Abstract
In this paper we considered a normal form game with a parameter A and suggested that this is an uncertain parameter for agents and they have to make some suggestion about it. We took a normal form game and weakened a suggestion on common knowledge. We introduced two fundamental alternatives based on dynamic epistemic logic and found equilibria for this modified game. We used the special property of these alternatives which let us calculate an equilibria by solving several normal form games with perfect information. We found direct expressions for equilibria for nonmodified game and for modified games with alternative suggestions on beliefs.
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The article was prepared within the framework of the HSE University Basic Research Program and funded by the Russian Academic Excellence Project ’5-100.
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Fedyanin, D. (2019). An Example of Reflexive Analysis of a Game in Normal Form. In: Petrosyan, L., Mazalov, V., Zenkevich, N. (eds) Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_1
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