Abstract
In this chapter, we look at the position of various representatives of Russian Orthodoxy on the traditional philosophical issue of free will versus determinism and the rise of interest in it among psychologists and physiologists. Russia’s small but growing number of professional philosophers formed an officially sanctioned society and took up as their first focus of attention the issue of free will though they largely did so independently of previous efforts in their country. Arguably the most notable of these treatments was that of Lopatin, whose concept of creative causality aroused a harsh assessment from Solov’ëv. His written comments on free will and Lopatin’s understanding of it appeared in print only posthumously and reveal his attempt at outlining a soft determinism that avoids a metaphysical stance.
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Notes
- 1.
Glagolev 1902: 490.
- 2.
As a contemporary scholar remarks, Golubinskij held that “the goal of philosophy is knowledge of the primary, universal truths. Such truths are the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, free will, and the spiritual needs of the human being in acquiring truth, goodness and beauty.” Kocjuba 2013: 47.
- 3.
Golubinskij 1868: 148.
- 4.
Kudrjavcev 1891: 400
- 5.
Kudrjavcev 1891: 405.
- 6.
Once again, we find – and will find – the advocacy of a position based on the adversary’s present inability to explain every detail of his/her position.
- 7.
Kudrjavcev 1891: 407.
- 8.
Kudrjavcev 1891: 412.
- 9.
Kunicyn 1966: 207.
- 10.
Kunicyn 1966: 207.
- 11.
Lavrov 1965: 365.
- 12.
Lavrov 1965: 367.
- 13.
Lavrov 1967: 196–197.
- 14.
Lavrov 1967: 343. Lavrov may have recognized that this claim ran counter to his overall metaphysically agnostic outlook. Later in 1872, Lavrov, in an unsigned but quite verbose article, returned to his position that metaphysics speaks of whether the will is free, whether consciousness can arise from matter alone, and whether the soul is an organism. As such, it “lies outside natural science.” Lavrov 1872: 23.
- 15.
McLeish 1975: 65. For the original Russian citation see Sechenov 1952: 682. Eventually, the charges against Sechenov were dropped. The prosecutor, fearing failure and the attendant bad publicity, did not proceed with the case. The distribution of Sechenov’s book resumed and was offered for sale in September 1867.
- 16.
Sechenov 1952: 8. Sechenov’s words eerily anticipate the later Wittgenstein. We should add that Ivan Lapshin later in emigration recognized the influence of Sechenov on his former teacher and colleague Aleksandr Vvedenskij. In an “internal review” of the yet unpublished manuscript of Jakovenko’s History of Russian Philosophy from the 1930s, Lapshin wrote, “There is an undoubted political connection between the ideas of the Kantian prof. A. I. Vvedenskij on the question of the objective signs of psychic life (1892) and the ideas of Sechenov, whose book Vvedenskij certainly read….” Lapshin 2006: 196. For a summary of Vvedenskij’s position, see Nemeth 2017: 233–236.
- 17.
Pustarnakov also noted Sechenov’s penchant for philosophical pronouncements. “Sechenov declares, ‘We are not philosophers,’ but though not being a professional philosopher, he in fact made a great contribution to university philosophy, defending the objective method in physiology and psychology, criticizing idealist philosophy and even positivism.” Pustarnakov 2003: 178.
- 18.
Naturally, Sechenov had to work on a piecemeal basis, and for this his investigations are still considered valuable and pioneering. It is not his strictly scientific work that is here questioned, but his generalizations based on them.
- 19.
Sechenov 1952: 52.
- 20.
Sechenov 1952: 94.
- 21.
The eminent Moscow professor/politician Boris Chicherin in his memoirs condemned Sechenov’s stance, writing that such attempts “to deduce psychology from physiology obviously have no scientific foundation whatever…. A natural scientist not knowing anything except his specialty could fall into a one-sided interpretation of such concepts as the free will. Random readings in psychology, without a broad education in philosophy, can confuse the unprepared mind.” Chicherin 1935: 89.
- 22.
For a more detailed account of the Solov’ëv-Kavelin confrontation, see Nemeth 2014: 42–48.
- 23.
Kavelin 1899: 846.
- 24.
- 25.
Kavelin 1899: 589.
- 26.
Sechenov 1872: 390.
- 27.
Sechenov returned to the topic in 1881 with an emphasis on the punishment of criminals. See Sechenov 1881.
- 28.
Samarin 1887: 420–421.
- 29.
Quoted in Samarin 1887: 393. The lengthy “Preface” to Samarin’s articles, by his younger brother Dmitrij (1827–1901), reprinted in his Collected Works contains much valuable information not only concerning the Kavelin-Samarin correspondence but also reveals much about the penetration of the standpoints of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann into Russia at this time. See Samarin 1887: 373–396.
- 30.
A second edition appeared in 1886. Unlike most scholars either in Kavelin’s day or in our own, Aleksandr Shevcov views Kavelin’s Zadachi as “the only true scientific study of morality done in Russia.” Shevcov 2007: 113.
- 31.
Kavelin 1899: 920.
- 32.
Kavelin 1899: 921.
- 33.
A fourth article appeared belatedly 8 years later authored by Viktor Gol’cev (1850–1906), a journalist/editor and sometime instructor in the law faculty of Moscow University. See Gol’cev 1892.
- 34.
This article appeared over several issues of the journal in August and September 1888. Pis’ma vol. 4: 185f.
- 35.
Pis’ma, vol. 2: 255.
- 36.
Grot’s undergraduate thesis, for which he received a gold medal, was entitled “Aristotle’s metaphysics as a refutation of Plato and the Pythagoreans.” See Emel’janov 2010: 19.
- 37.
Grot 1904: 149. Grot’s autobiographical essay originally appeared in 1886 in the journal that Solov’ëv often used as his own outlet, Pravoslavnoe obozrenie.
- 38.
Pis’ma, vol. 2: 255.
- 39.
See also the letter to the Serbian Canon Rački dated 22 October 1886 in which Solov’ëv writes that the journal will appear without censorship. Pis’ma, vol. 1: 169–170.
- 40.
Hereafter, this journal will simply be mentioned as Voprosy filosofii.
- 41.
Baram 1989: 108. In a lengthy letter dated November 1891 to the Tsar, Konstantin Pobedonoscev, a senior advisor and arch-reactionary, reported on the founding of the journal which had provided an arena for Solov’ëv, “who presents himself as some kind of prophet despite the obvious absurdity and baseless nature of everything that he preaches.” Pobedonoscev 1926: 251–253.
- 42.
Ermichëv 2016a: 116.
- 43.
SS, vol. 6: 269.
- 44.
Troickij addressed the Psychological Society on 24 October 1885 on Kavelin. The address was shortly afterward published. The positivistically inclined Troickij objected to Kavelin but also to Sechenov for his reduction of psychology to physiology. Troickij 1885: 183.
- 45.
Sobolev 1994: 102; Pis’ma, vol. 3: 259–261.
- 46.
Solov’ëv 1992: 205.
- 47.
See Solov’ëv 2014. Also see Nikanor 1886 and Grot’s response, Grot 1904. Joravsky, no doubt correctly, mentions the influence of the novelist Leo Tolstoy. Joravsky also pointedly mentions Tolstoy’s decided preference for Grot over Solov’ëv as a thinker and presumably as a person. Joravsky 1989: 116–117.
- 48.
Grot 1889: 11–12.
- 49.
- 50.
Again some decade and a half earlier, Kavelin had objected to such a metaphysical leap, writing “A positive investigation of psychic activity is not only difficult, but even more it moves onto an imaginary metaphysical plane where owing to insufficient material and facts it depletes itself in fruitless, scholastic exercises.” Kavelin 1899: 589–590.
- 51.
Grot 1889: 23.
- 52.
Korsakov 1889: 225.
- 53.
Korsakov 1889: 240.
- 54.
Korsakov 1889: 244.
- 55.
Korsakov 1889: 248.
- 56.
In a newspaper article, which we will examine in greater detail later, from 1891, Solov’ëv also recognized this quality of Lopatin’s, albeit without mentioning him by name, writing that his position concerning the human individual “must be recognized as an abstract fiction, which can be upheld only by minds devoid of scientific education, or at least unacquainted with the latest results of the natural sciences.” Pis’ma, vol. 3: 254. For another affirmation that Solov’ëv had Lopatin in mind, see Polovinkin 2013: 90.
- 57.
By no means is this a universally shared opinion. One recent scholar writes, “Defending metaphysics and in solidarity on this matter with Solov’ëv, the religious mysticism to which Solov’ëv was close was completely foreign to Lopatin. Popov 2010: 156. The reader will have to judge for oneself.
- 58.
Lopatin and Solov’ëv had known each other since childhood, Lopatin’s father Mikhail, an attorney, was a close friend of Solov’ëv’s father, the historian Sergej. There are numerous short sketches of Lopatin’s biography. A recent one is Gromov 2006, but there has been remarkably little secondary literature.
- 59.
See Lopatin 1891: 326–391.
- 60.
Lopatin 1889: 112. Lopatin’s continuing invocation of the notion of an agent as ultimately initiating action will lead to another sharp divergence with the later Solov’ëv.
- 61.
Lopatin 1889: 123.
- 62.
Lopatin 1889: 122. The address as published in 1889 was followed by five brief supplements, representing his replies to unnamed opponents in the discussion that followed Lopatin’s presentation. The first two supplements are Lopatin’s polemical responses allegedly to Solov’ëv. See Polovinkin 2013: 89. However, the first of them is largely devoted to a defense of Lopatin’s position vis-à-vis a purely phenomenalist reading of Kant’s doctrine of time. He did end the supplement, though writing, “I only tried to show that freedom of the will is a fact, which obviously follows from the entire content of our psychic life.” Lopatin 1889: 176. In the second supplement, Lopatin wrote that everything and every event must have a cause. Psychic phenomena, therefore, must have a cause. However, they cannot be explained through mechanical causality. Therefore, there must be another type of causality that can explain them, viz., a creative causality. Lopatin 1889: 178. Lopatin fully recognized that he and Solov’ëv differed on the issue of free will, writing many years later, “Already in 1889 we had a public dispute with Solov’ëv during the discussion in the Moscow Psychological Society of my address ‘The Question of Freedom of the Will,’ in which Solov’ëv strongly objected to my theory of creative causality.” Lopatin 1995: 517.
- 63.
Kant 1997a: 483 (A444/B472).
- 64.
See Kant 1997a: 304–316 (A189/B 232-A211/B256).
- 65.
Lopatin 1890: 35. The reader will surely notice that Lopatin framed his concern here in terms of a metaphysical justification of our entire moral sphere. Solov’ëv several years later entitled his major ethical treatise the Justification of the Moral Good. Is this merely a coincidence? Or was Solov’ëv in effect providing his own extended answer to Lopatin. Solov’ëv employed the Russian word “opravdanie” in the title of his book, and Lopatin used its verb form “opravdat’.”
- 66.
Lopatin 1890: 39.
- 67.
- 68.
Solov’ëv 2001: 111.
- 69.
Solov’ëv’s remarks were posthumously published in the journal Mysl’ i slovo in 1921.
- 70.
Solov’ëv 1923: 62. Although the letter itself is undated, the manuscript copy sent to Stasjulevich is marked as having arrived on 22 January.
- 71.
Stasjulevich surely felt Solov’ëv’s discussion of free will was ill-suited for Vestnik Evropy and informed him so. In a subsequent letter from 26 October 1893, Solov’ëv wrote Stasjulevich that he himself “at the last moment doubted its suitability….” Solov’ëv added that he “whole-heartedly endorsed” Stasjulevich’s decision. Pis’ma, vol. 1: 111. Solov’ëv’s nephew, Sergey, speculates that had the critique been published it would have brought “sorrow instead of consolation to his old friend,” namely Lopatin. Solovyov 2000: 392.
- 72.
Solov’ëv 1970: 278.
- 73.
Solov’ëv 1970: 280.
- 74.
Solov’ëv 1970: 282.
- 75.
Solov’ëv 1970: 284.
- 76.
Solov’ëv 1970: 285.
- 77.
Solov’ëv wrote, “… the mistaken confusion of mechanistic determinism with determinism in general, an error from which even Kant himself was not free.” Solov’ëv 2015: 12–13; SS, vol. 8: 38. Solov’ëv did not elaborate on this remark.
- 78.
Solov’ëv 2015: 13; SS, vol. 8: 38–39.
- 79.
Solov’ëv, once again, revealed his insistent penchant for triadic schemes. In the absence of an extended treatment delineating the nature of these faculties and their respective functions, it is difficult to assess Solov’ëv’s distinction between feeling and desire. We have no clear indications of his understanding of them as two separate faculties. Much of Solov’ëv’s treatment here parallels the discussion in his Critique of Abstract Principles. In this particular case concerning faculties, see Solov’ëv 2001: 79.
- 80.
Solov’ëv 2001: 79.
- 81.
Solov’ëv, in an unfortunately cryptic aside, stated that Kant denied mental activity in animals and ascribed only mechanistic determinism to them. See Solov’ëv 2015: 15. That is, Solov’ëv believed Kant did not recognize animals as having the power of representation. Continuing his usual practice, Solov’ëv omitted to supply us with a reference within Kant’s texts that support his contention. Yet, Kant clearly rejected the Cartesian view of animals as mere machines and did so on a basis similar to Solov’ëv’s. In his third Critique, Kant wrote, “animals also act in accordance with representations (and not, as Descartes would have it, machines)….” Kant 2000: 328 (Ak 5: 464). We also find in the “Metaphysik Volckmann” from the mid-1780s the statement, “but to think of animals as machines is impossible…” Kant 1997b: 295 (Ak 8: 449). In fact, had Solov’ëv known of Kant’s lecture notes he would have found additional philosophical support for his own stance.
- 82.
Solov’ëv 2015: 16; SS, vol. 8: 43.
- 83.
Cf. Kant 1997a: 533 (A534/B562).
- 84.
Solov’ëv wrote that though we can act morally, for the sake of the very idea of the good, this fact is “fully compatible with determinism without demanding in any way so-called freedom of the will.” Solov’ëv 2015: 15; SS, vol. 8: 42. Solov’ëv here implicitly distinguishes a phenomenal free will from a noumenal one, the latter being the conception he had in mind in this quotation. The very possibility of implementing moral considerations in action over hedonist ones demonstrates that phenomenally we are free, but whether we are noumenally free is an irrelevant metaphysical issue.
- 85.
Solov’ëv 2015: 15; SS, vol. 8: 42.
- 86.
Another immediate question that arises in this discussion is whether for Solov’ëv all nonmorally motivated actions are psychologically determined. That is, were it not for morally motivated actions, would we speak of human actions as being strictly psychologically determined and therefore psychologically necessary?
- 87.
Solov’ëv 2015: 16; SS, vol. 8: 42.
- 88.
Solov’ëv 2015: 18; SS, vol. 8: 45. The equation of rational freedom and moral necessity is explicitly stated only in a brief passage he added to the 1899 edition of the Justification of the Moral Good.
- 89.
- 90.
From a letter included in Borisova et al. 1993: 14. The reference to a “just completed dictionary article on Kant” is to SS, vol. 10: 345–380. In this letter, Solov’ëv, referring to Trubeckoj’s article, “Psychological Determinism and Moral Freedom,” wrote, “I approve of your article in general and agree with the ideas expressed in it.” Borisova et al. 1993: 14. Trubeckoj’s article appeared the previous month and was largely an attack on naturalistic explanations of our sense of free will from the standpoint of mundane introspection. Simply dismissing empirical psychology, Trubeckoj wrote, “Therefore, the objective reality of the will is, for us, indubitable. It, obviously, can be denied only out of misunderstanding, which is natural and understandable for some empirical psychologists. The will, as the root of our activity, of our autonomy, of our spiritual reality, is not subject to empirical observation.” Trubeckoj 1894: 499. Further on he wrote, “Empirically, we cannot find the freedom of which we are aware within ourselves. We find only various sorts of determinism. … On the other hand, however, empirical psychology still does not give us the right to deny free will, or freedom of choice.” Trubeckoj 1894: 516.
- 91.
SS, vol. 10: 284.
- 92.
Evgenij Trubeckoj already long ago recognized Solov’ëv’s oversight here, writing “The confusion of these two quite different viewpoints is reflected in the essential deficiencies of the corresponding chapters of the Critique of Abstract Principles.” Trubeckoj 1995: vol. 1, 143.
- 93.
Given Solov’ëv’s firm conviction that the super-natural can manifest itself in the natural world, it is surprising that he failed to address how it is possible.
- 94.
Solov’ëv 2001: 109–110.
- 95.
Solov’ëv 2001: 319.
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Nemeth, T. (2019). On Free Will. In: The Later Solov’ëv . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20611-6_3
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