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The Combination Problem(s)

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Abstract

The combination problem is perhaps the biggest challenge to pan-(proto)-psychism. In this chapter, I distinguish various types of the problem, especially the ‘easy’ combination problem, and the ‘hard’ combination problem. I indicate the solution to the easy problem, and I discuss some resources that are needed in order to solve or avoid the hard problem, namely panprotopsychism and eliminativism.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Sam Coleman puts it nicely: “There is little challenging in the notion of taking ingredients, each with a certain qualitative character, and putting them together into a whole whose macroscopic qualitative character is the intelligible product of the qualities of the components plus their arrangement. There are a few different relevant conceptual models we have available from everyday life, and it might be that phenomenal qualitative combination conforms to any one (or more) of these. Again, phenomenal qualitative combination may have its own rules; but there seems little reason to think there is anything much more conceptually challenging in such combination than there is in the everyday models of qualitative combination” (Coleman 2014, p. 28).

  2. 2.

    See also Goff (2017a, Chap. 7, especially §7.3).

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Correspondence to Jiri Benovsky .

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Benovsky, J. (2018). The Combination Problem(s). In: Mind and Matter. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05633-9_4

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