Abstract
This concluding chapter states that an assessment of the initial planning process (2013–2015) and most of the official first phase (2015–2020) of the CPEC’s implementation (especially the ‘Early Harvest Projects’) reveals clear indications that this development initiative will not function as a ‘game changer’ or ‘critical juncture’ for Pakistan’s economy and regional cooperation. In contrast to official proclamations, the CPEC project is accompanied by severe ramifications in all spheres of state and society, including economic, political, social and environmental aspects. Despite the fact that the CPEC implementation is still in an early phase—making a final evaluation premature—it can be stated that the stringent application of the newly developed concept of Economic Corridors offers a fruitful approach for the analysis of the CPEC—making comprehensive findings possible.
An assessment of the initial planning process (2013–2015) and most of the official first phase (2015–2020) of the CPEC’s implementation (especially the ‘Early Harvest Projects’), reveals clear indications that this development initiative will not function as a ‘game changer’ or ‘critical juncture’ for Pakistan’s economy and regional cooperation. In contrast to official proclamations, the CPEC project is accompanied by severe negative ramifications in all spheres of state and society, including economic, political, social and environmental aspects. Despite the fact that the CPEC implementation is still in an initial phase—making a final evaluation premature—the following key findings can be presented.
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For example, the cabinet’s Economic Coordination Committee (EEC), one of the most important regulatory bodies. The ECC was formed as an emergency wartime measure in 1965 amid the suspension of foreign aid and assistance and has been in place until today (BTI, 2018, p. 20).
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Such as financial, investment, monetary, trade, labor or business freedom (Miller et al., 2018, pp. 8–15).
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Michael Kugelman cited in Jamal (2018, January 11).
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Michael Kugelman cited in Jamal (2018, January 11).
- 5.
Regarding the United Nations, Pakistan spend between 1997 and 2015 in average 0.28% of its GDP for research and development; also known as GERD (Gross domestic expenditure on R&D/GERD, GERD as a percentage of GDP; United Nations [Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics] Furthermore, the World Bank state that from 2007 it dropped down dramatically from 0.63% down to 0.25. United Nations [Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics] data. For more information see: http://data.uis.unesco.org/index.aspx?queryid=74#
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Most of the R&D departments of the GoP are failing to deliver because of the shortage of funds.
- 7.
Understood here as being a transit country, a potential market for Chinese goods and a provider for raw and partly processed materials—including agricultural products. To a limited degree also as a provider of cheap labour in certain areas of industrial production and manufacturing.
- 8.
During the occupation of the Red Mosque in Islamabad by Islamist militants, the Chinese government pressured then military ruler General Pervez Musharraf to use coercive force so as to free Chinese hostages. Beijing also exercised its influence to convince the Pakistani government to move against Uyghur militants residing in the country (ICG, 2018, June 29, p. 6).
- 9.
Pakistan’s IDI ranking has improved from 52nd in 2017 to 47th in 2018 (Ali 2018e, February 27).
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Wolf, S.O. (2020). Final Thoughts. In: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative. Contemporary South Asian Studies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16198-9_10
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