Abstract
This chapter is a study of the role moral habits (habitus) play both in determining the goals of our actions and in inclining us to actually accomplish these actions, according to Aquinas. Moral habitus are not “habits” in the usual sense (the Latin term for such habits would be consuetudo), inasmuch as they do not entail the automatic, unconscious act common habits seem to produce. Rather, they dispose the agent to a special type of action without relieving her/him of a deliberate decision regarding the purpose and concrete behaviour which correspond to the proper objective of the habitus in question. In a concrete action situation, the moral habitus primarily and essentially affects (a) the content of the judgement about the specific goal of the action and (b) the mode of this judgement. Under the influence of the habitus, the judgement about the goal determines the special type of action the moral habitus is ordered to as its proper and immediate goal, as the target to be pursued in the action simpliciter and for its own sake. This judgement does not result from rational deliberation (per modum cognitionis) but is given spontaneously or intuitively per modum inclinationis.
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Notes
- 1.
Napier (2017).
- 2.
Ibid. 31.
- 3.
Ibid. 52, 70–71.
- 4.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, cap. 7: 1114 a 32–b 1.
- 5.
ST I-II, q. 58, art. 5, corp.; ST II-II, q. 8, art. 6, corp.; ST II-II, q. 24, art. 11, corp.; cf. Napier (2017, 48–49, 52–53).
- 6.
Napier (2017, 62).
- 7.
Ibid. 69.
- 8.
Cf. note 3.
- 9.
Ibid. 64–65: “Chess masters are estimated to have 50,000–100,000 meaningful board arrangements memorized. These meaningful arrangements may be called schemas [sic]. A schema is any mental representation of a category or concept , however abstract . In this case, chess masters have numerous schemas representing various meaningful patterns. When they see such patterns, they are able to recall them with much more facility than novices.” – Ibid. 65: “Having numerous schemas of meaningful patterns allows the master to recognize important moves without resorting to ‘look-ahead’ search processing.”
- 10.
Ibid. 71: “One might explore further analogs, namely analogs […] between being virtuous and having a deep and comprehensive schema system.”
- 11.
Here, I leave out the gifts of the Holy Spirit; Aquinas’s explanation of their effects on the human intellect is based on a complex of theological assumptions which calls for another approach.
- 12.
Ibid. 69.
- 13.
ST I-II, q. 58, art. 4, corp.: “ut homo recte accipiat ea quae sunt ad finem: et hoc non potest esse nisi per rationem recte consiliantem, judicantem et praecipientem; quod pertinet ad prudentiam. […] prudentia, quae est recta ratio agibilium.” For Aquinas’s general account of prudence see Keenan (2002), McKay (2005), Hoffmann (2013).
- 14.
Napier (2017, 51).
- 15.
ST I-II, q. 58, art. 5, corp.: “[...] recte judicare de fine. Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem.”
- 16.
ST I-II, q. 58, art. 5, ad 1: “Ratio secundum quod est apprehensiva finis praecedit appetitum finis: sed appetitus finis praecedit rationem ratiocinantem ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam.”
- 17.
Tallon (1997, 225): “Connaturality most properly, in its best sense, means not merely accompanied by feelings, nor of feelings, but through feelings.”
- 18.
Ibid. 225: “Thus knowledge by connaturality, in Aquinas’s example [ST II-II, q. 45, art. 2; cf. ibid. 201 sq.] usually means a nonconceptual judgement where connaturality replaces concepts ; we are then said to make ethical judgements by feeling, which means [...] by affective connaturality.” – Ibid. 270: “Habit structurally installs between nature and act, sinks roots into nature, connaturalizing the nature to the acts that form the habit. Connaturality is thus a name for how a nature tends to perfect its ability to act, for example, performing in fewer operations, more easily, enjoyably, spontaneously, immediately, directly; less discursive thought and rational will (deliberation and choice) are needed.”
- 19.
Ibid. 265.
- 20.
Ibid. 267.
- 21.
Ibid. 269.
- 22.
Ibid. 229.
- 23.
Ibid. 261.
- 24.
Ibid. 241.
- 25.
Ibid. 201, 230–231, 249.
- 26.
Ibid. 236–241.
- 27.
Ibid. 254–258.
- 28.
ST I-II, q. 58, art. 4 corp.: “moralis virtue est habitus electivus [cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, cap. 6, 1106 b 36–1107 a 1], idest faciens bonam electionem.”
- 29.
Ibid. “Ad hoc autem quod electio sit bona [... requiritur] quod homo recte accipiat ea quae sunt ad finem: et hoc non potest esse nisi per rationem recte consiliantem, judicantem et praecipientem.”
- 30.
- 31.
Cf. ST I-II, q. 49, art. 4, corp. and art. 3, corp. This concept appears for the first time in the systematic doctrine of habitus in ST I-II. Cf. Darge (1996, 15–30). Unless otherwise specified, all primary texts cited are by Aquinas.
- 32.
ST I-II, q. 49, art. 3, ad 2: “Non est de ratione habitus quod respiciat potentiam, sed quod respiciat naturam.”
- 33.
ST I-II, q. 82, art. 1, corp.: “Dicendum quod […] duplex est habitus. Unus quidem quo inclinatur potentia ad agendum sicut scientia et virtus dicuntur habitus. […] Alio modo dicitur habitus dispositio alicuius naturae, ex multis compositae, secundum quod bene se habet vel male ad aliquid; et, praecipue cum talis dispositio fuerit quasi in naturam versa ut patet de aegritudine et sanitate.” Cf. De Roton (1934, 157), Bourke (1942, 373), Darge (1996, 29).
- 34.
ST I-II, q. 71, art. 4, corp.: “Habitus in anima non ex necessitate producit suam operationem, sed homo utitur eo cum voluerit. Unde simul habitu in homine existente, potest non uti habitu, aut agere contrarium actum.”
- 35.
Concerning the moral habitus or “habitus of choice ” see in this volume: Boulnois’ contribution, p. 25–45.
- 36.
- 37.
ST I-II, q. 15, art. 3 corp.: “In ordine autem agibilium primo quidem oportet sumere apprehensionem finis; deinde appetitum finis; deinde consilium de his quae sunt ad finem; deinde appetitum eorum quae sunt ad finem.”
- 38.
The most important texts are the following: ST I-II, q. 56, art. 3, corp.; q. 57, art. 4, corp.; q. 58, art. 5, corp.; q. 65, art. 1, corp.; q. 65, art. 1, ad 4; ST II-II, q. 47, art. 13, ad 2; q. 51, art. 3, ad 1; Quodl. XII, q. 15, art. un., corp.; De virtutibus cardinalibus, art. 2, corp.
- 39.
Aristotle, NE 6.5, 1140b17–20; 6.13, 1144a8–9, a23–36; 7.9, 1151a15–28.
- 40.
In decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio (In Ethic.), lib. 6, lect. 4, n. 1170; lect. 10, nn. 1273–1274; lib. 7, lect. 8, nn. 1430–1433.
- 41.
ST I-II, q. 58, art. 5, corp.: “Respondeo dicendum quod aliae virtutes intellectuales sine virtute morali esse possunt, sed prudentia sine virtute morali esse non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium; non autem solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari, in quibus sunt actiones. Recta autem ratio praeexigit principia ex quibus ratio procedit. Oportet autem rationem circa particularia procedere non solum ex principiis universalibus, sed etiam ex principiis particularibus. Circa principia quidem universalia agibilium, homo recte se habet per naturalem intellectum principiorum, per quem homo cognoscit quod nullum malum est agendum; vel etiam per aliquam scientiam practicam. Sed hoc non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum circa particularia. Contingit enim quandoque quod huiusmodi universale principium cognitum per intellectum vel scientiam, corrumpitur in particulari per aliquam passionem, sicut concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis. Et ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia universalia, per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae; ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte iudicare de fine. Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, virtuosus enim recte iudicat de fine virtutis, quia qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo ad rectam rationem agibilium, quae est prudentia, requiritur quod homo habeat virtutem moralem.”
- 42.
- 43.
See ST I-II, q. 57, art. 4, corp.; q. 58, art. 3, ad 1.
- 44.
See ST I-II, q. 57, art. 4, ad 3: “Prudentia est bene consiliativa de his quae pertinent ad totam vitam hominis, et ad ultimum finem humanae vitae.”
- 45.
ST I-II, q. 58, art. 5, corp.: “Circa principia quidem universalia agibilium, homo recte se habet per naturalem intellectum principiorum, per quem homo cognoscit quod nullum malum est agendum; vel etiam per aliquam scientiam practicam.”
- 46.
ST I-II, q. 58, art. 5, corp.: “Sicut concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis.”
- 47.
ST I-II, q. 58, art. 5, corp.: “Et ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia universalia per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae; ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte iudicare de fine. Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, virtuosus enim recte iudicat de fine virtutis, quia qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo ad rectam rationem agibilium, quae est prudentia, requiritur quod homo habeat virtutem moralem.” The sentence is quoted from Aristotle, NE 3.7, 1114a32–b19. In his anthropological and ethical investigations Aquinas uses it regularly as a principle; see also De veritate, q. 24, art. 1, obj. 19 and ad 19; ST I-II, q. 10, art. 3, obj. 2 and ad 2; In Ethic., lib. 3, lect. 13, n. 510; De virtutibus cardinalibus, art. 2, corp.; De malo q. 6, art. un., corp. For its meaning according to Aristotle, see Gauthier and Jolif (2002, 215) and Müller (1982, 226–230).
- 48.
McInerny (1988, 140).
- 49.
Ibid., 142: “It is precisely this connaturality which is characteristic of appetite that makes the prudential judgement , which depends upon appetite, a judgement by connaturality or inclination . […] The judgement through connaturality [...] is such because of a special dependence on appetite.”
- 50.
Cf. ST I-II, q. 18, art. 3, corp.: “Plenitudo bonitatis eius [i. e. actionis] non tota consistit in sua specie, sed aliquid additur ex his quae adveniunt tanquam accidentia quaedam. Et huiusmodi sunt circumstantiae debitae.” – ibid. art. 4, corp.: “Actiones [...] humanae et alia quorum bonitas dependet ab alio, habent rationem bonitatis ex fine a quo dependent, praeter bonitatem absolutam quae in eis existit. Sic igitur in actione humana bonitas quadruplex considerari potest. Una quidem secundum genus [...]. Alia vero secundum speciem [...]. Tertia secundum circumstantias, quasi secundum accidentia quaedam. Quarta autem secundum finem, quasi secundum habitudinem ad causam bonitatis.” – ibid. ad 2: “Quamvis finis sit causa extrinseca, tamen debita proportio ad finem et relatio in ipsum, inhaeret actioni.” – ibid. ad 6: “actus humani species formaliter consideratur secundum finem.”
- 51.
Ibid. ad 1: “tanquam accidentia quaedam”.
- 52.
ST I-II, q. 58, art. 5, corp. (see note 47): “principia particularia agibilium, quae sunt fines.”
- 53.
Ibid. ad 1:“appetitus finis praecedit rationem ratiocinantem ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam.”
- 54.
See below Sect. 8.6.
- 55.
Cf. ST I-II, q. 14, art. 6, corp.: “Huiusmodi autem principia quae in inquisitione consilii supponuntur sunt quaecumque sunt per sensum accepta.”
- 56.
Cf. ST I-II, q. 14, art. 6, corp.: “ex ipso genere operabilium.”
- 57.
Cf. ST I-II, q. 14, art. 1, ad 1: “In consilio, quod est actus rationis, apparet aliquid voluntatis: […] sicut motivum, quia ex hoc quod homo vult finem, movetur ad consilium de his quae sunt ad finem.” q. 12, art. 1, corp.: “Intentio proprie est actus voluntatis.” q. 12, art. 1, ad 4: “intentio est actus voluntatis respectu finis.” q. 12, art. 4, ad 3: “Motus autem voluntatis qui fertur in finem, secundum quod acquiritur per ea quae sunt ad finem, vocatur intentio.”
- 58.
ST I-II, q. 77, art. 1 corp.: “Per quandam distractionem, quando motus appetitus sensitivi fortificatur secundum quamcumque passionem, necesse est quod remittatur vel totaliter impediatur motus proprius appetitus rationalis , qui est voluntas.”
- 59.
Cf. ST I-II, q. 50, art. 5; q. 56, art. 6; and De virtutibus in communi, art. 5.
- 60.
Cf. ST I-II, q. 77, art. 2 corp.: “Nihil prohibet aliquid sciri in habitu, quod tamen actu non consideratur.”
- 61.
Cf. ST I-II, q. 77, art. 1, corp.: “Manifestum est autem passionem appetitus sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio et iudicium aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur iudicium gustus. Unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes, non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur. Unde per consequens, iudicium rationis plerumque sequitur passionem appetitus sensitivi; et per consequens motus voluntatis, qui natus est semper sequi iudicium rationis.” Cf. ibid., ad 1.
- 62.
- 63.
ST I-II, q. 77, art. 2, ad 4: “Ille qui habet scientiam in universali propter passionem impeditur ne possit sub illa universali sumere et ad conclusionem pervenire; sed assumit sub alia universali, quam suggerit inclinatio passionis, et sub ea concludit. Unde Philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., quod syllogismus incontinentis habet quatuor propositiones; duas universales: quarum una est rationis, puta nullam fornicationem esse committandam; alia est passionis, puta delectationem esse sectandam. Passio igitur ligat rationem ne assumat et concludat sub prima; unde ea durante, assumit et concludit sub secunda.” For the syllogism of the incontinent agent see Pickavé (2013).
- 64.
Cf. notes 41 and 47 above.
- 65.
ST I-II, q. 20, art. 3, ad 2: “Virtutes morales ordinantur ad ipsos actus virtutum, qui sunt quasi fines.”
- 66.
ST I-II, q. 88, art. 3, corp.: “Unicuique habenti habitum, inquantum huiusmodi, finis est operatio secundum habitum.”
- 67.
In Ethic., lib. 3, lect. 15, n. 549: “Finis virtutis operantis […] proximus et proprius est quod similitudo habitus existit in actu.”
- 68.
Cf. ST I-II, q. 58, art. 2 corp.: “Virtuosus […] recte iudicat de fine virtutis.”
- 69.
In Ethic., lib. 3, lect. 15, n. 550: “Et hoc est quod dicit, quod bonum quod intendit fortis, est fortitudo. Non quidem habitus fortitudinis qui iam praeexistit, sed similitudo ipsius in actu. Et hoc etiam est finis, quia unumquodque quod est propter finem determinatur in propria ratione secundum proprium finem quia ex fine sumitur ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo finis fortitudinis est aliquid ad rationem fortitudinis pertinens. Sic igitur fortis sustinet et operatur gratia boni. Et hoc est inquantum intendit operari ea quae sunt secundum fortitudinem.”
- 70.
ST II-II, q. 123, art. 7: “Utrum fortis operetur propter bonum proprii habitus.”
- 71.
ST II-II, q. 123, art. 7, corp.: “Sic ergo dicendum est quod fortis sicut finem proximum intendit ut similitudinem sui habitus exprimat in actu, intendit enim agere secundum convenientiam sui habitus. Finis autem remotus est beatitudo, vel Deus.”
- 72.
See ST II-II, q. 145, art. 1, ad 1: “Eorum quae propter se appetuntur, quaedam appetuntur solum propter se, et nunquam propter aliud, sicut felicitas, quae est ultimus finis. Quaedam vero appetuntur et propter se, inquantum habent in seipsis aliquam rationem bonitatis, etiam si nihil aliud boni per ea nobis accideret, et tamen sunt appetibilia propter aliud, inquantum scilicet perducunt nos in aliquod bonum perfectius. Et hoc modo virtutes sunt propter se appetendae.”
- 73.
In Ethic., lib. 3, lect. 13, n. 517: “Potest aliquid apparere bonum alicui quasi practica cognitione per comparationem ad opus […] quod [iudicium] quidem potest super aliquo ferri, quod sit bonum, dupliciter. Uno modo ut aliquid videatur alicui simpliciter et secundum se bonum; et hoc videtur bonum secundum rationem finis. Alio autem modo ut videatur aliquid alicui bonum non simpliciter et secundum se, sed prout nunc.”
- 74.
In Ethic., lib. 3, lect. 13, n. 520: “Iudicium quo homo iudicat aliquid esse bonum ut secundum se et simpliciter provenit ex inclinatione habitus.”
- 75.
Cf. above, note 41.
- 76.
Cf. ST I-II, q. 94, art. 2, corp.: “Omnia illa, ad quae homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona [sc. humana; cf. the context] et per consequens ut opere prosequenda.”
- 77.
In Ethic., lib. 3, lect. 13, n. 520: “Iudicium, quo homo iudicat aliquid esse bonum secundum se et simpliciter, provenit ex inclinatione habitus.”
- 78.
Cf. ST I, q. 1, art. 6, ad 3: “Contingit enim aliquem iudicare, uno modo per modum inclinationis, sicut qui habet habitum virtutis, recte iudicat de his quae sunt secundum virtutem agenda, inquantum ad illa inclinatur, unde et in X Ethic. dicitur quod virtuosus est mensura et regula actuum humanorum. Alio modo, per modum cognitionis, sicut aliquis instructus in scientia morali, posset iudicare de actibus virtutis, etiam si virtutem non haberet.”
- 79.
Cf. ST II-II, q. 45, art. 2. The question is whether the gift of wisdom is in the intellect as its subject.
- 80.
Cf. ST II-II, q. 45, art. 2, corp.: “Rectitudo autem iudicii potest contingere dupliciter, uno modo, secundum perfectum usum rationis; alio modo, propter connaturalitatem quandam ad ea de quibus iam est iudicandum.”
- 81.
ST II-II, q. 45, art. 2, corp.: “Sicut de his quae ad castitatem pertinent per rationis inquisitionem recte iudicat ille qui didicit scientiam moralem, sed per quandam connaturalitatem ad ipsa recte iudicat de eis ille qui habet habitum castitatis.”
- 82.
For a more detailed analysis of Aquinas’s doctrine of the virtuous person’s judgement on the basis of connaturality or per modum inclinationis see Caldera (1980, 59-135), McInerny (1988, 138–142). In this volume Olivier Boulnois focuses on the interrelationship between habitus, nature and inclination; see Boulnois p. 25–45.
- 83.
Cf. De veritate q. 24, art. 10, corp.: “Secundum est inclinatio habitus: qui quidem cum sit quasi quaedam natura habentis […]”; and ST I-II, q. 78, art. 2 corp.: “Unicuique habenti habitum est per se diligibile id quod est ei conveniens secundum proprium habitum: quia sic fit ei quodammodo connaturale, secundum quod consuetudo et habitus vertitur in naturam.”
- 84.
Cf. Napier (2017, 52, 70–71; see the introduction above). It may well be that it is the analogy with respect to technical expertise (chess expertise, radiology expertise etc.) which induces Napier to interpret the end apprehended by the “moral expert” (ibid. 69) as an external good – a “good in his environment”; for technical expertise – “ratio recta aliquorum operum faciendorum” (ST I-II, q. 57, art. 3, corp.) – aims at a product outside of the acting person, a “work” (opus). However according to Aquinas the end of moral virtue is not a “work” but a mode of “doing” (agere) abiding in the agent: ST I-II, q. 57, art. 4, corp.: “factio est actus transiens in exteriorem materiam [...]; agere autem est actus permenans in ipso agente.”
- 85.
Cf. ST I-II, q. 58, art. 5, ad 1: “Ratio, secundum quod est apprehensiva finis, praecedit appetitum finis. Sed appetitus finis praecedit rationem ratiocinantem ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem: quod pertinet ad prudentiam.”
- 86.
See my introduction above.
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Darge, R. (2018). “As One Is Disposed, So the Goal Appears to Him”: On the Function of Moral Habits (habitus) According to Thomas Aquinas. In: Faucher, N., Roques, M. (eds) The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_8
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