Abstract
This piece surveys a recent body of studies in “matching with constraints.” It discusses relationship with traditional matching theory and new applications, and concludes with some open questions.
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Kojima, F. (2019). New Directions of Study in Matching with Constraints. In: Laslier, JF., Moulin, H., Sanver, M., Zwicker, W. (eds) The Future of Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_67
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_67
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