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Collingwood and the Philosophy of History: The Metaphilosophical Dimension

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Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology

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Abstract

In this chapter, Jonas Ahlskog examines R. G. Collingwood’s conception of the philosophy of history and its metaphilosophical import. Ahlskog shows that Collingwood’s philosophy of history is simultaneously both a descriptive metaphysics of history and an elucidation of the relation between historical and philosophical thought. As a descriptive metaphysics, Ahlskog argues that Collingwood’s account has an irreducible and underexplored role for contemporary issues in the philosophy of history. The metaphilosophical import of Collingwood’s philosophy of history is unpacked through an elaboration of Collingwood’s ideas about the historicity of human experience and understanding. In conclusion, Ahlskog argues that the metaphilosophical dimension of Collingwood’s philosophy of history is integrally connected with the concept of history as self-knowledge.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For Collingwood’s plans to write about the metaphilosophical dimension of the philosophy of history, see (PH: xix).

  2. 2.

    My general understanding of this topic is much indebted to the systematic accounts of Collingwood’s philosophy by scholars such as W. H. Dray, Giuseppina D’ Oro, Jan van der Dussen, Rex Martin, Heikki Saari, James Connelly and Louis Mink.

  3. 3.

    This is connected with Collingwood’s controversial claim that when we know what happened we also know why it happened. This claim is not as problematic as it is often made out to be. Problems arise only if we, erroneously, assume that Collingwood is claiming that any statement of ‘what’ is also always a sufficient answer to every ‘why’ question we may possibly pose.

  4. 4.

    In this sense, Collingwood introduces a technical concept of action (cf. D’Oro 2017: 220).

  5. 5.

    Giuseppina D’Oro has argued for this interpretation in (D’Oro 2002).

  6. 6.

    During the past decades, there are clear signs of a change away from narrativism. For a discussion, see (Ahlskog 2018).

  7. 7.

    A testimony to the contemporary vitality of narrativist philosophy of history is (Partner and Foot 2013).

  8. 8.

    This has lately been emphasized in (Kuukkanen 2015).

  9. 9.

    Arguably, narrativists and postnarrativists alike share this paradigmatic idea. Cf. (Roth 2016).

  10. 10.

    Arthur Danto introduced this concept in (Danto 1965).

  11. 11.

    For an extensive discussion of colligation using the example of ‘thaw’, see (Kuukkanen 2015: 97–130).

  12. 12.

    See also (PH: 223): “History means not re-thinking what has been thought before, but thinking of yourself as re-thinking it”.

  13. 13.

    For a discussion of such accusations, see (Dray 1995: 308–9).

  14. 14.

    Chris Lorenz has argued that these are the main themes in the theory of history since the 1990s (Lorenz 2011). For a discussion of Collingwood’s relevance for such themes, see (Ahlskog 2017).

  15. 15.

    This internal relation, however, is not finally understood until the development of scientific history based on re-enactment.

  16. 16.

    The Socratic spirit of Collingwood’s idea of philosophy is prevalent throughout his writings. For a particularly clear expression, see (IN: 59–60).

  17. 17.

    The enemy was what Collingwood called Realism (cf. A: 147–8).

  18. 18.

    There is no support for interpreting this as an argument for uncritical acceptance. As Collingwood writes, the acceptance should be in the spirit that Margaret Fuller expressed in saying “I accept the universe” (IH: 494–95).

  19. 19.

    I take this to follow from Collingwood’s idea of the logical efficacy of a question being dependent on a question-answer complex and absolute presuppositions. See (A: 37–9 and EM: 26–33).

  20. 20.

    Peter Winch later developed this conception of logic and reasoning (Winch 1972).

  21. 21.

    The following elaboration is indebted to Moran’s article.

  22. 22.

    This follows from the fact that knowledge is a two-way relation dependent on the clear understanding of both subject and object.

  23. 23.

    In this passage, Collingwood is alluding to and agreeing with Schiller.

  24. 24.

    The most well-known and penetrating discussion of these issues is to be found in Peter Winch’s work which is, in this respect, a direct continuation of Collingwood’s philosophy of history.

  25. 25.

    The continental equivalent of this is the contention that the They (das Man) permeates the human condition (cf. Guignon 2017).

  26. 26.

    A clear contrast is Michael Oakeshott’s constructivist philosophy in which the possibility of such discoveries is not clear. For an in-depth discussion of Collingwood’s idea of re-thinking the same thoughts, see (D’Oro 2000).

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Ahlskog, J. (2018). Collingwood and the Philosophy of History: The Metaphilosophical Dimension. In: Dharamsi, K., D'Oro, G., Leach, S. (eds) Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02432-1_9

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