Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

CoSMed: A Confidentiality-Verified Social Media Platform

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 9807))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

This paper describes progress with our agenda of formal verification of information-flow security for realistic systems. We present CoSMed, a social media platform with verified document confidentiality. The system’s kernel is implemented and verified in the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL. For verification, we employ the framework of Bounded-Deducibility (BD) Security, previously introduced for the conference system CoCon. CoSMed is a second major case study in this framework. For CoSMed, the static topology of declassification bounds and triggers that characterized previous instances of BD security has to give way to a dynamic integration of the triggers as part of the bounds.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    As it will turn out, this property needs to be refined in order to hold. We’ll do this in Sect. 3.3.

  2. 2.

    By modifying \({{\mathsf {S}}}\) to produce a dedicated value as soon as \({{\mathsf {T}}}\) occurs, and modifying \({{\mathsf {B}}}\) to only consider sequences without that value.

References

  1. OWASP top ten project. www.owasp.org/index.php/Top10#OWASP_Top_10_for_2013

  2. Jif: Java + information flow (2014). http://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif

  3. SPARK (2014). http://www.spark-2014.org

  4. Caritas Anchor House (2016). http://caritasanchorhouse.org.uk/

  5. Bauereiß, T., Gritti, A.P., Popescu, A., Raimondi, F.: The CoSMed website (2016). https://cosmed.globalnoticeboard.com

  6. Bichhawat, A., Rajani, V., Garg, D., Hammer, C.: Information flow control in WebKit’s javascript bytecode. In: Abadi, M., Kremer, S. (eds.) POST 2014 (ETAPS 2014). LNCS, vol. 8414, pp. 159–178. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Chlipala, A.: Ur/Web: a simple model for programming the web. In: POPL, pp. 153–165 (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Chugh, R., Meister, J.A., Jhala, R., Lerner, S.: Staged information flow for javascript. In: PLDI, pp. 50–62 (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Dam, M., Guanciale, R., Khakpour, N., Nemati, H., Schwarz, O.: Formal verification of information flow security for a simple ARM-based separation kernel. In: CCS, pp. 223–234 (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  10. de Amorim, A.A., Collins, N., DeHon, A., Demange, D., Hritcu, C., Pichardie, D., Pierce, B.C., Pollack, R., Tolmach, A.: A verified information-flow architecture. In: POPL, pp. 165–178 (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Esparza, J., Lammich, P., Neumann, R., Nipkow, T., Schimpf, A., Smaus, J.-G.: A fully verified executable LTL model checker. In: Sharygina, N., Veith, H. (eds.) CAV 2013. LNCS, vol. 8044, pp. 463–478. Springer, Heidelberg (2013)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  12. Fong, P.W.L., Anwar, M., Zhao, Z.: A privacy preservation model for facebook-style social network systems. In: Backes, M., Ning, P. (eds.) ESORICS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5789, pp. 303–320. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. Goguen, J.A., Meseguer, J.: Unwinding and inference control. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 75–87 (1984)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Groef, W.D., Devriese, D., Nikiforakis, N., Piessens, F.: FlowFox: a web browser with flexible and precise information flow control. In: CCS, pp. 748–759 (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Haftmann, F., Nipkow, T.: Code generation via higher-order rewrite systems. In: Blume, M., Kobayashi, N., Vidal, G. (eds.) FLOPS 2010. LNCS, vol. 6009, pp. 103–117. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  16. Hardin, D.S., Smith, E.W., Young, W.D.: A robust machine code proof framework for highly secure applications. In: Manolios, P., Wilding, M. (eds.) ACL2, pp. 11–20 (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Jang, D., Tatlock, Z., Lerner, S.: Establishing browser security guarantees through formal shim verification. In: USENIX Security, pp. 113–128 (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Kanav, S., Lammich, P., Popescu, A.: A conference management system with verified document confidentiality. In: Biere, A., Bloem, R. (eds.) CAV 2014. LNCS, vol. 8559, pp. 167–183. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  19. Klein, G., Andronick, J., Elphinstone, K., Heiser, G., Cock, D., Derrin, P., Elkaduwe, D., Engelhardt, K., Kolanski, R., Norrish, M., Sewell, T., Tuch, H., Winwood, S.: seL4: formal verification of an operating-system kernel. Commun. ACM 53(6), 107–115 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Kumar, R., Myreen, M.O., Norrish, M., Owens, S.: CakeML: a verified implementation of ML. In: POPL, pp. 179–192 (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  21. Leroy, X.: Formal verification of a realistic compiler. Commun. ACM 52(7), 107–115 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Lochbihler, A.: Java and the java memory model — a unified, machine-checked formalisation. In: Seidl, H. (ed.) Programming Languages and Systems. LNCS, vol. 7211, pp. 497–517. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  23. Mantel, H.: Information flow and noninterference. In: van Tilborg, H.C.A., Jajodia, S. (eds.) Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security, 2nd edn, pp. 605–607. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  24. Moore, J.S., Lynch, T.W., Kaufmann, M.: A mechanically checked proof of the amd5\({}_{\text{ k }}\)86\({}^{\text{ tm }}\) floating point division program. IEEE Trans. Comput. 47(9), 913–926 (1998)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  25. Murray, T.C., Matichuk, D., Brassil, M., Gammie, P., Bourke, T., Seefried, S., Lewis, C., Gao, X., Klein, G.: seL4: from general purpose to a proof of information flow enforcement. In: Security and Privacy, pp. 415–429 (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  26. Nipkow, T., Klein, G.: Concrete Semantics: With Isabelle/HOL. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Book  MATH  Google Scholar 

  27. Nipkow, T., Paulson, L.C., Wenzel, M.: Isabelle/HOL: A Proof Assistant for Higher-Order Logic. LNCS, vol. 2283. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  28. Pardo, R., Schneider, G.: A formal privacy policy framework for social networks. In: Giannakopoulou, D., Salaün, G. (eds.) SEFM 2014. LNCS, vol. 8702, pp. 378–392. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  29. Sutherland, D.: A model of information. In: 9th National Security Conference, pp. 175–183 (1986)

    Google Scholar 

  30. Yang, J., Yessenov, K., Solar-Lezama, A.: A language for automatically enforcing privacy policies. In: POPL, pp. 85–96 (2012)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We are indebted to the reviewers for useful comments and suggestions. We gratefully acknowledge support:

− from Innovate UK through the Knowledge Transfer Partnership 010041 between Caritas Anchor House and Middlesex University: “The Global Noticeboard (GNB): a verified social media platform with a charitable, humanitarian purpose”

− from EPSRC through grant EP/N019547/1, Verification of Web-based Systems (VOWS)

− from DFG through grants Hu 737/5-2, MORES – Modelling and Refinement of Security Requirements on Data and Processes and Ni 491/13-3, Security Type Systems and Deduction.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI), Bremen, Germany

    Thomas Bauereiß

  2. School of Science and Technology, Middlesex University, London, UK

    Armando Pesenti Gritti, Andrei Popescu & Franco Raimondi

  3. Global NoticeBoard, London, UK

    Armando Pesenti Gritti

  4. Institute of Mathematics Simion Stoilow of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romania

    Andrei Popescu

Authors
  1. Thomas Bauereiß
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Armando Pesenti Gritti
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Andrei Popescu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Franco Raimondi
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Thomas Bauereiß .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Inria Nancy – Grand Est, Villers-lès-Nancy, France

    Jasmin Christian Blanchette

  2. Inria Nancy – Grand Est, Villers-lès-Nancy, France

    Stephan Merz

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Bauereiß, T., Pesenti Gritti, A., Popescu, A., Raimondi, F. (2016). CoSMed: A Confidentiality-Verified Social Media Platform. In: Blanchette, J., Merz, S. (eds) Interactive Theorem Proving. ITP 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9807. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43144-4_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43144-4_6

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-43143-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-43144-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation