Abstract
Bruno’s concept of space remains constant throughout his entire work. Its main tenets are: (1) the rejection of Aristotle’s concept of ‘place’ as an accident of bodily substance and the ensuing notion of ‘natural places;’ (2) the notion of space as an infinite, homogeneous receptacle of matter; and (3) the idea that void, though conceptually prior to matter, is always and everywhere filled with matter. Edward Grant (in his masterful Much Ado About Nothing, Cambridge, 1981) argued that “the consequences of Bruno’s description of space and the properties he assigned it lead inevitably to an infinite space that is coeternal with but wholly independent of God.” In the present chapter I show that Grant’s conclusion is incompatible with the foundations of Bruno’s ontology. De immenso and Lampas triginta statuarum allow us to establish Bruno’s true concept of the relation between God and space in accordance with the doctrine of the six ‘infigurable’ primary principles distributed in two triads: Mind or Father-Intellect-Spirit; and Chaos or Void-Orcus or Privation-Night or Matter. Both triads represent, in accordance with the ontology of De la causa, the two (non hierarchized) aspects of God’s essence as a coincidence of opposites: potency and act, matter and form, void space and mind. As a consequence, since God is space and matter no less than mind and form, we can confidently say that Bruno – relying on Biblical passages describing God as unity of contradictories – had already gone as far as Spinoza in conflating God, extension, matter, and space.
This article is the result of research conducted within the project “Cosmología, teología y antropología en la primera fase de la Revolución Científica (1543–1633),” funded by the Spanish Government (Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Project FFI2015-64498-P for the triennium 2016–2018). I wish to thank Patrick J. Boner for his careful reading and improvements on the original English version of this article, as well as for his aid with the English translations of several passages from Bruno’s Latin works.
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Notes
- 1.
Koyré 1957, 39. On Bruno’s concept of space and the infinite, homogeneous universe see ibid., 39–55.
- 2.
Grant 1981, xiii, 380 n69, 389 n163. On Bruno’s concept of space see ibid., 183–192.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
For an account of the Aristotelian notions of place and space see Algra’s Chapter 2 in this volume.
- 6.
De caelo, I, 9, 279a, 16–18, in Aristotle 1939.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
On the Infinite in Bruno 1968, 254; De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 67–69. For the identification of both positions with those of the Stoics and Epicureans see De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 115; On the Infinite in Bruno 1968, 272. For the greater plausibility of the filled space see De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 171–173; On the Infinite in Bruno 1968, 298–299.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 125: “uno infinito, immobile, infigurato, spaciosissimo continente de innumerabili mobili;” 181: “tutto è un ricetto generale.” For the later Latin works see Acrotismus Camoeracensis in Bruno 1879, 123, art. xxviii: “[Spacium] est igitur receptaculum corporum magnitudinem habentium;” De immenso, IV, 1, in Bruno 1879, 78: “Spacium sane nullum est corpus, sed corporis receptaculum.”
- 15.
Grembo, seno (“infinito spacioso seno,” De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 175; “infinitely spacious bosom,” On the Infinite in Bruno 1968, 300; campo (“generale e spacioso campo,” De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 183; “the vastness of universal space,” On the Infinite in Bruno 1968, 302; inane, vuoto, vacuo, etere, cielo (“l’infinito spacio, cioé, il cielo continente e pervagato da quelli [gli astri],” De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 355; “the infinite space, the heaven comprehending all, traversed by all,” On the Infinite in Bruno 1968, 370.
- 16.
- 17.
De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 113: “incompossibilità delle dimensioni di uno et un altro.”
- 18.
De immenso, I, 8, in Bruno 1879, 231: “Est ergo spacium, quantitas quaedam continua physica triplici dimensione constans, in qua corporum magnitudo capiatur.” See Grant 1981, 186. On this page Philoponus is praised as the commentator who more audaciously (“audactius”) has attacked the Aristotelian concept of place. Bruno may have known Philoponus’ criticism and his novel concept of space directly, since Philoponus’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (containing his “Corollaries on Place and Void”) had been published in Latin translation in eight editions between 1539 and 1581. But he may also have found a sympathetic presentation of Philoponus’ views in Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola’s Examen vanitatis doctrinae gentium et veritatis Christianae disciplinae, printed in Basle in 1573, and demonstrably known to him. Philoponus, however, considered that space was finite and coextensive with the finite spherical world of the cosmological tradition; see Philoponus 1991. On Philoponus see Duhem 1913–1958, vol. I, 313–320, Sedley 1987; and Section 2.3 of Algra’s Chapter 2 in this volume. For Gianfrancesco Pico’s presentation of Philoponus’ concept see Schmitt 1967, 138–159. Pico was also the first to present in Latin the concept of space of the Hebrew Hasdai Crescas , whose affinity with Bruno was even stronger, since he stated the reality, beyond the outermost sphere of the world, of an infinite void space, in which God’s omnipotence could have created a plurality of other worlds. On Crescas’ views see Schmitt 1967 (index), and Wolfson 1929. According to Wolfson 1929, 36, “knowing as we do that a countryman of Bruno, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola , similarly separated from Crescas in time and space and language, obtained a knowledge of Crescas through some unknown Jewish intermediary, the possibility of a similar intermediary in the case of Bruno is not to be excluded.” We think, however, that such a possibility is rather remote. Since Pico’s comments on Crescas’ views are rather scarce, we are inclined to consider the striking similarities between Bruno and Crescas an effect of their common knowledge of the Stoic conception of extracosmic infinite void space, and of the assertion in Christian thought after 1279 of the possibility (by God’s absolute power) of a plurality of worlds.
- 19.
De immenso, I, 8, in Bruno 1879, 231: “ubi quippe nullius corporis sunt dimensiones, spacii dimensiones esse decebit, in quibus illae recipi possint. Quinimo illae dimensiones nusquam absque dimensionibus istis esse possunt.”
- 20.
- 21.
- 22.
- 23.
- 24.
De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 113: “Ora se la materia ha il suo appetito, il quale non deve essere in vano, perché tal appetito è della natura e procede da l’ordine della prima natura, bisogna che il loco, il spacio, l’inane abbiano cotale appetito;” On the Infinite in Bruno 1968, 271. It is important to note that, if space is indifferent to the kind of matter occupying it, it is not indifferent with respect to being occupied or empty, since space desires matter. This point separates Bruno from the triumphant representation of space and matter in the scientific revolution. More in accordance with ancient atomism and Epicureanism , authors like Galileo, Gassendi or Newton will maintain that space is indifferent to being void or filled. For this point of contrast with Lucretius see Fantechi 2006, 579–581. The cause of this divergence is precisely Bruno’s concept of the relation of void space to God, as will be shown in what follows.
- 25.
Cf. Koyré 1957, 44 and 46.
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
Lovejoy 1936, 116–124; cf. also Koyré 1957, 42. Regarding, however, the derivation of this principle also from Aristotle , see Del Prete 2003. Even Epicurus and Lucretius already subscribed to a version of the ‘principle of plenitude’ without giving up the necessity of void; see e.g. Lucretius, De rerum natura, II, 1048–1089.
- 29.
- 30.
De immenso, I, 11, in Bruno 1879, 242, principle IV: “Deus est simplicissima essentia, in qua nulla compositio potest esse, vel diversitas intrinsece.”
- 31.
Ibid., 243, principle IX: “Necessitas et libertas sunt unum, unde non est formidandum quod, cum [Deus] agat necessitate naturae, non libere agat: sed potius immo omnino non libere ageret, aliter agendo, quam necessitas et natura, imo naturae necessitas requirit.” Accordingly, the adversary should prove the (impossible) assertion that “necessity in God is different from freedom” (“probandum est adversario: [...] VI. necessitatem in Deo aliud esse a libertate,” ibid., 244).
- 32.
De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 89: “Qual raggione vuole che vogliamo credere che l’agente che può fare un buono infinito lo fa finito? E se lo fa finito, perché doviamo noi credere che possa farlo infinito, essendo in lui il possere et il fare tutto uno? Perché è immutabile, non ha contingenzia nell’operazione, né nella efficacia, ma da determinata e certa efficacia depende determinato e certo effetto inmutabilmente;” On the Infinite in Bruno 1968, 262: “What argument would persuade us that the Agent capable of creating infinite good should have created it finite? And if he hath created it finite, why should we believe that the Agent could have created it infinite, since power and action are in him but one? For he is immutable, there is no contingency in his action or in his power, but from determined and assured power there immutably do follow determined and assured results.”
- 33.
See Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names, chap. 4, §20; Saint Thomas Aquinas , Summa theologiae, I, 27, art. 5, obj. 2. Cf. Lovejoy 1936, 49 f.
- 34.
“He was good; and in the good no jealousy in any matter can ever arise. So, being without jealousy, he desired that all things should come as near as possible to being like himself,” as translated in Cornford 1935, 33. Unfortunately, Cornford’s translation misses the connection with the Latin tradition, preserved instead by Bruno with his terms invidioso, invidia (De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 85 and 87). The same happens in Singer’s translation; see On the Infinite in Bruno 1968, 260: “remain grudgingly sterile;” 262: “Omnipotence doth not grudge being.”
- 35.
See Blumenberg 1976, 127: “Ein Gott, der realisieren muss, was er kann, bringt sich selbst noch einmal hervor. Zeugung und Schöpfung fallen zusammen. Wo die Schöpfung die hervorbringende Macht Gottes erschöpft, kann für den trinitarischen Prozess kein Raum mehr sein. Wenn aber, und das ist der nächste Schritt, die absolute Selbstverwirklichung der göttlichen Allmacht ‘Welt’ ist und nicht ‘Person,’ dann muss der Charakter der Personalität auch schon dem sich selbst reproduzierenden Grunde abgesprochen werden;” 179, n148: “Bruno hat eine der dunkelsten Unterscheidungen der Dogmengeschichte nicht mitgemacht, die von generatio und creatio: die Hervorbringung des Gottessohnes als ‘Zeugung,’ die Hervorbringung der Welt als ‘Schöpfung.’ Er hält an der cusanischen Grundidee fest, dass das absolute ‘Können’ sich in dem Hervorgehen der aequalitas aus der unitas manifestieren müsse – aber die Stelle der aequalitas wird bei Bruno nicht durch den Sohn, sondern durch das unendliche Universum besetzt.” On the trinitary issue in Bruno see also Fantechi 2007; Scapparone 2008.
- 36.
See De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 357, 117 and 177; On the Infinite in Bruno 1968, 372, 273 and 300. The fact that the air internal to animals is called “spirto” shows the influence of Stoicism . The denomination “ether” for this fluid, inasmuch as it is pure and fills the space where the stars dwell and through which they move, manifests a remnant of the ancient wisdom preceding Aristotle , since the true meaning of this term is “percurribile:” “in quanto poi che è puro e non si fa parte di composto, ma luogo e continente per cui quello si muove e discorre, si noma propriamente ‘etere,’ che dal corso [Greek verb θεῖν] prende denominazione,” ibid., 357. Cf. also De immenso in Bruno 1879, IV, chap. 14, 78–79, where a second etymology [ether, from Greek aithein, to burn] is also adduced: “Aether vero est idem quod coelum, inane, spacium absolutum [...] qui omnia corpora circumplectitur infinitus. Quia maiori ex parte ardet. [...] Aether enim nullius qualitatis, virtutis, vel operationis, vel passionis esse potest subiectum; et sic coelum dicimus vere inalterabile impassibile ingenerabile incorruptibile immobile; quia in eo debent moveri, et currere astra. Hoc totum de spacio et vacui dicimus: hoc est coelum et regia deorum (id est astrorum) ab initio philosophantibus et vulgo cognita.” As pure air, this fluid is identified with the biblical firmamentum and with the image or symbol of Atlas in ancient pagan wisdom. See Acrotismus Camoeracensis in Bruno 1879, 165 (art. lxv): “Ipse [pure air] est figuratum firmamentum per vectorem Atlantem, omnia sine labore sustinentem;” cf. the Italian translation: Acrotismo in Bruno 2009, 125. For the first etymology of ether see Plato , Cratylus, 410b 6–7; Aristotle, De caelo, in Aristotle 1939, 270b 22–23. For the second etymology see [Arist.] De mundo, 392a, 5–6.
- 37.
On this concept see Granada 2010, 2013. In De immenso, I, 3, in Bruno 1879, 213, Bruno presents the concept of synodus ex mundis as secretly transmitted by the Homeric myth of the banquet of the Olympic Gods (suns) among the black Ethiopians (planets). This is a second point of ancient wisdom transmitted to us in the veiled form of etymology and myth concerning the principles and true structure of the universe.
- 38.
De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 249: “il spacio è tale, per quale possano discorrere tanti astri;” 355: “l’infinito spacio, cioè il cielo continente e pervagato da quelli [the stars].” De immenso, IV, 14, in Bruno 1879, 79: “spacium dicitur aether quia decurritur” [space is called ether because it is run through].
- 39.
- 40.
Grant 1981, 189.
- 41.
Grant 1981, 191.
- 42.
- 43.
On the Infinite in Bruno 1968, 257; De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 75: “Che repugna che l’infinito implicato nel simplicissimo et individuo primo principio [i.e. God as the One], non venga esplicato più tosto in questo suo simulacro infinito et interminato, capacissimo di innumerabili mondi, che venga esplicato in sì anguste margini [...]?” And on the next page, the passage “bisogna che di un inaccesso volto divino, sia uno infinito simulacro nel quale come infiniti membri poi si trovino mondi innumerabili quali sono gli altri [mondi],” 77 – the image (simulacro) of the inaccessible deity is not necessarily the space, but more probably the infinite universe in it with its infinite worlds.
- 44.
- 45.
On the Infinite in Bruno 1968, 270 (we have modified the translation); De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 111: “come veramente è uno individuo infinito simplicissimo, cossì sia uno amplissimo dimensionale infinito il quale sia in quello, e nel quale sia quello, al modo con cui lui è nel tutto, et il tutto è in lui.”
- 46.
De immenso, IV, 14, in Bruno 1879, 79–80: “Spacium dicitur aether quia decurritur. Tot sunt caeli quot astra, si caelum intelligamus contiguum et circumstans configuratum uniuscuiusque spacium, ut caelum Telluris dicitur non solum spacium in quo est, sed et quantum spacii perambit ipsum distinctum a spacio perambiente Lunam, et alia (quae circa sunt) corpora mundana. Caelum caeli est spacium unius synodi sicut in quo hic sol est cum suis planetis. Caelum caelorum e<s>t maximum et immensum spacium; quod et aether dicitur, quia totum est percurribile, et quia in toto maxime flagrant omnia. [...] Sedes ergo beatorum sunt astra: sedes deorum est aether seu caelum: astra quippe Deos secunda ratione dico. Sedes vero Dei est universum ubique totum immensum caelum, vacuum spacium cuius est plenitudo; pater lucis comprehendentis tenebras, ineffabilis,” (italics are ours). Regarding the biblical terms (coelum, coelum coeli, coelum coelorum) see Pépin 1953. Bruno, for obvious reasons, prefers the singular coelum coelorum (Nehemias 9:6) to the more frequent coeli coelorum, besides interpreting coelum coeli and coelum coelorum not as incorporeal and intelligible regions and entities, but as more or less extended regions in the unique infinite space and corporeal universe.
- 47.
De l’infinito in Bruno 2006, 87: “dico Dio ‘totalmente infinito’ perché tutto lui è in tutto il mondo, et in ciascuna sua parte infinitamente e totalmente;” On the Infinite in Bruno 1968, 261: “I say that God is all-comprehensive infinity because the whole of him pervadeth the whole world and every part thereof comprehensively and to infinity.”
- 48.
- 49.
- 50.
Our translation. Cf. Acrotismus Camoeracensis, in Bruno 1879, art. xxx, 126–127: “Potuit sane Plato dixisse, materiam esse receptaculum quoddam, et locum quoddam receptaculum esse. Non propterea calumniae locus erat, ut, juxta Aristotelis censuram, receptaculum illi [i.e. Plato ] idem fuerit quod materia, et materia idem ac receptaculum.” See also Acrotismo in Bruno 2009, 92–93.
- 51.
- 52.
This point has been rightly emphasized by Fantechi 2006, 582.
- 53.
De la Causa, dialogue iii, in Bruno 2016, 113–117.
- 54.
De immenso, I, 11, in Bruno 1879, 243. Cf. principles IV and V.
- 55.
- 56.
Lampas in Bruno 2000b, 938–940: “Ordo erit procedendi a notioribus nobis sensibilibus et phantasiabilibus ad intelligibilia et contemplabilia universalia, quae sunt causae et rationes omnium particularium: et ideo ab iisdem – tamquam a causis et principiis – facillimo negotio media desumere licebit. [...] [I]taque usum atque formam antiquae philosophiae et priscorum theologorum revocabimus, qui nimirum arcana naturae eiusmodi typis et similitudinibus non tantum velare consueverunt, quantum declarare, explicare, in seriem digerere, et faciliori memoriae retentioni accommodare” (italics are ours).
- 57.
For Chaos as a denomination of void space, Bruno refers to Hesiod (Theogonia, vv. 116–117). The reference is also present in the contemporary Acrotismus; see Acrotismus Camoeracensis, in Bruno 1879, 124 and the Italian translation: Acrotismo in Bruno 2009, 90 (art. 28). Most probably, Bruno owes the reference to Aristotle , whose description of Hesiod ’s chaos in Physics, IV, 1, 208b 29–33, he accepts as true against the Stagirite. Thus, Hesiodic chaos is another point of true philosophy present in ancient wisdom.
- 58.
Lampas in Bruno 2000b, 942.
- 59.
Lampas in Bruno 2000b, 1008, 1024 and 1044.
- 60.
Lampas in Bruno 2000b, 958: “Sequitur, tanquam filius patrem, Chaos ipsa Abyssus seu Orcus.”
- 61.
Lampas in Bruno 2000b, 972: “Orci filiam primogenitam Noctem esse intelligimus.”
- 62.
Lampas in Bruno 2000b, 1026: “Hic licet contemplari in patre essentiarum essentiam, in filio omnem pulchritudinem et generandi appetitum, in fulgore ipsum spiritum pervadentem omnia et vivificantem.”
- 63.
Lampas in Bruno 2000b, 994: “similitudinem quippe habet cum Deo ex hoc quod causa incausata;” 984: “ipsa [nox] causam non habet.”
- 64.
Lampas in Bruno 2000b, 952: “non est a causa seu causatum, sed incausabile prorsus.”
- 65.
For the application of the category of relation to the primordial principles, as well as to the connection between God and the universe, inasmuch as they are reciprocally dependent or mutually implicated, see Del Prete 2016. Del Prete, however, limits her study to the superior triad and to the Trinitary issue, paying no attention to the question of void space and its relation to God.
- 66.
Lampas in Bruno 2000b, 988: “[Matter] est natura seu naturae species, condistincta ab alia natura – quae est lux –, e quorum coitu naturalia generantur;” 994: “in quibus esse distinguitur ab essentia, in his Noctem intueri licet matrem, et lucem patrem.”
- 67.
See n46 above: “Sedes vero Dei est universum ubique totum immensum caelum, vacuum spacium cuius est plenitudo; pater lucis comprehendentis tenebras, ineffabilis.”
- 68.
Lampas in Bruno 2000b, 1008: “De patre, seu mente, seu plenitudine. [...] Typus tamen ipsius est lux infinita.”
- 69.
“Tria concurrunt, ut undique et ubique sit sol, radius et fulgur, ut in eo nulla distinctio sit, sed omnium horum trium unitas et identitas,” ibid.
- 70.
Lampas in Bruno 2000b, 1026: “Antiqui theologi per centrum illud paternam mentem intelligunt, quae – dum se ipsam contemplatur – circulum quendam producit [recall that the circle is defined and produced by its radius], et primum generat intellectum, quem filium appellant; qua conceptione perfecta, in imagine essentiae suae sibi complacens fulgorem emittit, quem amorem appellant, qui a patre seipsum in filio contemplante proficiscitur. Hic licet contemplari in patre essentiarum essentiam, in filio omnem pulchritudinem et generandi appetitum, in fulgore ipsum spiritum pervadentem omnia et vivificantem” (italics are ours). Cf. also Fantechi 2007, 392–396, and 405–406. Unfortunately, Fantechi’s analysis focuses uniquely on the ‘superior’ triad or trinity, leaving aside the ‘inferior’ one of space-matter, structurally and substantially connected with the other.
- 71.
- 72.
Cause in Bruno 1998, 68; De la causa in Bruno 2016, 213: “La coincidenzia di questo atto con l’assoluta potenza è stata molto apertamente descritta dal spirto divino dove dice: ‘Tenebrae non obscurabuntur a te. Nox sicut dies illuminabitur. Sicut tenebra eius, ita et lumen eius’.” The quote is from Psalms 139:12.
- 73.
Cause in Bruno 1998, 93; De la causa in Bruno 2016, 291: “Con il suo modo di filosofare gli Peripatetici e molti Platonici alla moltitudine de le cose, come al mezzo, fanno procedere il purissimo atto da uno estremo, e la purissima potenza da l’altro. Come vogliono altri per certa metafora convenir le tenebre e la luce alla costituzione di innumerabili gradi di forme, effigie, figure e colori.”
- 74.
Cause in Bruno 1998, 93; De la causa in Bruno 2016, 291: “Appresso i quali, che considerano dui principii e dui principi, soccorreno altri nemici et impazienti di poliarchia, e fanno concorrere que’ doi in uno, che medesimamente è abisso e tenebra, chiarezza e luce, oscurità profonda et impenetrabile, luce superna et inaccessibile” (italics are ours). The reference to two ‘princes’ (of light and darkness respectively) clearly alludes to Gnosticism, beyond Platonism and Aristotelianism . The rejection of polyarchy is clearly inspired by Homer’s Iliad, II, 204 (“The rule of many [πολυκοιρανίη] is not good; let there be one ruler”) as quoted by Aristotle in Metaphysics, XII, 1076a 4. This is a further reference by Aristotle to ancient wisdom, which he is unable to follow, contrary to Bruno. As W.D. Ross comments, “Aristotle is not a thoroughgoing monist. He is a monist in the sense that he believes in one supreme ruling principle, God or the primum movens. But God is not for him all-inclusive. The sensible world is thought of as having a matter not made by God,” in Aristotle 1924, II, 405. As Aristotle states in the Physics (II, 7, 198a 22–26), the efficient, formal and final cause “many times come to one” or coincide; cf. infra, n76.
- 75.
Grant 1981, 191.
- 76.
Cause in Bruno 1998, 100; De la causa in Bruno 2016, 315: “A questo [the coincidence of contraries in the One] tendeva con il pensiero il povero Aristotele ponendo la privazione (a cui è congionta certa disposizione) come progenitrice, parente e madre della forma: ma non vi poté aggiungere, non ha possuto arrivarvi; perché fermando il piè nel geno de l’opposizione, rimase inceppato di maniera, che non […] giunse né fissò gli occhi al scopo: dal quale errò a tutta passata, dicendo i contrarii non posser attualmente convenire in soggetto medesimo.”
- 77.
Guide, I, 69, in Maimonides 1963, 167. Cf. the Latin translation: Dux, I, 68, in Maimonides 1520, xxvii verso: “De credibilitate vero ipsorum [philosophorum] et opinione cui ego non contradico, est: quia credunt quod creator est causa eficiens & forma [&] finis: & ideo vocaverunt ipsum causam ut coniungantur in ipso tres causae: & sit ipse factor mundi & forma & finis.”
- 78.
Guide, III, 9, in Maimonides 1963, 436–437. Cf. Dux, III, 10, in Maimonides 1520, fol. lxxv recto: “Materia paries magnus est ante nos: unde non apprehendimus intelligentiam separatam secundum quod est. [...] Propter hoc igitur cum noster intellectus nititur apprehendere Creatorem vel aliquam de intelligentiis separatis, invenit parietem illud magnum dividentem inter ipsum et illa intelligibilia. [...] Ipse vero absconditus est a nobis in nube et caligine.”
- 79.
Ethica, II, 7, scholium, in Spinoza 1925, 46: “substantia cogitans, & substantia extensa una, eademque est substantia, quae jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur. Sic etiam modus extensionis, & idea illius modi una, eademque est res, sed duobus modis expressa; quod quidam Hebraeorum quasi per nebulam vidisse videntur, qui scilicet statuunt, Deum, Dei intellectum, resque ab ipso intellectas unum, & idem esse,” (italics are ours). That Spinoza refers to Maimonides is clear from Guide, I, 68, in Maimonides 1963, 163: “You already know that the following dictum of the philosophers with reference to God [...] is generally admitted: the dictum being that He is the intellect as well as the intellectually cognizing subject and the intellectually cognized object, and that those three notions form in Him [...] one single notion in which there is no multiplicity” [Dux, I, 67, in Maimonides 1520, xxvii recto: “Iam scis verbum manifestum quod philosophi dixerunt de Creatore, quod ipse est intellectus & intelligens & intellectum: & quod ista tria sunt unum in Creatore: & non est ibi multitudo”]. The ultimate philosophical source is, obviously, Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, 9, 1074b 33–35 (“Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking,” Aristotle 1985, vol. 2) through the interpretation of Themistius in his Paraphrasis of Metaphysics Book Lambda. See Pines 1996, Harvey 1981; Fraenkel 2006. Interestingly, near the end of eighteenth century Germany, Salomon Maimon (1751–1800) would use, in Give’at ha-Moreh (his second commentary on the Guide of the Perplexed), Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s partial German translation of Bruno’s De la causa for arguing, without mentioning Spinoza, that Maimonides should have conceived God as material cause too, and accordingly as extended. See Maimon 1999, 98–100 and 261–268, especially at 261: “comparé à toutes les autres causes, Dieu est la cause ultime. Car si nous posons que Dieu qu’il soit exalté, est la forme et la fin sans qu’il soit la cause matérielle, il nous faudra envisager l’existence d’une matière éternelle, c’est-à-dire non causée. Or ceci contredirait au concept de Dieu, qu’il soit exalté, lui qui est la cause universelle de tous les existants. [...] Dieu, qu’il soit exalté, est, de tous les points de vue, la cause ultime. Eu égard à la complexité de la question, j’ai jugé bon de reproduire ici les propos du philosophe italien Jordan Bruno de Nola tirés de son livre sur la cause.”
- 80.
Grant 1981, 229.
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Granada, M.Á. (2018). Giordano Bruno’s Concept of Space: Cosmological and Theological Aspects. In: Bakker, F., Bellis, D., Palmerino, C. (eds) Space, Imagination and the Cosmos from Antiquity to the Early Modern Period. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 48. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02765-0_8
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