Abstract
An intuitive view of language is frequently assumed: words are related by competent speakers to descriptions that determine reference. Such a view is generally understood as convention-based in the sense that it emphasises the existence of conventions that determine what descriptions are relevant. However, this descriptivist approach has been shown to be problematic in reconstructing our linguistic practices. In contrast, the Causal Theory of Reference (CTR) provides a plausible account of our use of words. CTR has been understood to be a theory that provides a non-conventionalist approach to language and one that is committed to an implausible version of essentialism. In this chapter, Ramírez-Ludeña presents a version of CTR that addresses the criticisms it has normally received. She also shows the advantages of this version of CTR when compared to the traditional descriptivist model. In the legal field, CTR has been associated with non-positivistic conceptions about law. However, since CTR is not committed to essentialism but rather takes account of the way in which the community uses words, Ramírez-Ludeña also shows how the proposed model is compatible with conceptions in legal philosophy such as that of Hart, which emphasises the conventional character of law.
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Notes
- 1.
In philosophy of language, Frege (1998a), pp. 58–77, Frege (1998b), pp. 25–50, Russell (1905), pp. 479–493 and Russell (1910–1911), pp. 108–128 are considered the two most representative authors of this conception, which we could call “traditional”. This is debatable, however, if one considers their writings. In any case, I am not interested in describing here the position of particular authors, but rather reconstructing what may be considered the traditional conception, which is intuitive and generally accepted, in order to understand the point of departure for those who defend CTR.
- 2.
Searle (1958), pp. 166–173.
- 3.
Some legal theorists have understood Hart (1994) in this way.
- 4.
That is to say, literal and ordinary meaning are frequently regarded as interchangeable. See Montiel and Ramírez-Ludeña (2010).
- 5.
- 6.
Regarding the notion of chains of communication, see Almog (1984), pp. 479–489.
- 7.
For emphasis on this point, see Martí and Ramírez-Ludeña (2016).
- 8.
Martí and Ramírez-Ludeña (2016).
- 9.
For an analysis of this example and its legal consequences, see Moore (1985), pp. 277–398.
- 10.
The existence of two different words in English precisely shows how it is plausible to say that, regarding vacío, two different uses (ordinary and expert) must be differentiated. In English, a vacuum is a space from which most or all of the matter has been removed, or where there is little or no matter; in contrast, “empty” is used in a looser sense to mean, for example, to not contain any objects or people.
- 11.
Regarding this example, see Moreso (2010), pp. 15–47.
- 12.
For more on the case of Madagascar and the problems it could pose for CTR, see Evans (1973), pp. 187–208.
- 13.
Here I follow Martí (2015). In this regard, she claims that “[w]hen a speaker intends to follow a practice, to abide by the rule, it is the rule, and not his intention, that does the semantic work. The referential intentions of a speaker do not determine the reference of particular uses of expressions, and so they fall outside of the realm of semantics” (Martí 2015, p. 82, fn. 11).
- 14.
Establishing this practice requires success in making people use a name to refer to a thing, which in the case of Madagascar depended upon a combination of errors and power (Martí 2015, p. 86). In addition, Martí (2015, p. 87) argues that “we should not think that bestowing a name is an act; it is a process. It requires success in launching a practice, and launching practices is not something that occurs instantly”.
- 15.
This case was discussed by German doctrine and jurisprudence and concluded with a decision by the Bundesgerichtshof (25.10.2006), which established that fungi were included in a regulation that refers to plants. For an analysis of this case, see Montiel and Ramírez-Ludeña (2010).
- 16.
See Kripke (1980), p. 102 ff.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
Such is the case, for example, with Moore (1994), pp. 188–242.
- 20.
Coleman and Simchen (2003), pp. 1–41 argue this.
- 21.
Regarding inclusive legal positivism, see Waluchow (1994), Coleman (2001), and Moreso (2001), pp. 37–63. For a defence of exclusive legal positivism, see Raz (1979, 1994), Shapiro (1998a), pp. 469–508, Shapiro (1998b), pp. 33–64 and Shapiro (2011). It is important to note that Hart has normally been understood as an inclusive legal positivist. See the postscriptum in Hart (1994).
- 22.
In fact, Hart explicitly acknowledges that there may be uncertainty in the rule of recognition (Hart 1994, p. 147 ff.) and that judges may agree on the relevance of the tests provided by the rule of recognition as something defined by established judicial practice “even though they disagree as to what the tests require in particular cases” (Hart 1994, pp. 258 and 259). In short, a certain degree of uncertainty is compatible with the conventional nature of law.
- 23.
See Hart (1994).
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Ramírez-Ludeña, L. (2019). Conventionalism and the Causal Theory of Reference. In: Ramírez-Ludeña, L., Vilajosana, J. (eds) Legal Conventionalism. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 126. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03571-6_10
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