Abstract
As a side effect of the crisis, there was a radical transformation of the party system. It did not make itself felt in the local government elections of autumn 2010 because up until that time people thought the situation would not worsen. After the passage of the second Memorandum, however, there was a rapid change in the relations between parties. The decades-long bipartisanship of New Democracy (ND) and PASOK collapsed and a new bipartisanship, more limited in range, emerged, involving ND and SYRIZA. With the shrinkage of PASOK, new parties emerged in the parliament in different phases (Independent Greeks, the River, Democratic Left), along with an explosion in support for the Union of Centrists and the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn. The continuing deterioration in the lives of Greeks would bring to power a party of the Radical Left, who formed a government together with the Independent Greeks, ANEL. There were high hopes around this government that it would put an end to the policy of the Memoranda, both inside and outside Greece. But it soon became clear that faith in rational discourse and the negotiation process would not be enough to change the policy mix in the country. Unwilling to break with the lenders, the Tsipras government was forced to sign yet another Memorandum.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
“And just when Greece was ready to start on the difficult path of modernizing its productive, i.e. entrepreneurial, structures, it was swept by a tsunami of populism that installed small and medium businesses in the role of ‘class’ allies of farmers, workers and oppressed State employees, in that order!” Article of M. Papadimitriou in Kathimerini of 12/9/2010, cited in Lialiouti and Bithymitris 2013: 159.
- 2.
“The European Union and the member-states that comprise it are not responsible for all these distortions. Responsibility lies with Greece, its peculiarities, and the inability of the country’s political system to function in such a way as to set an example for citizens”. Article by K. Iordanidis in Kathimerini of 27/6/2010 cited in Lialiouti and Bithymitris 2013: 158.
- 3.
“The goal we must remain committed to is ‘almost an accounting task’. The government is ‘free’ to concentrate on a single objective. Greece is short of precious time to organize its defences. Let us hope that it will not dissipate its strength in stupid, purportedly ‘ideological’ but in fact small-minded political betrayals”. Article of M. Papadimitriou in Kathimerini of 6/6/2010, cited in Lialiouti and Bithymitris 2013: 156.
- 4.
The country is divided into 13 regions.
- 5.
The results of the 2009 national elections were: PASOK 43.92% and 3012.542 votes, ND 33.47% and 2,295,719 votes, KKE 7.54% and 517,249 votes, LAOS 5.63% and 386,205 votes, SYRIZA 4.60% and 315,665 votes, Ecologists-Greens 2.53% and 173,589 votes, ANTARSYA 0.36% and 24,687 votes.
- 6.
As George Papandreou said in the inter-channel interview, if the results of the elections are negative for PASOK “then the decision must be for the People”.
- 7.
Dora Bakoyanni was a very important office holder in ND . When after the ND defeat in the 2009 parliamentary elections its then president K. Karamanlis resigned, D. Bakoyanni came second after Antonis Samaras in the elections for a new party leader. Bakoyanni subsequently disagreed with Samaras and in 2010 voted for the first Memorandum, which led to her expulsion. A few days after the local elections the five parliamentarians influenced by Bakoyanni formed the short-lived political party Democratic Alliance.
- 8.
Recall that in June 2010 the so-called renewing wing of the Synaspismos, headed by F. Kouvelis, left the then Synaspismos and formed the Democratic Left.
- 9.
Very briefly, after the 2010 elections an internal confrontation began within the Left Coalition (Synaspismos), which was the largest component of SYRIZA. Almost all the groups (apart from the Synaspismos and the Ananeotiki Kommounistiki Aristera [Renewing Communist Left – AKOA] in SYRIZA, which at that time was a front formation, were evidently reconsidering their participation, with most joining together with Alekos Alavanos to form the “Metopo Allilengyis kai Anatropis” (“Front for Solidarity and the Overthrow”), from which however they gradually withdrew when at the beginning of 2012 the dynamism of SYRIZA became evident, elevating it after the elections in the May of the same year to the position of official opposition.
- 10.
Local elections are held in two rounds. The participants in the first round are the candidates who manage to get themselves on the ballot. If in the first round a candidate obtains 50% +1 of the votes, he is the winner. Otherwise a second round is held with participation only of the two leading candidates.
- 11.
“Its main deficit, however, is that of political leadership. We urgently need politicians who will ignore political costs and will not be constantly preoccupied with public relations projection. Determined politicians who can understand what it means to balance income and expenditure, who can work in a technocratic and professional manner and who are already well-established in society and in the market. Unfortunately the parties have few such people, which is why we need new blood to enter politics”. Article in Kathimerini of 13/3/2011. (mentioned in Lialiouti and Bithymitris 2013: 162).
- 12.
“We hope for the good of the country that the people of New Democracy come to their senses and listen to their conscience. If at the end of May Mr. Papandreou has not achieved a minimum of national consensus, things will be bleak. If the parties have not overcome their obsessive ideological scruples about ‘their’ state, the Greek economy will surrender to its rapists …. The enemies of the nation will have won this round”. Article by M. Papadimitriou in “Kathimerini” of 17/4/2011 (mentioned in Lialiouti and Bithymitris 2013: 153).
- 13.
“We need … a strong emergency government. In a country at war”. Article by K. Kallitsis in Kathimerini 13/3/2011 (mentioned in Lialiouti and Bithymitris 2013:154). Also: “There is a solution for everything, with Bonapartist characteristics: a small government of national salvation, comprised of politically aware technocrats and knowledgeable politicians with a uniform political outlook, who will commit themselves to achieving clear goals, will save the country and after will each go his/her own way”. Article of K. Kallitsis Kathimerini of 17/4/2011 (mentioned in Lialiouti and Bithymitris 2013: 154). Also “Unfortunately, it turns out that only if foreign operatives take matters entirely into their own hands is there any hope of being saved …. This is not the first time Greece has been placed under the guardianship of foreigners …. There will be cries of protest, but it will not be so tragic in terms of national dignity if the supervision of the foreign functionaries is more direct, with the installation of commissioners in the non-existent Greek state machine”. Article by A. Stagos in Kathimerini on 15/5/2011 (mentioned in Lialiouti and Bithymitris 2013: 164).
- 14.
In November 2011, Papandreou proposed a referendum to approve or reject the decision of the EU summit the previous October. The agreement included a 50% “haircut” of the Greek debt and an additional €130 billion aid package to Greece. Under the agreement, private individuals accepted on a voluntary basis a 50% reduction in the value of the Greek bonds they held. The agreement was accompanied by a budgetary adjustment programme with a duration until 2021, and establishment of a permanent surveillance mechanism for continuous monitoring of implementation of the reforms in Greece. The referendum proposal encountered reactions both in other European countries and within Greece, and it did not take place. Papandreou withdrew his proposal and resigned from the prime ministership. A coalition government was formed with the support of PASOK, ND and the People’s Orthodox Alarm (LAOS), with the former vice-president of the European Central Bank, Lucas Papademos, as prime minister.
- 15.
Concerning PASOK it is significant that the first Memorandum was voted (May 2010) by 156 of its 160 deputies, the mid-term Memorandum (June 2011) by 154, the Papademos government’s (November 2011) by 148 and the second Memorandum (February 2012) by just 129 deputies. Correspondingly, there were 20 deputies in ND who did not vote for the Memorandum on February 12.
- 16.
Independent Greeks (ANEL ) was founded in April 2012 by 10 former deputies of ND, led by P. Kammenos, who refused to vote for the second Memorandum in February 2012.
- 17.
The two parties of Thanos Tzimeros and Stefanos Manos are perceived to represent extreme neo-liberal views, and this would lead them to collaboration in the next elections, of June 2012.
- 18.
It is worth recording the words of G. Mavris, who observes: “In Greek political history a percentage of bipartisan influence of this order has been recorded only once, 62 years ago in the first post-civil war elections of 1950. In those elections, (note that a proportional representation system was used) the aggregate vote for the two largest parties, the People’s Party, led by K. Tsaldaris and the Liberal Party, led by S. Venizelos, accounted for 36.4% of the votes. If we also count the third party of that era, i.e. National Progressive Centre Union of N. Plastiras, the cumulative percentage of the three largest parties was close to 52.5%. In today’s line-up of party forces, even though no straightforward analogy applies, the first two parties (ND and SYRIZA) in aggregate accounted for 35.6% and the first three (with PASOK) only 48.81% of the electorate. This fragmentation of political forces was deeper even than what had emerged in the Parliament of 1950. It was so dramatic that it sometimes seemed like an ideological-political equivalent of the corresponding fragmentation of political forces that was to be observed at the first post-civil-war elections. That was the result of occupation and civil war. This later version was the political and electoral result of implementation of the Memorandum” (Mavris 2012a).
- 19.
At that time the party of the United Democratic Left, which was the legal vehicle for the outlawed KKE, received 22.4% and emerged as the second parliamentary force after the conservative party of Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis.
- 20.
After voting in favour of the motion tabled by the Papademos government, LAOS did not support the second Memorandum but joined, albeit belatedly with the anti-Memorandum current.
- 21.
From this viewpoint, the example of Ekali (a very upper-crust district of Athens) is significant. ND took 31.6% of the vote there, but Drasi managed 21%, Recreation now 8.9% and Democratic Alliance 5.4%.
- 22.
PASOK formed governments from 1981 to 1989, from 1993 to 2004 and from 2009 to 2011.
- 23.
Nineteen per cent of the electoral base of SYRIZA was comprised of former PASOK voters, 16% of former KKE voters and 16% of new voters (Stathopoulos 2014: 66).
- 24.
In 1968, the united KKE split into the pro-Soviet KKE and the Eurocommunist KKE (interior). In all the electoral contests that took place after the fall of the junta the KKE clearly had greater electoral strength than the KKE (interior). The evolution, more or less, of the KKE (interior) into the Coalition of the Left (1991) did not change this correlation. It was not until the elections of May 2012 that SYRIZA, the electoral front of the Coalition of the Left with other organizations of the extra-parliamentary Left and Left-wing Social Democrats, overtook the KKE in electoral strength.
- 25.
- 26.
For the quite noteworthy similarities between LAOS’ electoral audience prior to its political collapse and the later audience for Golden Dawn see Koustenis 2014a: 105.
- 27.
- 28.
Specifically, on the immigration issue it is worth noting that in parts of Athens with dense concentrations of migrants, Golden Dawn obtained its highest levels of support: Plateia Vathis 12.1%, Plateia Attikis 11.6%, Plateia Amerikis 11%, Metaxourgeio 10.9%, Kolonos 10.2%, historical centre 10% (Mavris 2013d).
- 29.
Bear in mind that basic elements of the discourse articulated by Golden Dawn share common ground with Nazism. There is a condemnation of all that might be called the political “establishment” along with a quasi-metaphysical projection of the conviction that the solution will come from the Golden Dawn when Greek society effects its traditional return to the triptych Homeland—Religion—Family (Paraskeva-Veloudogianni 2012: 42). It is redolent with the neo-romanticism of the Nazi ideology of return to an ideal German past. Golden Dawn also articulates simplistic Manichean schemes, which are sometimes associated with already formulated conspiracy theories and the elaboration of a mystic schema in which Golden Dawn is the central axis against everything else and all others are complicit in, or tolerant of, the implementation of these conspiracies (conspiracies against Greeks, with Zionism playing a key role etc.). This, as in the case of classical Nazism, does not signify a socially subversive project but rather a more intensified capitalism with greater autonomy of the party-state. In fact, the Golden Dawn professes a kind of paternalistic capitalism where its party will oversee the elimination of the “distortions” of the post-junta settlement: “corrupt politicians”, the “left-wing state”, “lazy civil servants”, the “rotten political system” (Kousiantas 2012).
- 30.
It is worth mentioning on the subject of wage losses that in the SYRIZA election programme of May it says “we can, without irrationality and fragmentation, within a period of two years regain the wage levels that were secured in 2009, making unemployment benefits available to everyone, locals and immigrants, until they find work, and gradually increasing it, for the first two years, to 80% of the last salary”. On the issue of debt, the possibility of halting repayments and writing off most outstanding debt was considered within the framework of possible solutions. As regards major productive units, the May programme stated: “The financial system can and should become public”. The demand was raised for “returning to the public the enterprises and agencies that had been partially or totally privatized (Public Power Corporation, Greek telecommunications, Greek Railway Organization, Hellenic Post, Athens Public Water Authority, public transport system). Also promoted was retention or return to the control of the state of essential production units critical to the development of the economy, such as ports, airports, highways, shipyards, mineral and energy resources. The search for and exploitation of minerals and energy for as long as, and in so far as, they are needed, must be regulated by the State, with democratic control and in consultation with local communities. For this to happen public bodies are needed for the management of mineral and energy resources”.
- 31.
First of all the party leadership tried to calm fears that SYRIZA would follow policies of rupture with the EMU and the European Union. In the presentation of the electoral programme, it was stated that “we should reorient European resources to supporting unemployment, low incomes” or, as G. Dragasakis said in the same presentation, “redesigning the NSRF and increasing its absorptive capacity. A European investment financing program in EU member states to address the recession. Greece, like the other eurozone countries facing liquidity problems, needs to be strengthened, either through non-interest-bearing financing from the European Investment Bank or through alternative funding within the European Union”.
On the issue of debt, A. Tsipras stated “the new government … [will] demand renegotiation of the loan agreement. In particular, with regard to a sustainable response to the country’s sovereign debt crisis, it will seek a European solution. Without a common European solution to the problem of accrued debt and development finance, Greece cannot at the same time achieve fiscal adjustment and a primary surplus, paying interest on accumulated debt, and financing public investment and public policies. This is an unresolved equation. This is why we will demand a new debt renegotiation with the aim of drastically reducing it, or a moratorium on debt and the suspension of interest payments, until conditions for stabilization and recovery of the economy are established”.
As for salaries, social spending and property tax, the positions that were adopted were very moderate: “Unemployment benefit will be provided for twice as long as the present period (two years) …. The government will abolish special charges (real estate taxes) for small and medium income brackets, and first and foremost for the unemployed, for those on low pay, for people living on small pensions and those on the poverty line”, “There will be an immediate freeze on cuts to social spending, salaries and pensions to put an end to marginalization through low incomes and to the downgrading of the middle class”.
But on the question of nationalizations too it was moderation that predominated: For example, for natural and mineral wealth a special insurance fund would be created to which all rights on this wealth would be transferred. Thereafter “nationalization and then socialization, i.e. placement under public and transparent social control of banks that have been recapitalized through the Financial Stability Fund. A freeze on privatizations of Public Organizations of strategic importance for the national economy that have been passed on to the celebrated Special Fund, with gradual restoration, depending on the potential of the economy, of the publicly controlled strategic enterprises that are either in the process of privatization or have already been privatized (the Public Power Corporation, the Hellenic Telecommunications Organization, the Greek National Railways, the Hellenic Post Office, the Athens Water Supply and Sewerage Company, the public transport system)”. Here too the difference from the May programme is obvious.
- 32.
The data cited here is based on research carried out by Public Issue (Mavris 2012a), but in some cases (e.g. internal categories of private sector employees) we are using data from VPRC research (Vernardakis 2013a). In any case because there cannot be absolute accuracy in the context of a sample survey, all data should be treated as indicative.
- 33.
According to VPRC data, PASOK secured 1.6% of votes among skilled workers and 4.5% among unskilled workers and those working on flexible schedules.
- 34.
From this viewpoint the very good results it achieved in working class areas of Athens are indicative: Β’ Piraeus 9.3%, Salamina 13%, Tavros 11.1%, Perama 10.9%, Renti 10.3%, Kamatero 9.9% (Mavris 2013d).
- 35.
VPRC data show even more pronounced low-income characteristics to the point where their electoral geography looks like that of a Leftist party. From employers/entrepreneurs they receive only 1.6% of the vote, but from specialized workers 11.1%, from school pupils/students/soldiers 10.7%, from the unemployed 9.6%, from middle managers in the private sector 9.3% and from unskilled workers/ employees on flexible work schedules 9.1% (Vernardakis 2013a).
- 36.
The question of generations is very important. We should not forget that high rates of youth unemployment were also prevalent before the advent of the economic crisis. When the crisis struck, they exploded. Beyond that, even obtaining a degree sometimes complicates access to the labour market rather than facilitating it. In any case, the hunt for additional qualifications and certificates is never-ending. At the same time, young people are the ones who enter production under the worst conditions because of Memoranda commitments, in a framework that is then used as a lever for the generalized removal of basic labour rights (lower basic salary, absence of insurance, flexible employment, arbitrary prolonging of working hours). All this contributes to a situation where young people are forced to wait longer years and grow older before being able to gain their independence from their family. Thus a “cheated” generation is created which gradually realizes that although it has conformed with all the requirements imposed on it, the expectations created are not going to be satisfied (Gaitanou 2011: 58).
- 37.
In contrast to the past, where the Communist Left was based on its grounding in local society, subsequently consolidating its presence at the central political level.
- 38.
The others are regarded as “independent” but apart from certain mayoral candidates in island municipalities, the political identities of most “independents” are linked to ND and PASOK (Mavris 2014a: 5).
- 39.
After its participation in the Memorandum government DIMAR is to be included in the Centre-Left, not the Left, current.
- 40.
Τhe River was established in the spring of 2014 by the journalist S. Theodorakis, and espouses pro-Memorandum positions.
- 41.
But there is no justification for concluding that the electoral survival of “independent” pro-Memorandum candidates has been primarily due to clentelistic relations. As D. Belandis very perspicaciously observed: “It would be wrong to argue that the phenomenon is exclusively, or even primarily, a reflection of clientelism, notwithstanding the already widespread prevalence of clientelistic relations. Links of this kind supplement and underwrite habitual administrative practice and are integrated into broader relations of social representation but do not explain them or provide a comprehensive interpretation for the Centre-Left’s presence in the local administrative sphere and local government. In the final analysis what is of central importance is the ‘perceived’ or even real bureaucratic and administrative proficiency or even ‘more-than-adequacy’ of the Centre-Left authorities. Thanks to the long-term experience in management, this sufficiency acquires technocratic or quasi-technocratic characteristics. It therefore comes to be considered that the daily life of the populations and their management depends on the sufficiency and stability of the centre’s ‘administrative chieftains’” (Belantis 2014).
- 42.
In November 2013, the Centre-Left oriented mayors of Athens G. Kaminis, of Thessaloniki G. Boutaris, of Patras G. Dimaras, of Volos P. Skotiniotis and of Ioannina F. Filios published a joint declaration centred on three points: (a) independence from party tutelage; (b) innovative solutions for day-to-day management and improvement of quality of life; (c) rational management of competences and resources and redefinition of relations between municipalities, the State and business enterprises.
- 43.
Of the nine largest municipalities in the country (Athens, Thessaloniki, Piraeus, Peristeri, Patras, Larissa, Volos, Ioannina, Heraklion) it is only in Patras that an anti-Memorandum candidate achieved the highest vote, namely K. Peletides, who was supported by the Communist Party, and only three SYRIZA candidates (in Athens, Volos and Larissa), managed to come second.
- 44.
Naturally, as explained, this is a partial tendency confined to the municipal level. Of the nine largest municipalities only two were won by a candidate from the Left: Patras by the KKE candidate Peletides and Larissa by the SYRIZA-supported candidate A. Kalogiannis.
- 45.
The Hellenic European Citizens were founded a few weeks before the elections by the Greek German G. Hadzimarkakis, former Europarliamentarian of the German FDP, adopting moderate anti-Memorandum positions.
- 46.
The Union for our Country and our People was founded at the beginning of 2014, primarily by seceding ND parliamentarians disagreeing with the Memorandum policies of the Samaras government.
- 47.
If we take into account the average from all the electoral contests between 2007 and 2014 (2007 national elections, 2009 national elections, 2009 European elections, May 2012 national elections, June 2012 national elections, May 2014 European elections) we find that the Right scores an average of 43.9%, so that in the latest European elections its vote was 1.9% below the average. The Centre, with an average of 31.6% vote, was 13.6% below the average and the Left, with 22.5% in European elections also, achieved a vote 12.5% higher than average. (A special thanks to Alexander Rekleitis for this useful information).
- 48.
I have taken these processed statistics from an unpublished paper by Stathis Kouvelakis.
- 49.
What is interesting is that while Golden Dawn does have notable influence among students and young people, because among older age groups it attracts people of a lower educational level overall, it is shown as having 15.5% support among middle-school graduates and only 4.4% among graduates from institutions of higher education (Koustenis 2014b: 104).
- 50.
It is characteristic that according to data from VPRC The River won 12% of the vote from senior executives in the private sector.
- 51.
The figures are taken from the Public Issue exit poll of January 2015.
- 52.
The degree of over-representation results from the proportion in certain social categories of voters as against the national percentage.
- 53.
Characteristically we could cite President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker’s statement that “in the referendum Greek citizens are asked to answer whether they will stay in the euro or return to the drachma”. This is an opinion that was shared by the governments of Germany, Italy and the France. The Council of Europe, in a statement, said that the referendum did not comply with European standards, because a period of at least two weeks was not left for debate. And on the day of the referendum European Parliament President Martin Schultz said that if the “NO” won in the referendum, Greece would have to introduce another currency.
- 54.
Which was joined by a section of ANTARSYA and by other organizations of the extra-parliamentary Left.
- 55.
The figures are taken from a Public Issue exit poll (September 2015).
- 56.
According to a Kapa Research exit poll.
- 57.
Although private television stations have been operating freely in Greece since 1989 (!) a procedure has never been established for regulating permanent licencing, with the result that private TV stations operate with temporary licences that expired more than ten years ago.
- 58.
In this connection, there has been a great contraction in the practices of social solidarity that had developed in previous years.
References
Antoniou V., 2014, “2014 elections, a first approach” http://www.iskra.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16486:antoniou-2014&catid=81:kivernisi&Itemid=198, accessed on 13/6/2014 (in Greek).
Belantis D., 2014, “The centre-left and the biopolitical administrative state” http://rednotebook.gr/2014/05/kentroaristera-aftodioikhsh/, accessed on 12/6/14 (in Greek).
Eleftheriou K., 2014, “Cracks in the Monolith: the KKE in the 2012 elections”, in Voulgaris G. and I. Nikolakopoulos (eds.) 2012, the twofold electoral earthquake, Athens: Themelio, pp. 151–184 (in Greek).
Gaitanou E., 2011, “Social and Political Resistance from Youth on the grounds of the crisis”, Ektos Grammis no. 27–28, pp. 55–58 (in Greek).
Gemenis K., 2012, “The 2010 regional elections in Greece: voting for regional government or protesting the IMF?”, Regional and Federal Studies, vol. 22 no 1, pp. 107–115.
Georgiadou B., 2014, “The electoral rise of golden dawn. Revenge vote of the insecure and new political opportunities”, in Voulgaris G. and I. Nikolakopoulos (eds.) 2012, the twofold electoral earthquake, Athens: Themelio, pp. 185–219 (in Greek).
Katsourides Y., 2016, Radical left parties in Government. The cases of AKEL and Syriza, London: Palgrave.
Kousiantas K. 2012, “The growth of fascism in Greece” http://aristeroblog.gr/node/897, accessed on 1/4/2014 (in Greek).
Koustenis P., 2014a, “Elections 2014: the electoral cycle of Golden Dawn”, Archeiotaxio no. 16, pp. 89–108 (in Greek).
Koustenis P., 2014b, “Deconstruction and reconstruction of electoral identities. The sociological detection of Attica” in Voulgaris G.- I. Nikolakopoulos (eds.), 2012, The twofold electoral earthquake, Athens: Themelio, pp. 83–123 (in Greek).
Lialiouti Z. and G. Bithymitris, 2013, “Crisis, hegemony and media”, The Example of SKAI and Kathimerini, Greek Review of Political Science vol. 40, pp. 139–173 (in Greek).
Mavris G., 2010, “Disapproval in two rounds”, Kathimerini of 21/11/2010 (in Greek).
Mavris G., 2012a, “The elections of 6th May 2012 and the end of the post-junta two party arrangement” http://www.publicissue.gr/2005/ekloges-2012-telos-metapoliteftikou-dikommatismou/, accessed on 28/3/2014 (in Greek).
Mavris G., 2012b, “Greece’s austerity election”, New Left Review vol. 76, pp. 95–107.
Mavris G., 2013a, “From the fragmentation of the right to conservative disintegration. New democracy a year after the elections” http://www.mavris.gr/3496/2-katakermatismos-dexias/, accessed on 28/3/2014 (in Greek).
Mavris G., 2013b, “Where is SYRIZA going?” http://www.mavris.gr/3533/pou-vadizei-o-syriza/, accessed on 29/3/2014 (in Greek).
Mavris G., 2013c, “The PASOK of Evangelos Venizelos. What is the source of the party’s continuous electoral decline?”, http://www.mavris.gr/3549/pasok-venizelou/, accessed on 29/3/2014 (in Greek).
Mavris G. 2013d, “The rise and fall of the democratic left”, http://www.mavris.gr/3572/anodos-kai-ptosi-tis-dimar/, accessed on 29/3/2014 (in Greek).
Mavris G., 2014a “The fluctuations in SYRIZA’s influence in the 2012–2014 post-election period”, Efimerida ton Syntakton of 25/2/2014 (in Greek).
Mavris G., 2014b, “The unseen aspects of the electoral war. Elections in two stages: the Greek electoral experiment”, http://www.mavris.gr/3981/elliniko_eklogiko_peirama, accessed on 10/6/14 (in Greek).
Mavris G., 2015 “From 2012 to 2015: why new democracy lost the elections” http://www.mavris.gr/4599/why-nd-lost-the-elections/, accessed on 4/4/2018 (in Greek).
Mavris G., 2016, “The Greek referendum of 2015” http://www.mavris.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Mavris_GrRef2015.pdf, accessed on 6/4/2018 (in Greek).
Mavroudeas S., 2015. “On the programmatic statements of the SYRIZA-ANEL government” https://stavrosmavroudeas.wordpress.com/2015/02/09/, accessed on 4 4/2015 (in Greek).
Moschonas G., 2012, “The elections of May 2012: The rupture, the tendencies, SYRIZA”, Synchrona Themata vol. 116, pp. 6–7 (in Greek).
Paraskeva-Veloudogianni D., 2012, “The contribution of official political discourse to the legitimation of golden dawn”, Ektos Grammis vol. 31, pp. 41–43 (in Greek).
Pleios G., 2013, “The crisis and the Greek media”, http://left.gr/news/i-krisi-kai-ta-ellinika-mme, accessed on 24/32014 (in Greek).
Public Issue, 2015, “Conspectus of no voters” http://www.publicissue.gr/11719/referendum-2015-no/, accessed on 8/4/2018 (in Greek).
Spourdalakis M., 2016, “Becoming Syriza again” https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/01/syriza-memorandum-troika-left-platform-tsipras-austerity-government/, accessed on 4/4/2018.
Stathopoulos P., 2014, “The deregulation of the party system”, in Voulgaris G. and I. Nikolakopoulos (eds.) 2012, the twofold electoral earthquake, Athens: Themelio, pp. 61–81 (in Greek).
Touliatos C., 2012, “Have we said it all, finally, about Golden Dawn?”, Ektos Grammis vol. 31, pp. 51–53 (in Greek).
Vernardakis C., 2011, “Regional and municipal elections 2010: the vote, parties and the party system”, in VPRC Institute (ed.) Public opinion in Greece 2008–2010. Parliamentary and regional elections, political parties, political communication, cultural practices, Athens, pp. 55–64 (in Greek).
Vernardakis C., 2012a, “Elections in the new post-Junta period”, Avghi of 13/5/2012 (in Greek).
Vernardakis C., 2012b, “The June 2012 elections in the context of the last days’ tendencies” http://www.vernardakis.gr/uplmed/145_Hotdoc%20(2).pdf, accessed on 29/3/2014 (in Greek).
Vernardakis C. 2013a, “The 17th June elections and the new breaches in the party system” http://archive.avgi.gr/ArticleActionshow.action?articleID=697536, accessed on 30/3/2014 (in Greek).
Vernardakis C. 2014, “European elections 2014. The key dividing lines in the electorate” http://rednotebook.gr/2014/05/evroekloges-vasikes-diairetikes-eklogikou-swmatos, accessed on 16/6/2014 (in Greek).
Voulgaris G. and I. Nikolakopoulos, 2014, “Introduction: the 2012 electoral earthquake”, in Voulgaris G. and I. Nikolakopoulos (eds.) 2012 the twofold electoral earthquake, Athens: Themelio, pp. 9–31 (in Greek).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Sakellaropoulos, S. (2019). The Crisis of the Party System. In: Greece’s (un) Competitive Capitalism and the Economic Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14319-0_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14319-0_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-14318-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-14319-0
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)