Abstract
This chapter is dedicated to Hume’s most significant contribution to aesthetics and the theory of literature, his essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ (1757). I suggest that Hume’s exploration of the notion of a standard of taste is part of a programme akin to realism. This suggestion is based on a close reading of Hume’s essay and on argument advanced by other commentators which emphasizes that for Hume the standard of taste is discovered (as opposed to being constituted) by the ‘true judges’. Such a programme is, indeed, at odds with some of Hume’s earlier writings, but it is not incompatible with Hume’s general sentimentalism which is an epistemological doctrine concerning how (aesthetic) truths are known. My claim is that Hume’s epistemology of beauty leaves room for, and perhaps lends support to, a moderate aesthetic realism.
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Notes
- 1.
For the claim that Hume’s project was not per se anti-metaphysical, see Stephen K. McLeod (2001, 1–7).
- 2.
For a brief survey of previous discussions of Hume’s essay in the analytic tradition, see Levinson (2002, 228–229).
- 3.
C. MacLachlan (1986, 18) has emphasized that irony permeates the essay, making it difficult to discern Hume’s ultimate view: ‘perhaps the greatest difficulty facing interpretation of this essay is the irony which Hume seems to use, for this raises the question of just how seriously we are to take some of the more conventional views contained in “Of the Standard of Taste”.’
- 4.
Mothersill (1989, 271) refers to a ‘paradox of taste’ in Hume’s aesthetics, ‘generated for Hume by conjoining his general theory with his own critical convictions.’ See also p. 274: ‘What “cuts off all hope of success” […] and “represents the impossibility of ever attaining any Standard of Taste” is the skeptical philosophy, i.e., Hume’s own theory.’
- 5.
What precludes the rule from being a mere convention is that a mere convention can be arbitrarily decided, whereas a standard of taste, as Hume conceives it, is not arbitrarily decided. My aim is to claim that the standard of taste as Hume conceives it reflects what has value.
- 6.
Both Anthony Savile (1996) and Peter Kivy (2003, 252) emphasize the discrepancy between Hume’s views in earlier writings and in the essay on taste.
- 7.
Cf. Hume in ‘The Sceptic’ ([1742] 1985, 165): ‘[Beauty] is only the effect, which that figure produces upon a mind’. p. 166: ‘the beauty, properly speaking, lies not in the poem, but in the sentiment or taste of the reader.’
- 8.
Kivy (2003) takes the assimilation of matters of sentiment to matters of fact to be one of Hume’s aims in the essay, which would support the thought that Hume may not be endorsing the sceptical view: ‘In questions concerning beauty and deformity, Hume is arguing, we can “translate” (so to say) matters of sentiment into matters of fact’ (2003, 252). If this thought is plausible, then Hume should perhaps not be identified with the species of philosophy objecting to the standard of taste, and the objection against the standard should be seen ironically.
- 9.
Miguel Tamen (2005, 211). Tamen remains neutral concerning the nature of the standard, but the contrast he makes between Kant’s project and Hume’s seems to suggest the view that for Hume matters of beauty are matters for discovery. See (2005, 219): ‘Where Hume says “imitate the experts,” Kant says “consult your conscience.”’
- 10.
So if the standard of taste is constituted by the ‘true judges’, Hume’s project might be (as some have claimed) incoherent.
- 11.
Someone might say that (e.g.) laws are constituted, but normative. So why shouldn’t the standard of taste be both constituted and normative? In reply, we can say that the normativity arrived at via a constitution (such as the case of law) is not yet like the normativity of aesthetic judgements, which seem to be based on what is the case (aesthetically). A law may or may not be based on what is fair: some laws are simply arbitrary (think of the case of right- and left-hand traffic). A standard of taste should, to the contrary, reflect what has aesthetic value in the first place.
- 12.
See Savile (1996) and Kivy (2003, 252).
- 13.
For instance, Malcolm Budd (1995).
- 14.
Someone might say that (e.g.) the commands and laws that govern a state, an army, etc., are both stipulated and motivating; there does not seem to be any philosophical difficulty, per se, in the idea that a stipulation can motivate. But we can reply by saying that the standard of taste is meant to accommodate the fact that claims (judgements) are correct or incorrect in virtue of the nature of the objects they are about, not in virtue of arbitrary stipulations. So yes, stipulations can motivate; but the motivations we are looking for, based on the aesthetic nature of certain objects, cannot be based on mere (arbitrary) stipulations. Cf. Budd (1995, 17): ‘for [a standard of taste] to be possible, the authority of such a court of appeal must be justified, not arbitrary.’
- 15.
This is what Levinson (2002) claims to be the ‘real problem’ in Hume’s essay.
- 16.
Budd (1995, 21): ‘the standard is set by the preferences of individuals who satisfy a certain condition’; ‘even if there were unanimity amongst the competent judges, their agreement would constitute, not a normative standard, but only a natural or fortuitous coincidence of preferences.’
- 17.
That Budd construes Hume as an anti-realist is clear in this passage (1995, 17): ‘[For Hume aesthetic pleasure] is a reaction to how the world is represented to the subject, rather than a representation of a possible state of affairs.’
- 18.
See Budd (2001).
- 19.
In the story as Hume tells it, two of Sancho’s relatives had tasted a wine and had expressed different verdicts about it. One had said that the wine was good, ‘were it not for a small taste of leather he perceived in it’. The other also said that it was good, but noticed ‘a taste of iron.’ When the hogshead was emptied, an old key with a leathern thong tied to it was found and all acknowledged they were both (partially) right in their judgement.
- 20.
The idea that sentiments can be understood as ‘towards the world’ is developed in Peter Goldie (2002, Chapter 3). Although sentiments are not strictly representational, they are about properties of reality, not simply about the subject’s feelings. So, pace Budd, some sentiments are more fitting to an object than others (and therefore preferable to others).
- 21.
Someone might say that this passage does not favour realism over response-dependence. But the crucial aspect that Savile notes (which I think is at least compatible with realism) is that the sentiments of the true judges are responses to ‘what is present in the object’. So even if a response is involved, the presence of the property is not dependent on the response. I should also mention that it is not clear that response-dependence is incompatible with realism. Levinson (2001), for instance, takes some aesthetic properties to be response-dependent, and his account is meant to remain realist. For the claim that realism (in general) is compatible with response-dependence (concerning concepts), see Pettit (1991).
- 22.
Cf. Levinson (2002, 228): ‘The [more reasonable interpretation of Hume’s discourse is that] true judges are consistently described as reliable detectors of the beautiful, in virtue of their alleged superior capacities of discrimination and response, and not as constituters of the beautiful.’
- 23.
That not all sentiments towards works are equally appropriate is consistent with projectivism, which is an anti-realist view. But Hume’s claim is that some but not all aesthetic claims are true. (Recall the contrast made by Hume between the merits of Ogilby and Milton.)
- 24.
I am now assuming that the standard, as Hume proposes it, is to be discovered by the true judges.
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Morais, I. (2019). Hume’s Standard of Taste. In: Aesthetic Realism. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20127-2_4
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