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Scientific Results and the Mind-Brain Issue: Some Afterthoughts

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Abstract

Rereading the transcript of the preceding “Conversation among Philosophers and Scientists” left me feeling unsatisfied or, rather, unfulfilled. It was not so much the old familiar feeling that, I suppose, most of us in the academic game have had more than once—the feeling that, “When he said so and so, I should have said such and such. That would have been a good lick!” On the contrary, it left me with the impression that all of us, including even me, did pretty well—pretty well, that is, given the material that we had and had had before us at the conference. My regret was that, in view of the interest in the matter and its crucial importance, we had not had more formal presentations on the relevance of scientific knowledge for the mind-brain issue.

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Maxwell, G. (1976). Scientific Results and the Mind-Brain Issue: Some Afterthoughts. In: Globus, G.G., Maxwell, G., Savodnik, I. (eds) Consciousness and the Brain. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2196-5_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2196-5_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4684-2198-9

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