Abstract
Implementation of IAEA safeguards and the drawing of safeguards conclusions has changed dramatically from an ad hoc arrangement in 1962, to an approach focused on verifying nuclear material at declared facilities and drawing safeguards conclusions at the level of individual facilities, to one that assesses the consistency of all safeguards relevant information regarding a State’s nuclear programme and draws a safeguards conclusion for the State as a whole. The notion of implementing safeguards that considers a State’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities and capabilities, as a whole, is referred to as the State-level concept. The State-level concept is applicable to all States with a safeguards agreement in force. Through implementing safeguards in the context of the State-level concept, a number of benefits in terms of effectiveness and efficiency have been realized, including taking better account of State-specific factors which allow for the development and implementation of customized State-level approaches (SLAs). SLAs provide options for safeguards measures to be implemented in the field and at Headquarters, allowing the IAEA to compare their cost-effectiveness and providing greater flexibility in safeguards implementation. Instead of mechanistically applying the activities listed in the safeguards criteria, the implementation of SLAs is focused on attainment of technical objectives. By doing so, safeguards implementation is more performance-oriented and is helping the IAEA to avoid spending resources on doing more than is needed for effective safeguards. The objectives are established by the Secretariat using structured and technically based analytical methods conducted according to uniform processes and defined procedures. Utilizing the same technically-based processes and procedures for developing SLAs for all States helps to ensure consistency and non-discrimination in safeguards implementation, efficient performance of the work, and more soundly based safeguards conclusions.
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Notes
- 1.
In 1970, safeguards were being applied to 82 nuclear facilities in 32 States.
- 2.
States with significant nuclear activities were defined to be those with a facility or a quantity of nuclear material exceeding the INFCIRC/153, paragraph 37 limits for exempting nuclear material from safeguards and thus were subject to routine in-field inspection activities.
- 3.
A significant quantity is the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.
- 4.
Safeguards relevant information is information relevant for the implementation of IAEA safeguards and which contributes to the drawing of soundly based safeguards conclusions. It is collected, evaluated and used by the IAEA in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations under safeguards agreements.
- 5.
The safeguards conclusion for States with voluntary offer agreements or item-specific safeguards agreements relates only to the non-diversion of nuclear material or non-misuse of facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied.
- 6.
At that time, State-specific factors were referred to as ‘State-specific features and characteristics’.
- 7.
In 2010, there were 175 States with safeguards agreements in force, and 1175 nuclear installations and 172,180 significant quantities of nuclear material under safeguards.
- 8.
Item-specific safeguards agreements are based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 [3].
- 9.
Indicators are inputs to a process that suggest that a State may have a capability in that process. Examples of indicators are attempts by the State to purchase equipment contained in Annex II of the AP and other equipment from the export control ‘trigger list’, and certain dual use items.
- 10.
Signatures are emanations from a process that provide evidence that an undeclared activity may be occurring. An example of a signature of undeclared production of high enriched uranium would be high enriched uranium particles in a low enriched uranium enrichment plant.
- 11.
Acquisition path analysis does not consider weaponization nor does it involve judgements about a State’s intention to pursue any such path.
- 12.
Diversion path analysis does not involve judgements about a State’s intention to pursue any such path.
References
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (1972) The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (1997) Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (1968) The Agency’s Safeguards System (1965, as provisionally extended in 1966 and 1968), INFCIRC/66/Rev.2
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Cooley, J.N. (2020). The Evolution of Safeguards. In: Niemeyer, I., Dreicer, M., Stein, G. (eds) Nuclear Non-proliferation and Arms Control Verification. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29537-0_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29537-0_3
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