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Electricity Market Pricing: Uniform Pricing vs. Pay-as-Bid Pricing

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Electricity Markets

Abstract

Selecting proper pricing rule is essential for the efficient operation of power markets. There are two main pricing rules in the existing power markets, namely uniform pricing (UP) and pay-as-bid (PAB) pricing. Among auction theorists, it is an unsolved question whether uniform pricing is superior to pay-as-bid pricing or the opposite. In this chapter, the aim is not to test various market benchmarks to answer the mentioned question; instead, the existing works relating introducing of and comparison between UP and PAB pricing schemes are reviewed, and the answer of the question is prescribed from each literature’s perspective.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran

    Alireza Akbari-Dibavar, Behnam Mohammadi-Ivatloo & Kazem Zare

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  1. Alireza Akbari-Dibavar
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  2. Behnam Mohammadi-Ivatloo
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  3. Kazem Zare
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Correspondence to Alireza Akbari-Dibavar .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Bonab, Bonab, Iran

    Sayyad Nojavan

  2. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran

    Kazem Zare

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Akbari-Dibavar, A., Mohammadi-Ivatloo, B., Zare, K. (2020). Electricity Market Pricing: Uniform Pricing vs. Pay-as-Bid Pricing. In: Nojavan, S., Zare, K. (eds) Electricity Markets. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36979-8_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36979-8_2

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-36979-8

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