Abstract
We focus on the coalition formation in a supply chain network that consists of three layers of decision-makers, namely, suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers, with prices and shipments that evolve over time. We suppose that some partners in the chain vertically merge each other and act as one player to confront the other players that make their choices independently. In this model, the retailer is the dominant player and is a profit-maximizer. We present a non-cooperative approach to the coalitional game and provide the equilibrium conditions governing the model as well as an equivalent evolutionary variational inequality formulation.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Amoozad Mahdiraji, H., Govindan, K., Zavadskas, E.K., Razavi Hajiagha, S.H.: Coalition or decentralization: a game-theoretic analysis of a three-echelon supply chain network. J. Bus. Econ. Manag. 15(3), 460–485 (2014)
Bartolini, D.: Investment and merging as an endogenous coalition formation game. In: Discussion Paper n. 628, University of Essex (2011)
Daniele, P.: Evolutionary variational inequalities and applications to complex dynamic multi-level models. Transp. Res. Part E 46, 855–880 (2010)
Facchinei, F., Pang, J.S.: Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequalities and Complementarity Problems. Vols. I and II. Springer, New York (2003)
Jahn, J.: Introduction to the Theory of Nonlinear Optimization. Springer, Berlin (1996)
Lin, C.C., Hsieh, C.C.: A cooperative coalitional game in duopolistic supply-chain competition. Netw. Spat. Econ. 12(1), 129–146 (2012)
Maugeri, A., Raciti, F.: On existence theorems for monotone and nonmonotone variational inequalities. J. Convex Anal. 16(3–4), 899–911 (2009)
Nash, J.F.: Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 36, 48–49 (1950 )
Nash, J.F.: Non-cooperative games. Ann. Math. 54, 286–295 (1951)
Acknowledgements
The research was partially supported by the research project “Modelli Matematici nell’Insegnamento-Apprendimento della Matematica” DMI, University of Catania. This support is gratefully acknowledged.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Scrimali, L. (2018). Coalitional Games in Evolutionary Supply Chain Networks. In: Daniele, P., Scrimali, L. (eds) New Trends in Emerging Complex Real Life Problems. AIRO Springer Series, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00473-6_49
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00473-6_49
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-00472-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-00473-6
eBook Packages: Mathematics and StatisticsMathematics and Statistics (R0)