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Maritime Cross-Border Insolvency pp 5–64Cite as

Cross-Border Insolvencies

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Abstract

Jefferson’s timeless statement is more appropriate than ever before. There has always been international commerce, but in the last decades the volume of international trade has reached unprecedented highs and the trends are globally set for growth as world exports continue to grow. Moreover, nowadays the merchants and their trade companies are replaced by globally operating international enterprises, which install subsidiaries and joint-ventures under complicated liability-limiting and tax-avoiding company structures all over the world. Furthermore, the USA and the European Union are currently negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) to overcome the remaining, relatively low, economic barriers to further promote the trans-atlantic commerce.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Statement by Thomas Jefferson in his letter to Horatio G. Spafford in 1814.

  2. 2.

    See World Trade Organization International Trade Statistics 2014, Table A1a World merchandise exports 1950-2013 available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2014_e/its14_appendix_e.htm (last visited on 10 June 2018).

  3. 3.

    The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects an increase of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) from 75,213 billion US Dollars in 2016 to 93,599 billion US Dollars in 2020, available at http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-projected-gdp.php (last visited on 10 June 2018).

  4. 4.

    See European Commission Final Report High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, February 11, 2013 available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf (last visited on 10 June 2018).

  5. 5.

    See Westbrook (1991), p. 457.

  6. 6.

    On the crisis in the Asian economic markets, see Radelet and Sachs (1998), pp. 1231–1239.

  7. 7.

    See for this and the following Wood (2007b), p. 1.

  8. 8.

    See Fletcher (2009), p. 6.

  9. 9.

    See Levinthal (1918), p. 230.

  10. 10.

    See Treiman (1927), p. 30.

  11. 11.

    See Frege et al. (2015), p. 7.

  12. 12.

    See Dalhuisen (1968), on pp. 6–8; Treiman (1927), p. 34.

  13. 13.

    See for Germany: § 80 InsO; for England & Wales: sec. 14 IA 1986; for the USA: 11 U.S.C. § 704.

  14. 14.

    See Levinthal (1918), p. 241.

  15. 15.

    See Levinthal (1918), p. 241.

  16. 16.

    See Dalhuisen (1968), p. 13.

  17. 17.

    See for this and the following sentence Dalhuisen (1968), p. 16.

  18. 18.

    See Frege et al. (2015), p. 8.

  19. 19.

    See Jaeger (1931), p. XXII (Einheitskonkurs).

  20. 20.

    See Fletcher (2009), p. 9.

  21. 21.

    See Fletcher (2009), p. 9.

  22. 22.

    See Dalhuisen (1968), p. 18.

  23. 23.

    See Goode (2011), p. 10.

  24. 24.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 9.

  25. 25.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 8.

  26. 26.

    See for this and the following Goode (2011), p. 11.

  27. 27.

    See Fletcher (2009), p. 13.

  28. 28.

    See Fletcher (2009), pp. 14, 15.

  29. 29.

    See Countryman (1983), p. 813. “Indenture was an alternative to serving debt-imprisonment. The employers in the English colonies in America paid for the passage and subsistence of the immigrants, who were in return obliged to work-off these costs in their first four or five years in America”.

  30. 30.

    Buchbinder (1991), p. 11.

  31. 31.

    Warren (1935), pp. 10, 12.

  32. 32.

    See Warren (1935), pp. 19, 20.

  33. 33.

    See for this and the following Buchbinder (1991), p. 12.

  34. 34.

    See Dreher et al. (2014), p. 3.

  35. 35.

    Kennedy and Clift (2000), p. 175. The term “fresh start“ was coined by the US Supreme Court in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt [1934] 292 U.S. 234 to describe the debtor friendly discharge regulations of the Bankruptcy Act 1898.

  36. 36.

    Report of the Reform Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, ch. 17 (1973).

  37. 37.

    See Dreher et al. (2014), p. 5.

  38. 38.

    See Dreher et al. (2014), pp. 6, 7.

  39. 39.

    See on the changing approach taken in German insolvency legislation Vallender (2010), p. 838.

  40. 40.

    Black’s Law Dictionary (Garner 2014).

  41. 41.

    UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (2004), para. 12, under B “Glossary, Terms and definitions” available at https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf (last visited on 10 June 2018) and UNCITRAL Practice Guide (2009), under B “Glossary”, in “2. Terms and explanations” available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Practice_Guide_english.pdf (last visited on 10 June 2018).

  42. 42.

    The translation of the German insolvency code (InsO) is provided by the German Ministry of Justice available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_inso/ (last visited on 10 June 2018). All following English translation of the German InsO are derived from this source.

  43. 43.

    See BVerfG, Beschl. v. 23.5.2006—1 BvR 2530/04, NJW (2006), pp. 2613, 2614.

  44. 44.

    See Gres and Frege (2002), p. 5.

  45. 45.

    See Stürner (1986), p. 326.

  46. 46.

    See for this and the following Ganter/Lohmann in Kirchhof et al. (2013), § 1 marg. no. 51, 52.

  47. 47.

    See Wood (2013), p. 231.

  48. 48.

    See Wood (2013), p. 231.

  49. 49.

    See H. Ganter in Kirchhof et al. (2013), § 49 marg. no. 5, 7, ships are treated as immovable objects under German law.

  50. 50.

    See H. Ganter in Kirchhof et al. (2013), Vor §§ 49 bis 52 marg. no. 76.

  51. 51.

    See above at Sect. 2.1.2.1.2.

  52. 52.

    See T. Thies in Schmitd (2017), Vorbem. zu §§ 217 ff., marg. no. 15, 16.

  53. 53.

    See Vallender (2010), p. 838.

  54. 54.

    See Hölzle (2011), p. 124, fn. 3.

  55. 55.

    Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen, BGBl. 2011, Teil 1 Nr. 64, p. 2582.

  56. 56.

    See BT-Drs. 17/5712, p. 17.

  57. 57.

    See BT-Drs. 17/5712, p. 18.

  58. 58.

    See Schäfer and Frischemeier (2012), p. 195. For a detailed discussion of debt-equity-swap under German insolvency law see Pühl (2016).

  59. 59.

    See J. Drukarczyk in Kirchhof et al. (2013), § 18 marg. no. 23; IDW PS 800, marg. no. 20-23.

  60. 60.

    See BT-Ds. 16/10600, p. 13.

  61. 61.

    See J. Schröder in Schmitd (2017), § 19, marg. no. 6.

  62. 62.

    See BGH (2010) ZInsO, on p. 2396.

  63. 63.

    See OLG Hamburg (2013) ZInsO, on p. 2449; Bork (2000), p. 1710.

  64. 64.

    See Frege et al. (2015), p. 358, marg. no. 808.

  65. 65.

    See LG Göttingen (2003) NZI, p. 499.

  66. 66.

    See OLG Zweibrücken (2000) NZI, p. 373, where the dismissed insolvency administrator was administrator of two conflicting insolvency proceedings and favoured the creditors of one proceeding over the creditors of the other proceeding; AG Hamburg (2004) ZInsO, p. 102.

  67. 67.

    The benchmark of “important reason” for the dismissal of the insolvency administrator was set by the pre-InsO court decision of OLG Köln (1986) ZIP, p. 1261.

  68. 68.

    Examples of important reasons justifying the dismissal of an insolvency administrator are: Inability of the insolvency administrator (LG Halle (1995) EWiR, p. 1091), deficiency of accessibility of the insolvency administrator, as his office is not manned or his telephone number is not available (AG Göttingen (2003) NZI, p. 267), criminal offences of the insolvency administrator (BGH (2011) NZI, p. 282).

  69. 69.

    See F. Frind in Schmitd (2017), § 59, marg. no. 3; BGH (2009) ZInsO, on p. 1491, held, that the reason for the dismissal of the insolvency administrator has to be due to an indefensible breach of duty and furthermore BGH (2006) ZInsO, on p. 147 held, that the dismissal has to be proportionate to the breach of duty.

  70. 70.

    See Pape in Uhlenbruck – Insolvenzordung (2015), § 1, marg. no. 13.

  71. 71.

    See Ganter/Lohmann in Kirchhof et al. (2013), § 1 marg. no. 53; BT-Ds. 12/2443, p. 100.

  72. 72.

    Pape/Uhlenbruck/Voigt-Saulus in Pape/Uhlenbruck/Voigt-Saulus Insolvenzrecht (2010), Chapter 16, marg. no. 2.

  73. 73.

    See Ganter/Lohmann in Kirchhof et al. (2013), § 1 marg. no. 56.

  74. 74.

    See BGH (2009) ZIP, p. 727.

  75. 75.

    See RG (1902) 52 RGZ, p. 407.

  76. 76.

    See Delhaes in Nerlich/Römermann, Insolvenzordnung (2014), § 56 marg. no. 8.

  77. 77.

    The allocation of a broad discretional power of the German insolvency courts has been confirmed by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in BVerfG, Beschl. v. 3. 8. 2004—1 BvR 135/00, NJW (2004), p. 2725.

  78. 78.

    See Frind and Schmidt (2004), p. 536.

  79. 79.

    See for this and the following sentence Wittkowski/Kruth in Nerlich et al. (2014), § 80 marg. no. 41.

  80. 80.

    See F. Frind in Schmitd (2017), § 58, marg. no. 3b.

  81. 81.

    See Goode (2011), p. 93.

  82. 82.

    For an extensive discussion on the theories underpinning the insolvency law of England & Wales see Finch (1997), p. 227; Finch (2009), pp. 29 et seqq.; Keay and Walton (2012), pp. 26 et seqq.

  83. 83.

    Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558, 1982). The Cork Committee was chaired by Kenneth Cork and was installed by the Labour government in 1977.

  84. 84.

    See Finch (1997), p. 228.

  85. 85.

    Cork Report (1982), para. 198; Finch (2009), pp. 29, 30 a list of those aims is provided.

  86. 86.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 24.

  87. 87.

    See Powdrill v Watson [1995] 2 AC 394, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.

  88. 88.

    See Goode (2011), pp. 93–107.

  89. 89.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 23.

  90. 90.

    See Fletcher (2005), pp. 8, 9.

  91. 91.

    Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2005] EWHC 2125.

  92. 92.

    So does Mokal (2001), p. 581.

  93. 93.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 507.

  94. 94.

    See Fletcher (2005), p. 10.

  95. 95.

    See Fletcher (2009), p. 775.

  96. 96.

    See Fletcher (2009), pp. 343–345.

  97. 97.

    A detailed discussion of the nature of floating charges would go beyond the scope of this book, but for a better understanding the following: In the field of corporate borrowing, the most common forms of charges to secure the interests of the money lender are the fixed and the floating charge. Whereas the fixed charge, as the name tells, ascribes immediately to the property in question, the floating charge attaches to a “shifting fund of assets” (Re Cimex Tissues Ltd [1994] B.C.C. 626), e.g. stock in trade or receivables. Until the floating charge crystallises by repayment default or other stipulated events, the company is free to deal with its assets. On crystallisation the floating becomes a fixed charge over the remaining assets of the company. Slade J refined the characteristics of a floating charge in Re Bond Worth Ltd ([1980] Ch. 228) that it “remains unattached to any particular property and leaves the company with a licence to deal with, and even sell, the assets falling within its ambit in the ordinary course of business, as if the charge had not been given, until …it is said to ‘crystallise’ …”. The differences of the fixed and the floating charge lies therefore in the uncertainty of the creditor secured by a floating charge, as he cannot foresee which assets will be available for the satisfaction of his claim. This uncertainty leads to an economically less valuable security and is mirrored in the proceedings of receivership and liquidation, where the holder of a floating charge ranks below the one secured by a fixed charge, and below other secured creditors.

  98. 98.

    See Fletcher (2009), p. 753.

  99. 99.

    See Wood (2007b), p. 237.

  100. 100.

    See Wood (2007b), p. 240.

  101. 101.

    See Wood (2013), p. 227.

  102. 102.

    See Goode (2011), p. 112; Keay and Walton (2012), pp. 16, 17.

  103. 103.

    Goode (2011), p. 114.

  104. 104.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 16.

  105. 105.

    See for this paragraph Goode (2011), pp. 379, 380.

  106. 106.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 46.

  107. 107.

    See for this and the following Keay and Walton (2012), p. 235.

  108. 108.

    From January to March 2015 there were 3385 company liquidations in England & Wales of which 904 were compulsory liquidations, see The Insolvency Service’s Insolvency Statistics – January to March 2015 (Q1 2015) available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/424345/Q1_2015_statistics_release_-_web.pdf (last visited on 10 June 2018).

  109. 109.

    Keay and Walton (2012), p. 240.

  110. 110.

    See Goode (2011), p. 156.

  111. 111.

    See Goode (2011), p. 158.

  112. 112.

    See for this and the following Goode (2011), p. 158.

  113. 113.

    See Goode (2011), p. 161.

  114. 114.

    Re Zirceram Ltd. [2000] 1 B.C.L.C. 751 at 24 seqq.

  115. 115.

    See Goode (2011), p. 161.

  116. 116.

    See Goode (2011), p. 159.

  117. 117.

    See Finch (2009), p. 243.

  118. 118.

    Finch (2009), pp. 32, 245.

  119. 119.

    Cork Report (1982), para. 204.

  120. 120.

    Hunter (1999), p. 441.

  121. 121.

    Powdrill v. Watson [1995] H.L. 2 Appeal Case 394, 442.

  122. 122.

    See Finch (2009), pp. 254, 255.

  123. 123.

    See Finch (2009), p. 255.

  124. 124.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 122.

  125. 125.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 87.

  126. 126.

    See for this and the following Bailey and Groves (2007), p. 377.

  127. 127.

    See for this and the following sentence Keay and Walton (2012), p. 90.

  128. 128.

    See Re Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander Ltd. (No. 2) [2011] 1 B.C.L.C. 12.

  129. 129.

    See Goode (2011), p. 393.

  130. 130.

    See Goode (2011), pp. 397, 398.

  131. 131.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), pp. 127, 129; Goode (2011), p. 412.

  132. 132.

    See Goode (2011), pp. 412, 413; Finch (2009), pp. 456, 457.

  133. 133.

    See Frisby (2007), p. 16.

  134. 134.

    See for this and the following Frisby (2007), p. 72.

  135. 135.

    See Finch (2009), pp. 462, 463.

  136. 136.

    See Frisby (2007), pp. 53–64.

  137. 137.

    See Bailey and Groves (2007), p. 191.

  138. 138.

    Cork Report (1982), para. 430.

  139. 139.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), pp. 146, 147.

  140. 140.

    See Bailey (2007), p. 10; Keay and Walton (2012), p. 148.

  141. 141.

    See Brown (1996), p. 546.

  142. 142.

    RA Securities v Mercantile Credit Co. Ltd [1994] 2 B.C.L.C. 721.

  143. 143.

    See Goode (2011), p. 500.

  144. 144.

    For a detailed display of ‘debt-equity-swap’ as a financial restructuring tool in Germany as well as England &Wales see: Hagemann (2014) and Schwarz (2015).

  145. 145.

    Keay and Walton (2012), pp. 148, 149.

  146. 146.

    See Bailey and Groves (2007), p. 201.

  147. 147.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 148.

  148. 148.

    See for this and the following Keay and Walton (2012), p. 147.

  149. 149.

    See Brown (1996), p. 544.

  150. 150.

    See Goode (2011), p. 501.

  151. 151.

    See for this and the following sentence Paulus (2011), p. 1077.

  152. 152.

    See Paulus (2011), p. 1078.

  153. 153.

    See Goode (2011), p. 484.

  154. 154.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 204.

  155. 155.

    See Goode (2011), p. 484.

  156. 156.

    See Goode (2011), p. 484.

  157. 157.

    See for this and the following Re Hawk Insurance Co Ltd [2001] 2 B.C.L.C. 480, para. 12.

  158. 158.

    See for this and the following Olivares-Caminal et al. (2011), p. 162.

  159. 159.

    Re English, Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank [1893] 3 Ch. 385.

  160. 160.

    Re Midland Coal, Coke & Iron Co [1895] 1 Ch. 267.

  161. 161.

    See Goode (2011), p. 488.

  162. 162.

    See Paulus (2011), p. 1083; with an exhaustive discussion of the features of scheme of arrangement and which aspects could be implemented in German insolvency law: Mankowski (2011), pp. 1201 seqq.

  163. 163.

    In re DAP Holding NV [2005] EWHC 2092 (Ch.) the “sufficient connection with England & Wales” was accepted by Lewison J, even though the respective Dutch Companies did not have their COMI or any establishment in England & Wales.

  164. 164.

    Re La Seda De Barcelona Sa [2010] EWHC 1364 (Ch.).

  165. 165.

    Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch.).

  166. 166.

    Re Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch.).

  167. 167.

    In re Tele Columbus GmbH [2014] EWHC 249 (Ch.) the court accepted the scheme of arrangement for a German company’s debt restructuring worth more than one billion EUR.

  168. 168.

    See Bork (2012), p. 282.

  169. 169.

    See Bork (2012), p. 202.

  170. 170.

    See for this and the following Baird (2014), p. 6.

  171. 171.

    The US Bankruptcy Code’s Chapter 15 is displayed below in Sect. 2.2.3.1.3.

  172. 172.

    See Bailey and Groves (2007), p. 1349.

  173. 173.

    The different concepts of international insolvency law are discussed from p. 54 onwards.

  174. 174.

    See Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), p. 719.

  175. 175.

    See Aaron (2014), p. 145.

  176. 176.

    See for this and the following sentence Gorman (2014/2015), p. 102.

  177. 177.

    See Peck (2013), p. 960.

  178. 178.

    See Bailey and Groves (2007), p. 1372.

  179. 179.

    The conflict between the jurisdictions of bankruptcy and admiralty courts over the vessel—the central asset of a defaulting ship-owner—will be discussed below in Chap. 4.

  180. 180.

    See for this and the following Baird (2014), p. 6.

  181. 181.

    See for this and the following Baird (2014), p. 23.

  182. 182.

    Landers (1971/72), p. 509.

  183. 183.

    See Bailey and Groves (2007), p. 1350.

  184. 184.

    See Wood (2013), p. 226.

  185. 185.

    See Aaron (2014), p. 75.

  186. 186.

    See Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), p. 720; In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428, 432 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996), where the bankruptcy court famously stated, that “a dollar, a dime or a peppercorn” would suffice to establish US located property to be eligible to petition for an insolvency proceeding in the US; see also In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 407 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2005). The generosity of the bankruptcy courts was restricted in 2013 when the United States Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit in In re Barnet, 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013) held that a foreign company applying for recognition under the US Bankruptcy Code Chapter 15 must have a residence, domicile, place of business or assets in the US according to 11 U.S.C. § 109 (a). The Second Circuit overturned the bankruptcy court, which had granted recognition to an Australian company that had not introduced any evidence of assets or operations in the US.

  187. 187.

    See Aaron (2014), p. 76.

  188. 188.

    See Adler et al. (2007), p. 66.

  189. 189.

    See Adler et al. (2007), p. 66.

  190. 190.

    If the company is small and has less than twelve creditors, the petition of a single creditor is sufficient (11 U.S.C. § 303 (b) (2)).

  191. 191.

    See Aaron (2014), p. 123.

  192. 192.

    See for this and the following Baird (2014), p. 37.

  193. 193.

    See for this and the following Aaron (2014), pp. 133, 134.

  194. 194.

    Information required under 11 U.S.C. § 521 (a) is for example a list of creditors, a schedule of assets and liabilities and a statement of the debtor’s financial affairs.

  195. 195.

    Schillig (2010), p. 117.

  196. 196.

    On the doctrine of ‘deepening insolvency’ see the cases In re Investors Funding Corporation of New York Securities Litigation (Bloor v Dansker), 523 F.Supp. 533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 1980) and Schacht v Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983). For an exhaustive display and discussion of the US ‘deepening insolvency’ doctrine compared to the German liabilities see Schillig (2010), pp. 116–157.

  197. 197.

    The US House Report No 94-595, 1978 US Code Cong. & Admin. News 6296-6297 of the conference committee of the House of Representatives and the Senate detailed the automatic stay as “one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of financial pressure that drove him into bankruptcy”.

  198. 198.

    See Schmidt (2010), p. 55.

  199. 199.

    See for this and the following Baird (2014), p. 195.

  200. 200.

    See Stong (2006), p. 414.

  201. 201.

    See for this and the following Gorman (2014/2015), p. 112.

  202. 202.

    Kalb v. Feuerstein [1940] 308 U.S. 433.

  203. 203.

    See Buchbinder (1991), p. 12.

  204. 204.

    See Bailey and Groves (2007), p. 1350.

  205. 205.

    See for this and the following Adler et al. (2007), pp. 21, 22.

  206. 206.

    Seitz (2009), p. 1357.

  207. 207.

    See Podewils (2010), p. 212.

  208. 208.

    See Aaron (2014), p. 696.

  209. 209.

    See Schmidt (2010), p. 55.

  210. 210.

    See Table F-2—U.S. Bankruptcy Courts Statistical Tables For The Federal Judiciary (Dec. 31, 2014) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f-2/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2014/12/31 (last visited on 10 June 2018).

  211. 211.

    See for this and the following Bailey and Groves (2007), p. 1392.

  212. 212.

    The United States Attorney General appoints the United States Trustees (28 U.S.C. § 586) and under 28 U.S.C. § 586 (a) (1) they are responsible to establish, maintain, and supervise a panel of private trustees that are eligible and available to serve as trustees in cases under Chapter 7.

  213. 213.

    Information required under 11 U.S.C. § 521 (a) is for example a list of creditors, a schedule of assets and liabilities and a statement of the debtor’s financial affairs.

  214. 214.

    See for this and the following Bowen (2013), p. 121.

  215. 215.

    See Fletcher (2005), p. 6.

  216. 216.

    Wessels (2006), p. 1.

  217. 217.

    UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, Guide to Enactment (1197), Nr. 1.

  218. 218.

    Westbrook (1999/2000), p. 2278; see Smid (2004), p. 4.

  219. 219.

    See Perkins (2000), p. 787; Adler et al. (2007), p. 744.

  220. 220.

    Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co v United States Lines Inc. [1989] 1 Q.B. 360.

  221. 221.

    Maxwell Communications Corporation plc (No. 2) [1992] B.C.C. 757 (C.A.).

  222. 222.

    See Hoffmann (1996), pp. 2514, 2515.

  223. 223.

    See Fletcher (2005), p. 11; Veder (2004), p. 85; Keay and Walton (2012), p. 404; Goode (2011), p. 620; S. Reinhart in Kirchhof et al. (2014), Vor §§ 335 ff, marg. no. 19, 20.

  224. 224.

    See Nadelmann (1949/1950), p. 54.

  225. 225.

    See Paulus (2005b), p. 334; Westbrook (2006), p. 362.

  226. 226.

    See Westbrook (2004/2005), p. 625; Hathorn (2013), p. 241.

  227. 227.

    See Paulus (2005b), p. 334; Hathorn (2013), p. 241.

  228. 228.

    See Veder (2004), p. 86; Keay and Walton (2012), p. 404.

  229. 229.

    See American Law Institute (2003), pp. 73, 74.

  230. 230.

    Goode (2011), p. 782.

  231. 231.

    For a detailed discussion on where to file for insolvency and the flexibility of the possible insolvency forum see below at Sect. 4.1.2.

  232. 232.

    See Veder (2004), p. 86.

  233. 233.

    Hathorn (2013), p. 242.

  234. 234.

    Westbrook (1991), p. 469.

  235. 235.

    See for this and the following Kindler and Nachmann (2014), § 1 Grundlagen, marg. no. 1.

  236. 236.

    This problem is addressed by Westbrook (1999/2000), p. 2293, as he argues for a single court for the whole insolvency proceeding, “A single court would maximize asset values, even in liquidation, by providing a unified approach to assembly and sale of assets as a whole. … A single court would improve dramatically the possibility of reorganization, with a single court to whom the manager of the reorganization could report and a single mechanism for adjusting the interests of stakeholders, the possibility of saving a sprawling multinational corporation would be greatly increased”.

  237. 237.

    Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1993] B.C.C. 787; see Goode (2011), p. 827.

  238. 238.

    See Wood (2007a), p. 401.

  239. 239.

    See LoPucki (1998/1999), pp. 709 seqq.

  240. 240.

    See for this and the following LoPucki (1998/1999), pp. 713, 714; Wood (2007a), p. 401.

  241. 241.

    The term ‘centre of main interest’ (COMI) is used in accordance with the wording of the Art. 3 (1), (2) EU Insolvency Regulation (1346/2000). The Court of Justice of the European Union gave guidelines on the determination of the COMI in Interedil Srl v. Fallimento Interedil Srl and Intese Gestione Crediti SpA (CJEU, C-3906/09).

  242. 242.

    See for this and the following sentence Marantz (1997), p. 7.

  243. 243.

    See LoPucki (1998/1999), p. 718.

  244. 244.

    See LoPucki (1998/1999), p. 719.

  245. 245.

    See Wood (2007a), p. 400.

  246. 246.

    See LoPucki (1999/2000), p. 2219.

  247. 247.

    See LoPucki (1999/2000), p. 2224.

  248. 248.

    See Paulus (2005b), p. 334, this passage has been translated into English by the author.

  249. 249.

    See Goode (2011), p. 785.

  250. 250.

    American Law Institute (2000), p. 11.

  251. 251.

    Goode (2011), p. 624; see LoPucki (1998/1999), p. 728.

  252. 252.

    See Goode (2011), p. 785.

  253. 253.

    See Bowen (2013), p. 122; Fehrenbach (2014), pp. 16–21.

  254. 254.

    See Perkins (2000), p. 787.

  255. 255.

    Keay and Walton (2012), p. 403.

  256. 256.

    On 23 June 2016 a majority in the UK voted to leave the EU. Based on that vote the government of the UK will prepare the dissolution of the UK’s EU membership. The actual modalities of this dissolution and the effect on the existing legal regulations in the UK are not predictable. Hence this book applies the legal status quo.

  257. 257.

    See S. Reinhart in Kirchhof et al. (2014), Vor §§ 335ff marg. no. 2, 3.

  258. 258.

    See AG Köln (2012) NZI, p. 379.

  259. 259.

    See Bork (2014), pp. 274, 275.

  260. 260.

    See BGH (2003) ZIP, p. 2124.

  261. 261.

    See Bork (2014), p. 277.

  262. 262.

    See BGHZ 88, pp. 153 seqq.

  263. 263.

    See BGHZ 95, pp. 263 seqq.

  264. 264.

    See BGHZ 95, pp. 269 seq.; BGH (1997) NJW, pp. 524 seqq.

  265. 265.

    See Miguens and Esser (2011), p. 278, pointing out that the German international insolvency law takes a more universalist approach than nations like Argentina, USA, Switzerland or even the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, which all insist on the opening of a parallel proceeding in their jurisdiction.

  266. 266.

    The designated countries are: Anguilla, Australia, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Botswana, Brunei, Canada, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Ireland, Malaysia, Montserrat, New Zealand, St Helena, South Africa, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu and the Virgin Islands.

  267. 267.

    See Bowen (2013), p. 122.

  268. 268.

    Great Britain includes England, Wales and Scotland. For Northern Ireland a separate Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation (Northern Ireland) came into force on 12 April 2007.

  269. 269.

    See for this and the following Fletcher (2007), pp. 138, 139.

  270. 270.

    See for this and the following Keay and Walton (2012), p. 413.

  271. 271.

    See for this and the following Bowen (2013), p. 123.

  272. 272.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 414.

  273. 273.

    See Bowen (2013), p. 130; in re Stanford International Bank [2011] Ch. 33, the Court of Appeal decide on the requirement of collectivity and held, that the US receivership was not a “foreign proceeding” for the purpose of Art. 2(1) of the Model Law, but the Antiguan liquidation in contrast was.

  274. 274.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 416.

  275. 275.

    See for this and the following Aaron (2014), p. 1057.

  276. 276.

    See Paulus (2005a), p. 439.

  277. 277.

    As already pointed out, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, on which the US Chapter 15 is based on, was a clear move towards the modified universalism most prominently advocated by Westbrook.

  278. 278.

    See O’Flynn (2012), p. 400.

  279. 279.

    See Paulus (2005a), p. 439.

  280. 280.

    See for a full display of the US bankruptcy courts’ interpretation of COMI in contrast to European Courts: Ragan (2010/2011), pp. 117–168.

  281. 281.

    See Gopalan and Guihot (2015), p. 1266.

  282. 282.

    A Case in which the US bankruptcy courts accepted a scheme of arrangement proceeding to be a proceeding according to 11. U.S.C. § 101 was In re Magyar Telecom B.V., Case No. 13-13508 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013).

  283. 283.

    See Paulus (2005a), p. 440.

  284. 284.

    See Paulus (2005a), p. 441.

  285. 285.

    For a detailed display of the history of European insolvency law and the route it took, see Moss et al. (2009), pp. 1–16; Fehrenbach (2014), pp. 12–15.

  286. 286.

    EU Regulation 1346/2000, 29 May 2000 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000R1346 (last visited on 10 June 2018).

  287. 287.

    See Fletcher (2005), pp. 354, 355.

  288. 288.

    Applicable only in 27 of 28 member states, as Denmark opted out of giving effect to the Regulation.

  289. 289.

    Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings will take effect on 26 June 2017 available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015R0848 (last visited on 10 June 2018).

  290. 290.

    See Moss et al. (2009), p. 42.

  291. 291.

    See Keay and Walton (2012), p. 428.

  292. 292.

    See Mucciarelli (2013), p. 176.

  293. 293.

    See for this and the following Fehrenbach (2014), p. 19.

  294. 294.

    Especially Art. 8 of the EU Insolvency Regulation plays an important role in maritime cross-border insolvency as this article covers the “Third Parties’ Rights in rem” and the effect the opening of an EU Member States’ insolvency proceeding has on these rights. At this point of the book a detailed discussion of Art. 8 EU Insolvency Regulation is not helpful for a general orientation, therefore this article will be displayed exhaustively in the relevant chapter on maritime insolvency, see below at Sect. 4.3.1.

  295. 295.

    See Fehrenbach (2014), pp. 18, 19.

  296. 296.

    See Bork (2014), p. 277.

  297. 297.

    For a detailed display and discussion of public policy in European insolvency proceedings see: Laukemann (2012), pp. 207–215.

  298. 298.

    The Montevideo Treaties were ratified in 1889 and 1940 dealing with commercial law in general and insolvency procedural regulations in particular. See Nadelmann (1944), p. 69.

  299. 299.

    The Nordic Bankruptcy Convention was concluded in 1933 and amended in 1977 and 1982 and takes effect in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. See Nadelmann (1944), p. 68.

  300. 300.

    See Clift (2004), p. 313.

  301. 301.

    See Clift (2004), p. 308.

  302. 302.

    See Guide to Enactment of UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency at para 4 available at https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-Enactment-e.pdf (last visited on 10 June 2018).

  303. 303.

    These states are: Australia (adopted in 2008), Benin (2015), British Virgin Islands (overseas territory of the UK) (2003), Burkina Faso (2015), Cameroon (2015), Canada (2009), Central African Republic (2015), Chad (2015), Chile (2013), Colombia (2006), Comoros (2015), Congo (2015), Côte d’Ivoire (2015), Democratic Republic of the Congo (2015), Dominican Republic (2015), Equatorial Guinea (2015), Gabon (2015) Great Britain (2006), Greece (2010), Guinea (2015), Guinea-Bissau (2015), Israel (2018), Japan (2000), Kenya (2015), Malawi (2015), Mali (2015), Mauritius (2009), Mexico (2000), Montenegro (2002), New Zealand (2006), Niger (2015), Northern Ireland (2007), Philippines (2010), Poland (2003), Republic of Korea (2006), Romania (2003), Senegal (2015), Serbia (2004), Seychelles (2013), Singapore (2017), Slovenia (2007), South Africa (2000), Togo (2015), Uganda (2011), USA (2005) and Vanuatu (2013). An updated status of the list of adapting countries is available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html (last visited on10 June 2018).

  304. 304.

    Acte uniforme portant organisation des procédures collectives d’apurement du passif (OHADA), adopté le 10/09/2015 à Grand-Bassam (Côte d’Ivoire).

  305. 305.

    See Goode (2011), p. 794.

  306. 306.

    See for this and the following Goode (2011), p. 793.

  307. 307.

    See Goode (2011), pp. 795, 796; Clift (2004), p. 317.

  308. 308.

    See Clift (2004), p. 315.

  309. 309.

    Fletcher (2005), p. 453.

  310. 310.

    See Ragan (2010/2011), p. 123.

  311. 311.

    See McCormack (2016), p. 138.

  312. 312.

    For further reading on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency see the instructive article Clift (2004), pp. 307–345.

  313. 313.

    See for the whole paragraph: Fletcher and Wessels (2013), pp. 2, 3.

  314. 314.

    See Fletcher and Wessels (2013), p. 3.

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  1. Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    Erik Göretzlehner

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  1. Erik Göretzlehner
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Göretzlehner, E. (2019). Cross-Border Insolvencies. In: Maritime Cross-Border Insolvency. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11793-1_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11793-1_2

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