Abstract
This chapter investigates the Chewa concept of truth through a reflection on the relation between statements and reality/facts. It argues that the Chewa people have a logical concept of truth, which is dependent on the relation between statements and reality, and the requirement of observation. It is argued that for a sentence to be true, it must correspond to facts, and there must be ontological commitment supporting this relation.
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Notes
- 1.
I am aware of the existence of different theories of truth, but my interest is on analytic philosophy . In fact, philosophy has for a long time been accompanied by five theories of truth namely, correspondence theory of truth, the coherence theory of truth, pragmatic theory of truth, semantic theory of truth and redundant theory of truth (Walker 2000, 309–330). For example, Coherence theory of truth has also been commonly promoted as it underlined the truth of a proposition as consisting in its coherence with other propositions.
- 2.
In analytic philosophy during the early days, philosophers of the Vienna Circle supported the idea of truth as correspondence to the facts. Different versions of this concept were developed by philosophers such as Schlick, Wittgenstein and Alfred Ayer.
- 3.
T represents truth.
- 4.
- 5.
See also (Oruka 1988).
- 6.
Some of his ideas will be incorporated in my development below.
- 7.
The opposite of truth is zonama or zabodza.
- 8.
Berkeley’s famous expression that captures this idea of existence as determined by seeing is, esse et percipi (to be is to be perceived).
- 9.
Another proverb on patience: Fisi akatola fupa sadyera pomwepo (When a Hyena gets a bone he will not eat it right there)-refers to the importance of patience in revealing what is true.
- 10.
As is well known this conception of knowledge was questioned by Gittier.
- 11.
Another proverb on deception is, Musamayese ndi masweswe, ndi dazi (Do not think it is a mere rim of hair, this is baldness).
- 12.
The story behind this proverb is that the individual in question thought that the presence of bees on flowers meant that there was also honey. This person did not understand properly about bees and honey making process. For truth to come about, the individual needs to see by himself not just depending on the information given by others. This is indicative of the fact there is a certain degree of mistrust towards information that is given from others.
- 13.
There is an interesting attitude in Malawi whereby individuals run towards any noise they hear so that they can see by themselves.
- 14.
This attitude is encouraging the fundamentality of doing research in order to come out with good results.
- 15.
Note that the notion above represents better the common idea of truth in this context although there are other concepts among the Chewa that represents the notion, ‘truth.’
- 16.
Note that they symbol ∧ is a conjunct joining C, E.
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Kayange, G.M. (2018). The Chewa Logical Concept of Truth. In: Meaning and Truth in African Philosophy. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 135. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01962-4_6
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