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Early and Late Vision: Their Processes and Epistemic Status

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Cognitive Penetrability and the Epistemic Role of Perception

Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

Abstract

In this chapter, I elaborate my thesis that a stage of visual processing, namely, late vision, is Cognitively Penetrated (CP). The CP of late vision results in states with hybrid, that is visual/iconic and semantic/symbolic contents. The conceptual modulation of late vision notwithstanding, I argue that late vision is a perceptual stage rather than a stage of discursive thought. My main claim is that instead of discursive inferences, late vision involves pattern matching processes, and I discuss the perception of ambiguous figures to sybstantiate my claim. I also argue that early vision, too, does not involve discursive inferences and that both late and early vision involve some sort of abductive reasoning.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Concepts are constant, context independent, and freely repeatable elements that figure constitutively in propositional contents; they correspond to lexical items.

  2. 2.

    The P3 waveform is elicited about 250–600 ms and is generated in many areas in the brain and is associated with cognitive processing and the subjects’ reports. P3 may signify the consolidation of the representation of the object(s) in working memory.

  3. 3.

    The view that the formation of the viewer independent representations of objects relies on object knowledge is common in theories of the formation of the 3D viewer independent representation. Biederman (1987) thinks that object recognition is based on part decomposition, the first stage in forming a structural description of an object. This decomposition cannot be determined by general principles reflecting the structure of the world alone, since the decomposition appears to depend upon knowledge of specific objects.

  4. 4.

    The phenomenal/non-phenomenal distinction is orthogonal to the discussion on mental imagery since mental imagery, exactly like perception, can either be accompanied by consciousness, or it can be implicit (as in implicit perception).

  5. 5.

    Gauker (2012, 45) reaches the same conclusion starting from a similar structural description of the perceptual system but without any mention of neural networks, although his construal of representations as marks and his discussion of perceptual similarity space in which these marks are located is close to the connectionist account I have sketched here.

  6. 6.

    For an elaborate treatment of proto-objects see Raftopoulos (2009).

  7. 7.

    In a de re belief, one retrieves information from the object itself and not through a description. In late vision where information in WM guides the formation of hypotheses about object identity, these hypotheses are based on descriptions in addition to visual information, since the knowledge stored in memory is a description of the object. Thus, the ensuing recognitional belief is based on a combination of information deriving from the object and from a description of it in memory. It is not a pure de re belief.

  8. 8.

    The view that the result of the conceptualization process occurring in perception can be described as a prima facie belief is explicitly endorsed by Gauker (2012, 45), and implicitly assumed by most among those who discus the epistemic role of perception in rationally supporting beliefs.

  9. 9.

    Nanay’s wording is very similar to Sellar’s (1977) explanation of the way the unseen parts of objects participate in the sense-image-model of the object that unifies contributions from the senses and the imagination. According to Sellars (1977)

    But while these features are not seen, they are not merely believed in. These features are present in the object of perception as actualities. They are present in virtue of being imagined.

    Sellars, unlike Nanay, however, thinks that the abovementioned remark applies to all cases of perception and not just to those in which imagination activates the visual cortex and gives rise to some sort of phenomenology, which is probably why Sellars says that these features are not seen. This immediately creates the problem (discussed by Coates 2007, 175–176) of how one should understand the claim that the unseen features of objects are present in the object of perception as actualities even in those cases in which imagination does not activate the visual cortex. When it does, there is a clear sense in which these properties are present in perception as actualities, as Nanay remarks, but when it does not, their presence as actualities needs explanation. Coates (2007, 177) proposes convincingly, that a way to understand Sellars is to think of the ‘presence as actuality of these features’ in terms of dispositional presence in the form of anticipations of the ways our phenomenal experience could be transformed should we, or the objects, move around and change the perspective from which the perceiver views the object. Such a change in perspective could render the hitherto unseen hidden parts of the object perceptible properties of the objects, which, thus, may be phenomenally experienced.

  10. 10.

    Note that Nanay (2010, 244) seems to talk about a perceptually driven amodal completion that is insensitive to other beliefs.

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    Athanassios Raftopoulos

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Raftopoulos, A. (2019). Early and Late Vision: Their Processes and Epistemic Status. In: Cognitive Penetrability and the Epistemic Role of Perception. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10445-0_5

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