Abstract
We saw in part I of this book that there are many challenges in contemporary philosophy of self-consciousness. The account of self-feeling presented in this book attempts to contribute to these problems. First, it avoids the problems of reflective theories, namely infinite regress and vicious circularity. Second, it overcomes the “ex negativo” challenge that alternative, current pre-reflective theories suffer from. Moreover, chapter “Self-Feeling and Unity” will further explore the problem of unity. In addition to the problems of philosophy of self-consciousness, this account of self-feeling contributes to philosophy of human affectivity by complementing the theory of existential feelings.
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Notes
- 1.
This book maintains a broad understanding of the term “mental state”, not making any point about potential differences to propositional attitudes, mental events, and the like.
- 2.
The terms pre-reflective and self-intimating are used interchangeably here.
- 3.
This may also serve as an answer to a potential criticism from an orthodox Heideggerian perspective: Do we take the ontological level of “attunement” serious or are we stuck on a merely “ontic” level here? Besides the fact that it has been controversial among Heidegger scholars for long what the ontological-ontic distinction ultimately amounts to (see e.g. Sheehan 2014) we are safe due to the twofold characteristic of self-feeling. First, it constitutes the background structure of our experience so it accounts for the ontological level. Second, as a feeling it is part of experience and thus accounts for the ontic level.
- 4.
For more detailed thoughts about the problem of unity please see chapter “Self-Feeling and Unity” below.
- 5.
Notably, Henrich in his long unpublished paper (Henrich 2007 [1971]) shares his own doubts if his proposal actually succeeded to escape vicious circularity.
- 6.
Block (2011a, p. 423) made a similar remark in his critique on higher-order theories.
- 7.
- 8.
Please note that there is a complicated and controversial discussion on the phenomenon of pain which I will not address in further detail here (for an overview see Aydede 2013). Pain shall here just be understood as an illustration of the complexities of subjective experience.
- 9.
Note that this does not imply that we cannot become oblivious of our self-feeling at times. Compare Sects. 4 of chapter “Matthew Ratcliffe’s Theory of Existential Feelings” and 6 of chapter “The Features of Self-Feeling” for a detailed discussion.
- 10.
- 11.
Compare also Musholt’s similar critique (Musholt 2015, pp. 5ff.).
- 12.
- 13.
Compare Rousse’s (2009) similar critique on that issue.
- 14.
Personal conversation with Zahavi suggests that this is precisely what he had in mind.
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Kreuch, G. (2019). How This Account of Self-Feeling Contributes to Today’s Debates. In: Self-Feeling. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 107. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30789-9_10
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