Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Navies and Maritime Policies in the South Atlantic pp 151–185Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Brazil and the Construction of Its Power to Defend the South Atlantic

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

Abstract

Although the South Atlantic is considered a zone of peace and one of the few areas of the international system in which the level of conflict is very low, nothing can assure that this situation is going to be permanent. The region is one of the richest portions of the world’s oceans and if its coastal countries want to be able to defend their interests, it is mandatory that they invest in the construction of different instruments of power. This reality is even more important in a context in which several extra-regional powers maintain constant military presence in the South Atlantic and therefore can influence its political destiny. Considering these realities, the chapter will analyze how Brazil is developing its structural and relational powers to defend its interests in the South Atlantic and the domestic political limitations of this process.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    ANTAQ – Agência Nacional de Transportes Aquaviários, Panorama da Navegação Marítima e de Apoio 2012, http://portal.antaq.gov.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Panorama-Aquaviário-2012-.pdf, accessed 26/3/2017.

  2. 2.

    ANP – Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Boletim da Produção de Petróleo e Gás Natural, http://www.anp.gov.br/WWWANP/images/publicacoes/boletins-anp/Boletim_Mensal-Producao_Petroleo_Gas_Natural/Boletim-Producao_Outubro_2017.pdf, accessed 15/12/2017.

  3. 3.

    A. Malamud, ‘A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy’, Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 3 (2011): 1–24; S. W. Burges, ‘Without Sticks or Carrots: Brazilian Leadership in South America during the Cardoso Era, 1992–2003’, Bulletin of Latin American Research 25, no. 1 (2006): 23–42; and S. W. Burges, ‘Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War’, International Relations 22, no. 1 (2008): 65–84, provide very interesting analyses about Brazil’s leadership in the region, the limitations of its efforts and some of the responses that the country has received from its South American counterparts. According to Burges (‘Consensual Hegemony’), Brazil has over the years invested in the creation of a ‘consensual hegemony’ in South America, a kind of leadership that avoids dominating other countries. Brazil’s project has several specificities that lead to good results, but its excessive focus on ideational tools has important limitations when dealing with countries that are not always ready to accept a leadership that cannot provide the material resources demanded by these nations. The present chapter focuses exactly on these limitations.

  4. 4.

    S. Strange, States and Markets, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Continuum, 1999).

  5. 5.

    Ibid.

  6. 6.

    J. S. Nye Jr., The Powers to Lead: Soft, Hard, and Smart (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

  7. 7.

    The dissatisfaction generated by the American military presence abroad is great (see C. Lutz, ed., The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts (New York: New York University Press, 2009)), but it hasn’t avoided the growth of these movements in the South Atlantic.

  8. 8.

    An interesting analysis of the rationale behind the establishment of the Fourth Fleet is provided by J. D. Maclay, M. Potter, R. R. Scott, and M. W. Sibley, ‘The Fourth Fleet: A Tool of U.S. Engagement in the Americas’, CSIS – Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2009, http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/The_Fourth_Fleet.pdf, accessed 23/6/2017. On the limitations of the re-establishment of the Fleet as an international strategy of the USA, see J. Battaglino, ‘A reativação da IV Frota e o novo paradigma de controle global dos Estados Unidos’, Política Externa 17, no. 4 (2009): 31–45.

  9. 9.

    J. Gerson, ‘U.S. Foreign Military Bases and Military Colonialism: Personal and Analytical Perspectives’, in Lutz, ed., The Bases of Empire, 62–63.

  10. 10.

    A. E. Abdenur and D. M. Souza Neto, China’s Growing Influence in the South Atlantic, Working Paper, Rio de Janeiro: BRICS Policy Center, 2013.

  11. 11.

    C. Pérez, ‘A misteriosa base que a China está construindo na Patagônia argentina’, BBC Brasil, 19 March 2016, http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2016/03/160318_china_base_patagonia_fn, accessed 19/7/2017; V. R. Lee, ‘China Builds Space-Monitoring Base in the Americas’, The Diplomat, 24 May 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/china-builds-space-monitoring-base-in-the-americas/, accessed 25/1/2017; U. Goñi, ‘Argentinian Congress Approves Deal with China on Satellite Space Station’, The Guardian, 26 February 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/argentina-congress-china-satellite-space-station, accessed 19/7/2017; M. Dinatale, ‘Preocupa a EE.UU. y a Europa la base espacial de China en Neuquén’, La Nacion, 17 March 2015, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1776764-preocupa-a-eeuu-y-a-europa-la-base-espacial-de-china-en-neuquen, accessed 19/7/2017.

  12. 12.

    A. Korybko, ‘Washington’s Nightmare Comes True: The Russian-Chinese Strategic Partnership Goes Global’, Oriental Review, 21 August 2014, http://orientalreview.org/2014/08/21/washingtons-nightmare-comes-true-the-russian-chinese-strategic-partnership-goes-global-i/, accessed 24/1/2017; A. Korybko, ‘Hybrid Wars and the Geopolitics of South Atlantic Africa: The Russia-China Strategic Outpost’, Global Research, 12 February 2017, http://www.globalresearch.ca/hybrid-wars-and-the-geopolitics-of-south-atlantic-africa-the-russia-china-strategic-outpost/5574213, accessed 10/3/2017.

  13. 13.

    G. P. Dos Santos, ‘Russia’s “Charm Offensive” in Africa: The Case of Angola’, IPRIS Viewpoints 184, Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS), 15 October 2015, http://www.ipris.org/?menu=6&page=52, accessed 20/1/2017.

  14. 14.

    D. Negroponte, ‘Russo-Latin American Arms Sales’, America’s Quarterly, Winter 2015, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/russo-latin-american-arms-sales, accessed 20/1/2017.

  15. 15.

    BBC Brasil, ‘Para América do Sul, liderança brasileira ainda é promessa’, 10 March 2008, http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2008/03/080303_ams_abre1_diplomacia.shtml, accessed 20/7/2017.

  16. 16.

    Even in 2006, when Brazil’s economic performance and diplomatic efforts increased regional expectations that it would ascend to a leadership position, President Lula declared that ‘South America doesn’t need a political leader, but the “collective understanding that there is no individual exit” to the continent in the current context of a globalized world. “We need to join our experiences, to enjoy the similarities of each country. This is what will assure that we won’t need a leader, but a collectivity that thinks with the same objective”’ (Congresso em Foco, ‘Lula Sinaliza com Manutenção de Mantega e Meirelles’, 10 November 2006, http://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/noticias/lula-sinaliza-com-manutencao-de-mantega-e-meirelles/, accessed 20/7/2017).

  17. 17.

    T. Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration’, Review of International Studies 28, no. 4 (2002): 677–696; Burges, ‘Without Sticks or Carrots: Brazilian Leadership in South America during the Cardoso Era, 1992–2003’; Burges, ‘Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War’.

  18. 18.

    P. R. Almeida, ‘Brazilian Diplomatic Thought: Methodological Introduction to the Ideas and Actions of some of its Representatives’, in J. V. S. Pimentel, ed., Brazilian Diplomatic Thought: Policymakers and Agents of Foreign Policy (1750–1964), Vol. 1 (Brasília: Funag, 2016), 19, for example, mentions principles such as ‘an undeniable adhesion to international law; the absence of the recourse to force to resolve disputes among States; nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries; the observance of human rights; and a set of values unique to our civilizing heritage’.

  19. 19.

    J. P. S. Alsina Jr., Rio Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2015); Almeida, ‘Brazilian Diplomatic Thought: Methodological Introduction to the Ideas and Actions of some of its Representatives’, 19.

  20. 20.

    Malamud, ‘A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy’.

  21. 21.

    Nye Jr., The Powers to Lead, x–xi; D. A. Baldwin, Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Strange, States and Markets.

  22. 22.

    Nye Jr., The Powers to Lead, x.

  23. 23.

    Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration’, 678.

  24. 24.

    Baldwin, Power and International Relations.

  25. 25.

    Ibid., 102–122.

  26. 26.

    Strange, States and Markets, 23.

  27. 27.

    J. S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990); J. S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); Nye Jr., The Powers to Lead.

  28. 28.

    Nye Jr., Soft Power, x.

  29. 29.

    Ibid., 7.

  30. 30.

    Nye Jr., The Powers to Lead, x.

  31. 31.

    Strange, States and Markets, 24.

  32. 32.

    Ibid., 24–25.

  33. 33.

    Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration’, 688–693.

  34. 34.

    Burges, ‘Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War’, 74.

  35. 35.

    We recognize that bilateral cooperation, especially with African countries such as Namibia and Angola, to mention only two examples, is also an important asset in the implementation of the country’s leadership in the South Atlantic. But since structural power is related to multilateral initiatives, the next section of the chapter will be concentrated on the broader efforts that Brazil has been implemented in the region.

  36. 36.

    A. J. Ramalho, ‘Brazil and the Global Security Order: Principled Action and Immediate Responses to Long-term Challenges’, in B. A. Smith-Windsor, ed., Enduring NATO, Rising Brazil: Managing International Security in a Recalibrating Global Order. NATO Defense College Forum Papers Series, 2015, http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/current_news.php?icode=761.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    A. E. Abdenur and D. M. Souza Neto, ‘O Brasil e a cooperação em defesa: a construção de uma identidade regional no Atlântico Sul’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 57, no. 1 (2014).

  39. 39.

    A. Hurrell, ‘The Politics of South Atlantic Security: A Survey of Proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization’, International Affairs 59, no. 2 (1983): 179–193.

  40. 40.

    ZPCSA’s members perceived that different rules of engagement, founded on cooperation and institutional efforts, were the best way to assure the stability of the region during a time in which balance of power was the rule.

  41. 41.

    The abstentions came from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Portugal.

  42. 42.

    S. Miyamoto, ‘Atlântico Sul: zona de paz e de cooperação?’ Lua Nova 3, no. 3 (March 1987), http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-64451987000100005&lng=en&nrm=iso, accessed 20/12/2016.

  43. 43.

    P. M. S. S. Abreu Pereira, ‘Segurança Marítima e Pirataria no Atlântico Sul: um balanço do ano de 2013’, Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval 19, no. 2 (2013): 322.

  44. 44.

    The document is divided in six major cooperation areas and several tangential ones. Among the priorities established in the new Action Plan, the following seem to be the most important: mapping and exploration of the bottom of the ocean, with incentives for countries to delimitate their continental platforms; environmental cooperation and protection of the living marine resources; cooperation on aerial and maritime transportation and port security; cooperation on maritime security; cooperation in defence; and others. In addition to establishing several areas of action, the plan defines the necessity to articulate meetings and seminars related to them.

  45. 45.

    Abdenur and Souza Neto, ‘O Brasil e a cooperação em defesa: a construção de uma identidade regional no Atlântico Sul’.

  46. 46.

    P. Penna Filho, ‘Reflexões sobre o Brasil e os Desafios do Atlântico Sul no Início do Século XXI’, in G. F. Gheller, S. L. M. Gonzales, and L. P. Melo, eds., Amazônia e Atlântico Sul: desafios e perspectivas para a Defesa no Brasil (Brasília: IPEA, 2015), 162.

  47. 47.

    L. E. Rocha Paiva, ‘O Jogo de Poder na Faixa Atlântica do Entorno Estratégico Nacional e seus Reflexos para a Defesa e Projeção do Brasil’, in Gheller et al., eds., Amazônia e Atlântico Sul.

  48. 48.

    UNCLOS negotiations were concluded in Montego Bay (Jamaica) on 10 December 1982. The Convention entered into force in 1994 with the signature of its 60th member and since then each country was given ten years to present proposals for the extension of its continental shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), an institution that was established in 1997 under UNCLOS. Officially, the purpose of CLCS is to ‘facilitate the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the Convention) in respect of the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (M) from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured’. See United Nations, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS): Purpose, Functions and Sessions, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_purpose.htm#Purpose, accessed 15/7/2017.

  49. 49.

    A. R. Almeida Silva and J. A. A. Moura, ‘The Brazilian Navy’s Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program’, The Nonproliferation Review 23, no. 5–6 (2016): 617–633.

  50. 50.

    The main plans and programmes of the Interministerial Commission are mentioned in its webpage, https://www.mar.mil.br/secirm/ingles/principal.html.

  51. 51.

    The continental shelf is defined by UNCLOS in its article 76. In this area, countries have the right to explore natural resources, including living sedentary species that are only capable of moving through constant physical contact with the bottom of the ocean or are immobile when captured, and minerals or other non-living resources in the seabed and subsoil. They also have the exclusive right to regulate scientific investigations, the construction and operations of structures, and the protection and preservation of that environment.

  52. 52.

    The bilateral cooperation that the Brazilian Navy offers to African nations such as Namibia and Angola, for example, or the Brazilian private and public investments in the continent are also important relational power strategies, but instead of examining these cases, the chapter will focus on the dimension in which Brazil seems to have more difficulties to improve.

  53. 53.

    Albeit Brazil has recently lost ground in relation to the rest of the world, the sizes of these countries’ economies are still comparable. According to the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, in the last decade Brazil experienced years of strong growth and in 2011 its GDP overtook that of Britain. Since then, on the other hand, it has again lost ground to both European countries.

  54. 54.

    For example, the Army can deliver many contributions to the protection of an important share of the area by developing a coastal artillery capacity and the Air Force is an essential tool in the dissuasion of foreign threats that emerge from overseas.

  55. 55.

    The previous version had been approved in 2005 and the original one in 1996.

  56. 56.

    The previous version had been approved in 2012 and the original version dated from 2008.

  57. 57.

    The original version had been approved in 2012.

  58. 58.

    Brasil, Política Nacional de Defesa / Estratégia Nacional de Defesa – preliminary version under the appreciation of Congress, 29 September 2016, 26, http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2017/mes03/pnd_end.pdf, accessed 20/7/2017.

  59. 59.

    Ibid., 27.

  60. 60.

    Internationally, the country has suffered several technological constraints from developed countries, following the same pattern that has been applied to Brazil at least since the aftermath of the Second World War (see Almeida Silva and Moura, ‘The Brazilian Navy’s Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program’; W. P. Longo, and W. S. Moreira, ‘O acesso a tecnologias sensíveis’, Tensões Mundiais, Fortaleza, 5, no. 9 (2009): 76–98; W. P. Longo, and W. S. Moreira, ‘Contornando o cerceamento tecnológico’, in E. M. Svartman, J. M. Arias Neto, and T. R. P. Godoi, eds., Defesa, Segurança Internacional e Forças Armadas – III Encontro da ABED (Campinas: Mercado de Letras, 2010), vol. 1, 309–321). These restrictions decreased Brazil’s capacity to develop advanced military equipment but Brazil’s trade restraints cannot fully respond for the country’s limited technological development. Brazilian political and military institutions have never considered the acquirement of new equipment and technologies as a priority.

  61. 61.

    Italy had the seventh biggest economy in the world, with a GDP of US$1850.74 billion. The complete data is available at the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx.

  62. 62.

    The Guardian, ‘HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier to take to the seas’, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/26/hms-queen-elizabeth-aircraft-carrier-takes-to-the-seas, accessed 30/12/2017.

  63. 63.

    Aircraft Carrier Alliance, ‘HMS Prince of Wales floats out’, http://www.aircraftcarrieralliance.co.uk/hms-prince-of-wales/latest-news/2017/21-12-2017, accessed 20/3/2018.

  64. 64.

    The equipment had been purchased from France in 2000 and it arrived in Brazil in 2001, having maintained its full capacity for only three years. Due to its age (56 years old) and the long time without proper maintenance, its revitalization costs would be too extensive and the Navy finally decided to decommission the ship.

  65. 65.

    NATO, for example, recommends that its members spend only 40% of their total defence budget on personnel in order to leave room for higher investments in research and development of new equipment, considering that technology will be an essential asset in any future conflict.

  66. 66.

    These ships must carry several weapon, radar, communication and sonar systems, to name a few.

  67. 67.

    A nuclear propelled submarine such as the one that Brazil is developing has more than 950,000 parts and it takes more than 8 million hours to be produced. In comparison, a fighter aircraft carries only around 30,000 parts and can be produced in around 57,000 labour hours. See L. Padilha, ‘Submarino Nuclear Brasileiro “Álvaro Alberto” (SN 10)’, Defesa Aérea & Naval, 7 December 2012, http://www.defesaaereanaval.com.br/submarino-nuclear-brasileiro-alvaro-alberto-sn-10/, accessed 13/6/2017.

  68. 68.

    Brasil, Política Nacional de Defesa / Estratégia Nacional de Defesa – preliminary version under the appreciation of Congress, 29 September 2016, 35, http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2017/mes03/pnd_end.pdf, accessed on 20/7/2017.

  69. 69.

    Brasil, Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional – preliminary version under the appreciation of Congress, 29 September 2016, http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2017/mes03/livro_branco_de_defesa_nacional_minuta.pdf, accessed 20/7/2017.

  70. 70.

    Washington Post, ‘Brazil defense minister: Troops to fight violence in Rio’, 28 July 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/brazil-defense-minister-troops-to-fight-violence-in-rio/2017/07/28/694ec2fc-734a-11e7-8c17-533c52b2f014_story.html?utm_term=.62a5e389aca0, accessed 28/7/2017; The Economist, The ‘Brazilian army is turning into a de facto police force. Its plodding infantry are ill-suited to repel threats to natural resources’, 6 July 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21724839-its-plodding-infantry-are-ill-suited-repel-threats-natural-resources-brazilian-army, accessed 14/7/2017.

  71. 71.

    IBOPE – Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística, Índice de Confiança Social (ICS) 2015, http://www.ibope.com.br/pt-br/noticias/Paginas/Instituicees-politicas-perdem-ainda-mais-a-confianca-dos-brasileiros.aspx, accessed on 3/7/2016; IPEA – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Sistema de Indicadores de Percepção Social (SIPS): Defesa Nacional. Brasília, 2011, http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/SIPS/120417_sips_defesanacional.pdf, accessed 13/7/2015.

  72. 72.

    T. C. Bruneau and J. R. Goetze, Jr., ‘Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control’, in T. C. Bruneau and S. D. Tollefson, eds., Who Guards the Guardians and How (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 71.

  73. 73.

    Ibid., 80.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Brasília, Brasília, Brazil

    Juliano da Silva Cortinhas

Authors
  1. Juliano da Silva Cortinhas
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil

    Érico Duarte

  2. Strategic Studies Centre of Angola-CEEA, Luanda, Angola

    Manuel Correia de Barros

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

da Silva Cortinhas, J. (2019). Brazil and the Construction of Its Power to Defend the South Atlantic. In: Duarte, É., Correia de Barros, M. (eds) Navies and Maritime Policies in the South Atlantic. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10600-3_7

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation