIAL, 14:2. http://eial.tau.ac.il/index.php/eial/article/view/893/946

  111. 111.

    Robert Wade (2003), “Introduction to the 2003 Paperback Edition,” in Governing the Market, p. i.

  112. 112.

    “Industrialization of the 19th century latecomers was in fact frequently accompanied by both tariff protection and a vigorous export drive which threatened the previous dominant position of the old established industrial countries in a number of important markets.” (p. 25) See Albert O. Hirschman (1968), “The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82:1, pp. 1–22; Tony Pierenkemper and Richard Tilly (2004), The German Economy during the Nineteenth Century, Chap. 10: The International Economy, London: Berghahn Books, pp. 145–156.

  113. 113.

    Kenneth Pomeranz (2001), “Is there an East Asian Development Path?” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 44:3, pp. 322–362.

  114. 114.

    Unless otherwise specified, “shallow integration” and “external integration” only refer to external integration.

  115. 115.

    Wade (2003), introduction: p. xlviii.

  116. 116.

    Ibid.

  117. 117.

    Ibid.

  118. 118.

    Ibid.

  119. 119.

    Wade (2003), intro, p. 1.

  120. 120.

    Harry Oshima (1986), “The Transition from an Agricultural to an Industrial Economy in East Asia,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 34:4, pp. 783–809.

  121. 121.

    Samuel Huntington (1965), “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics, 17:2, pp. 386–430.

  122. 122.

    George Lawson, Chris Armbruster, and Michael Cox (eds.) (2010), The Global 1989—Continuity and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  123. 123.

    As to whether a “law-based state” is congruent with “a socialist state,” please refer to Sergio De Sanctis (1993), “Legal and Criminal Law Reform: Another Failure of Perestroika?” (p. 152) in Stephen White, Rita Di Le, and Ottorino Cappelli (co-ed.), The Soviet Transition: From Gorbachev to Yeltsin (Special Issue of the “Journal of Communist Studies,” 9:1), London: Routledge.

  124. 124.

    From a hindsight perspective, it is the EU rather than the USA that has long been China’s largest destination for exports and the top source of high technology, thus being more crucial to China’s modernization drive. See also Wen Jiabao speech in 2012 in which he claimed that EU was China’s largest export market and the biggest source of technologies. “Keynote address by Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, at the 8th EU-China Business Summit, on 20 September 2012, in Brussels,” https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/event/eu-china-summit-september-2012/8th-eu-china-business-summit-wen-jiabao-part-1

  125. 125.

    Ivan Krastev, “The Crisis of the Post-Cold War European Order,” 10/09/2008. http://www.eurozine.com/the-crisis-of-the-post-cold-war-european-order/. Charles Grant with Tomas Valasek (2011), “Preparing for the Multipolar World—European Foreign and Security Policy in 2020,” Centre for European Reform. http://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/e783_18dec07-1376.pdf

  126. 126.

    Robert Wade (1996), “Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective,” New Left Review, 1:217, May–June, pp. 3–36.

  127. 127.

    Yue, J (2014), “EU: China’s Lost ‘Ally’?” Phoenix Weekly, No. 18, 25/06/2014.

  128. 128.

    Wade (2003) used “development space,” which can be used interchangeably with “policy space.”

  129. 129.

    Cheng Xiaonong (2015), “Capitalism Making and its Political Consequences: A Comparative Political Economy of China’s Communist Capitalism,” in China’s Transition from Communism—New Perspectives, ed. Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne, Oxon: Routledge.

  130. 130.

    Leong Liew (2005), “China’s Engagement with Neo-liberalism: Path Dependency, Geography and Party Self-Reinvention,” The Journal of Development Studies, 41:2, pp. 331–352.

  131. 131.

    This was the term used by Dani Rodrik in his book that interpreted the divergent development outcomes in the age of globalization in a different way.

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  1. London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

    Jianyong Yue

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Yue, J. (2018). Introduction. In: China's Rise in the Age of Globalization. Palgrave Studies in Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63997-0_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63997-0_1

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