Abstract
The development of argumentation theories in the contemporary epistemological space is shortly outlined and the pragma-dialectical approach is, in particular, considered for its focus on the theoretical kernel of the discipline and for systematically eliciting, from this, the connected methodological implications. The key notion of argument is specified by comparing it to the apparently near notion of demonstrative proof. Analogies (discursiveness, inferentiality, procedurality, critical approach) and differences (things that could also be in a different way, pragmaticity, use of ordinary language, implicitness) are brought to light, and the rather fuzzy but challenging and fundamental notion of reasonableness is identified as denoting the main value at stake in argumentative interactions. The authors propose a model of argumentative intervention in which argumentation is conceived as a particular type of communicative interaction. The model aims both at producing and at analyzing/evaluating argumentative interventions. Three core aspects of the argumentative intervention are highlighted in the model: the social context of communicative interaction, both in its institutionalized and in its interpersonal components, which is seen as the environment of argumentative activities; the inferential structure of argumentation, in its dialectical and relational components; and the quality of argumentation (distinguishing sound and manipulative argumentative moves). The fundamental claim is that assuring the quality of argumentation implies contributing to a healthy social consensus and promoting cultural development, at the individual and collective levels.
We are indebted to Joëlle Stoudmann for the very accurate and competent language revision.
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Notes
- 1.
Since the argument is considered to be the central and substantial element of the discourse, the element on which the whole discourse is based, in the case of narrative texts, “argument” is used to indicate the story, understood as the kernel of a narrative text.
- 2.
For an explanation of the role of lógos in communication, see Rigotti and Cigada (2004), in particular chapter IV. In his moral tractate De officiis, I, 50 Cicero proposes a nice hendiadys (ratio et oratio, “reason and discourse”) for rendering in Latin the complexity of the Greek word (see Winterbottom 1994).
- 3.
The Latin language indicated a bookkeeper by using the expression a rationibus (in charge of accounts).
- 4.
In this volume, Baker shows the relevance of argumentative interaction in the process of social construction of knowledge. In particular, the paper explores the resolution of the so-called “interlocutionary problems,” i.e. of “problems that are embedded in social practices […] that may be both formulated and solved in language exchanged in interaction.” Andriessen, in this volume, describes an educational activity designed for enhancing university students’ understanding of scientific texts, through the use of graphical tools aimed at supporting argumentation. By discussing the strengths and weaknesses of such an activity, Andriessen shows the importance of a well-thought argumentative design.
- 5.
In the first lines of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, pistis, as trustworthiness, created in the process of argumentation, is defined as a sort of proof.
- 6.
Toulmin’s model was presented in the book “The uses of argument,” published in 1958.
- 7.
For a more detailed account of the notions of communicative inference and communicated inference, see Rocci (2006), in particular pp. 418–424.
- 8.
It is worth quoting here the whole passage by Aristotle (Topica I, see Ross 1958): “It is useful to have examined the number of meanings of a term both for clearness’ sake (for a man is more likely to know what it is he asserts, if it has been made clear to him how many meanings it may have), and also with a view to ensuring that our reasoning shall be in accordance with the actual facts and not addressed merely to the term used. For as long as it is not clear in how many senses a term is used, it is possible that the answerer and the questioner are not directing their minds upon the same thing: whereas when once it has been made clear how many meanings there are, and also upon which of them the former directs his mind when he makes his assertion, the questioner would then look ridiculous if he failed to address his argument to this.”
- 9.
During the Middle Ages an example was suggested, which underlines the difficulties that can emerge from the semantic ambiguity of the terms used in argumentation: “A: Quidquid currit habet pedes; B: Sequana currit; C: Ergo, Sequana habet pedes.” A functional translation of this example into English could be: “A: Everything that runs has legs; B: The engine runs; C: The engine has legs.” But there are also more ‘updated’ examples, like the following: “A: In order to read one needs eyes; B: My computer has read the file you sent me; C: My computer has eyes.” Of course, these examples may appear quite trivial, and being misled by them seems unlikely. However, we might think of cases in which semantic ambiguity has really caused misunderstandings in various contexts. For instance, the democratic system of Switzerland nowadays has a structure very different from the one that the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR) had until 1989… And, nonetheless, both systems claim or claimed to be democratic.
- 10.
Aristotle speaks, in this connection, of “things that could also be in a different way” (see Ross 1959).
- 11.
The term krités (eng. decision maker) derives from the Greek verb kríno, which literally means “sieving.” The krités is the person that sieves a discourse, extracting the truth it contains, and evaluating it in order to make a decision.
- 12.
By this, we do not want to underestimate the importance and the specificity of individual reasoning, which should in any case be distinguished from proper argumentation. This latter involves the subject’s public assumption of a standpoint and, thus, of a commitment in front of an audience.
- 13.
Properly, from a formal point of view, the inferential procedure applied corresponds to a very fallacy, based on a wrong construction of the syllogistic reasoning named secundum consequens. This procedure can however prove that the invoked cause is a possible cause of the considered fact, and so it acts as a possible hypothesis. As a matter of fact, a particular version of this procedure plays a fundamental role in the scientific method.
- 14.
By the way, it is also worth mentioning the empirical studies conducted by van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels, who have tested the pragma-dialectical notion of reasonableness by analysing the perception of bad (fallacious) argumentative moves in everyday arguers (some of the results are outlined in van Eemeren et al. 2003). It emerges from these studies that moves that are considered fallacious in argumentation theory are also mostly perceived as unreasonable by ordinary arguers.
- 15.
As we shall see, an argument is a complex construct consisting of a dialectical component, largely “universal,” and of an endoxical component, strictly bound to the contextual culture.
- 16.
The challenging text by Walter Demel (1992) titled “How the Chinese became yellow” (Wie die Chinesen gelb wurden) interestingly points at how an unessential and even questionable feature of human beings (the colour of their skin) was “discovered” and transformed into a distinguishing feature at a certain time in history by the emerging racist ideologies.
- 17.
Douglas Walton and Eric Krabbe have explored this topic in their well-known volume “Commitment in Dialogue” (1995).
- 18.
Cicero (de Officiis I, 50, see Winterbottom 1994) had already noticed that the possibility of engaging in argumentative discussions distinguishes human beings from beasts, which can only rely on strength (violence): “Eius (humanae societatis) autem vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, iudicando conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate, neque ulla re longius absumus a natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam, aequitatem, bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis expertes.” We can propose the following translation: “And the tie of human social life is constituted by reason and discourse, which create consensus and unite human beings in a sort of natural society by teaching, learning, communicating, critically discussing and making common decisions. And nothing else distinguishes us more clearly from the nature of beasts, in which we say, for instance, that there is a certain force, as there is for horses or lions; but we do not say that there is any justice, fairness, or goodness, because they lack reason and discourse.”
- 19.
Within the Pragma-dialectical approach, reasonableness is one of the philosophical bases of argumentative analysis: “Providing an illuminating analysis of what may count as reasonable argumentation is probably the most general goal all argumentation theorists have in common” (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002b). These authors start by criticizing two notions of reasonableness that seem inappropriate for the field of argumentation: (1) The first way of understanding reasonableness is defined as geometrical view and presents argumentation as a process of proof, analogous to geometrical proofs. This perspective does not tolerate differences between argumentation and proof: “The geometrical view of argumentation is an integral part of the demonstrative tradition, which is, in fact, anti-argumentative.” (2) The second perspective, defined as the anthropologic-relativistic perspective, considers rationality and reasonableness as concepts linked to culture, therefore relative. A set of implications are generated from this position, which are difficult to accept: what is rational or reasonable for someone could not be the same for another; rationality and reasonableness change in time, and we cannot define argumentation as “rational” or “reasonable” per se, because everything depends on the culture it refers to and on the historical moment. From this point of view, argumentation, which is by definition a “rational instrument for convincing other people,” loses its value: if it is not possible to agree on what is reasonable, argumentation is useless. The perspective put forward by van Eemeren and Grootendorst is defined as critical perspective. According to this approach, reasonableness can be reached through critical discussion, namely in the argumentative practice in which the interlocutors try to examine a certain thesis: “This critical perspective focuses pre-eminently on discussion; it encourages the systematic submission of the one party’s standpoints to the other party’s critical doubts. In this way, an explicit argumentation is elicited. This, in turn, can be called into question until the difference of opinion is resolved in a manner that is acceptable to the parties involved. In this perspective, all argumentation is regarded as part of a critical discussion between parties that are prepared to abide by an agreed discussion procedure.” Therefore, reasonableness is guaranteed by two factors: (a) The intersubjective validity, namely the acceptance of the argumentation by the participants to the critical discussion; (b) The problem validity, namely the adequacy of the argumentation with respect to the rules which guarantee the resolution of the difference of opinion. Therefore, a reasonable argumentation is: “An effective means of resolving a difference of opinion in accordance to discussion rules acceptable to the parties involved.” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004).
- 20.
In a recent paper, López and Vicuña (2006) describe the origin of their interest in argumentation not only as a scientific object of study, but also as an instrument for “an education for democracy” in Chile, where the dictatorship by Augusto Pinochet had just ended. They observed that creating democratic institutions (free elections, etc.) was not enough, if they were not supported by the citizens’ argumentative participation.
- 21.
Here, it is worth mentioning the analysis of the Jewish argumentative tradition and of its pedagogical implications proposed by Zittoun (2007). The Indian logical and argumentative tradition is also often quoted for its similarities with the Western development of these disciplines (see Hamblin 1970: 177–189, and Sen 2005). Recently, an entire volume of the international journal Argumentation has been devoted to Buddhist argumentation (see in particular the introduction by Tillemans 2008).
- 22.
- 23.
The clarity of the model has made it a very popular tool, also in the domain of knowledge visualization and knowledge management; representations based on this model are used also in business contexts (Eppler and Burkhard 2007).
- 24.
Such an inventory relies on classical works, like the Topics by Aristotle.
- 25.
See also the distinction between the concepts of rational and reasonable presented in Perelman (1979, p. 119): “But a rule of action defined as reasonable or even as self-evident at one moment or in a given situation can seem arbitrary and even ridiculous at another moment and in a different situation.”
- 26.
Contributions bound to this approach can be found in the journal Informal Logic, founded in 1978, but also in Argumentation, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Argumentation and Advocacy and Teaching Philosophy. It is also worth mentioning the volume devoted to the topic Reasoning and Argumentation published by ProtoSociology in 1999. Leo Groarke (2007) has written a comprehensive review of studies in informal logic in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
- 27.
Concerning this aspect, it is interesting to quote a criticism on ‘traditional’ logic textbooks included the very well-known work on fallacies written by Hamblin, which can be considered a milestone in the study of manipulation (Hamblin 1970, p. 12): “This is the part of the book [namely, the one devoted to fallacies] in which a writer throws away logic and keeps his reader’s attention, if at all, only by retailing the traditional puns, anecdotes, and witless examples of his forbears.” Scholars of informal logic extend this criticism to all chapters of logic textbooks.
- 28.
29 The original educational goal of this discipline is reflected in a variety of textbooks on informal logic and critical thinking. Here, it is worth mentioning two very recent and comprehensive volumes: Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation, by Walton (2006a), and A practical Study of Argument by Trudy Govier (2006).
- 29.
The ground-breaking monograph Fallacies written by Charles Hamblin (1970) contributed considerably to the development of critical analysis and evaluation of argumentative practices. In relation to this topic, the numerous works by Douglas Walton on formal and informal fallacies also need to be mentioned.
- 30.
The Amsterdam school has equally become a reference point for the community of argumentation scholars, who are organised in the International Association of the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). Since 1986, the ISSA organizes an international conference on argumentation every 4 years in Amsterdam, which has become a core occasion for dialogue between different scholars. The international journal Argumentation is the most important journal for the publication of contributions to argumentation theory.
- 31.
The other three stages are certainly not irrelevant for argumentation, not only because they represent as many essential moments of a critical discussion, but also because they frequently require argumentative moves for the fulfilment of their own tasks.
- 32.
It is interesting to compare the formulation of the ten rules with the definition of “exploratory talk” fostered in the Thinking Together program, presented by Mercer in chapter “Developing Argumentation: Lessons Learned in the Primary School” of this volume. Exploratory talk can be said to express, in an explicit fashion, the normative ground rules of the argumentative attitude which is fostered by the program, implemented since the 1990s in UK. The aim of this program to foster primary school pupils’ argumentative abilities with the help of their teachers.
- 33.
This formulation of the ten rules of critical discussion is a more handy and explicit way of presenting the original 15 rules of critical discussion, which are formulated in terms of speech acts (see van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, pp. 123–157).
- 34.
Rules 3 and 4 concern the respect of relevance, respectively for the arguments used for attacking the counterparty&s standpoints and for the arguments used in support to one&s own standpoint.
- 35.
The starting point rule concerns the correct management of the parties' common ground. In argumentative practices, it is essential that the reasoning proceeds on the basis of shared premises which both parties agree upon.
- 36.
In the following paragraphs, we propose a model of topics which helps generating and evaluating possible loci (argumentation schemes) in support to one's standpoint.
- 37.
This rule can be interpreted as an explicit mention of the principle according to which the reasonable attitude requested by argumentation presupposes rationality
- 38.
Rule 10 directly recalls the maxim of clarity proposed by Grice (1975) as a general componentof the principle of cooperation in conversation.
- 39.
See the applications of strategic manoeuvring to the analysis of a Shell advertorial text (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002a) and to the interesting case of William the Silent’s Apologie, which can be considered a foundational text for the story of the Netherlands (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1998, 2003).
- 40.
In this volume, Schwarz notices, drawing on Stein and Miller (1993), that the presence of “a desire to achieve personally meaningful goals” significantly influences, at the level of the children’s cognitive acquisitions, their ability to learn argumentation skills.
- 41.
42 Among the contemporary studies in argumentation which tackle the topic of argument schemes (loci), see also Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958; Hastings 1963; Toulmin et al. 1984; Kienpointner 1992; Grennan 1997; Garssen 2001; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004; Katzav and Reed 2004; and Braet, 2005.
- 42.
This research on argument schemes has also been integrated on the account of artificial intelligence and by the application to the domain of reasoning in law (see Walton 2005). The identification of argument schemes is also supported by a software tool for analysing arguments, called Araucaria, developed by Chris Reed and Glenn Rowe at the School of Computing, University of Dundee (see http://www.araucaria.computing.dundee.ac.uk). See also Reed et al. (2007).
- 43.
In this relation, European educationalists are also disclosing the relevance of argumentation in substantial projects funded by the EU (LEAD, DUNES, ESCALATE, among others) and in studies such as Nonnon (1996) in France, and Erduran et al.(2004) in the United Kingdom. More recently, the introduction of computer-supported technology in classrooms has opened up important new areas of research concerning mediated collaborative work and learning, adding accounts of the role of technological mediations to the existing literature; the emphasis is usually on group production and learning, but recently specific attention has been paid specifically to argumentation (Andriessen et al. 2003). Another important stream of research in the field of research concerns exploratory talk and guided construction of knowledge as a basis for understanding argumentations (Mercer and Littleton 2007).
- 44.
Argumentum (www.argumentum.ch) is a project financed by the Swiss Virtual Campus to which the universities of Lugano, Neuchâtel and Geneva have been collaborating since September 2004. Greco Morasso (this volume) describes a didactical experience based on this project. See also Tardini (2007) for a description of its technological and pedagogical structure.
- 45.
Within the project Argumentum, this consideration has given rise to the structure of the modules produced by the universities of Neuchâtel and Geneva. Both modules are organized around the metaphor of the “argumentative town,” (Argupolis) where each building (school, university, tribunal, family home…) also physically represents a precise interaction field with its institutional constraints and opportunities. See also the website of the doctoral program Argupolis (www.argupolis.net).
- 46.
Agency theory, a key instrument in explaining many economic and social phenomena, was defined by Stephen Ross (1973) as follows: “We will say that an agency relationship has arisen between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated as the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems.” The principal delegates a task, which entails a decision making activity, to the agent, and the agent gets a compensation for it. In such kinds of relationship, a problem arises (the agency problem) because there is no alignment of goals between the two parties, and the agent tends to act, as much as possible, in her own interest. Examples of agency relationship can be found in many situations and in different contexts of interaction (see Eisenhardt 1989; Mann 1997).
- 47.
An introduction to logic tailored for students in argumentation theory, worked out by Marco Colombetti, is now being published within Argumentum.
- 48.
The role of emotions in the argumentative strategy has been analyzed in particular by Ch. Plantin. Plantin observes that: “exhibiting the emotional strategy of a discourse can always be suspected of unfair intentions. The antonomy rational/emotional is so deeply grounded that characterizing a discourse as “emotional” practically amounts to implying that it is not rational. Such an interpretation should be strongly rejected” (Plantin 2004, p. 274). In fact, if excluding emotions, argumentation risks becoming “alexithymic,” i.e. to become a language where no expression of emotions or sentiments is allowed (Plantin 1998, p. 9), and thus all kind of involvement is mortified. On the contrary, Plantin claims that there are some “reasons of emotions” that cannot be neglected when analyzing argumentative interventions: “On dit, à juste titre, que le discours argumentatif fonde un « devoir croire » (l’horizon s’éclaircit, il fera beau demain); un « devoir faire » (il fait beau, allons à la plage). Nous voudrions montrer qu’on peut de même « argumenter des émotions » (des sentiments, des éprouvés, des affects, des attitudes psychologiques), c’est-à-dire fonder, sinon en raison, du moins par des raisons un « devoir éprouver »” (Plantin 1998, p. 3).
- 49.
Here, such theoretical discussion is skipped in favor of an application of the AMT model that is expected to indirectly contribute to show its explicative force.
- 50.
The claim of generating all relevant arguments in relation to a certain standpoint might appear unreasonable. We are not pretending that our model of topics is able to actually produce all relevant arguments. As a matter of fact, no model of topics could ever be considered exhaustive in this sense, given that each fragment of reality shows endless aspects that bear endless relations with endless other fragments of reality… Nonetheless, the system of topics generates all relevant arguments as it is expected to assign to each possible argument a precise inferential structure that is related to the ontology of the standpoint.
- 51.
It is often the case that the term argument is used to indicate both an argument and a locus. Thus, instead of saying “argument belonging to the locus from authority,” one can speak of “argument from authority”.
- 52.
Let us consider an example that could help us recognize the relations between these last key notions of topics. If we consider the locus from the final cause, we observe that all the arguments it generates origin from a particular aspect of the standpoint: the final aim of the action referred to by the standpoint. But, depending on the presence or absence of a finality (motive), it is, first of all, possible to state whether the situation the standpoint refers to is an actual action or rather an event, e.g. an involuntary behaviour (“You’ve just stepped on my foot!”;–“I didn’t do it on purpose!”). However, the same locus can generate other kinds of arguments. Let us suppose that the nature of an action has already been defined and that the arguer’s aim is to determine whether this action can be described as a murder or as a case of self-defence. The argumentative process will develop in the following way: if it has been ascertained, from a number of circumstances, that the victim was evidently not capable of causing serious damages to anybody, then the locus from the final cause allows concluding that the hypothesis of murder is true. Both procedures, as different as they may be, are established in relation to the same ontological relation: the finality of the action. It is clear that within the same locus, i.e. by referring to the same moment of the semantic-pragmatic structure (ontology) of the standpoint, different kinds of arguments can be found. Their variety depends on two mutually connected factors: (1) the border which is posed in the standpoint between what is already ascertained and what is still disputed (in the first example, the status of action has not yet been ascertained and is thus being disputed, whereas in the second example it is taken for granted and what is disputed is the quality of the action); (2) the specific maxim. For example, within the locus of the final cause, referring to a different border between the ascertained and the disputed, we have found two different maxims: (1) If a behaviour does not have a final cause, it cannot be defined as an action in a strict sense; (2) If, for an action, the final cause that is pretended is evidently meaningless or incompatible with the actual circumstances, another final cause must be identified.
- 53.
The importance of semantic analysis as an essential tool for avoiding ambiguities and possible forms of manipulation has been, by the way, often presupposed in some studies on fallacies and argumentation. Some specific studies are devoted to particular forms of ambiguity, and to ways for dealing with them; in this relation, to quote a very significant example, the works by Agnes van Rees on the possible manipulative uses of dissociation (van Rees 2005) are bound to a specific problem related to the definition of the semantics of terms. The problem of definition is, in general, tackled in a more detailed fashion by Macagno and Walton (2008).
- 54.
A certain likeliness with the locus from definition is evident, but an essential difference should not be neglected: the locus from definition necessarily refers to constitutive traits of the concerned entity, while, very often, the locus from derivates refers to aspects of the concerned entity, whose relevance depends on the extent to which their scope covers the whole concerned entity. In our example, we notice that a professional status, like that of an entrepreneur, does not exhaust (is only a part of) the civil status (with related rights and duties) of a citizen. When resting on a proper locus from definition, the arguments of this locus acquire, indeed, a quite different inferential strength: As they are human beings, they are expected to behave humanly. Evidently, the specific force of this locus is bound to the wording (is a sort of poetic proof) and is therefore rhetorical in nature, while its inferential strength depends each time on the locus that is exploited.
- 55.
This chair was inaugurated in the nineteenth century by the very well-known Italian literate Francesco De Sanctis (from 1856 to 1860).
- 56.
The survey of the debate on a corpus of articles which appeared in Italian Swiss newspapers between December 31st, 2004 and February 5th, 2005 was conducted during an edition of the Master course in Media Management (Argomentazione nei media), held at the faculty of communication sciences, at the University of Lugano (see Rigotti et al. 2006a).
- 57.
Raffaello Ceschi “La cultura italiana al Poli.” The article appeared on a Swiss Italian daily newspaper, La regione Ticino, on January 31, 2005; p. 4.
- 58.
The intervention by Piero Martinoli, at that time Professor at the University of Neuchâtel, appeared on the first page of another Swiss Italian daily newspaper, the Giornale del Popolo, on January 20, 2005; it was entitled “In gioco la coesione confederale.”
- 59.
In the second book of his Physics, Aristotle introduces the concept of cause, conceived of as constitutive condition of a state of affairs. The final cause, in particular, is the goal an action aims at, and, thus, the reason for performing that action (see Rigotti and Greco 2006).
- 60.
The original text in Italian is: “…Lo stato federale si regge sul riconoscimento delle culture che lo compongono, e deve assicurare a esse pari dignità, nonostante le disparità numeriche: questa era stata la condizione che in sostanza aveva giustificato dalle origini giustifica tuttora il patto federativo stretto tra i cantoni.”
- 61.
For a more detailed analysis of this argument and the following one presented here as examples, and for their critical evaluation of their validity and persuasiveness in the context of the debate on the position of the Italian language in the Swiss multilingual context, we refer to Christopher Guerra (2008).
- 62.
In relation to the functioning of keywords in argumentative discourse, see Bigi (2007).
- 63.
The original text in Italian is: “…Esiste tuttavia un argomento essenziale che gioca a favore del mantenimento del detto istituto di italiano. Questo argomento risiede nella natura stessa del nostro Paese: l'esistenza della Svizzera poggia infatti soltanto sulla volontà politica di vivere insieme in una struttura multiculturale.”
- 64.
Very significantly, Martinoli makes a Swiss shared and almost unquestionable premise explicit. This provides a very solid foundation of his argument in the readers’ common ground.
- 65.
Aristotle observed: “Further, one should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a question, just as in the use of syllogisms, not that we may actually do both (for one should not persuade what is debased) but in order that it may not escape our notice what the real state of the case is and that we ourselves may be able to refute if another person uses speech unjustly” (see Ross 1959).
- 66.
See below for the analysis of these manipulative processes.
- 67.
The fundamental aspect that our definition fails to consider is precisely how manipulation can succeed in twisting the addressee’s world without being discovered. In fact, in order to succeed, a lie has to seem true, an insincere promise must seem authentic, a fallacy must look like a sound argument, a secondary aspect has to appear essential and a deviant or reductive reading of a key-word must look straightforward and appropriate. In short: what is negative has to be somehow disguised as something positive.
- 68.
Manipulation perpetrated by such individuals may be of a mixed type: partially unintentional – because they have been manipulated – and partially intentional (as they might think that a little bit of manipulation can help in pursuing the “Good Cause”). In principle, between these two extremes, various intermediate degrees of fausse conscience can be envisaged. Such a picture of the manipulator’s mind would also lead to hypothesize the possibility of auto-manipulation, where there is no manipulator whose goals are pursued.
- 69.
Here, one could not help also thinking of the attention devoted to the educational system (programs, textbooks…) as a system of propaganda and disinformation by totalitarian regimes. In every case, this manipulative form can succeed if legitimated by a wide consistency with the whole communicative behaviour of the manipulator: in his Institutionis oratoriae libri duodecim (1. IV, 2, 91–92), Quintilian (see Winterbottom 1970) mentions, in this connection, a subtle proverb: “Uerumque est illud quod uulgo dicitur, mendacem memorem esse oportere” (What the common people say is true: it is convenient, for the liar, to have a good memory).
- 70.
As the ancient sophists were believed to systematically apply manipulative distortions to inferential processes, the term sophism is used as a synonym of fallacy.
- 71.
The fallacy concerning accident refers to the incorrect inference “deducing” the identity of two terms that receive the same attribute: Socrates is an animal; the donkey is an animal, so Socrates is a donkey.The fallacy named secundum quid et simpliciter takes place when a property inhering to one part or aspect is generalised to the whole entity: John is good at swimming, so John is good.Ignoratio elenchi could be translated into “incorrect proof of contradiction”: You said that John was a bachelor and that John married, so you said that John was married and unmarried.The fallacy secundum consequens infers the premise from the consequent. If a man who has fever is hot, a man who is hot must have a fever; Since after the rain the ground is wet, in consequence, we suppose that if the ground is wet, it has been raining.The not-cause-as-cause fallacy (non causa ut causa) takes place when a false cause is indicated to explain an undesired consequence;Petitio principii (begging the question) intervenes when the consequent occurs covertly among the premises: The party we vote for defends our interests because it is the people’s party.Finally the fallacy named “many questions” refers to questions (see also below) where apparently the questioned statement is one, but other statements deserving to be questioned too are implicitly conveyed: Why did Ivan betray the party? – where the fact that Ivan betrayed the party is not already established and therefore cannot be taken for granted.
- 72.
Locke (1975) has distinguished four main arguments, three of which are misleading, while one is correct and relevant: ad verecundiam, ad hominem, ad ignorantiam, ad iudicium: the first dissuades from refusing an opinion not to be arrogant towards an authoritative source; the second opposes an argument by focusing not on the argumentative force of the discourse, but on the quality or the behaviour of the arguer; the third induces to adhere by simply showing that the other is not able to propose an acceptable opinion; finally, the fourth is based on the force of the argument itself. In the Western tradition before and after Locke, other fallacies were singled out. The following are, in our opinion, particularly noteworthy: ad consequentiam: “this is false, because if it was true, terrible consequences would follow”; ad populum: “This newspaper is read by 100,000 readers every day, therefore it’s a good newspaper”; ad baculum: “I am your main advertiser, but you keep your freedom of the press”; post hoc ergo propter hoc: “After the conversation with you he died. Therefore you caused his death.”
- 73.
For a more detailed account on the treatment of noun phrases in their manipulative exploitation, see Cigada (1999).
- 74.
A possible danger of manipulation related to the universalizing instinct, which consists in the manipulative exploitation of agenda setting power of the media, the control of which is an important component of political and economic power. Another particular instance of this “totality temptation” that it constitutes an enormous source of manipulative power could be termed “the cake temptation.” This is not, by the way, a sin of gluttony but the tendency to think that the resources we have in front of us make up the totality of possibly available resources.
- 75.
It has to be noticed, however, that the actual relevant paradigm with respect to which negation operates is pragmatically restricted by the actual contextual condition in which the speech act is performed and does not coincide with the virtual lexical paradigm that can be reconstructed from the organisation of long term memory. For example, when I say This animal cannot be a mink, my utterance can be understood as implying that the animal can be a ferret, or some other sort of small furry carnivore, but certainly not as implying that it can be an elephant, a whale or a seagull. Note also that the actual, pragmatically restricted paradigm of negation coincides with the rhematic paradigm made of the set of alternatives to the focus of the utterance. On the interaction between paradigm, focus and negation see Gatti (2004).
- 76.
Peter of Spain (see Bochensky 1947, pp. 53–54) speaks of contraria immediata and contraria mediata respectively.
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Rigotti, E., Greco Morasso, S. (2009). Argumentation as an Object of Interest and as a Social and Cultural Resource. In: Muller Mirza, N., Perret-Clermont, AN. (eds) Argumentation and Education. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-98125-3_2
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