Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to delineate the mechanisms and strategies through which an oligarchy substantiates its power in developed democracies, focusing on Israel. For this purpose, it identifies different forms of oligarchies in democracies, and different strategies they deploy. It delves into the Israeli oligarchy, indicating other cases of oligarchies around the world—particularly the US, South Korea, and Hong Kong. Throughout a long decade, after obtaining significant shares of the privatized assets of the state, and internalizing financialization in the Israeli political economy, a group of very powerful few controlled the Israeli market, influencing policy-making and manipulating regulation for their benefit. They asserted that claims about economic concentration were excessive, and alternatively, that reducing the concentration would push away investors, including themselves. They were advocated as the entrepreneurs developing the free market, in times when they were its rival.
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- 1.
These findings are based on the author’s Ph.D. thesis published in 2015.
- 2.
The way the Alovitz group obtained control over the Israeli communication and media market is hightened these very days (2018–2019) in the Israeli judicial system, with suspicions of bribe, involving Shaul Alovitz, the controlling owner, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
- 3.
Essentially multimarket contacts, in which several conglomerates interact as competitors in different sectors or industries, which, in return, are centralised, enable the coordination of prices (Matsushima 2001).
- 4.
This estimation was also provided during the fieldwork conducted in the framework of this research.
- 5.
Tel Aviv District Court Judge Eitan Orenstein approved on December 2013 a bondholder vote that wrested control of the company from Dankner in favor of two businessmen: Moti Ben-Moshe and Eduardo Elsztain.
- 6.
- 7.
These elaborated findings are detailed in the author’s Ph.D. thesis published in 2015.
- 8.
See more examples in Gottfried (2015), D&B Directors database.
- 9.
The data was published in Haaretz newspaper and is based on a report produced by Natra Company, which is no longer available for public review.
- 10.
Haaretz magazine exposed the BoI inner report; the BoI and Hapoalim Bank refused to reveal either the draft or the final report (Weitz and Gabison, Haaretz 2013).
- 11.
It is noteworthy, all the same, that the media was a central actor in stimulating public awareness to the centralized market structure, increasing inequality, and declining competitiveness. It was first and foremost TheMarker that assumed this role, but following the 2011 social protests, the media as a whole started engaging with the concentration problems. The case of Dankner losing control of IDB is an illustration of the media’s power .
- 12.
It is important to mention the Israel Hayom daily newspaper, founded in 2007 and owned by the Jewish-American casino magnate Sheldon Adelson. Adelson is the political patron of Benjamin Netanyahu , the Prime Minister since 2009, and the paper is commonly perceived to be biased towards him (see for example Eglash, The Washington Post 2014; Rachlevsky, Haaretz 2014). Nonetheless, Adelson is not a part of the Israeli market, and Netanyahu is not associated with the oligarchy.
- 13.
The Ministry of Communication presented data showing that the public saved ILS 5.7 billion as a result of the reform (Levy, Calcalist 2012).
- 14.
Lessig (2011) identified this kind of dependence as a form of political corruption.
- 15.
The Team to Examine Increasing Competitiveness in the Banking System (also termed as the Zaken Committee, after Banks’ Supervisor David Zaken who led the team) published a summary report in March 2013, including its final recommendations, with the aim of bolstering competition and increasing the consumer power of households and small businesses. These recommendations included, among others, increasing competition in the provision of credit to households and small businesses by non-bank institutions; removing a main impediment to moving from one bank to another; and increasing online banking services. In 2016, the joint MoF-BoI Committee on Increasing Competition in the Banking and Financial Services (the Strum Committee) re-enforced these recommendations with further concrete and clear-cut ones, designed to stimulate competition in the Israeli banking sector. These recommendations were legislated in January 2017, but as of mid-2018 were not yet implemented.
- 16.
Hizkiyahu specifically was appointed to the Supervisor of Banks position after serving in senior positions in the banks. He was head of the Corporate Division as Deputy CEO at Discount Bank, the CEO of Maritime Bank of Israel, and served in a series of positions at the Hapoalim Bank Group. On 2016 he was appointed as Accountant General at the Ministry of Finance.
- 17.
The collapse of IDB, analyzed in the next chapter, has proven that ‘too big to fail’ was a myth nurtured by the oligarchy itself.
- 18.
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Gottfried, S. (2019). The Consolidation of the ‘Liberal’ Oligarchy. In: Contemporary Oligarchies in Developed Democracies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14105-9_5
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