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Semantic Theory of Truth—Formal Aspects

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Semantics and Truth

Part of the book series: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ((LEUS,volume 45))

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Abstract

This chapter contains a detailed account of STT as a formal theory. The exposition considers truth as truth in a model. Firstly, truth-definition as satisfaction by all sequences of objects is explained. Arithmetic of natural numbers and its models play the crucial role in presenting various results concerning the concept of truth, particularly limitative theorems and the undefinability of arithmetical truth in arithmetic itself. Models constructed on terms are used as tools for defining the denotations of sentences in models. The last section reports Gödel’s and Tarski’s views on limitative theorems and truth.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Jagiellonian University (prof. emeritus), Kraków, Poland

    Jan Woleński

  2. University of Information, Technology and Management, Rzeszow, Poland

    Jan Woleński

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Woleński, J. (2019). Semantic Theory of Truth—Formal Aspects. In: Semantics and Truth. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 45. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24536-8_8

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