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Part of the book series: Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action ((HSNA,volume 7))

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Abstract

This paper presents John Buridan’s nominalist ontology of habits, as the acquired qualities of innate powers aiding or hampering their operations, against the background of a more traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine to be found in Boethius, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Cajetan. The paper argues that considerations of his late question commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics may have forced Buridan to rethink some of his earlier arguments for his parsimonious nominalist ontology of powers endorsed in such earlier works as his Questions on Aristotle’s Categories and De anima. The lesson to be drawn from this investigation seems to be that upon working out the details of a nominalist programme in such fields as moral psychology and ethics, the requisite refinements sooner or later will involve such modifications of an originally “radical” programme that would bring it closer to what used to be the “mainstream” view. Even so, this much seems enough further down the line to change significantly how issues are framed relative to the “mainstream” view as well.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Thomas Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 50, art. 1.

  2. 2.

    Cajetan , Commentaria in Praedicamenta (ed. Laurent, 145–146).

  3. 3.

    Boethius , In Categorias, lib. 3 (PL 64: 24T). Albert the Great , De Praedicamentis, tract. 5, c. 2 (Opera Omnia 1: 246–248).

  4. 4.

    Thomas Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 49, art. 2, ad 3: “Dispositio autem dupliciter accipitur, uno modo, secundum quod est genus habitus , nam in V Metaphys. dispositio ponitur in definitione habitus; alio modo, secundum quod est aliquid contra habitum divisum.”

  5. 5.

    Cajetan , Commentaria in Praedicamenta (ed. Laurent, 149).

  6. 6.

    Thomas Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 49, art. 2, ad 3.

  7. 7.

    Thomas Aquinas, In Symbolum Apostolorum, prooemium: “Cognitio nostra est adeo debilis quod nullus philosophus potuit unquam perfecte investigare naturam unius muscae.”

  8. 8.

    Thomas Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 49, art. 3, corp.: “Respondeo dicendum quod habere ordinem ad actum potest competere habitui et secundum rationem habitus; et secundum rationem subiecti in quo est habitus. Secundum quidem rationem habitus, convenit omni habitui aliquo modo habere ordinem ad actum. Est enim de ratione habitus ut importet habitudinem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, secundum quod convenit vel non convenit. Sed natura rei, quae est finis generationis, ulterius etiam ordinatur ad alium finem, qui vel est operatio, vel aliquod operatum, ad quod quis pervenit per operationem. Unde habitus non solum importat ordinem ad ipsam naturam rei, sed etiam consequenter ad operationem, inquantum est finis naturae, vel perducens ad finem. Unde et in V Metaphys. dicitur in definitione habitus, quod est dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum aut secundum se, idest secundum suam naturam, aut ad aliud, idest in ordine ad finem.”

  9. 9.

    Thomas Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 49, art. 3, corp.: “Sed sunt quidam habitus qui etiam ex parte subiecti in quo sunt, primo et principaliter important ordinem ad actum. Quia ut dictum est, habitus primo et per se importat habitudinem ad naturam rei. Si igitur natura rei in qua est habitus, consistat in ipso ordine ad actum, sequitur quod habitus principaliter importet ordinem ad actum. Manifestum est autem quod natura et ratio potentiae est ut sit principium actus. Unde omnis habitus qui est alicuius potentiae ut subiecti, principaliter importat ordinem ad actum.”

  10. 10.

    Thomas Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 56, art. 1, ad 3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod unum accidens dicitur esse in alio sicut in subiecto, non quia accidens per seipsum possit sustentare aliud accidens, sed quia unum accidens inhaeret substantiae mediante alio accidente, ut color corpori mediante superficie; unde superficies dicitur esse subiectum coloris. Et eo modo potentia animae dicitur esse subiectum virtutis.”

  11. 11.

    John Buridan, Q. In Praed. (ed. Schneider, 129) : “auctor Sex principiorum et omnes eius sequaces deturpaverunt philosophiam Aristotelis et veram scientiam auctorizantes, quod nulla nomina abstracta diversorum praedicamentorum supponunt pro eisdem rebus.” Ibid. (149): “horum ignorantia duxit multos in maximos errores, sicut apparet per librum Sex principiorum.” Cf. In Phys. 3, q. 13 (1509, fol. 55vb): “Ad auctoritatem auctoris Sex principiorum dico quod, ut mihi videtur, melius fuisset quod numquam illum librum fecisset”.

  12. 12.

    John Buridan, Q. In Praed., q. 18 (ed. Schneider, 145) : “Talia enim mihi apparent satis fortia ad interficiendum canes, et capti in eis non plus possunt evadere quam ex reti pisces.”

  13. 13.

    John Buridan, Quaestiones in Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea, Prol. (1489, fol. 2ra–b).

  14. 14.

    For more detailed, systematic comparisons of the relevant features of realist and nominalist semantics, see Klima (1999a, 2011a).

  15. 15.

    For more on the medieval metaphysics of relations see Henninger (1989).

  16. 16.

    For this conception of a more “laid-back” nominalism , see Klima (2012).

  17. 17.

    John Buridan, Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima (QDA), lib. 3, q. 11.

  18. 18.

    For a detailed account of Buridan’s elimination of shape as a distinct ontological category , see Klima (1999b).

  19. 19.

    Thomas Aquinas, Q. disp. de anima, art. 21, arg. 11: “Deus non potest facere quod contradictoria sint simul vera. Hoc autem sequeretur, si subtraheretur alicui quod est de essentia eius. Puta, si homo non esset rationalis, sequeretur quod esset simul homo et non homo. Ergo Deus non potest facere quod aliqua res careat eo quod est ei essentiale.” Cf. De spiritualibus creaturis, art. 11, ad 7: “Non enim potest intelligi quod homo non sit risibilis, vel triangulus non habeat tres angulos aequales duobus rectis: hic enim est repugnantia intellectuum, quia oppositum praedicati dependet ex natura subiecti.”

  20. 20.

    Thomas Aquinas, Q. disp. de anima, art. 12, s.c. 1. “Sed contra. Sicut se habet essentia ad esse, ita posse ad agere. Ergo permutatim, sicut se habent esse et agere ad invicem, ita se habent potentia et essentia. Sed in solo Deo idem est esse et agere. Ergo in solo Deo idem est potentia et essentia. Anima ergo non est suae potentiae.” In case the notation inserted into the translation is not self-explanatory, the algebraic proportions included in the parentheses inserted in the text are devised merely to indicate how one can get the second from the first “by permutation”, as Aquinas says. Given s/x = p/a (essence is to existence as power is to action), if you multiply the equation by a (action) and divide it by s (essence), you get a/x = p/s (action is to existence, as power is to essence). But then, since action and existence are the same only in God (for all creatures can exist without being active; they are not “always on” just because they exist, so to speak); therefore, powers and essence are the same only in God as well. Ergo, power and essence are distinct in everything other than God, that is, in all creatures; and so, in the soul, too.

  21. 21.

    John Buridan, QDA, lib. 2, q. 5, ad 3, n. 23.

  22. 22.

    John Buridan, QDA, lib. 2, q. 5, in opp. 3, n. 14.

  23. 23.

    John Buridan, Quaestiones in Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea, lib. 1, q. 22 (1489, fol. 26ra-27va).

  24. 24.

    For more discussion of the issues mentioned here, see Klima (2011b).

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Klima, G. (2018). The Metaphysics of Habits in Buridan. In: Faucher, N., Roques, M. (eds) The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_17

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