Abstract
Pakistan’s unhealthy civil-military relations constitute as a major hindrance for sustainable development and democratic consolidation in the country. This chapter will outline the basic determinants of civil-military relations in Pakistan—with special reference to the democracy-development nexus. By applying the concept of embedded democracy and a derived notion of civilian control, it will be argued that the establishment of the CPEC will lead to a further weakening of civilian decision-making powers vis-á-vis the military. Furthermore, it will be pointed out that the CPEC implementation and its respective security requirements created an environment in which the military could legally build-up a far-reaching institutionalized, formal role in the political-administrative system. The subsequent seizing of power by the armed forces will have severe impacts on the quality of democracy in Pakistan.
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Notes
- 1.
It is important to mention that economic growth fosters democratisation by increasing the size of the educated middle class; it is not guaranteed and depends on a certain set of factors, which the author identified with reference to western Europe at that time (Lipset, 1959, pp. 85; Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2005, p. 77).
- 2.
- 3.
See also Dahl (1989).
- 4.
See also Kohn (1997, p. 142).
- 5.
- 6.
See also Stepan (1988, p. 93).
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
Due to direct or indirect military intervention into politics, neither Benazir Bhutto nor Nawaz Sharif were able to finish their term in office.
- 10.
For example, territorial dispute over Kashmir with India and a contested border with Afghanistan claiming parts of Pakistan’s territory, socio-economic problems, lack of functioning political-administrative institutions; but at the same increasing over-bureaucratization of the state apparatus, and unstable, ineffective civilian governments.
- 11.
General Zia usurped power through a military coup in July 1977 by unconstitutionally overthrowing Bhutto’s civilian government.
- 12.
There has been a tendency for the military to institutionalise its political role (especially under Zia ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf). It’s featured by three criteria: (1) the abandonment of former personalised forms of exercising political influence (Ayub Khan 1958–1962 and partly Yahya Khan 1962–1971); (2) the (informal) induction of broader sections of the armed forces into the political system to run the affairs of state; and (3) the constitutional entrenchment of a political role for the armed forces, e.g., the introduction of the 8th Amendment.
- 13.
The five members of the country’s highest bench ruled that the PM had not been ‘honest’, which is a prerequisite for the eligibility for membership of the national parliament—and subsequently for the chief executive’s office—as enshrined in the Articles 62 and 63 of Pakistan’s Constitution. It was argued that Nawaz did not disclose to the national parliament and the judiciary his employment (and related monthly income of $ 3000) in the Dubai-based Capital FZE company in his nomination papers for the 2013 general elections (Wolf, 2017c, August 1).
- 14.
Understood as regular and paramilitary forces as well as intelligence agencies.
- 15.
The ‘mullah-military-nexus’ refers to the close relationship between the country’s military (including intelligence) and Islamic clerics and organisational structures. Most military leaders, especially when they took over power, have sought to use Islam so as to enhance their legitimacy, undermine political opposition and increase their authority in both state and society (Malik, 2011, p. 42). For the security forces, Islamic clerics and support for conservative and radicalised Islamic thinkers were important factors in providing an ideological justification for the dominant role in the country’s political arena. For the radicalised Islamic clerics, the backing of the soldiers was necessary to provide them with the means to penetrate all facets of Pakistani society (Murphy & Malik, 2009, p. 25; Wolf, 2017a, pp. 112–117).
- 16.
See for more information: http://www.moib.gov.pk/InnerPage.aspx?Page_ID=46
- 17.
In constitutional-technical terms, the 21st amendment to the Constitution provides for entering the Pakistan Army Act 1952, the Pakistan Army Act 1953, the Pakistan Navy Act 1961 and the Protection of Pakistan Act, 2014 in the first schedule of the Constitution. The first schedule of the Constitution contains laws which are exempted from the application of Article 8 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. These articles are part of Chapter 1 of the Constitution relating to the fundamental rights. More concretely, the 21st Amendment Act provides for the creation of military speed trial courts (STCs) for offences relating to terrorism, waging war against Pakistan and prevention of acts threatening the security of the country. The Act shall remain in force for two years starting on 7 January 2015 after the President signed the Act (Dawn, 2015d, January 6; Pakistan Today, 2015, January 6).
- 18.
This bill also became known as the ‘28th amendment bill’ (Bilal, 2017, March 31).
- 19.
The Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a meeting at the ministerial level. The JCC is the apex decision-making forum on the CPEC and is jointly chaired by Pakistan’s Planning and Development Minister and the vice-chairman of National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of China. However, the more significant bodies within the JSS are the Senior Official Meetings (SOMs), responsible for the preparation of the discussions to be held during the JSS sessions (Geo News, 2017, November 21).
- 20.
Despite the International Forum being hailed as the first platform on which top civil and military organisations meet to promote the common objective of building the CPEC, the composition of the Pakistani delegation during its first meeting clearly emphasises the strong influence of the military in this bilateral entity (Nation, 2015, August 17).
- 21.
This is understood as aid-to-civilian-power missions, the objective of which has been to restore civilian authority in law and order crises or cope with natural calamities (e.g., in East Pakistan there occurred the Bengali-Urdu language crisis; various food crises; and the Dhaka police riots; while West Pakistan was confronted with the Karachi riots and the Ahmadiyya crisis, all of which transpired in the 1950s) (Cheema, 2002, p. 122).
- 22.
Operation Rast-e-Rath (27 April-30 June 2009) is another interesting example for Pakistan’s autonomy in internal security decision making. Operation Rast-e-Rath or Rah-e-Nijat refers to a full-fledged military action in the Swat district of the Malakand Division of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) in Pakistan, aiming to crush the followers of the militant organisation Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) as well as Taliban elements, operating in this area. Subsequently to counter similar extremist elements in the South Waziristan Agency, Operation Rah-e-Nijat was carried out. See for more details: Jones and Fair (2010, pp. 70–75).
- 23.
The operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched in North Waziristan (NWA) on 15 June 2014, following a series of major terrorist attacks (especially attacks on Karachi’s international airport & Peshawar school attack) and the failure of peace negotiations between the government/army and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan/TTP. The campaign has been bolstered by a surge of 170,000 troops, almost a third of Pakistan’s entire military. Besides the TTP, the major targets were the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Al Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (Sial, 2014, December; Wolf, June 2015; Zahid, 2015, July 10).
- 24.
The security forces have arrested over 58,000 criminals. Of them, 9570 were absconders while 630 were proclaimed offenders. Others apprehended during the operation included 1731 murderers, 713 terrorists, 517 extortionists and 118 kidnappers. Security forces also recovered 15,612 illegal weapons during the operation (Gishkori, 2015a, November 12).
- 25.
For example, the decision to go for a further enrichment of the nuclear weapon program was clearly made by the military top echelon. In contrast, civilians were made responsible only to find a diplomatic solution for the consequences (international sanctions) (Kukreja, 2003, p. 237).
- 26.
- 27.
“Given how important nuclear weapons are to the South Asian nation’s military capabilities and even identity, the significance attached to China’s essential role in the nuclear program can hardly be overstated.” (Andrew Small quoted in Domínguez, 2015b, January 15).
- 28.
One of the earlier examples is the decision to set up a think tank called ‘Research and Development International’ (Daily Times, 2015b, April 19).
- 29.
The basic concept behind the proposal is to create a body exclusively for the CPEC which can be used by major stakeholders (namely provincial governments and the security actors) so as to present their ideas regarding project planning and implementation to the executing authority, the federal government (Ghumman, 2016, February 10). The new authority is proposed to be headed by a chairman, who is to be assisted by director generals responsible for implementation of CPEC-related projects (Rana, 2016, April 16).
- 30.
See for more information: http://www.fwo.com.pk/
- 31.
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Wolf, S.O. (2020). Development Versus Democracy? The CPEC and Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan. In: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative. Contemporary South Asian Studies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16198-9_9
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