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On the Computational Meaning of Axioms

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Epistemology, Knowledge and the Impact of Interaction

Part of the book series: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ((LEUS,volume 38))

Abstract

This paper investigates an anti-realist theory of meaning suitable for both logical and proper axioms. Unlike other anti-realist accounts such as Dummett–Prawitz verificationism, the standard framework of classical logic is not called into question. This account also admits semantic features beyond the inferential ones: computational aspects play an essential role in the determination of meaning. To deal with these computational aspects, a relaxation of syntax is necessary. This leads to a general kind of proof theory, where the objects of study are not typed objects like deductions, but rather untyped ones, in which formulas are replaced by geometrical configurations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As Dummett (1976) remarks, a truth-conditional theory of meaning is itself presented in an axiomatic way. In particular, the axioms fix the reference of the primitive terms of the language.

  2. 2.

    Notice that here we prefer to exclude from the set of canonical proofs those that are trivially canonical, i.e. those terminating with a sequence of c-elim/c-intro rules, with c as the principal connective of the conclusion. Another well known example of axiomatic theories that prevent from the possibility of obtaining canonical proofs, namely of canonical proofs of disjunctive or existential sentences, is represented by those theories the axioms of which contain strictly positive occurrences of disjunctive and existential sentences (see Troelstra and Schwichtenberg 2000, pp. 6, 106–107).

  3. 3.

    This position is usually identified with a Wittgensteinian position (see Wittgenstein 1956, Part II, §31, Part V, §7), nevertheless we think that this is a mistake. The point is that Wittgenstein is not speaking of the meaning of a sentence considering it as something abstract, invariant and objective – as the propositional content of that sentence could be – but he is speaking instead of how each single agent gets to a specific understanding of that sentence, depending on the particular place she assigns to it inside her own web of beliefs.

  4. 4.

    The characterization of proofs either as constructions – or better, as methods of construction – or as demonstrations can be originally found in Proclus (1970, p. 157ff.). A more contemporary discussion about these distinctions can be found in Sundholm (19931998).

  5. 5.

    This aspect is strictly connected to the ideal of deductive completeness (cf. Awodey and Reck 2002, p. 4).

  6. 6.

    It is worth noting that the fact of not limiting to the simple analysis of the provability level, but to investigate theorems also from the point of view of the structural analysis of proofs is one of the leitmotifs of Kreisel’s work (see for example Kreisel 1987, p. 399).

  7. 7.

    This seems to be indeed the idea expressed by Bourbaki (1994, p. 17) when they say: ≪ “Mathematical truth” resides thus uniquely in logical deduction starting from premises arbitrarily set by axioms. ≫ 

  8. 8.

    This immediacy corresponds to the idea that proofs are epistemic transparent objects (Usberti 1997, p. 535): it is not possible that something is a proof without the possibility (for a human agent) to recognize it as such (cf. Kreisel 1962, p. 202).

  9. 9.

    For the notion of maximal formula see Dummett (1977, p. 152). For the notation of \(\lambda\)-calculus see Krivine (1993).

  10. 10.

    Notice that the difference between proper axioms and assumptions is that the former can never be discharged, while the latter are in principle always dischargeable (even if de facto they are not). At the level of proof-objects – i.e. at the level of the objects used for codifying derivational steps, as \(\lambda\)-terms (see Sundholm 1998, pp. 196–197) – the difference is that proper axioms correspond to proof-term constants, while assumptions to proof-term variables. Roughly speaking, proper axioms are sentences which are to be considered as already having been proved, and therefore which can always be justified (see Heyting 1962, p. 239). Assumptions, on the other hand, are placeholders: they wait to be justified by a proof that we neither possess nor know to be constructible.

  11. 11.

    The original Prawitz’ translation works for systems of minimal, intuitionistic and classical logic. It is worth noting that Prawitz treats sequents as composed by sets of formulas. However, his translation can be adapted to the case of sequents considered as composed by multisets. In this case, the translation is directed either to the sequent calculus system G1[mic] or G2[mic] (see Troelstra and Schwichtenberg (2000), pp. 61–66 for a presentation of these systems).

  12. 12.

    In Gentzen’s translation (Genzten 1934–1935, § 4), differently from the translation chosen here, normal proofs are also translated into proofs with non-atomic cuts, because elimination rules are translated by appealing to cuts.

  13. 13.

    By the translation provided above we can assign a well defined computational content to cut elimination, i.e., β-reduction. Analogously, the property of identity axiom atomization can be assigned a computational operation, i.e., η-expansion. This operation guarantees the possibility of working in an extensional setting even in the case of programs, which are by definition intensional objects (see Hindley and Seldin 2008, pp. 76–77). For further details see Naibo and Petrolo (2015).

  14. 14.

    The \(\lambda\)-term associated to the previous natural deduction proof is \((\mathtt{t})\langle (\lambda x(\mathtt{t})\langle x,\mathtt{r}\rangle )\pi _{1}(z),\pi _{2}(z)\rangle\), where r and t are two proof-constants associated with the reflexivity and Euclidean axioms respectively, and π 1(z) and π 2(z) are the first and second projection of z. Reducing the β-redex contained in this \(\lambda\)-term – which corresponds to the detour of the proof that this \(\lambda\)-term codifies – we get \((\mbox{ $\mathtt{t}$})\langle (\mbox{ $\mathtt{t}$})\langle \pi _{1}(z),\mbox{ $\mathtt{r}$}\rangle,\pi _{2}(z)\rangle\). It is not difficult to see that the constants t and r, as well as the variable z, are not involved in the process of reduction. This means that proof-constants have no interaction with the other proof-constructors and that we cannot assign to them any computational content. Proof-objects in this case have only the role of codifying the structure of the proofs to which they are associated with, but they cannot be interpreted as programs.

  15. 15.

    This point becomes even clearer when applied to proof-objects. While in natural deduction the proof-objects associated with proper axioms are constants, in sequent calculus they are complex \(\lambda\)-terms not containing any constant. This is because in sequent calculus proper axioms are constructed in the context of derivations, i.e. in the antecedent.

  16. 16.

    For the standard definition of positive and negative occurrences of a formula see Troelstra and Schwichtenberg (2000, p. 6).

  17. 17.

    In the next section we will restrict to one-sided sequent systems. This choice is only dictated by a wish to ease the proof analysis. Notice that the result we presented above could be adapted to one-sided systems (i.e. without any formulas on the left of sequents) by replacing the two-sided notion of basic sequent with the corresponding notion of one-sided basic sequent, that is \(\vdash P_{1},\ldots,P_{n},\perp,\ldots,\perp \) where the P i are now either atoms or negations of atoms.

  18. 18.

    It must be remarked that at present there is no such discipline as abstract proof theory as a branch of mathematical logic, in the same sense as which there is, instead, an abstract model theory. Our proposal can be considered as a contribution to the attempt of defining such a discipline, which is different in nature from other attempts such as those undertaken in the categorial analysis of proofs (cf. Hyland 2002, §1).

  19. 19.

    In other words, an antilogy is the negation of a tautology.

  20. 20.

    In the literature, this kind of formulas are usually called neutral formulas. However, we prefer to avoid this terminology; even if these formulas are neutral form a logical point of view – they are neither tautology nor antilogy –, they are not neutral from the point of view of a particular theory T. Since our aim is to provide a framework that is applicable to specific mathematical theories, using this terminology could be misleading.

  21. 21.

    Absurdity is seen here in a Brouwerian perspective, that is, as something that interrupts a derivation (Brouwer 1908, p. 109). In absence of any formula, no rule corresponding to a logical connective can be applied, and thus the derivation cannot be further carried on.

  22. 22.

    It would be incorrect to claim that Schütte’s demonstration of cut admissibility through completeness is tout court non-effective. In a purely logical setting, given a valid sequent \(\vdash \Gamma \) – i.e. \(\vDash \Gamma \) – it is possible to effectively enumerate all the proofs of the theorems of LK R until a proof of \(\Gamma \) is found. Since LK R does not contain the cut rule, this is a cut-free proof. However, as Kreisel (1958, p. 167) remarks, ≪ [it] is not an algorithm at all in the sense of a working mathematician, because it depends on ‘trying out all proofs of the subject’, i.e. it is a systematic method of trial and error. ≫ In other words, the algorithm in question in not an efficient one.

  23. 23.

    The local/global distinction is inspired by the terminology adopted in computer science to specify how the behavior of programs is studied. The application of this distinction has been first introduced by Paoli (2002) in order to analyze the inferential properties of proofs, and successively used by Poggiolesi (2011) and Hjortland (2012). More precisely, they claim that the meaning of logical constants depends both on the shape of the premisses and conclusions of the rules governing the inferential behavior of each specific connective, and on the way these rules interact with the others, particularly during the process of cut elimination.

  24. 24.

    This is correct only in the case of binary rules, while it is less clear in the case of unary rules. When there is only one premiss there is only one context of derivation, and thus the problem of sharing it or splitting it does not arise. On the other hand, the presence of all the immediate subformulas of the conclusion of a unary rule in the premiss signals that in order to reconstruct the proof we need to follow all these formulas, since they are not derivable form the very same context. And this means that we are in presence of a multiplicative rule. Hence, the distinction we traced is not ambiguous as it could have been thought at first sight.

  25. 25.

    Here we consider directed simple graphs, i.e. directed graphs with, for all vertices a, b, at most one edge of source a and target b.

  26. 26.

    The terminological choice adopted here is intended to convey the idea that a proof refers to a structure not only as a syntactical entity, but also as a semantical one, as we have seen in Sect. 5.3.3 and will clarify later, especially in Sect. 5.5.2.

  27. 27.

    Roughly speaking, the idea is to take a graph, drop all the formulas labelling its nodes, and label again only the nodes of the axiom bricks with natural numbers (counting from left to right). The different paths that can be defined through the graph – or through its subgraphs \(\mathcal{R}_{a}\) and \(\mathcal{R}_{t}\) – induce a set of permutations on the given (finite) set of natural numbers.

  28. 28.

    A full analysis of logical constants from the untyped perspective is part of ongoing researches. See Naibo et al. (2011).

  29. 29.

    A similar analysis is proposed by Bonnay (2007) on the basis of Krivine’s classical realizability (see Krivine 2003).

  30. 30.

    This normative conception of language shares some similarities with the Orthosprache-project promoted by the so-called Erlangen School (or Erlangen Constructivism; Kamlah and Lorenzen 1972; Lorenzen and Schwemmer 1973). On this view, ≪ language is not just a fact that we discover, but a human cultural accomplishment whose construction reason can and should control  ≫ (Rahman and Clerbout 2013, p. 4). However, the Orthosprache-project differs from Dummett-Prawitz verificationism in that it endorses a pluralistic – and not a monistic – conception of logic which allows to justify, for example, both intuitionistic and classical logic (see Rahman and Clerbout (2013), p. 9, 67, note 28; Sørensen and Urzyczyn (2006), §§4.5,4.6, 6.5,7.5).

  31. 31.

    Classic texts in game-theoretic semantics are Hintikka (1983) for a model-based account of games, and Lorenzen and Lorenz (1978) for a syntactical and operative – or dialogical – account. For detailed surveys of recent developments of dialogical approaches to game-theoretic semantics see Rahman and Keiff (2004) and Keiff (2009). For textbook presentations see Redmond and Fontaine (2011) and Rückert (2011).

  32. 32.

    A similar idea is presented in Marion (2012).

  33. 33.

    This fact can be established “empirically”.

  34. 34.

    Indeed, in Ludics it is possible to represent fallacies in a formal and precise way as it has been shown by Lecomte and Quatrini (2011b).

  35. 35.

    Furthermore, paraproofs are not necessarily correct proofs and thus their definition does not involve the notion of truth. On the contrary, in the Bolzanian tradition an assertion takes the form of the judgment ‘A is true’ (where A is a sentence or a proposition). Thus, both in the case in which assertion is taken to be a primitive notion – e.g. by realist positions – and in the case in which is taken to be non primitive – by anti-realist positions – assertion is defined is defined with respect to the very notion of truth.

  36. 36.

    These considerations become evident when we consider that the untyped setting introduced here validates the logical rules of linear logic; it indeed widely acknowledged that linear logic is the clearest example of a resources-oriented logic (Di Cosmo and Miller 2010).

  37. 37.

    These kinds of bounds are essentially dictated by two reasons: (1) guaranteeing that the process of verification that something is a proof can be practically done by human beings; (2) guaranteeing the semantic key objects, i.e. canonical proofs, to be objects that can be practically constructed by human beings. By respecting these two conditions it should be assured that, in the verificationist account, both truth and meaning never make appeal to entities transcending concrete human capacities, as it could be the existence of proofs the size of which goes beyond physical limits.

  38. 38.

    The standard justification for the choice of polynomial bounds can be found in Wang (1981, §6.5) and it has been well summarized by Marion (2009), p. 424:

    It is generally agreed that polynomial-time computability captures the capacities of digital computing machines, as opposed to their idealized counterparts, the Turing machines. Digital computing machines do not have access to unlimited resources, and this seems to be the key point for a radical anti-realist program. It is only asked here from the radical anti-realist that she grants that digital computing machines are an unproblematic extension of human cognitive capacities, so that, with polynomial-time computability, one remains within the sphere of what is humanly feasible.

    In fact, it seems to us that there is a further, and usually neglected, argument supporting this choice. Schematically, it can be presented in the following way: (i) from the verificationist point of view meaning is based on proofs, and the only logical rules allowed for constructing these proofs are the intuitionsitic ones; (ii) via the Curry-Howard correspondence each proof of intuitionistic logic can be associated to a computable function, and vice versa; (iii) a fundamental property of a theory of meaning is compositionality; (iv) by restricting to polynomial computable functions, compositionality between functions (i.e. proofs) is preserved: the composition of two polynomial computable functions is still a polynomial computable function.

  39. 39.

    The other way round, this situation corresponds to the idea that to understand the meaning of an axiom it is necessary to understand the totality of the consequences that can be drawn from it (see Dummett 1991, p. 228).

  40. 40.

    In particular, see Dummett (1991, p. 223): ≪ Compositionality demands that the relation of dependence imposes upon the sentences of the language a hierarchical structure deviating only slightly from being a partial order. ≫ 

  41. 41.

    It is worth noting that Girard’s latest work, known under the name of transcendental syntax, aims at studying these issues from a formal point of view. In particular, it tries to prove how in some specific cases – namely when purely logical formulas are considered – the sets of tests can be shown to be finite (see Girard 2013, in part. § 3.2). The framework developed by Girard perfectly fits into our definition of untyped proof theory, as it is a particular case of Seiller’s interaction graphs construction (Example 5.30).

  42. 42.

    In fact, sometimes it could already be sufficient to prove a weaker property, like the subterm property. There are some theories – like the theory of equality, of groupoids and of lattices – for which the fact that a proof of A can make appeal to no other terms than those appearing in A is already sufficient to impose a bound on the set of formulas that should be known in order to know the meaning of A. The reason is that, from a technical point of view, for these theories the subterm property works like the subformula property: it allows to define proof-search methods by limiting the proof-search space (cf. Negri and von Plato 2011, §4).

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Vito Michele Abrusci, Marianna Antonutti Marfori, Clément Aubert, Mathieu Marion, Shahid Rahman, and Luca Tranchini for their interest in our work, and for their useful comments and suggestions. We also wish to thank Myriam Quatrini, Jean-Baptiste Joinet, Damiano Mazza, Luiz Carlos Pereira, and Alain Lecomte for invitations to present this work in Marseille, Lyon, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, and Rome, respectively. Finally, we thank an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions that helped to improve the article.

This work has been partially funded by the French-German ANR-DFG project Hypothetical reasoning: its proof-theoretic analysis – HYPOTHESES (ANR-11-FRAL-0001) and by the French-German ANR-DFG project Beyond Logic (ANR-14-FRAL-0002).

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Appendices

Appendices

A Properties of System \(\text{pLK}_{\text{R}}^{\mbox{ $\maltese$}}\)

2.1 A.1 Proof of Proposition 5.3

By induction on the number of connectives in the sequent. Since the proofs for ∨ and for ∧ are similar, we only show the invertibility of the ∨. The base case for the induction is a sequent containing only one connective, i.e. a \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule followed by a ∨-rule. In this case the \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}^{At}\) rule itself gives a derivation of the premiss of the ∨-rule. Let us now assume that this is true for any sequent containing at most n connectives, and let us take a derivable sequent \(\vdash \Gamma,A \vee B\), containing n + 1 connectives, and let π be one of its derivations. If π ends with a ∨-rule, the subderivation obtained dropping the last rule gives a derivation of the premiss. If π does not end with a ∨ rule, then it must end with a ∧ rule: Applying the induction hypothesis on the premisses we get two derivations π1 and π2 of \(\vdash \Delta,A,B,C\) and \(\vdash \Delta,A,B,D\) respectively; thus the desired derivation is:

2.2 A.2 Proof of Lemma 5.6

By induction on the number of connectives in \(\vdash \Gamma \). The base case is obvious. Assume that the lemma is true when the number of connectives in \(\Gamma \) is at most n. We show that the derivations of \(\vdash \Gamma,F,G\) terminating with a rule where F is principal have the same set of leaves as the derivations terminating with a rule where G is principal. We only show how the proof is done in the case F = AB and G = CD, which is the more complicated case. By the invertibility of the ∧-rule we have the two derivations:

Using the induction hypothesis, we have that \(\mathfrak{L}(\pi _{k}) = \mathfrak{L}(\rho _{k})\) for all k in {1, 2, 3, 4}. Using these equalities and the induction hypothesis once again, we obtain that:

  • any derivation π of \(\vdash \Gamma,A,C \wedge D\) satisfies \(\mathfrak{L}(\pi ) = \mathfrak{L}(\pi _{1}) + \mathfrak{L}(\pi _{2})\);

  • any derivation π of \(\vdash \Gamma,B,C \wedge D\) satisfies \(\mathfrak{L}(\pi ) = \mathfrak{L}(\pi _{3}) + \mathfrak{L}(\pi _{4})\);

  • any derivation π of \(\vdash \Gamma,A \wedge B,C\) satisfies \(\mathfrak{L}(\pi ) = \mathfrak{L}(\pi _{1}) + \mathfrak{L}(\pi _{3})\);

  • any derivation π of \(\vdash \Gamma,A \wedge B,D\) satisfies \(\mathfrak{L}(\pi ) = \mathfrak{L}(\pi _{2}) + \mathfrak{L}(\pi _{4})\);

We have therefore shown that if π is any derivation of \(\vdash \Gamma,A \wedge B,C \wedge D\) terminating with a ∧-rule on AB and, if ρ is any derivation of the same sequent terminating with a ∧-rule on CD, they have the same set of leaves, namely:

$$\displaystyle{\mathfrak{L}(\pi ) =\sum _{i=1,\ldots,4}\mathfrak{L}(\pi _{i}) = \mathfrak{L}(\rho )}$$

The other cases are similar.

2.3 A.3 Proof of Proposition 5.10

Suppose π is a derivation of \(\vdash \Gamma \) in pLK R , then by replacing every axiom rule by a \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule we obtain a derivation π′ of \(\vdash \Gamma \) in pLK\(_{R}^{\mbox{ $\maltese$}}\). Every \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}^{At}\) rule in π′ is correct, since the sequent was introduced by an axiom rule in pLK R .

Conversely, if π′ is a derivation of \(\vdash \Gamma \) in pLK\(_{R}^{\mbox{ $\maltese$}}\) such that \(\mathfrak{L}(\pi ')\) contains only correct sequent, then each sequent in \(\mathfrak{L}(\pi ')\) can be derived from an axiom rule in pLK R . Therefore we obtain a derivation π of \(\vdash \Gamma \) in pLK R by replacing every \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}^{At}\) rule in π′ by an axiom rule.

2.4 A.4 Proof of Lemma 5.12

Notice that, by definition of satisfiability of a sequent (and associativity of ∨), \(\delta \vDash \Delta,A,B\) if and only if \(\delta \vDash \Delta,A \vee B\).

In the case of the ∧-rule, assume first that \(\delta \vDash \Delta,A\) and \(\delta \vDash \Delta,B\). Either there is satisfiable formula in \(\Delta \), either both A and B are satisfiable, therefore \(\delta \vDash \Delta,A \wedge B\). Conversely, assume that \(\delta \nvDash \Delta,A\), then all formulas in \(\Delta \) are unsatisfiable and A is not satisfiable, therefore AB is not satisfiable. We conclude that \(\delta \nvDash \Delta,A \wedge B\). The lemma is then proved by simple induction.

2.5 A.5 Proof of Proposition 5.13

Suppose \(\mathfrak{L}(\vdash \Gamma )\) contains only correct sequents, then for any valuation δ and sequents \(\vdash \Delta \) in \(\mathfrak{L}(\vdash \Gamma )\), \(\delta \vDash \Delta \) from the definition of correct sequent. Then, by Lemma 5.12, \(\delta \vDash \Gamma \).

Conversely, let us assume that \(\mathfrak{L}(\vdash \Gamma )\) contains at least an incorrect sequent \(\vdash P_{1},\ldots,P_{n},\neg Q_{1},\ldots \neg Q_{p}\), such that for all integer i ∈ [1, n] and j ∈ [1, p], P i  ≢ Q j . We can now take a valuation δ satisfying δ(P i ) = 0 and δ(Q j ) = 1. Then \(\delta \nvDash P_{1},\ldots,P_{n},\neg Q_{1},\ldots \neg Q_{p}\) and by Lemma 5.12 this means that \(\delta \nvDash \Gamma \).

B Properties of System LK\(_{R}^{\mbox{ $\maltese$}}\)

3.1 B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.19

Let π be such a derivation of the sequent \(\vdash \Gamma \). Let \(\mathfrak{L}(\pi )\) be the set of sequents introduced by \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rules in \(\vdash \Gamma \), \(\mathfrak{L}_{c}(\pi )\) the subset of \(\mathfrak{L}(\pi )\) containing the sequents introduced by correct \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rules, and \(\mathfrak{L}_{a}(\pi ) = \mathfrak{L}(\pi ) - \mathfrak{L}_{c}(\pi )\). By assumption, the sequents in \(\mathfrak{L}_{a}(\pi )\) are introduced by admissible \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rules that are not correct. Hence there exists correct derivations π i of \(\vdash \Gamma _{i}\). Then, replacing the \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rules introducing the sequents \(\vdash \Gamma _{i}\) in π by the derivations π i , we obtain a derivation π′ of \(\vdash \Gamma \) extending π and containing only correct \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rules.

3.2 B.2 Proof of Theorem 5.21

Suppose we have a derivation of π in LK R  of a sequent \(\vdash \Gamma \). Then, replacing every axiom rule by a \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) yields a derivation π′ of \(\vdash \Gamma \) in LK\(_{R}^{\mbox{ $\maltese$}}\) . Moreover, the \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rules are all correct (since they were axiom rules in LK R  ), hence admissible.

Conversely, suppose we have a derivation π′ of a sequent \(\vdash \Gamma \) in LK\(_{R}^{\mbox{ $\maltese$}}\) that contains only admissible rules. Then, by Lemma 5.19 we can find a derivation π″ extending π′ such that π″ contains only correct \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rules. Then, we can replace these \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rules by axiom rules to get a derivation π of \(\vdash \Gamma \) in LK R  .

3.3 B.3 Proof of Lemma 5.23

Suppose π contains at least one \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule introducing a sequent \(\vdash \Gamma \) containing a formula B that is not an atom, a negation of an atom or an existential formula. Then the principal connective in B is either a ∧, a ∨ or a \(\forall \). Replacing the \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule introducing \(\vdash \Gamma \) by the rule introducing the principal connective and closing the derivation we obtain by \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rules then gives us a new derivation π 1 of π. After a finite number of iterations of this process, we obtain the wanted extension.

3.4 B.4 Proof of Lemma 5.25

Suppose now that the sequent \(\vdash \Gamma \), \(\Gamma = A_{1},\ldots,A_{m}\), introduced by the non-admissible \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule contains at least one quantifier. We fix an enumeration of the terms \(t_{1},\ldots,t_{n},\ldots\) of the language and we will define an iterative process indexed by pairs (s, k s ) where s is a finite sequence of integers (the first step will be indexed by the null sequence of length m which will be written (0) m ) of length p s and k s is an integer in \([1,\ldots,p_{s}]\). The process we describe consists in extending the derivation by applying \(\exists \) rules in a way that insures us that for all existential formula \(\exists xA(x)\) and term t i , there exists a step where the \(\exists \) rule is used on the formula A[t i x]. To insure all terms appear at some point in the process we will use the enumeration but we need to keep track of the last term used for each existential formula. Moreover, applying a \(\exists \) rule on a formula containing two existential connectives will produce new existential formulas on which we must apply the same procedure. The sequence will therefore keep track, for each existential formula, of the last term we used. Its length may vary, but due to our choice of existential rule it can only expand. The integer, on the other hand, will keep track of the last existential formula we decomposed, so that we can ensure that all formulas are taken into account.

First, let us write \(A_{1},\ldots,A_{p_{(0)_{ m}}}\) the formulas in \(\Gamma \) that contain quantifiers. By Lemma 5.23 we can suppose, without loss of generality, that the \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rules in π are simple. We will denote π by \(\pi _{(0)_{m}}\), i.e. π will be the initial step of the process. The integer \(k_{(0)_{m}}\) is defined to be 1, so we consider the derivation \(\pi _{A_{1},t_{1}}\) obtained from π by replacing the \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule introducing \(\Gamma = \Delta,A_{1},\ldots,A_{p}\) by the derivation consisting of a \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule introducing \(\Delta,A'_{1}[t_{1}/x],A_{2},\ldots,A_{p_{(0)_{ m}}}\) followed by an existential rule introducing A 1. It follows from Lemma 5.23 that this derivation can be extended to a simple derivation \(\bar{\pi }_{A_{1},t_{1}}\). Then, by the non-admissibility of the \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule, this derivation contains at least one non-admissible \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule introducing a sequent \(\vdash \Gamma '\). Amongst the formulas of \(\Gamma \) are the all the formulas A i for \(1\leqslant i\leqslant p\), but \(\Gamma '\) may contain more existential formulas. We thus denote by \(A_{1},\ldots,A_{p}\) the existential formulas of \(\Gamma '\). We write \((0)_{m}^{+} = (1,0,\ldots,0)\) the sequence of length p: we thus obtained an extension \(\pi _{(0)_{m}^{+}} =\bar{\pi } _{A_{1},t_{1}}\) containing a non-admissible \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule introducing a sequent \(\Gamma _{(0)_{m}^{+}} =\bar{ \Gamma }\). Defining \(k_{(0)_{m}^{+}} = 2\), we arrived at the next step, indexed by \(((0)_{m}^{+},k_{(0)_{m}^{+}})\) and we can then iterate the process.

More generally, suppose we are at step (s, k s ) with \(s = (s(0),\ldots,s(p))\): we have a simple derivation π s with a non-admissible \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule introducing a sequent \(\Gamma _{s} = \Delta _{s},A_{1},\ldots,A_{p_{s}}\) (\(\Delta _{s}\) contains only atoms and negations of atoms). We obtain a derivation \(\pi _{A_{k_{s}},t_{s(k_{ s})+1}}\) by replacing the \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule introducing \(\Gamma _{s}\) with the derivation:

This derivation \(\pi _{A_{k_{s}},t_{s(k_{ s})+1}}\) can then be extended by Lemma 5.23 to a simple derivation \(\bar{\pi }_{A_{k_{s}},t_{s(k_{ s})+1}}\) which contains a non-admissible \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule. The sequent \(\Gamma '\) introduced by this rule contains all the formulas \(A_{1},\ldots,A_{p_{s}}\) and may contain additional existential formulas \(A_{p_{s}+1},\ldots,A_{n}\). Let s + to be the sequence of length n defined by \((s(0),\ldots,s(k_{s} - 1),s(k_{s}) + 1,s(k_{s} + 1),\ldots,s(p_{s}),0,\ldots,0)\), and:

$$\displaystyle{ k_{s^{+}} = \left \{\begin{array}{ll} k_{s} + 1&\mbox{ if $k_{s} + 1\leqslant n$}\\ 1 &\text{ otherwise} \end{array} \right. }$$

Let us write \(n = p_{s^{+}}\). We thus obtained the next step in the process, indexed by \((s^{+},k_{s}^{+})\): a simple derivation \(\pi _{s^{+}} =\bar{\pi } _{A_{k_{s}},t_{s(k_{ s})+1}}\) with a non-admissible \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule introducing a sequent \(\Gamma _{s^{+}} = \Gamma ' = \Delta _{s^{+}},A_{1},\ldots,A_{p_{ s^{+}}}\).

We claim that for all pairs (i, j) of natural numbers (different from 0), there is a step s in the process such that s(i) = j. We will write len(s) the length of a sequence s. Notice the formulas \(A_{p_{s}+1},\ldots,A_{p_{ s^{+}}}\) are instantiations of an existential formulas A i for \(1\leqslant i\leqslant p_{s}\) and therefore the number of existential connectives in a B j is strictly less than the number of existential connectives in the corresponding A i . We will show that the value of k s returns to 1 in a finite number of steps using this remark. We will denote the number of existential connectives in a formula A by (A). Suppose that we are at a given step s such that k s  = 1 and write \(o_{s} = (\max _{k_{s}<i\leqslant p_{s}}\natural (A_{i}),p_{s} - k_{s})\). This pair somehow measures the number of steps one has to make before k s returns to 1. Then, after p s k s steps in the process – let us write the resulting step as s 1, we have \(k_{s^{1}} = p_{s}\) and \(p_{s^{1}} - p_{s}\) new formulas, each one such that \(\natural (A) <\max _{k_{s}<i\leqslant p_{s}}\natural (A_{i})\). Therefore, the pair \(o_{s^{1}} = (\max _{k_{ s^{1}}<i\leqslant p_{s^{1}}}\natural (A_{i}),p_{s^{1}} - p_{s})\). Since \(\max _{k_{ s^{1}}<i\leqslant p_{s^{1}}}\natural (A_{i}) <\max _{k_{s}<i\leqslant p_{s}}\natural (A_{i})\), we have \(o_{s^{1}} < o_{s}\) in the lexicographical order and this is enough to show the claim.

3.5 B.5 Proof of Theorem 5.26

If the sequent \(\vdash \Gamma \) introduced by the non-admissible \(\mbox{ $\maltese$}\) rule does not contain any quantifiers, then the proof reduces to the proof of Proposition 5.13. Indeed, the derivation of \(\vdash \Gamma \) in \(pLK_{R}^{\mbox{ $\maltese$}}\) is incorrect (if it were correct, it would contradict the assumption since any correct derivation in \(pLK_{R}^{\mbox{ $\maltese$}}\) is a correct derivation in LK\(_{R}^{\mbox{ $\maltese$}}\) ), hence we can find a model \(\mathcal{M}\) such that \(\mathcal{M}\not\vDash \Gamma \).

If \(\vdash \Gamma \) contains existential formulas, we use Lemma 5.25 to obtain a sequence (π i ) i ∈ N of extensions. From this sequence of extensions, one can obtain a sequence of sequents \(\vdash \Gamma _{i}\) where for each i, there exists N such that \(\vdash \Gamma _{i+1}\) is the premise of a rule whose conclusion is \(\vdash \Gamma _{i}\) in all derivations π j with \(j\geqslant N\). Moreover, this sequence can be chosen so as to contain all instances of the subformulas of \(\Gamma \). We now define a model whose base set is the set of terms. The interpretations of function symbols and constants are straightforward. The only thing left to define is the interpretation of predicates: if P is a n-ary predicate symbol, then \((t_{1},\ldots,t_{n})\) is in the interpretation of P if and only if \(\forall i\geqslant 0\), \(Pt_{1}\ldots t_{n}\notin \Gamma _{i}\).

We can now check that \(\mathcal{M}\not\vDash \Gamma \). We chose A a formula in \(\Gamma \) and prove by induction on the size of the formula A that \(\mathcal{M}\not\vDash A\):

  • if A is an atomic formula, then \(\mathcal{M}\not\vDash A\) by definition of the model;

  • if A = BC, then there exists a sequent \(\vdash \Gamma _{i}\) such that either \(B \in \Gamma _{i}\) or \(C \in \Gamma _{i}\). We suppose \(B \in \Gamma _{i}\) without loss of generality. Then, by the induction hypothesis, we have \(\mathcal{M}\not\vDash B\), hence \(\mathcal{M}\not\vDash A\);

  • if A = BC, then there exists a sequent \(\vdash \Gamma _{i}\) containing both B and C. By induction, these two formulas are not satisfied in the model \(\mathcal{M}\), hence \(\mathcal{M}\not\vDash A\);

  • if \(A = \forall xB(x)\), then there is a sequent \(\vdash \Gamma _{i}\) containing B[yx]. By induction, \(\mathcal{M}\nvdash B[y/x]\), hence \(\mathcal{M}\not\vDash A\);

  • if \(A = \exists xB(x)\), then for every term t there exists a sequent \(\vdash \Gamma _{i}\) such that \(B[t/x] \in \Gamma _{i}\). By the induction hypothesis, \(\mathcal{M}\not\vDash B[t/x]\). This being true for all term t, we conclude that \(\mathcal{M}\not\vDash A\).

This concludes the proof: since all formula \(A \in \Gamma \) is such that \(\mathcal{M}\not\vDash A\), we have that \(\mathcal{M}\not\vDash \Gamma \).

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Naibo, A., Petrolo, M., Seiller, T. (2016). On the Computational Meaning of Axioms. In: Redmond, J., Pombo Martins, O., Nepomuceno Fernández, Á. (eds) Epistemology, Knowledge and the Impact of Interaction. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 38. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26506-3_5

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