Abstract
This chapter shows that self-feeling may contribute to the problem of unity as well, while not attempting to present a comprehensive theory of self. This can be further explained by introducing Heidegger’s notion of the “care-structure”. It has three elements that are affectively manifested and revealed in self-feeling. Importantly, Heidegger’s “care-structure” is not static but essentially temporal. Thus, self-feeling is not about ourselves as static sameness but as dynamic, living beings. It affectively discloses and manifests the basic, dynamic structure of “care”. There is no “core self” that would be the object of self-feeling. Instead, self-feeling is the affective resonance to our active way of existing as human beings. As can be seen, this account of self-feeling goes beyond the egological/non-egological distinction. It is not non-egological because it reveals our individual existence as a whole. It is not egological in the traditional sense because it is not about a “core self”. Instead, it is egological in a new, unorthodox way because it is the affective resonance of the dynamic process of our individual, human life. As a consequence, self-feeling can account for the unity of self-consciousness both in its synchronic and its diachronic aspect.
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- 1.
This book cannot go into the details of the wide debate on unity of consciousness (compare e.g. Bayne 2010; Brook and Raymont forthcoming; Dainton 2000; Tye 2003; Zahavi 2014, part 1). Instead, it will focus on one question, namely to what extent self-feeling can explain unity of self-consciousness.
- 2.
Please note that this book is not dedicated to a comprehensive interpretation of Heidegger’s work. Heidegger’s thinking is used merely to enrich and illustrate its line of argument. This seems appropriate, since two major proponents of the theory of existential feelings, Ratcliffe and Slaby, extensively build on Heidegger’s work. Beside their already mentioned contributions also see their papers that predominantly focus on Heidegger (Ratcliffe 2002a, b; Slaby 2007, 2010, 2015).
- 3.
Since Heidegger’s original text is in German, the page numbers of the German original text are provided in my direct quotations. The translation into English, however, is taken from the respective sources mentioned.
- 4.
Heidegger speaks of “thrown possibility”, too: “But this means that Dasein is Being-possible which has been delivered over to itself – thrown possibility through and through. Dasein is the possibility of Being-free for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Its Being-possible is transparent to itself in different possible ways and degrees.” (Heidegger 2006 [1927], p. 144, translated by Macquarrie and Robinson)
- 5.
Remember Heidegger’s distinction between “existential” and “existentiell” (Heidegger 2006 [1927], §§ 4 ff.). Roughly speaking, the sphere of the former refers to a formal background structure of “Dasein” whereas the latter refers to its everyday concretions.
- 6.
Gallagher (2005, p. 74) presented a similar notion of “pre-reflective pragmatic self-awareness” that is “performative awareness”.
- 7.
Compare also Shoemaker’s concept of “self-blindness” (Shoemaker 1996, pp. 30ff.). He argues that there could not be a rational agent that does not have self-awareness. Basic self-awareness is a prerequisite for rational agency.
- 8.
Schmid suggested something along these lines in his paper on plural self-awareness (Schmid 2014c).
- 9.
The question might arise how to deal with fragmented selves with split personalities. Consider the following: Self-feeling integrates cognitive and bodily aspects. In split personalities the bodies remain the same but there is a split on the cognitive level. Thus, we would expect that there are two self-feelings in split personalities because the two personalities are likely to have different ways of being in the world, different cares and concerns. Yet, the two self-feelings cannot be too much apart from each other because they are bodily felt in the same body. Be that as it may, we should not overemphasize extreme examples like this because they are derivative to the normal case where one body coincides with one person.
- 10.
Manfred Frank (Frank 2012, chapter 3) seems to follow a similar line of argument by building on Sartre’s work.
- 11.
See also a paper by Slaby (2017). He argues that affect is saturated with temporality, especially with the past. Our individual temporality (e.g. our history) shapes the way we are affectively situated.
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Kreuch, G. (2019). Self-Feeling and Unity. In: Self-Feeling. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 107. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30789-9_11
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