Abstract
The political process that evolved in Catalonia from 2012 onwards vis-à-vis the claims for the territory’s secession reached its culminating point, for the time being at least, with the UDI approved by its Parliament in October 2017 and the simultaneous authorisation by the Spanish Senate of the application by the Government of the measures of ‘federal coercion’ provided for in the Constitution. This paper analyses the grounds upon which its advocates have sought to base the democratic legitimacy of the secessionist claim and the legal feasibility of its implementation, and the difficulties posed by them both in the legal field. In the same vein, it attempts to analyse the most important political weakness undermining the demand for secession in Catalonia today: the absence of a sufficient social majority supporting it. Finally, it is suggested that reform of the system of territorial autonomy is the only viable means of addressing the secessionist challenge.
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Notes
- 1.
In the two ‘secessionist’ processes that have taken place in Spain there has been a tendency to avoid the term ‘referendum’ and this has usually been replaced by ‘consultation’. It is an attempt to avoid the objection—repeatedly ratified by the CC—that the AC lack the competence to call a referendum of this type, both because it is not provided for in the Constitution and because it refers to a question that corresponds to the Spanish nation as a whole as the holder of sovereignty, in accordance with the Constitution (López-Basaguren 2009, p. 206; López-Basaguren 2017, p. 307).
- 2.
Public opinion analysis, however, question this commonplace: see Saura (2016), del Pino Matute (2017) and Yécora (2015). In any case, in protest against the CCR on the Estatut there was a major demonstration in Barcelona, with the participation not only of the parties and organisations that, subsequently, drove the independence process and in which the majority did not demand independence of Catalonia. But it might have been, in any case, the remote detonator of the process demanding independence and the moment when Catalan nationalism discovered the motivating potential of the discourse of the wrong being done to Catalonia.
- 3.
On 9-N, the ballot paper included two questions: “1. Do you want Catalonia to be a State? 2. Do you want Catalonia to be an independent state?”. This double question was the result of the agreement reached by the parties forming the parliamentary majority that advocated independence and Iniciativa per Catalunya—a left-wing federalist formation that supported a referendum on the political future of Catalonia but was not in favour of independence-, enabling its supporters to vote in favour of Catalonia being a state, but rather than an independent one, integrated within a federal Spain; in other words, ‘yes’ to the first question and ‘no’ to the second (Castellá Andreu 2013, 2014). By contrast, the ballot paper for the ‘1-O’ referendum included just one question: “Do you want Catalonia to be an independent State in the form of a Republic?”.
- 4.
The Government of Catalonia designed a “universal” electoral roll, as a result of which the ‘voters’ at the—few—polling stations’ that were closed by the police were able to vote at other, nearby venues.
- 5.
See Diari de Sessions del Parlament de Catalunya, XI Legislatura, cinquè període, Ple del Parlament, Sessió 43, dimarts 10 d’octubre de 2017, sèrie P, n°. 83, pp. 7–8. Sec. 4.4 of the Act on the referendum on self-determination—which, despite its suspension by the CC, the parliamentary majority and the Government regarded as applicable—established that if in the referendum there were more votes in favour than against, this would imply the Independence of Catalonia and that, to this effect, within the 2 days following the announcement of the results by the Electoral Commission (Sindicatura electoral)—which did not exist, having been suspended by the CC and its members having resigned, faced by the periodic penalty payment imposed by the CC in the event of disobedience—Parliament would hold an ordinary session to issue a formal declaration of the independence of Catalonia, its consequences and agree upon the beginning of the del constituent process. Parliament voted on neither the “Declaration” nor its suspension.
- 6.
See Order PRA/1034/2017, of October 27 (Boletín Oficial del Estado, n.° 260, of October 27, 2017).
- 7.
See Resolution of October 27, 2017, of the Senate Presidency (Boletín Oficial del Estado, n.°260, of October 27, 2017). The Senate rejected the Government’s proposal to take direct control of the public media of Catalonia.
- 8.
The declaratory part of the Resolution can be read in Diari de Sessions del Parlament de Catalunya, XI Legislatura, cinquè període, Sessió 44, divendres 27 d’octubre de 2017, sèrie P, n°. 85, p. 28. In any case, there are contrasting interpretations as to whether the Parlament proceeded to declare independence since although the expository part would appear to indicate that this is the case, in the operative part the decision is to urge the Government to adopt all the resolutions necessary for the development of the Law on Foundational and Legal Transience of the Republic.
- 9.
See Royal Decree 946/2017, of October 27, on the call for elections to the Parliament of Catalonia and its dissolution (Boletín Oficial del Estado n.° 261, of October 28, 2017).
- 10.
The lehendakari Ibarretxe specifically declared that the Basques have, as a people, a ‘national identity’ that makes them the holder of an ‘original sovereignty’ that, amongst others, is rooted in the right to self-determination of peoples recognised in article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: see Parlamento Vasco: Diario de Sesiones, VII Legislatura, n. ° 41, session of September 27, 2002. The same reasoning was repeated in his speech before Parliament in September 2003: see Diario de Sesiones. VII Legislatura, n.° 73, session of September 26, 2003.
- 11.
In CiU’s 2012 election manifesto it was claimed that Catalonia is a ‘nation’ and that, consequently, it has a right to self-determination, a right that Catalonia “has never renounced”.
- 12.
See Resolució 5/Xdel Parlament de Catalunya, per la qual s’aprova la Declaració de sobirania i del dret a decidir del poble de Catalunya, passed on January 23, 2013 (Bulletí Oficial del Parlament de Catalunya, X Legislatura, segon periode, núm. 13, of January 24, 2013.
- 13.
This Resolution was declared contrary to the Constitution—and, consequently, annulled by the CC—in CCR 42/2014, of March 25, with regard to its declaration of Cataloniaas sovereign subjectand it specifies the way in which the other affirmations within the Resolution should be interpretedin order to be consistent with the Constitution. On this CCR, see Ferreres Comella (2014) and Fossas Espadaler (2014).
- 14.
See Act (Catalonia) 10/2014, of September 26, on non-referendum popular consultations and other forms of citizen participation and Decree (Catalonia) 129/2014, of September 27, on holding a non-referendum consultation on the political future of Catalonia. CCR 31/2015, of February 25, declared contrary to the Constitution and, consequently, annulled the part of the Act—referring to ‘general referendum consultations’—which provided for the holding of the ‘consultation’ on the future of Catalonia. CCR 32/2015, of February 25, declared contrary to the Constitution and, consequently, null and void, the Decree on the holding of the ‘consultation’ of 9 N.
- 15.
See parliamentary intervention by MP Ferran Pedret in Parlament de Catalunya: Diari de Sessions, XI legislatura—quart periode—sèrie P—n.° 76, 26.07.2017, p. 61.
- 16.
The procedure of ‘single reading’ establishes that processing will be carried out via the procedure of ‘full debate’ regulated in article 129 of the Rules of Procedure, so it will consist in a defence by the author of the legislative initiative; next, the groups requesting that the initiative be rejected may intervene for a maximum of 30 min each. Then there may be another turn against the rejection of the initiative for another 30 min and a final defence of the rejection of 5 min per group advocating this stance. There is then a vote to adopt or reject the initiative. Upon the request to the Consell de Garanties Estatutàries by the opposition groups that it should issue a ruling on the processing of the initiatives, it rejects the latter due to not having been approved by the Bureau of the Parlament, as is established by the regulatory law of the Consell, but reminds the Bureau that the right to request the Opinion upon the presentation of a Bill is a fundamental right of the members of Parliament: see Consell de Garanties Estatutàries: Acord del Ple del Consell de Garanties Estatutàries, of September 6, 2017andAcord del Ple del Consell de Garanties Estatutàries, of September 7, 2017 (accessible at https://www.cge.cat/contingut.php?id_pagina=18).
- 17.
Indeed, the president of the Government brought an action of unconstitutionality, referring to article 161.2 of the Constitution, which establishes the automatic suspension of the Act of the AC once the appeal is admitted for processing. The CC resolved the appeal via Ruling 139/2017, of November 29, in which it considers that the reform of article 135 of the Regulation is constitutional insofar as it is interpreted in the sense that it allows for the presentation of partial or total amendments to the Bill by the parliamentary groups. The Consell de Garanties Estatutàries had ruled in a similar vein in its Opinion 7/2017, of July 6, on the proposal of partial reform of the Parliament’s Standing Orders (accessible at https://www.cge.cat/admin/uploads/docs/20170712131231-1.pdf).
- 18.
Very interesting, with regard to what occurred in this session, as it was both most expressive of events and had considerable public impact, was the intervention of MP Joan Coscubiela, of Catalunya sì que es pot, in defence of the rights of opposition parliamentarians: see. Parlament de Catalunya: Diari de Sessions, XI legislatura—cinquè període—sèrie P—n.° 81, Sessió 42, 7.09.2017, pp. 68 ff.
- 19.
In the same vein, after the 1-O referendum (2017), Keating (2017c): “There are many problems with the Catalan strategy. The secessionist parties cannot hope that a unilateral declaration of independence will be recognized internationally and it has never been clear how the Catalan government could actually govern (including collecting taxes). There was always going to be a confrontation.”
- 20.
The secessionists have maintained (Consell Assesor per a la Transició Nacional 2013a) that, in the opinion of the ICJ, “there is no law that prohibits the exercise of the right to self-determination and, therefore, the declaration of independence of Kosovo does not violate any international legal norm.” From which it deduces that the ICJ “understands that the exercise of the right to self-determination is permissible”, though it creates no obligation of recognition on the part of existing States; a permissiveness that would only disappear if there were recourse to the illegitimate use of force or to other serious violations of international law. The interpretation maintained by the Consell Assesor would be included in the preamble of the Law of referendum on self-determination adopted on September 6, 2017.
- 21.
It is significant that, according to demoscopic analyses, the sum of those who declare themselves satisfied with the current system of territorial autonomy and those who favour a reform of the system in a federal direction results in clearly majority support, of over 55%: see the recent Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (Generalitat de Catalunya) (2018), answer to question n.° 30.
- 22.
- 23.
These are measures that, however, the court has so far avoided using, with the exception of the establishment of periodic penalty payments for the members of the electoral commission established in the Catalan Act of the referendum on self-determination, which led to the resignation of its members. It is particularly significant that the court did not recur to the provision of suspension of authorities and public employees on the occasion of the holding of the referendum of 1-0.
- 24.
In his Order of Indictment the judge accused the most important leaders of the secessionist movement of the crime of rebellion, an extremely serious criminal liability. It is not easy, in my opinion, to understand the grounds for this indictment: see, on the definition of the crime of rebellion, compared with that of sedition, in López-Basaguren (2017), p. 311.
- 25.
The Canadian SC adds that: “In short, it is suggested that as the notion of popular sovereignty underlies the legitimacy of our existing constitutional arrangements, so the same popular sovereignty that originally led to the present Constitution must (it is argued) also permit “the people” in their exercise of popular sovereignty to secede by majority vote alone.”
- 26.
The SC of Canada concludes with a consideration that show balanced its reasoning is, stating that: “Nor, however, can the reverse proposition be accepted. The continued existence of the Canadian constitutional order could not be indifferent to a clear expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada. The other provinces and the federal government would have no basis to deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession, should a clear majority of the people of Quebec choose that goal, so long as in doing so, Quebec respects the rights of others”.
- 27.
A recent example is the referendum on the Brexit and what, in reference to the reflections of the Quebec premier Jacques Parizeau, I have termed the theory of ‘lobster catching’: see López Basaguren (2017) In the Netherlands, following the experience of the referendum on the EU-Ukraine Agreement held in 2016, the Lower House has passed an Act that rejects consultative referendums established by the Referendums Act 2015: see Janene Pieters: “Dutch Parliament agrees to abolish Referendums”, NLTime (23 February 2018; accessible at https://nltimes.nl/2018/02/23/dutch-parliament-agrees-abolish-referendum). Regarding the Bill on rejection of referendums, see Wendy Zeldin: “Netherlands: Draft Law to End Advisory Referendum Law”, Library of Congress (accessible at http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/netherlands-draft-law-to-end-advisory-referendum-law/). That shows that the issue of referendum as an unquestionable tool of democratic expression is again under strong criticism.
- 28.
Indeed, the Venice Commission Report repeatedly refers to the requirement of legality. Thus, it states that “the use of referendums must comply with the legal system as a whole, and especially the procedural rules. In particular, referendums cannot be held if the Constitution or a statute in conformity with the Constitution does not provide for them, for example where the text submitted to a referendum is a matter for Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction” (Part III.1) And adds: “The principle of the sovereignty of the people allows the latter to take decisions only in accordance with the law”. In the same sense, the Explanatory Memorandum that accompanies the Report reiterates that “(t)he use of referendums must be permitted only where it is provided for by the Constitution or a statute in conformity with the latter, and the procedural rules applicable to referendums must be followed. On the other hand, referendums must be organised where the legal system provides for them (para. 26). And, further on, notes that “under the principle of the rule of law, the people are not exempt from compliance with the law. This applies to both procedural aspects and the substance of texts put to the vote, which must comply with all superior law. Legislative referendums must therefore comply with the Constitution; referendums within federated or regional entities must comply with the law of the central State” (para. 32). To conclude by affirming that “in order to prevent unlawful referendums, texts that are procedurally or substantively invalid must not be put to a referendum” (para. 34).
- 29.
It is significant that the Consell Assesor per a la Transició Nacional refers to the obligation to negotiate established, in this event, by the Canadian SC, but, however, eludes the demands for “clear majority as a qualitative evaluation” which is the basis of that obligation, arguing, by contrast, that there is no need to demand special quorum of participation nor qualified majority in support of independence (Consell assesor per a la transició nacional 2013a, pp. 98 ff).
- 30.
In this sense, immediately after the elections of September 2015, Keating (2015), stated, in relation to the first of the pro-independence options (unilaterally declare independence): “Prominent members of the civil society pro-independence movements have long advocated this. Yet, without a majority of the popular vote, this looks democratically dubious. It is also formidably difficult as a practical matter, as it would require international recognition and the loyalty of citizens to the new state.” See, as well, Keating (2017a).
- 31.
Practically all the provisions of the Constitution related to the system of territorial autonomy are oriented towards the process of creation of the AC; in other words, they are temporary regulations, which have already fulfilled their function.
- 32.
See, in this respect, Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (Generalitat de Catalunya): Enquesta sobre context polític a Catalunya. 2018, February 2018 (accessible at http://ceo.gencat.cat/ca/barometre/detall/index.html?id=6508), a survey that confirms a growing trend in Catalan public opinion during these years. It is something that, even more clearly, is also evident in public opinion in the Basque Country.
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Acknowledgements
This work was undertaken as part of the DER 2013-47774-P Research Project, funded by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) and the activities of the Research Group “Multilevel Constitutionalism”, funded by the Basque Government and the University of the Basque Country.
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López-Basaguren, A. (2019). Claims for Secession in Catalonia. Rule of Law, Democratic Principle and Federal Alternative. In: López-Basaguren, A., Escajedo San-Epifanio, L. (eds) Claims for Secession and Federalism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59707-2_21
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