Abstract
A state’s economic policies, including the protection of intellectual property and foreign investments, and trade liberalisation, can have an impact on the enjoyment of human rights. Some of these policies may also be encouraged by international treaties. But it does not follow that any given economic policy is required by those treaties. Determining whether this is the case requires a close analysis of the treaties at issue. In fact, most treaties typically contain exceptions clauses that permit states to comply with both their economic and their human rights obligations. In sum, while Sarah Joseph is right that, in principle, international economic law could hinder the enjoyment of human rights, it is more difficult to identify cases in which this is mandated. But even if this were the case, the logical solution is not to add human rights obligations to international economic agreements. It would be sufficient to ensure that those agreements contain exceptions that can permit—without mandating—states to comply with, and further, their existing human rights obligations.
Sarah Joseph’s article addresses an important question: what is the relationship between international economic law—concerning, principally, trade, intellectual property and investment—and obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. While broadly agreeing with her conclusions, this comment highlights some aspects of this question that merit more detailed consideration.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Joseph (2016), section 7.
- 2.
See, further, Bartels (2009).
- 3.
Bartels (2009), p. 581 and references there cited, especially Garcia (2003), pp. 14–19. Even in cases of ‘group rights’ it is usually individuals that are the rights holders. See, further, Smit Duijzentkunst BL, The Concept of Rights in International Law (unpublished PhD manuscript on file with author, 2015), section 3.1.
- 4.
On investor rights as human rights, see Savarese (2014), p. 95 n 13 noting the result in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe, SADCT No 2/2007, 28 November 2008.
- 5.
See Joseph (2016), section 3.1.
- 6.
Eg Hestermeyer and Broude (2014), p. 295.
- 7.
Mercurio (2013).
- 8.
See, eg, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, SA and Vivendi Universal, SA v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability of 30 July 2010, para 240, where the tribunal stated that “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, Argentina’s human rights obligations and its investment treaty obligations are not inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually exclusive. Thus … Argentina could have respected both types of obligations.” and Final Award, 9 April 2015, para 117.
- 9.
Hestermeyer (2007).
- 10.
WTO, European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit—Request for Consultations by India, WT/DS408/1, 19 May 2010; European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit—Request for Consultations by Brazil, WT/DS409/1, 12 May 2010. For discussion, see Mercurio (2012), p. 389.
- 11.
Arts 8.9 and 28.3 of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (not yet signed), (last accessed 20 March 2016).
- 12.
Kinley (2009), ch 2.
- 13.
Smith (2012), pp. 52–53.
- 14.
It is not clear that this practice is actually damaging. See Matthews (2012), pp. 120–121.
- 15.
WTO/ICT/UNCTAD, World Tariff Profiles 2014, Geneva 2014, p. 12, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles14_e.pdf (last accessed 20 March 2016).
- 16.
Earlier more cautious approaches to the scope of the ‘public morals’ exception seem unwarranted. In EC—Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014, the Appellate Body had no difficulty finding that EU ‘public morals’ include concern for the protection of seals, largely because, as the panel had found, there was a reference to animals as ‘sentient beings’ in one of the EU primary treaties. A fortiori, it would be inconceivable that the protection of human rights, in virtually all cases referenced in national constitutions, would not be considered to be valid ‘public morals’ of the respective country.
- 17.
Bartels (2015).
- 18.
- 19.
Aside from the US, the complainants in these cases were Brazil, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Thailand. See WTO, Disputes by country/territory, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm (last accessed 20 March 2016).
- 20.
Sarah Joseph (Joseph (2016)), section 3.2) refers to Stiglitz and Charlton (2005), p. 47, who state that “by some estimates, 48 of the least developed countries had suffered economic losses of close to US$600 million per year since they began implementing WTO agreements.” As this has become something of a meme in this area, it is appropriate to note that Stiglitz and Charlton are misquoting their source. This source was the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (1997) Human Development Report, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/258/hdr_1997_en_complete_nostats.pdf, p. 82 forecasting in 1997—ie 2 years after the WTO agreements were signed—that “[t]he least developed countries stand to lose up to $600 million a year, and Sub-Saharan Africa $1.2 billion.” It was not clear from that report why this would be the case, but it appears likely that the basis for this claim is a different UNDP study, using identical language, which said that “the least developed countries stand to lose up to US$600 million per year in generalized system of preferences (GSP) advantages.” UNDP, High-level Meeting on the Integrated Initiatives for Least Developed Countries’ Trade Development, Trade Liberalisation and Sustainable Human Development, Doc LDC/HL/7, 9 October 1997, 27–28 October 1997, p. 3. Aside from the figures being mere forecasts, the result would be from rich countries, not poor countries, ‘implementing WTO agreements’. This aside, it turns out that the figures were probably accurate: Hoekman et al. (2009), pp. 18–19.
- 21.
Cf Bartels (2014), p. 1071 ff.
- 22.
See Table A.1 in WTO, Aid for Trade at a Glance, 2013.
- 23.
Article 13.2 of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, WT/L/931, 15 July 2014. For discussion, see Bartels, Sequencing the Implementation of Obligations in WTO Negotiations, Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics No 116, Commonwealth Secretariat, December 2014.
References
Bartels L (2009) Trade and human rights. In: Bethlehem D, McRae D, Neufeld R, Van Damme I (eds) The Oxford handbook of international trade law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 571–591
Bartels L (2014) The EU’s human rights obligations in relation to policies with extraterritorial effects. Eur J Int Law 25(4):1071–1091
Bartels L (2015) The chapeau of the general exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS agreements: a reconstruction. American Journal of International Law 109(1):95–115
De Schutter O (2011) International trade in agriculture and the right to food. In: De Schutter O, Cordes K (eds) Accounting for hunger: the right to food in the era of globalisation. Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, pp 137–192
Garcia F (2003) Trade, inequality, and justice. Transnational, Ardsley
Häberli C (2013) God, the WTO – and hunger. In: Nadakavukaren Schefer K (ed) Poverty and the international economic legal system. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 79–106
Hestermeyer H (2007) Canadian-made drugs for Rwanda: the first application of the WTO waiver on patents and medicines. Am Soc Int Law: Insights 11(28)
Hestermeyer H, Broude T (2014) The first condition of progress? Freedom of speech and the limits of international law. Va J Int Law 54(2):295–321
Hoekman B, Martin W, Braga CAP (eds) (2009) Trade preference erosion: measurement and response. World Bank Publications/Palgrave-MacMillan, Washington
Joseph S (2016) Human Rights and International Economic Law. In: Bungenberg M, Hermann C, Krajewski M, Terchechte JP (eds) European yearbook of international economic Law, vol. 7. Springer, Heidelberg, pp 461–481
Kinley D (2009) Civilising globalisation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Matthews A (2012) The impact of WTO agricultural trade rules on food security and development: an examination of proposed additional flexibilities for developing countries. In: MacMahon JA, Desta MD (eds) Research handbook on the WTO agriculture agreement. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 104–132
Mercurio B (2012) ‘Seizing’ pharmaceuticals in transit: analysing the WTO dispute that wasn’t. Int Comp Law Q 61(2):389–426
Mercurio B (2013) TRIPS and access to essential medicines. In: Van Calster G, Prévost D (eds) Research handbook on environment, health and the WTO. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 233–269
Savarese E (2014) The coherence of EU law: the promotion of investments vs the protection of human rights. Ital Yearb Int Law 23(1):91–112
Smith F (2012) Food security and international agricultural trade regulation: old problems, new perspective. In: MacMahon JA, Desta MD (eds) Research handbook on the WTO agriculture agreement. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 31–49
Stiglitz JE, Charlton A (2005) Fair trade for all. Oxford University Press, Oxford
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (1997) Human development report. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Acknowledgement
I am grateful to friends and colleagues for their valuable suggestions.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bartels, L. (2016). International Economic Law and Human Rights: Friends, Enemies or Frenemies?. In: Bungenberg, M., Herrmann, C., Krajewski, M., Terhechte, J. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2016. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29215-1_19
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29215-1_19
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-29214-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-29215-1
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)