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Design and Verification of Microprocessor Systems for High-Assurance Applications pp 323–339Cite as

Refinement in the Formal Verification of the seL4 Microkernel

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Abstract

We present an overview of the different refinement frameworks used in the L4.verified project to formally prove the functional correctness of the seL4 microkernel. The verification is conducted in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL and proceeds in two large refinement steps: one proof between two monadic, functional specifications in HOL and one proof between such a monadic specification and a C program. To connect these proofs into one overall theorem, we map both refinement statements into a common overall framework.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. NICTA, Sydney, NSW, Australia

    Gerwin Klein

Authors
  1. Gerwin Klein
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  2. Thomas Sewell
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  3. Simon Winwood
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Gerwin Klein .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Rockwell Collins, Inc., Collins Road NE., 400, Cedar Rapids, 52498, USA

    David S. Hardin

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Klein, G., Sewell, T., Winwood, S. (2010). Refinement in the Formal Verification of the seL4 Microkernel. In: Hardin, D. (eds) Design and Verification of Microprocessor Systems for High-Assurance Applications. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1539-9_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1539-9_11

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  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-1538-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4419-1539-9

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