Abstract
Legal scholars have tended to focus upon whether blackmail is paradoxical rather than upon its substance. In actuality, federal and state blackmail laws vary considerably in their elements and defenses. After defining what I mean by blackmail, I discuss how jurisdictions frame prohibitions against blackmail in relation to prohibitions against theft, larceny, extortion, threats, coercion and intimidation; how extensively jurisdictions elect to prohibit blackmail; what, if anything, jurisdictions regard as defenses to blackmail; and how harshly or mildly jurisdictions penalize blackmail. I conclude by discussing the paradox of blackmail, including recent scholarly efforts by philosophers and legal scholars to resolve it.
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Notes
- 1.
See Helmholz (2001, p. 35); McLaren (2002, pp. 12–13); Ginsburg and Shechtman (1993, p. 1851). The “Waltham Black Act” of 1722, which was enacted in response to a gang of extortionists who called themselves “blacks” and painted their faces black, further solidified the use of “black” as a pejorative description of extortion. See ibid. p. 1851. For an alternative etymology of the term, see Mackay (1888, pp. 11–12).
- 2.
See D.C. Code §22-3252; Kan. Stat. §21-5428; 21 Okla. Stat. §1488; 13 Vt. Stat. §2651.
- 3.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-118; S.C. Code §16-17-640; Wyo. Stat. §6-2-402.
- 4.
For the frequency with which “blackmail” is used in common discourse, see Oxford English Dictionary (n.d.). For the popular meaning of “blackmail,” see how it is defined in Google, Dictionary (“the action, treated as a criminal offense, of demanding money from a person in return for not revealing compromising or injurious information about that person”).
- 5.
This is not to say that the paradox is confined to information blackmail. To the extent the paradox exists, it extends more broadly to include statutes that, like the Model Penal Code, make it an offense to obtain property of another by threatening to “inflict any … harm which would not benefit the actor.” Model Penal Code §223.4(7); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §53a-119(5)(I).
- 6.
The term with [B’s] consent is designed to distinguish extortion, which functions by inducing victims to cooperate for fear of the consequences, from robbery, which can function by brute force, as in purse grabbing or mugging (see In re Stanley E.).
- 7.
Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (1997, p. 412) (“extortion”). Some jurisdictions extend extortion to include private individuals who, while possessing legal authority to act on behalf of others, threaten to use such authority to obtain personal benefits for themselves rather than those they represent. See Oregon Rev. Stat. §164.075(1)(f) (extortion for a union leader to demand monies in return for not causing a labor strike, provided the leader demands money for the benefit of himself rather than for “the group in whose interest [he] purports to act”).
- 8.
See 18 U.S.C. § 873; Mass. Code § 265-25; Mich. Code § 750.213; Miss. Code §97-3-82(2); North Carolina Code §14-118; Vermont Code §13-1701.
- 9.
A majority of states treat truth as a defense to libel and slander, though some require in addition that speakers act from good motives. See Note (1993) (arguing that requiring a truth-speaker to act with “good motives” violates New York Times v. Sullivan). In contrast, in the nineteenth century in England truth was not a defense to criminal libel. See Yehudai (2009, pp. 799–800).
- 10.
Compare W. Va. §61-2-13 (grading based on success) with D.C. Code §22-3252 (no grading based on success). Other jurisdictions implicitly grade based on success by, first, defining blackmail in terms of success and, then, separately criminalizing attempted blackmail but punishing it less severely. See, for example, Code of Ala. §§13A-8-13, 13A-4-2.
- 11.
Under the MPC, affirmative defenses shift burdens of production to defendants but not burdens of persuasion; see MPC § 1.12(2)(a). In some states, however, affirmative defenses shift both burdens to defendants. See Ohio Rev. Code §2901.05(A).
- 12.
See Conn. Code §§53a-119 (larceny); 53a-192 (coercion); 53a-192(b) (defense to coercion); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-23-10 (theft); 12.1-17-06(1) (coercion); 12.1-17-06(2) (defense to coercion).
- 13.
But see State v. Pauling, stating in dictum that victims of vandalizing property have a constitutional right to threaten criminal prosecution in order to obtain compensation.
- 14.
Consider the common practice of conditioning reduced sentences on payment of restitution. See, for example, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-64 (the “Victim Witness Protection Act”).
- 15.
New York did not have a criminal statute against revenge porn at the time Payne acted.
- 16.
Exceptions to this may be victims oflibelous blackmail. Victims of threatened disclosures of false information may have an adequate remedy in civil court because in contrast to victims of threatened disclosures of true information, victims of threats of libel may welcome the opportunity to litigate the truth in public.
- 17.
See Lindgren (1993, p. 1975) (describing blackmail as “one of the most elusive intellectual puzzles in all of law”) and articles in 2016, 2015, 2012, 2011 and 2007, referenced in note 19, infra.
- 18.
- 19.
For critiques of older efforts to resolve the paradox of blackmail, see Westen (2012, pp. 614–632); Christopher (2006, pp. 750–769); Berman (1998, pp. 799–832). For critical commentary on more recent efforts by Einer Elhauge (2016), Ram Rivlin (2015), James Shaw (2012), Mitchell Berman (2011) and Ken Levy (2007), see Westen (2018).
- 20.
Thomas Aquinas appears to have such a case in mind in arguing that, when A knowingly kills a person, B, who is wrongfully threatening his life, A’s conduct is permissible if A’s purpose is to defend himself but impermissible if A’s purpose is to kill B. See McMahan (1994, p. 211). But see Cavanaugh (1997, p. 109).
- 21.
Ram Rivlin argues that even where conditional threats do not reveal motives that render otherwise permissible disclosures impermissible, they reveal motives that render any consequent transfer of hush money nonconsensual. See Rivlin (2015, pp. 418–423). For criticism of Rivlin’s view, see note 19.
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Westen, P. (2019). Blackmail: A Crime of Paradox and Irony. In: Alexander, L., Kessler Ferzan, K. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Applied Ethics and the Criminal Law. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22811-8_6
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